The response of the fleet and the Russian Aerospace Forces forced the US to change the strike vector for Syria
No matter how many telephone conversations between Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov and Chairman of the Committee of the US Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford took place in the coming weeks, one thing remains unshakable: the headquarters of the US-led international coalition continues to quickly develop a large-scale military operation against Syrian government forces directed to the expulsion of the Syrian Arab army from the environs of the southern region of the de-escalation of Dar'a-Ess-Suweida-Es-Kuneitra, as well as from the communities th 420-kilometer section of four southern provinces (Es Suwayda Damascus, Homes and Deir Ezzor). Judging by the information on the accumulation of forces of the western coalition, the 55-kilometer “security zone” near At-Tanfa, the Husham’s pocket near Deir ez-Zor and various parts of the Mediterranean, as well as the Persian Gulf, come simultaneously from the area The conclusion is that this military action will take place in several stages.
First of all, it is the complete destruction of electronic intelligence equipment, early warning systems, air defense and electronic warfare of the Syrian army, which will make it defenseless against the actions of the assault and army aviationsupporting the offensive tank units and MTR from At-Tanf and Khusham. Secondly, this is striking command posts and relay nodes in order to deprive the SAA of the network-centric linkage, and hence the possibility of operational interaction when building defensive orders in the desert area of Homs and Deir ez-Zor. Thirdly, this is, of course, the ground phase of the operation, in which mechanized units of the US ILC, the British Army, as well as such specialized formations as the SAS and the "green berets" will be involved. The number of the assault group is planned to be provided at the expense of "cannon fodder" from the "moderate opposition", "al-Nusra", ISIS, as well as units of the "Syrian Democratic Forces", retrained for the requirements of the "New Syrian Army" in the camps of the province of Haseke. The technical potential of this group will undoubtedly be placed on the shoulders of American and British military personnel.
This time, when the Western coalition headquarters began to slowly anticipate the operational-strategic dividends from the upcoming military operation, Moscow presented a completely unexpected “surprise” that absolutely did not fit into the Napoleonic plans of Washington and London. Initially, it was a warning from General Valery Gerasimov about intercepting UGM / RGM-109E launched on the Syrian military and administrative targets of the TFR, as well as retaliating against destroyers and carriers of the US Navy’s air attack contingent (at the moment our contingent is present at numerous sites of strategic importance to the CAA). Even this was enough for such major military officials as the head of the US defense department, James Mattis, the chairman of the US Army Chief of Staff Joseph Dunford, and the head of the Central Command of the US Air Force, Lt. Gen. Jeffrey Harrigan, began scratching their heads in meditations on the tracks. out of this situation. The whole point was that the warning Gerasimov simple shaking of the air is not limited. Within a few days, information was received about the arrival in the Syrian Arab Republic of the additional divisions of the C-400 Triumph.
Parallel to this, the airspace of the radionavigation system GPS periodically disappeared in the airspace above the Eastern Mediterranean (above the eastern and northern parts of Cyprus), which is regularly reported by civilian side pilots, whose air corridors pass in 100 — 200 km off the Mediterranean coast of Syria. Obviously, ground-based electronic countermeasure complexes were included in the game, setting up radio-electronic interference in the L-band decimeter waves, which completely covers the frequency range of the GPS navigation system from 1,228 to 1,575 GHz. It is quite clear that the work of EW radiation was launched both to suppress the NAVSTAR modules that make up the Tomahawk strategic cruise missiles in the event of strikes against Syria, and to complicate the operation of airborne radar and radio intelligence equipment (from airplanes AWACS E-3C to strategic planes РТР / РЭР RC-135V / W).
The naval strike force of the Russian Navy in the Eastern Mediterranean was also expanded. On the day before Valery Gerasimov’s loud announcement, 13 March 2018, the Admiral Essen frigate, carrying the Kalibr-NK strategic cruise missiles, passed through the Bosporus towards the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea. Then, in the same direction, the more outdated SC of the 11356M “Pytlivy” avenue proceeded. Some of our pseudo-experts began to make fun of this decision, pointing to its alleged “insignificance” before the large-scale steps being taken by the command of the US Navy (moving a large number of destroyers and UROS cruisers armed with not only “Tomahawks” but also anti-ship missiles to the Mediterranean and Red Sea) Harpoon").
