Patriot is better than C-500. ” In Poland, questioned the effectiveness of the Russian air defense system
Polish online edition Defence24.plspecializing in defense issues, published a material under the heading “Russian“ truth ”about C-500. Is “Patriot” better than “Prometheus”? ”In it, the captain of the first rank, retired, and now the journalist Maximilian Dura, criticized the Russian air defense system:
According to the author, the bombardment of Syria indirectly struck in the Russians: after all, they placed their newest air defense systems there, which, as it turned out, did not ensure the safety of the attacked objects. And this is despite the fact that the Russians also transferred their newest C-400 Triumph system to the Middle East, which, according to them, should cover the entire territory of Syria and most of the Mediterranean Sea.
The publicist reveals the reasons why Russia did not use its air defense systems:
The failure of the Russians, according to Maximilian Dury, is also evidenced by the fact that they could, without risking anything, use the missile strikes of the US and allies to train their anti-aircraft complexes, but, nevertheless, they did not.
"Promotional" capabilities of the C-500 system
The expert describes the capabilities of the C-500 system, which are distributed by “Russian propaganda”:
According to Russian data, it is assumed that air defense missiles and anti-missile systems C-500 can hit aerial targets at a distance of 600 km and at an altitude of 40-50 km (in the case of aerodynamic targets) and 200 km (in the case of ballistic targets). Another parameter often cited in the Russian media is the ability to track one battery of ten objects at the same time and destroy ballistic targets flying at speeds up to 5 km / s (some sources even point to 7 km / s). While the whole battery command system has the ability to simultaneously guide up to five hundred routes.
As the author writes, Russians are imposing that their system is superior to the Western ones and “has no analogues in the whole world.” However, from his point of view, the fact that something has no analogues does not mean that it is the best.
Probable “impossibilities” of the C-500 system
The journalist believes that the biggest success of Russian propaganda is the suggestion to the Poles that the C-500 system located in the Kaliningrad region or in Belarus "can fully control the Polish sky". This false statement is in the hands of the Russians, but at the same time it contradicts the basic laws of physics concerning, first of all, the straight-line path of the propagation of radar waves and light waves:
According to the Polish expert, with a well-organized counterbattery system, this may make it possible to destroy the C-400 firing battery before the anti-aircraft missiles reach the target that is in the maximum coverage area, which is actually only theoretical:
At the same time, from the point of view of the author, the placement of the Prometheus C-500 system near Kaliningrad practically does not change anything in this regard. Of course, theoretically, new complexes will have a greater altitude (up to 200 km) and a range (up to 600 km) on which targets can be destroyed. However, the altitude in this case does not matter, because Poland does not use aircraft flying above 20 kilometers.
Thus, Maximilian Dura concludes, for the Russians, the C-400 system would be quite enough:
What is the range of the Prometheus system in reality?
As the publicist believes, for Russians, the only way to circumvent the limitations arising from the existence of a “radar horizon” would be to use for detecting targets of other radars than those that are integrally included in the C-500 battery. Theoretically, this would require placing radar stations closer to the attacked object, or it is necessary to place them higher, for example, on airplanes. The first solution is often impossible to implement (it is difficult to secretly push forward long-range air defense radars), while Russians do not yet have the means to implement the second. Their AWACS aircraft belong, to put it mildly, to a different, earlier era.
In addition, according to the author, difficulties may arise due to the fact that, in the C-500 complex, it is mainly planned to use missiles with a semi-active homing system (for example, 48Н6) - and, therefore, affecting only those targets that are distinguished by special fire control radar. Such radar stations (such as 76T6 / 77T6), from the point of view of the Russians, are an integral element of the C-500 battery, and, therefore, using another radar is actually impossible.
The Polish expert also spoke critically about the possibility of using missiles with an active homing system in the new Russian air defense system:
Which is better: "Patriot" or "Prometheus"?
From the point of view of Maximilian Dury, the great success of the Russians is the introduction into the public opinion of the opinion that the C-500 "will significantly outpace the current generation of Patriot missiles. In this case, the arguments that speak in favor of such an assessment are, first of all, the range and altitude of the action of the missiles used in Prometheus.
