A loud exclamation echoes through the cluttered yard of a house in the city of Tall Afar, which lies far to the north of Iraq. It's late September, but it's still hot outside. It seems that the heat flows from everywhere, even rises from the ground. The city itself is empty, except for feral stray dogs and young people with weapons in hand.
“Habibi!” Damien Spleeters shouts again. So he affectionately in Arabic calls his Iraqi translator and local colleague Haider al-Hakim.
Splitters is an on-site investigator for the EU-funded international organization Conflict Armament Research (CAR), which tracks illicit arms trafficking in war zones. He is 31 a year old, he has Freddie Mercury's mustache from 1980's, and his thin hands, which are quickly tanned under the southern sun, are covered with tattoos. In a different setting, he could have been mistaken for a hipster bartender, not an investigator who had been involved in the past three years in following the smuggling of grenade launchers in Syria, AK-47 type assault rifles in Mali, and hundreds in various ways they fall into military zones, sometimes in violation of existing international agreements. The work done by the Splitters is usually performed by secret government services, such as the Defense Materials Identity Division of the Defense Intelligence Agency, known as Chuckwagon. But if the word Chuckwagon in Google can be found with great difficulty, then Spliters' detailed reports for CAR are always available on the Internet in the public domain, and they can find much more useful information than all the intelligence I received, commanding in 2006 in the year Iraq, the unit for the disposal of unexploded ordnance.
In that war, militants undermined American soldiers on improvised explosive devices. Those devices that I met during my missions, the militants mostly buried in the ground or put into action, putting it in a car, which in this case turned into a large moving bomb. Such cars were undermined in the markets and at schools, and after the explosions, the gutters were filled with blood. But mostly it was roughly made primitive devices, the details of which were glued together with scotch tape and epoxy resin. Those few missiles and mines that hit the militants were old, of poor quality, they often did not have the right detonators, and they did not always explode.
Many of the leaders of ISIL were veterans of this insurgency, and starting a war against the Iraqi government in 2014, they understood very well that in order to capture territories and create their own independent Islamic state, they would only use improvised explosive devices and Kalashnikov assault rifles will not be enough for them. Serious war requires serious weapons such as mortars, rockets, grenades, but ISIS, being an outcast in the international arena, could not buy it in sufficient quantity. Something they took away from the Iraqi and Syrian government forces, but when they ran out of ammunition for these weapons, the Islamists acted like no other terrorist organization had before them: they began to design their own ammunition, and then began their mass production by applying fairly modern production technologies. Iraq’s oil fields became their production base, as there were tools and dies, high-quality cutting machines, injection molding machines — and also skilled workers who knew how to quickly machine complex parts to the specified dimensions. They received raw materials by dismantling pipelines and melting scrap metal. ISIS engineers stamped out new fuses, new missiles and launchers, as well as small bombs that the militants dropped from the drones. All this was done and collected in accordance with the plans and drawings that were made by responsible functionaries of ISIL.
Since the beginning of the conflict, CAR has conducted 83 inspection trips to Iraq, collecting information on weapons, and Spliter has participated in almost all investigations. As a result, a detailed and extensive database was created containing the 1 832 weapon units and the 40 984 ammunition found in Iraq and Syria. CAR calls this "the most comprehensive collection of weapons and ammunition seized from ISIS today."
So this fall Splitters found himself in a scruffy house in Tall Afar, where he sat above an 18-liter bucket of aluminum powder paste and waited for his assistant to appear. Al-Hakim is a bald, well-dressed man, somewhat reminiscent of a sophisticated urban snob, which sometimes makes him seem like a foreign body in an ISIS garish workshop. Men easily established contact and mutual understanding, but at the same time Al-Hakim acts as a host, and Spliters is always a respectful guest. Their task is to notice the little things. Where others see garbage, they find evidence that Splitters then photographs and investigates in search of unobtrusive factory numbers that can tell about the origin of the find.