For example, the comments on the "military parity" slipped ridicule multipurpose shock complex frigate "Admiral Essen" which has only a single universal vertical launcher 3S90E.1 on 8 transport and launch container for strategic cruise missiles 3M14K intended for limited strikes on remote ground objects of the enemy, while Western naval units have in the arsenal of universal vertical launchers Mk 41 hundreds of strategic UGM / RGM-109E and dozens of anti-ship RGM-84 "Harpoon", located in the inclined PU Mk 141. In the same turn, these “experts” commentators did not even bother to recall that the Caliber family contains not only strategic cruise missiles, but also an anti-ship modification 3М54Е, the third combat stage of which is accelerated to speed in 3M and is capable of performing intensive anti-aircraft maneuvers on the trajectory.
Intercepting such a complex and highly mobile target with the use of anti-aircraft missiles RIM-162 ESSM "Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile" is possible, but rather problematic, exactly like even more "vertuki" 3М55 "Onyx". The only chance for the successful destruction of anti-ship versions of the “Calibrov” in the 3M54E and CRC 3M55 “Onyx” modification is only the use of Aegis-class destroyers of the “Arley Burk” class of SM-2 Block IVA anti-aircraft interceptor missile interceptors of the 4th-9A chtha-7A chronomer interceptors. -156 (RIM-6 ERAM) in the over-the-horizon mode. But here, the 174% of the Americans simply do not have guarantees for a successful reflection of the anti-ship strike, since the Onyxes have the ability to perform energetic anti-yen maneuvers on the cruise path of the trajectory, and the SM-100 - low-maneuverable missiles.
Moreover, when attempting to intercept “Onyxes” over the horizon, the operators of the Ajgis staff will have to rely solely on the noise immunity and stability of the “capture” of targets by means of the SM-6 active radar missile missile defense system, as well as on the accuracy of target designation from DRLO E-3C / E-2D directly aboard missiles on the radio "Link-16". In the conditions of directed, noise and barrage interference from our ship and airborne electronic warfare systems, operating independently ARGSN SM-6 can seriously make a mistake, and the possibility of issuing corrected target designation from AN / SPY-1D will not be, because the interception is beyond the horizon.
The conclusion is that even 8 Onyxes or anti-ship Caliber in supersonic performance can create a couple of American destroyers URO Arleigh Burke or cruisers URO Ticonderoga a whole cart of problems, and this without taking into account the unknown number of ultra-low noise hiding in the Mediterranean Sea 2nd-class diesel-electric submarines of project 636.3 Varshavyanka (as part of the Black Sea fleet 6 DEPL of this type). Each of them can carry either a standard ammunition of 4 strategic (3M14T) or anti-ship (3M54E) "Calibers", and an extended strike arsenal of 8 - 12 3M54E. For example, three submarines Novorossiysk, Kolpino and Rostov-on-Don, located in the Mediterranean Sea, together with Admiral Essen IC, are capable of delivering a salvo of 20 to 44 Calibers to the NATO airborne assault carrier groups. And there is also the Tu-22M3 with their X-38 anti-ship missiles, and the MiG-31BM with their "Daggers", and "Dryers" with the X-31AD. So I do not advise some of our observers to blow in the comments that “everything has disappeared” and try to undermine the authority of our naval and aerospace groups in the Syrian theater of war in every way.
Supersonic RCC X-31AD
It is the enhancement of the anti-missile component over Hmeimim and Tartus, the naval component of the Russian fleet east of Cyprus, as well as the activation of EW facilities throughout the Mediterranean air route made the command of the US Navy and the OVS international coalition completely rework the strategy of a massive missile attack on Syria, which as a result, it affected the delay of a large-scale military operation as a whole. Now it remains to find out the following: which “air loopholes” for a massive rocket attack on ATS are considered by strategists in the commands of the Navy and the US Air Force as the least risky (under the A2 / AD zone established over Eastern Mediterranean)? To answer this question, it is necessary to expand the horizons of our vision from a relatively small Syrian theater of operations to the expanses of the entire Central Asian region.