The journalist notes that even until recently, such a comparison was generally erroneous, because the systems of two completely different classes were evaluated - medium range (for Americans) and long range (for Russians).
But the situation radically changed after the start of work on the new air defense system in the USA and after the start of production of the Patriot battery for Poland:
The expert states that the development path to this “Polish” version of the system is a continuous process that has continued in the USA for many years, which consisted in the systematic replacement of individual battery cells in such a way that the final result will have little to do with what defined as the system "Patriot" (and in fact nothing - except the name).
The author informs about the changes that will occur in the "Polish" version:
The publicist also reports about the next revolutionary change among the Americans, which is an attempt to create the so-called integrated naval control and air defense system NIFC-CA (Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air). It is assumed that it will combine into a single whole different detection systems (sensors) and missiles (effectors), due to which, in particular, it will be possible to destroy air targets beyond the horizon (over-the-horizon air defense capability). Missiles can attack objects that are invisible to battery sensors, using data transmitted, for example, from another ship closer to the target, from Northrop Grumman E-2D Advanced Hawkeye early warning aircraft, or even F-35 multi-purpose aircraft.
Differences between the modernization of Russian air defense systems from the US
According to Maximilian Dury, only the introduction in Russia of an analogue of NIFC-CA will allow full use of the capabilities of the C-500 missiles and help ensure that it actually has a range of 600 kilometers. However, the Russian army does not yet have its own “NIFC-CA” and, most likely, does not even work on it. This “conceptual” delay is due, in particular, to the fact that the Russians never used in combat conditions: neither the C-300 system, nor the C-400 system, and even the C-500 system was tested. But all these systems are actually sequential versions of the complexes, the mass production of which was begun in the Soviet Union (in 1975).
The publicist states that the very concept of the Russian air defense system has not changed:
The author notes that the system was replaced by radar observation and illumination of targets, which was, at the moment, at least fifteen modifications. In this case, therefore, it is impossible to talk about unification, the confusion in the nomenclature is aggravated, and all this, of course, makes it difficult for the Russian logistics services. However, on the other hand, it makes it easier for Russians to carry out disinformation, which consists, for example, in the presentation on photos and videos of the latest versions of the C-300 system, like C-400, and vice versa. However, many experts still believe that C-400 is just a C-300 system in C-300PMU3 version.
The journalist draws attention to a wide variety of ammunition from Russian air defense systems:
The expert also concludes that the distinctive feature of the C-500 battery from C-400 and C-300 is the size of the ammunition. Long range (600 km) should affect the length of missiles, ammunition containers, as well as the size of vehicles - launchers. Such a vehicle will be difficult to disguise, especially when it is deployed. In the case of long-range missiles, for example, these are MZKT-792911 elongated chassis with the 12x12 wheel system of the Minsk Automobile Plant.
How to neutralize the system C-500 "Prometheus"?
From the point of view of Maximilian Dury, the C-500 system has the same weak points as C-400 and partly as C-300. It is primarily about the use of missiles with semi-active homing heads, which means the need to use special guidance radars (for example, such as 76Т6). By eliminating this radar, the entire battery is eliminated.
Meanwhile, according to the publicist, in the case of long-range systems, the construction of the target radar itself is a big problem, since detecting and tracking small air objects at a distance of 600 km requires the use of very high power transmitters, as well as complex antenna systems, which must also have an extremely efficient cooling system.
However, he notes:
The author adds that the lack of long-range radar is not only the size of the antenna itself, but also the high power of the generated signal. Since active devices radiate strongly, they are easy to track down, interfere with them, and also physically destroy (for example, by artillery fire). And it will be particularly sensitive in the case of ground-based radars that make up the C-500 system. The vulnerable point of "Prometheus" can also be a communication system with a rocket, to which data is transmitted, correcting its flight. Break the connection with such a rocket the easier it gets from the transmitter of the control system.
Expert conclusions
The expert summarizes that the Russians do not make fundamental changes in the mode of operation of their air defense systems:
As a result, Maximilian Doura concludes that the Prometheus C-500 system can really make a revolution in the Russian air defense systems, but this, he believes, is not confirmed by the information presented to them above. In general, from the point of view of a publicist, certain restrictions for the Russian air defense system are insurmountable, as exemplified by the range of anti-aircraft missiles and the actual range of operation of their systems.