For example, with regard to aluminum paste, the masters of ISIS mix it with ammonium nitrate and get a powerful explosive for mines and missile warheads. Spliters found the same buckets from the same manufacturers and sellers in Fallujah, Tikrit and Mosul. “I like it when I see the same material in different cities,” he tells me. The fact is that repeated finds allow him to identify and describe the various links in the chain of supply of ISIS. “This confirms my theory of the industrial revolution of terrorism,” Splitters says. “And also why they need raw materials on an industrial scale.”
Spliters is constantly looking for new types of weapons and ammunition in order to understand how the expertise and professionalism of ISIS engineers is developing. Arriving in Tall Afar, he clung to a new and promising trail: a series of modified rockets that appeared in ISIS propaganda videos that this organization shows on YouTube and other social networks.
Spliters suspected that the ISIS engineers made tubes for fuses, detonation mechanisms and plumage for new missiles, but he believed that the warheads came from somewhere else. Finding several types of similar ammunition over the past six months, he concluded that ISIS could have captured warheads from Syrian anti-government forces that secretly supplied weapons to Saudi Arabia and the United States of America.
But in order to prove this, he needed additional evidence and evidence. Spliters believes that if he manages to find more launchers and warheads, he will be able for the first time to get enough evidence that the Islamic State is using powerful ammunition from the United States in combat against the Iraqi army and its American partners from special forces. ISIS itself could hardly make such modern ammunition. This would mean that he had new and very serious opportunities and aspirations. These circumstances also give an alarming idea of the future nature of wars, when any group anywhere can start homegrown weapons production using materials from the Internet and 3D printing.
Almost all military ammunition, from rifle cartridges to aviation bombs, regardless of country of origin, are marked in a certain way. Conventional marking allows you to determine the date of manufacture, manufacturing plant, the type of explosive used as a filler, as well as the name of the weapon, which is called the nomenclature. For Spliters, this marking is a document that "cannot be faked." Stamped impressions on hardened steel are very difficult to remove or remake. “If it says that the ammunition from such and such a country is 99% true,” he says. - And if not, then you can still determine that this is a fake. And this is something completely different. Every detail matters. ”
Such designations are considered by manufacturers to be proprietary information, and therefore the decoding of marking is both a science and an art. This is a search for signs, and the collection of intelligence information, and the recognition of patterns. Specialists from Conflict Armament Research have been following the labeling since 2011. At that time, a group of weapons experts from the United Nations established this organization to assist in such work for states and non-governmental organizations from around the world. This is a small company with fewer 20 researchers. The position of Spliters is called the “head of regional operations”, but he does not have full-time employees. The work of CAR is mainly related to small arms. Mostly these are rifles and bullets. She published her first report on ISIS in 2014, when researchers at this company proved that the ammunition supplied to the Iraqi army by the United States ended up in the hands of the Islamic State. Unlike government departments that conduct secret investigations and do not publish their results, CAR collects information on the ground and publishes its databases and analytical reports that anyone can read. With each trip of inspectors, with each new photo or rocket, the CAR database becomes more and more authoritative. The retired American Army Col. Leo Bradley (Leo Bradley), who once led the actions to disarm and destroy improvised explosive devices in Afghanistan, told me that this organization had become an accidental but very useful tool for the American authorities to discuss topics in public. which at the state level are classified. “We can always refer to the reports of CAR, because they are all from public sources, and none of them discloses American sources and methods of collecting information,” says Bradley. In practice, this means that if the American authorities want to talk about the intentions of ISIS, but they only have secret information at their disposal, then in this case they can share very little with the public. But if such information is also contained in the CAR report, then these same authorities can often discuss it freely. Bradley says the work of CAR is impressive. However, he notes that the US government does not always know how to work with such an “unconventional source” as CAR.
On one occasion, Splitters, in the late afternoon at the Iraqi military base in Tall Afar, set up 7,62 mm caliber cartridges to photograph the markings on each sleeve. At that moment I told him that I had never met a man who loves ammunition so much. “I take it as a compliment,” he said with a smile.