Those who are closely watching news blocks of domestic and foreign military-analytical resources, managed to pay attention not only to the suspension of the implementation of the force scenario in Syria by the coalition forces as a whole, but also to the complete reformatting of the first phase of this scenario - a tactical aerospace offensive operation. Formed in the airspace over the Eastern Mediterranean and the western provinces of Syria, the anti-aircraft access and restriction zone and A2 / AD maneuver, as well as similar anti-ship and anti-submarine “barriers” forced the US Navy's naval strike groups to begin deploying the non-eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea (as it was earlier), and closer to its central sections, as indicated by the lack of news about the location of American NK off the coast of Crete or Cyprus. The rest of the KUG chose the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf for deployment. This move is not only very thought out, but also practically win-win, as it allows American destroyers and Tomahawk carrier cruisers to maintain fire control over the entire territory of Syria, remaining outside the radius of the multipurpose missile system with the Dagger aeroballistic missile, in case of appearances in the Middle East sky.
For this, the main “shock asset” of the US Navy's 5 fleet, which is responsible for the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea, as well as the western Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, will only be located slightly north of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (approximately 2200 km from the Syrian territory) and launch a couple of hundreds of Tomahawk Block IV SKRMB with a range of 2400 km. What is the most unpleasant in this moment from a tactical point of view?
Most of the flight path of the RGM-109E will not take place in neutral airspace over the Mediterranean, but over the desert relief in the airspace of Saudi Arabia and Jordan. In this case, the Russian Aerospace Forces will be virtually deprived of the possibility of early interception of the Topors, because the relatively few tactical wing of the Russian Aermed Flight Forces in the SAR cannot operate freely in the airspace of the SA, whose air forces are the most powerful in the Front. Asia on a par with Hel Haavir. Nevertheless, there is still a narrow “window of opportunity” for reducing the impact from this direction. Airborne radar and A-50U airplanes on duty in airspace over the province of Damascus and Homs are able to detect the Tomahawks cloud approaching Syria at a distance of about 100 - 120 km (taking into account the use of EW aircraft on the trajectory of the RGM-109E approach). Using a simple calculation, we determine that in order to intercept strategic cruise missiles on the approach section of the trajectory (from the point of detection to the target areas in the provinces of Damascus, Homs and Hama), fighter aviation and ground-based air defense systems of the Russian Air Force will remain approximately 8 - 9 minutes.
The first echelon of the Tomahawk interception can be the long-range interceptors MiG-31BM, carrying on the suspension points of the long-range air-to-air missile Р-33С or Р-37 on the four ventral nodes and RVV-AE on the underwing nodes. A total of 3 units of these machines, when targeting from A-50U, are capable of destroying enemy cruise missiles from 48 to 96 in a few minutes (using terminals for tactical information exchange and target distribution). Even such a move would allow approximately by 30% to weaken the strike by “Tomahawks” from the side of the US navy’s naval forces deployed in the Red Sea. So, as early as the beginning of 2000, immediately after the United States Air Forces and the United Kingdom air forces conducted the Desert Fox air operation in December 1998, Russian experts concluded that if the Air Force of Iraq were armed with MiG interceptors -31B, the damage would have been inflicted to approximately 10% of the country's military and industrial facilities, including ZRK divisions, command posts, communications centers, air bases, and the infrastructure of the Republican Guard.