It should be noted that the material of the publication Defense24.pl has a customized and manipulative nature. Regarding Russian air defense systems, the author dismisses all official data from Russian sources as “propaganda” and uses information taken, apparently, from Western publications, the reliability of which for some reason does not cause him to have any doubts.
The statement of the expert that the Russian air defense systems are “useless” against American low-flying maneuvering missiles due to the fact that Russia did not use its C-400 systems in striking Syria does not stand up to criticism at all. The other day, the Russian Ministry of Defense showed a photo with the wreckage of "smart" American missiles, shot down, which is remarkable, by Syrian air defense systems still Soviet-made. Naturally, if the C-400 complexes were used to repel a missile strike, the result would be much sadder for the United States and its allies.
At the same time, the reasons for which the author is struggling to prove the superiority of the Patriot system over the Russian Prometheus are understandable. Poland recently acquired these US complexes worth almost 5 billion dollars, and now the Polish media need to convince its reader that this money was not spent in vain.
Both about the C-400 system and about the C-500 system, we only know what the Russians want. It was possible to ascertain whether they provided reliable information in the Middle East when the Americans, the French and the British attacked Syrian bases protected by Russian C-400 systems. At the same time, the results of the analysis show that this Polish system “Patriot” can be in many ways better than the newest Russian C-500 system.
According to the author, the bombardment of Syria indirectly struck in the Russians: after all, they placed their newest air defense systems there, which, as it turned out, did not ensure the safety of the attacked objects. And this is despite the fact that the Russians also transferred their newest C-400 Triumph system to the Middle East, which, according to them, should cover the entire territory of Syria and most of the Mediterranean Sea.
The publicist reveals the reasons why Russia did not use its air defense systems:
Of course, the Russian military claim that they did not use weaponsbecause they didn’t want to use it, protecting only non-attacked objects at Khmeymim and Tartus. In fact, if the Russians could use the C-400 and C-300 systems, they would, of course, use them. However, with regard to low-flying maneuvering missiles - most of them made in the stealth technique - their equipment turned out to be practically useless.
The failure of the Russians, according to Maximilian Dury, is also evidenced by the fact that they could, without risking anything, use the missile strikes of the US and allies to train their anti-aircraft complexes, but, nevertheless, they did not.
"Promotional" capabilities of the C-500 system
The expert describes the capabilities of the C-500 system, which are distributed by “Russian propaganda”:
Most of the Polish and Western descriptions of Prometheus are exactly what the Russians would like them to be. And they created a legend about a system that, within a radius of 600 km from the launcher, can shoot down almost everything that is in the air: from ballistic and hypersonic missiles to aircraft, maneuvering missiles and small drones. Therefore, maps with a coverage area are often drawn, on which a circle with a center in the Kaliningrad region includes all of Poland and part of Germany.
According to Russian data, it is assumed that air defense missiles and anti-missile systems C-500 can hit aerial targets at a distance of 600 km and at an altitude of 40-50 km (in the case of aerodynamic targets) and 200 km (in the case of ballistic targets). Another parameter often cited in the Russian media is the ability to track one battery of ten objects at the same time and destroy ballistic targets flying at speeds up to 5 km / s (some sources even point to 7 km / s). While the whole battery command system has the ability to simultaneously guide up to five hundred routes.
As the author writes, Russians are imposing that their system is superior to the Western ones and “has no analogues in the whole world.” However, from his point of view, the fact that something has no analogues does not mean that it is the best.
Probable “impossibilities” of the C-500 system
The journalist believes that the biggest success of Russian propaganda is the suggestion to the Poles that the C-500 system located in the Kaliningrad region or in Belarus "can fully control the Polish sky". This false statement is in the hands of the Russians, but at the same time it contradicts the basic laws of physics concerning, first of all, the straight-line path of the propagation of radar waves and light waves:
The sphericity of the Earth leads to the fact that with the defeat of targets, it is necessary to take into account the so-called “radar horizon”. And that which is beyond this horizon is invisible, and therefore theoretically unattainable. In addition, in the case of the Kaliningrad region, the situation is quite favorable for Poland, because it is a flat and covered with trees area. This does not allow for the secretive installation of radar at high altitude, and in addition, it allows counter-battery strikes by artillery systems from Poland and Lithuania (the distance from north to south is about 100 km).