This love began when Spliters was still a newfound reporter and worked in a newspaper in his native Belgium. “There was a war in Libya at that time,” he says of the 2011 civil war of the year. He really wanted to understand how the Belgian rifles came to the rebels, who fought against Gaddafi. He believed that if you reveal this connection, the Belgian public will be interested in this conflict, to which it has not shown any attention.
Spliters began to look at the Belgian diplomatic correspondence in search of more information about secret state deals, but this did little to him. He decided that the only way to understand the essence of what is happening is to go to Libya himself and personally follow the path of these rifles. He bought a plane ticket, using the money from the received grant, and set to work. “You know, it was a bit strange,” he says. “I took a vacation to go to Libya.”
Spliters found the rifles he was looking for. He also found that a search of this kind causes him much more satisfaction than reading materials about these weapons on the Internet. “You can write a lot about weapons,” he said. - Weapons unleash people languages. It can even make the dead speak. ” Splitters has returned to Belgium as a freelance journalist. He has written several articles on the arms trade for French-language newspapers, as well as a couple of reports for think tanks, such as the Geneva Small Arms Survey. However, the life of a freelancer was very unstable, and therefore Splitters put aside the journalistic pen and in 2014 came to work at Conflict Armament Research as a full-time investigator.
During one of his first missions to this organization in the Syrian city of Kobani, he worked among the dead ISIS fighters whose bodies were thrown right onto the battlefield, where they rotted and decomposed. Spliters found one AK-47 assault rifle with scraps of rotting meat stuck in the bends and indentations of the forend and wooden handle. There was a sweet smell of decay and decay everywhere. Among the corpses, he also found 7,62 mm rounds of ammunition, PKM machine guns and ammunition for the RPG-7 grenade launcher. Some of these weapons were stolen from the Iraqi army. These findings convinced him of the tremendous value of field work. He says that the information available to him cannot be obtained by monitoring the news and videos online. “In all of these social networks, when I see ammunition or small arms from afar, sometimes I get the impression of“ well, yes, this is M16. ”But if you look closely, it becomes clear that this is a Chinese rifle CQ-556, which is a copy of M16. But to understand this, you need to look closely, "he tells me, adding that the camera hides much more than it shows. And if you look at the weapon personally, it may turn out that it is from a different manufacturer, and thus has a different origin. this can hardly be guessed by looking at the grain True YouTube video.
The war between the ISIL formations and the government forces of Iraq is a series of intense hostilities that are conducted on the streets of cities from house to house. At the end of 2016, when government forces fought ISIS for the northern city of Mosul, Iraqis discovered that the Islamic State was producing large-caliber ammunition in clandestine enterprises located throughout the region. To study these munitions factories in Mosul, the Splitters traveled there even while fighting was going on there. Once, when Splitters was shooting weapons at the whistle of flying bullets, he saw how an Iraqi bodyguard who was supposed to guard him was trying to cut his head off with a knife using a butcher’s knife to a dead ISIL fighter. The blade of the knife was dull, and the soldier was upset. Finally, he walked away from the corpse.
From Mosul, the Splitters brought some important information. But because of the coalition airstrikes, a significant part of the city was destroyed, and by the time government forces announced their victory in July, much of the evidence had already been destroyed or lost. When ISIS began to lose its position in Iraq, Spliters became worried, believing that the group’s weapons production system could be destroyed even before he or someone else could document its full potential. He needed to get to these plants before they were destroyed. Only in this case could he describe their contents, understand their origin, and identify supply chains.
At the end of August, ISIS combat detachments were very quickly driven out of Tall Afar. Unlike other worn cities, there was relatively little destruction in Tall Afar. Only every fourth house was destroyed there. To find additional clues and information about the secret production and supply of weapons, Splitters needed to get to this city very quickly.