Naturally, such a conclusion can be considered as an exaggeration, because according to official data, American strategic aviation, as well as the US and British Navy launched at least 415 targets for strategic air-launched AGM-86С CALCM and sea-based RGM-109C / D Block III. Consequently, to intercept 90% of a given number of missiles in an MRAU (373 TFR), at least two fighter air regiments of the MiG-31B (more than 60 machines) are needed, taking into account the equipment of each 4 URVB P-33 and 2 URVB P-40T / P-60T / P-1T-P-1991T / P-2T-P-100T / P-33T-RNXXX / NNXX URVB P-31 and NNXX Fighter Aviation Regiment air regiments necessary for each 100 / R-XNUMX and XNUMX URBB P-XNUMXT / P-XNUMXT-P-XNUMXT / P-XNUMXT-P-XNUMXT / P-XNUMXT-P-XNUMXT / P-XNUMXT-XNUMXT-P-XNUMXT-8NNXX interceptor unit. . And this is not taking into account the then lack of armament of the Iraqi Air Force of modern airborne DRLO complexes (one DRLO “Adnan-XNUMX” aircraft was damaged on Avb Al-Taqaddum during the Western Coalition airstrike of the Western Coalition in late January XNUMX, another XNUMX flew into Iran) and the use of the enemy EW. Taking into account the latest tactical details, as well as the far from XNUMX% probability of defeating Tomahawks through P-XNUMX, the required number of MiG-XNUMXB to oppose the operation “Desert Fox” should have exceeded XNUMX units.
One of the two airplanes DRLOU "Adnan-1", distilled to Iran in 1991 year. Apparently, the machine adopted by the Iranian Air Force; the fate of the second car is unknown
In today's question, the reflection of the planned strike on the Syrian Arab Republic, deeply improved MiG-31BM, equipped 2 times with more distant onboard PPAR-radar Zaslon-AM, will be much more effective than the outdated MiG-31B. But these machines alone will be absolutely not enough. It is logical that to complete the picture you will need to use the multi-purpose interceptors Su-30CM and Su-35С deployed on Hmeimim, as well as the C-300B4 and C-400 "Triumf" anti-aircraft missile systems to bring the number of destroyed high-precision weapons weapons more than 50-60%. But it is precisely here that the most insidious moment of the rocket strike developed at the headquarters of the international coalition is hidden.
The launch of "Tomahawks" from the waters of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf does not at all indicate that their access to the combat fields in Syria (the final part of the trajectory) will be from the Iraqi air route (Abu Kemal or Ess Suvar). Given that the Americans are well aware of the capabilities of the C-300P / C-400 family of systems to detect low-altitude targets at a range of 35 - 38 km using low-altitude 76Н6 detectors and 40ВХNNUMXМД universal towers, it would be naive to think that they could be a type of NNXX and 6ВХNUMXМД universal towers. System "Toporov" flight task with a trajectory over the flat desert relief of the southern regions of Syria. Obviously, the entire emphasis will be placed on building “air corridors” passing from Saudi Arabia to Jordan and Israel, and only then (through the Golan Heights) into the mountain range of Anti-Lebanon, which for many years has been successfully used by pilots Hel Khaavir for covertly applying missile bombing attacks on the Syrian military infrastructure in the governorates of Damascus, Homs and Hama.
For the Buk-М2Е anti-aircraft missile battalions acquired by the Syrian army, as well as for our Triumph C-400, deployed to strategically important objects near the foot of Anti-Lebanon, the sudden appearance of "Tomahawks" directly from mountain ranges can become a critical moment, since All these air defense weapons simply do not have time to work out one, two or more hundreds of enemy missiles. The use of the C-300В4 anti-aircraft complex with the new 9X82MB missile defense system capable of over-the-horizon interception thanks to the active RGSN also does not guarantee the destruction of a part of the Tomahawks in the mountains, since target designation from A-50U must be. But after all, the A-109U A-50U aircraft on duty away from the flight sites of the RGM-XNUMXE cruise missiles may not find them behind the “screen” of mountain elevations. The fact that the massive US missile attack on the Syrian Arab Republic through the Antilivan mountain range will be carried out with full military support from the Israeli Air Force, which pursue its own interests, cannot be disregarded. This means that the tactical picture becomes even more unpredictable.
Information sources:
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/bgm109c_d/bgm109c_d.shtml
https://www.gazeta.ru/army/2018/03/17/11686855.shtml
https://dambiev.livejournal.com/1110461.html
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/3m54e1/3m54e1.shtml
https://evropakipr.com/novosti/nad-vostochnym-sredizemnomorem-periodicheski-propadaet-signal-gps-naskolko-eto-opasno
Information