According to the Polish expert, with a well-organized counterbattery system, this may make it possible to destroy the C-400 firing battery before the anti-aircraft missiles reach the target that is in the maximum coverage area, which is actually only theoretical:
However, this coverage area in relation to the S-400 system is purely theoretical, which was proved by previous actions (or rather, their absence) in Syria. Even using their tallest masts 36 meters high, Russians can attack air targets from the Kaliningrad region over the airfield of the 31st tactical base aviation in Kzhesiny (and, therefore, at a distance of 400 km) only from an altitude of 8200 m. Everything below is “invisible” to Russian radars, which means that it is completely inaccessible.
At the same time, from the point of view of the author, the placement of the Prometheus C-500 system near Kaliningrad practically does not change anything in this regard. Of course, theoretically, new complexes will have a greater altitude (up to 200 km) and a range (up to 600 km) on which targets can be destroyed. However, the altitude in this case does not matter, because Poland does not use aircraft flying above 20 kilometers.
Thus, Maximilian Dura concludes, for the Russians, the C-400 system would be quite enough:
It also does not matter, a larger radius of action, because the Russians, even getting the opportunity to destroy air targets that are farther away, for example, over Krakow (on 600 km), could do this, but only from the height of 19300 meters. Consequently, at such a distance, the C-500 system with respect to aircraft is useless, because in the overwhelming majority they do not fly so high.
Of course, as you approach the Kaliningrad region, this target reach will decrease, for example, it will be 12000 m at 477 km from the launcher near Kaliningrad, 4000 m, for example, above Warsaw and 250 m above Malbork - but this is not means that Polish aviation will remain on the ground. It is enough just to fly accordingly.
Of course, as you approach the Kaliningrad region, this target reach will decrease, for example, it will be 12000 m at 477 km from the launcher near Kaliningrad, 4000 m, for example, above Warsaw and 250 m above Malbork - but this is not means that Polish aviation will remain on the ground. It is enough just to fly accordingly.
What is the range of the Prometheus system in reality?
As the publicist believes, for Russians, the only way to circumvent the limitations arising from the existence of a “radar horizon” would be to use for detecting targets of other radars than those that are integrally included in the C-500 battery. Theoretically, this would require placing radar stations closer to the attacked object, or it is necessary to place them higher, for example, on airplanes. The first solution is often impossible to implement (it is difficult to secretly push forward long-range air defense radars), while Russians do not yet have the means to implement the second. Their AWACS aircraft belong, to put it mildly, to a different, earlier era.
In addition, according to the author, difficulties may arise due to the fact that, in the C-500 complex, it is mainly planned to use missiles with a semi-active homing system (for example, 48Н6) - and, therefore, affecting only those targets that are distinguished by special fire control radar. Such radar stations (such as 76T6 / 77T6), from the point of view of the Russians, are an integral element of the C-500 battery, and, therefore, using another radar is actually impossible.
The Polish expert also spoke critically about the possibility of using missiles with an active homing system in the new Russian air defense system:
Of course, the information materials of the Kremlin and the Almaz-Antey concern also indicate the presence in the Prometheus system (and C-400) of missiles with an active homing system, and, therefore, acting on the principle of "shoot and forget." With a distance of 400-600 km, this, however, is only a theory, because it is impossible for the homing head to intercept the target at that distance immediately after the shot, and it can only do this in the last phase of the attack. Flight time to the maximum range, however, is quite long (a few minutes), so the anti-aircraft missile may not find the target in the area set before the shot, and therefore it must be corrected by radio along the way to the target. Such a correction requires knowledge of both the target and the position of the rocket itself. Consequently, in this case the “radar horizon” is an inevitable problem that needs to be taken into account.
Which is better: "Patriot" or "Prometheus"?
From the point of view of Maximilian Dury, the great success of the Russians is the introduction into the public opinion of the opinion that the C-500 "will significantly outpace the current generation of Patriot missiles. In this case, the arguments that speak in favor of such an assessment are, first of all, the range and altitude of the action of the missiles used in Prometheus.