In mid-September, the Splitters flew to Baghdad, where he met with Al-Hakim. Then, guarded by an Iraqi military convoy of trucks with machine guns, he drove north for 9 hours on a highway that was only recently cleared of improvised explosive devices. The last stretch of road to Tall Afar was deserted, pitted with explosions. The burnt fields around the road were black.
The Iraqi army controls the southern districts of Tall Afar, and Iranian-backed militiamen (mostly Shiites) from the Hashd al-Shaabi organization (Popular Mobilization Force) keep the city north under their control. The relationship between them is very tense. My driver was a Kurd, and he spoke little English. As we approached the first roadblock, and this man saw the Hashd al-Shaabi militants' flag, he turned to me with dismay.
“I am not a Kurdish. You are not America, ”he said. At the checkpoint, we were silent, and we were missed.
We arrived in Tall Afar on a hot evening. We made the first stop in a fenced area where, according to Al-Hakim, a mosque could be located. There at the entrance lay several shells for the bombing installation. At first glance, they have a very simple structure, and they look like standard American and Soviet mines for mortars. But if mines have standard calibers (60 mm, 81 mm, 82 mm, 120 mm and so on), then these shells have an 119,5 mm caliber to match the inside diameter of steel pipes that ISIL uses as a launcher. Such a difference may seem a trifle, but the projectile must be very tightly placed in the launch tube, so that there would be enough pressure of powder gases for its release. ISIS has very strict tolerances and quality requirements, sometimes up to tenths of a millimeter.
Ammunition confiscated from ISIS fighters (prohibited in the Russian Federation) near Mosul
At the back of the building there were several tanks connected by a steel pipe, as well as large barrels of black liquid. Something dripped from one reservoir, and some disgusting growths formed on it. “Do you think this is rust?” Asks Spliters Al-Hakim. It is clear that the liquid is toxic. She looks like a vomit of a drunk who vomited right on the shirt. But the Splitters cannot take samples and make analyzes. He has neither laboratory instruments, nor a protective suit, nor a gas mask.
“My eyes are stinging,” says Al-Hakim. There is a pungent, irritating smell in the courtyard, as if there had just been spilled paint. Nearby are bags of caustic soda for disinfection.
“Yes, here everything is somehow suspicious,” agrees with Al-Hakim Spliters. Soon we leave. Black liquid can be an incendiary substance like napalm or some toxic industrial chemical, but Splitters cannot confidently say what is produced in these tanks. (Later he learns that he would be able to identify the production process if he took more high-quality photos of pressure gauges and their serial numbers. According to Spliters, whatever information he collected on the ground, he always has the feeling that he forgot something .)
After a short trip through quiet, pitted shells to the streets, we drive up to an unremarkable building that looks like all the other houses in the block. Stone wall, iron gates, private rooms around the patio, shady trees, giving a pleasant coolness. In the middle of abandoned shoes and bed linen are laying mortar barrels and artillery shells. Splitters expertly casually pushes them aside.
In the back of the courtyard, he notices something unusual. A neat hole was punched in the concrete wall - it is immediately obvious that it was made by hand, and not by a projectile. Behind the wall is a large open space where there are a lot of tools and half collected ammunition. It is covered with a tarpaulin to hide the contents from enemy UAVs. The smell of engine oil is in the air.
Spliters immediately understands what this place is. This is not a warehouse, which he saw and photographed in large quantities. This is a production workshop.
On the table, he notices the small bombs that ISIS does. Such a bomb has a plastic body made by injection molding, and a small tail unit to stabilize in the air. These bombs can be dropped from UAVs, as we often see on videos on the Internet. But they can also shoot from the grenade launchers of AK-47 type machines.
Near the site for the manufacture of fuses. On the floor near the lathe lie piles of shiny chips in the form of a spiral. Most often, ISIS fuses resemble a conical-shaped silver plug with a safety check, threaded through the case. The design of the fuse is distinguished by its elegant minimalism, although it is not nearly as simple as it seems. The originality of this device in its interchangeability. The standard ISIS fuse triggers all of its missiles, bombs and mines. Thus, the militants managed to solve a serious engineering problem. In the interest of safety and reliability, the United States and most other countries create separate fuses for each type of ammunition. But for ISIL, fuses are modular, safe, and according to some experts, they rarely misfire.