The journalist notes that even until recently, such a comparison was generally erroneous, because the systems of two completely different classes were evaluated - medium range (for Americans) and long range (for Russians).
But the situation radically changed after the start of work on the new air defense system in the USA and after the start of production of the Patriot battery for Poland:
Because it turns out that this version of Polish air defense batteries received under the Vistula and Narev programs (with various kinds of omnidirectional radars and several types of missiles) can be better in terms of many combat capabilities than the C-500 system. And in the case of future American Patriot complexes, it will be so for sure.
The expert states that the development path to this “Polish” version of the system is a continuous process that has continued in the USA for many years, which consisted in the systematic replacement of individual battery cells in such a way that the final result will have little to do with what defined as the system "Patriot" (and in fact nothing - except the name).
The author informs about the changes that will occur in the "Polish" version:
Meanwhile, since the IBCS (Integrated Air Defense / Missile Defense Command System) integrated network air defense / missile defense system is used, the new PAC-3MSE (and, possibly, SkyCeptor), launched operating, as a rule, according to the “shot and forget” principle, it is also planned to replace the AN / MPQ-65 sector radars with new omnidirectional radars. The Americans used the experience of the Patriot’s combat use in numerous conflicts in the Middle East - including, above all, against such a complex goal as tactical ballistic missiles.
The publicist also reports about the next revolutionary change among the Americans, which is an attempt to create the so-called integrated naval control and air defense system NIFC-CA (Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air). It is assumed that it will combine into a single whole different detection systems (sensors) and missiles (effectors), due to which, in particular, it will be possible to destroy air targets beyond the horizon (over-the-horizon air defense capability). Missiles can attack objects that are invisible to battery sensors, using data transmitted, for example, from another ship closer to the target, from Northrop Grumman E-2D Advanced Hawkeye early warning aircraft, or even F-35 multi-purpose aircraft.
Differences between the modernization of Russian air defense systems from the US
According to Maximilian Dury, only the introduction in Russia of an analogue of NIFC-CA will allow full use of the capabilities of the C-500 missiles and help ensure that it actually has a range of 600 kilometers. However, the Russian army does not yet have its own “NIFC-CA” and, most likely, does not even work on it. This “conceptual” delay is due, in particular, to the fact that the Russians never used in combat conditions: neither the C-300 system, nor the C-400 system, and even the C-500 system was tested. But all these systems are actually sequential versions of the complexes, the mass production of which was begun in the Soviet Union (in 1975).
The publicist states that the very concept of the Russian air defense system has not changed:
At the same time, all components of the C-300 battery have been upgraded, or in most cases replaced with new ones, however, basically, on a one-to-one basis. The concept itself has remained almost the same. With these changes, there were sometimes completely different versions, such as C-300 and C-300P with completely different missiles and radars. Such upgrades carried out during the entire production time arose, however, more because of the need to replace technologically aging elements than because of the existence of some special rocket program.
The author notes that the system was replaced by radar observation and illumination of targets, which was, at the moment, at least fifteen modifications. In this case, therefore, it is impossible to talk about unification, the confusion in the nomenclature is aggravated, and all this, of course, makes it difficult for the Russian logistics services. However, on the other hand, it makes it easier for Russians to carry out disinformation, which consists, for example, in the presentation on photos and videos of the latest versions of the C-300 system, like C-400, and vice versa. However, many experts still believe that C-400 is just a C-300 system in C-300PMU3 version.
The journalist draws attention to a wide variety of ammunition from Russian air defense systems:
The Russians also have the ability to hide the contents of containers with ammunition. Thus, in reality, it is never known which missiles are used in this battery, and it remains only to believe the Russian in this question for a word. It is assumed that in the C-300 and C-400 systems currently used in Russia, there may be more than ten types of different missiles. It is not officially known, however, what the proposal of the Almaz-Antey concern is relevant in this area.
For example, the fact that the Russians boast of sending the latest 40H6 type missiles to Syria (with a range of more than 400 km) does not mean that these missiles were there, and even that they are already being used. This diversity is aggravated by the fact that Russian anti-aircraft missiles are developed by two different design bureaus: Torch and Novator.
For example, the fact that the Russians boast of sending the latest 40H6 type missiles to Syria (with a range of more than 400 km) does not mean that these missiles were there, and even that they are already being used. This diversity is aggravated by the fact that Russian anti-aircraft missiles are developed by two different design bureaus: Torch and Novator.
The expert also concludes that the distinctive feature of the C-500 battery from C-400 and C-300 is the size of the ammunition. Long range (600 km) should affect the length of missiles, ammunition containers, as well as the size of vehicles - launchers. Such a vehicle will be difficult to disguise, especially when it is deployed. In the case of long-range missiles, for example, these are MZKT-792911 elongated chassis with the 12x12 wheel system of the Minsk Automobile Plant.
How to neutralize the system C-500 "Prometheus"?
From the point of view of Maximilian Dury, the C-500 system has the same weak points as C-400 and partly as C-300. It is primarily about the use of missiles with semi-active homing heads, which means the need to use special guidance radars (for example, such as 76Т6). By eliminating this radar, the entire battery is eliminated.
Meanwhile, according to the publicist, in the case of long-range systems, the construction of the target radar itself is a big problem, since detecting and tracking small air objects at a distance of 600 km requires the use of very high power transmitters, as well as complex antenna systems, which must also have an extremely efficient cooling system.
However, he notes:
Russians praise, of course, the presence of active dipole antennas, but nothing indicates that they were created using gallium nitride technology. Therefore, they must be very large and heavy, and therefore heavy to move in the event of a threat of counter-battery fire. In addition, they cannot be lifted on mobile towers that Russians have (for example, the type 40В6MD height 36-39-m or 40В6М height 13-25 m). It is because of these technological limitations that the 9C32 guidance radar (from the C-300 system) can detect fighters only at a distance of about 140 km, and of the 30H6 type (for example, from the C-300PMU1 system) only at a distance of 300 kilometers.
The author adds that the lack of long-range radar is not only the size of the antenna itself, but also the high power of the generated signal. Since active devices radiate strongly, they are easy to track down, interfere with them, and also physically destroy (for example, by artillery fire). And it will be particularly sensitive in the case of ground-based radars that make up the C-500 system. The vulnerable point of "Prometheus" can also be a communication system with a rocket, to which data is transmitted, correcting its flight. Break the connection with such a rocket the easier it gets from the transmitter of the control system.
Expert conclusions
The expert summarizes that the Russians do not make fundamental changes in the mode of operation of their air defense systems:
The opposite is a relief for the fact that Russians from the seventies practically did not change the way the C-300 / 400 / 500 air defense systems operated. This is a big mistake, since countermeasures are developing very quickly, as evidenced, for example, by the way Americans conduct air operations in Vietnam. It shows there that, after the use of appropriate tactics of actions and weapon systems, the effectiveness of air defense systems can be minimized. The Israelis also proved this by conducting actions against the ex-Russian and ex-Soviet air defense systems in the Middle East.
As a result, Maximilian Doura concludes that the Prometheus C-500 system can really make a revolution in the Russian air defense systems, but this, he believes, is not confirmed by the information presented to them above. In general, from the point of view of a publicist, certain restrictions for the Russian air defense system are insurmountable, as exemplified by the range of anti-aircraft missiles and the actual range of operation of their systems.
It should be noted that the material of the publication Defense24.pl has a customized and manipulative nature. Regarding Russian air defense systems, the author dismisses all official data from Russian sources as “propaganda” and uses information taken, apparently, from Western publications, the reliability of which for some reason does not cause him to have any doubts.
The statement of the expert that the Russian air defense systems are “useless” against American low-flying maneuvering missiles due to the fact that Russia did not use its C-400 systems in striking Syria does not stand up to criticism at all. The other day, the Russian Ministry of Defense showed a photo with the wreckage of "smart" American missiles, shot down, which is remarkable, by Syrian air defense systems still Soviet-made. Naturally, if the C-400 complexes were used to repel a missile strike, the result would be much sadder for the United States and its allies.
At the same time, the reasons for which the author is struggling to prove the superiority of the Patriot system over the Russian Prometheus are understandable. Poland recently acquired these US complexes worth almost 5 billion dollars, and now the Polish media need to convince its reader that this money was not spent in vain.
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