Splitters continues its work in the back of the yard-factory. And here he notices something special - those converted missiles, which he was looking for. They are at various stages of manufacturing and preparation, and assembly instructions are written on the walls with a felt-tip pen. Dozens of combat units dismantled ammunition waiting for their turn to rework. They lie in a dark extension on a long table next to calipers and small containers for improvised explosives. Each individual workplace is in itself a wealth of information that provides a visual representation of the ISIL’s weapons and ammunition program. But there are a lot of jobs, and therefore, from the abundance of evidence, something like sensory overload occurs. “My God, look at this. And look here. God, come over there. God, God, wow, ”mutters the astonished Splitters, moving from one job to another, He is like Charlie who has fallen into a chocolate factory.
However, the night falls on Tall Afar, and there is no electricity in the city. It means that the Splitters will not be able to study their treasures and photograph samples in natural light. Soon our convoy returns to the Iraqi military base, located near the destroyed city airport. It is a small outpost of repaired trailers, half of which are riddled with bullets. In the trailer next to us are sleeping two detained militants who are suspected of belonging to ISIS. This is a young man and an older man. They seem to be the only ones captured during the Battle of Tall Afar. Spliters spends the evening impatiently watching satellite TV. For all the time we spent together, he almost did nothing except work and food, and slept only a few hours.
It was dawn quite early, and when the soldiers woke up, Splitters returned, accompanied by the convoy, to the workshop. He pulls out 20 of yellow crime scene stickers — one for each table. Then he draws a diagram to restore the configuration of this room later. At one place in this scheme, it denotes welding electrodes, at the other a grinding machine. “No, this is not a flow process,” he muses aloud. “Most likely, these are different work areas for making different things.”
Then Spliters begins to photograph, but suddenly the Iraqi intelligence officers, who learned about this small factory, fill the room. They open all the boxes, take out every electrical board, kick chips and metal cuts, take papers, pull the handles. Unused ammunition is quite safe if you do not throw the fuse head down, however, the dismantled projectiles and mines are very unpredictable. In addition, inside the shop can be mine traps. But this is not what worries Spliters. He despairs for another.
“Habibi,” he declares, “it’s necessary that they don’t touch anything here and carry it away.” It is important that everything be together, because the whole point is to study it together. If they take something away, everything will be meaningless. Can you tell them that? ”
"I told them," says Al-Hakim.
“They can do what they want when I finish,” Splitters says wearily.
In a small room adjacent to the site for the manufacture of launch tubes, Splitters begins to study dozens of grenades of various models for grenade launchers. Some of them were made many years ago, and each has a certain identification mark. On grenades of the Bulgarian production in a double circle is the figure "10" or "11". The green paint used by China and Russia varies slightly in hues. “In Iraq, we are fighting with the whole world,” one soldier boasted to me two days earlier, referring to the numerous foreign militants recruited by ISIL. But exactly the same impression arises when you look at weapons from various countries, concentrated in one room.
Splitters carefully examines the launchers of the missiles, and finally finds what he needs. “Habibi, I found a PG-9 projectile,” he exclaims, looking towards Al-Hakim. This is a romanian missile with a batch number of 12-14-451. Spliters has been looking for this particular serial number all past year. In October, 2014, Romania, sold to the US military 9 252 PG-9 grenades with the batch number 12-14-451 for grenade launchers. By purchasing these munitions, the United States signed the end-user certificate. This is a document confirming that these munitions will be used only in the American army and will not be passed on to anyone. The Romanian government has confirmed the fact of sale, providing CAR end-user certificate and a document on the delivery of goods.
However, in 2016, the Splitters saw a video made by ISIS, which showed a box with PG-9 shells. It seemed to him that he noticed the batch number of 12-14-451. These munitions were captured from the Syrian militant group "Jaish Surya Al-Jadid". Somehow, PG-9 from this batch came to Iraq, where technicians from ISIS separated the stolen grenades from the starting powder charge, and then improved them, adapting them to the battle in urban conditions. Grenade rounds cannot be fired inside buildings because of a dangerous jet stream. But by attaching ballast to the grenade, the engineers created such an ammunition that can be used in combat operations inside buildings.
So how did American weapons end up in the hands of ISIS? Splitters can not yet say for sure. 19 July 2017, the Washington Post wrote that the US authorities secretly prepared and armed Syrian rebels, doing it from 2013 until the middle of 2017, when the Trump administration stopped the training program, partly fearing that American weapons might be in the wrong hands. The US government did not respond to numerous requests to comment on this situation and to tell how this weapon came from the Syrian rebels and at the LIH factory for the manufacture of ammunition. The government also declined to say whether or not the United States violated the terms of its end-user certificate and, accordingly, whether they were fulfilling the terms of the UN arms trade treaty, which they signed along with 130 in other countries.
It seems that other countries are also buying and reselling weapons. CAR traced how Saudi Arabia bought various types of weapons, which were then found in ISIL militant groups. In one of the cases, the Spliters checked the flight plan of a single aircraft, which was to deliver 12 tons of ammunition to Saudi Arabia. Documents show that this plane did not land in Saudi Arabia, but flew to Jordan. Having a common border with Syria, Jordan, as is well known, is the point of transfer of weapons to the rebels, leading the fight against the Assad regime. Although the Saudis could have claimed that these weapons were stolen or seized, they did not. The people responsible for the flight insist that the plane with the weapon made landing in Saudi Arabia, although the flight documents refute it. The Government of Saudi Arabia did not respond to a request for comment on how its weapons turned out to be in the hands of ISIS.
“This is war,” says the Splitters. - It's a damn mess. No one knows what is happening, and therefore conspiracy theories always arise. We live in the post-truth era, when the facts mean nothing. And while doing this work, I can sometimes grab onto irrefutable facts. ”
In Syria and Iraq, the ISIL militants went into retreat, losing their territories under the onslaught of government troops. They are increasingly losing the opportunity to conduct an offensive, and their ambitions are becoming less and less. However, their intellectual capital still poses a serious threat. This is evidenced by the weapons that its engineers design, the problems that they manage to solve during the design and production process, the streamlined process of making weapons and ammunition, as well as drawings and diagrams. “The most frightening thing is that the methods of work of ISIS are widely spread,” says Matt Schroeder, who works as a senior researcher at the Small Arms Survey in Geneva, for which Splitters used to prepare his materials. To a large extent, the international system that impedes the smuggling of weapons turned out to be useless, since ISIL can simply use the Internet and share design materials and production information with its branches in Africa and Europe, which have the money and the opportunity to purchase the appropriate equipment.
For the most part, the new generation of terrorism and scenarios of future wars involve the use of artificial intelligence, unmanned aerial vehicles and self-propelled vehicles with explosives. But this is only a part stories, reflecting the fears of American engineers in front of numerous opportunities to use new technologies. Another, much more dangerous part of this story relates to ISIS technical specialists. These people have already shown that they can manufacture weapons that are not inferior to what the military industry of states is doing. And over time, it will be even easier for them to adjust the production process, since 3D printing is widely used in the world. Joshua Pearce, a mechanical engineering professor at Michigan Technological University, is an expert in open source hardware, and he says that the production process of ISIL is characterized by “very insidious features”. In the future, schematic drawings of weapons can be downloaded from secret sites on the Internet, or received through popular social networks with coding, such as WhatsApp. These files can then be loaded into metal-working 3D printers, which have been widely used in recent years and cost no more than a million dollars, including debugging. Thus, the weapon can be done by simply pressing a button.
“Making weapons using layered printing technology is much easier than it seems,” says Art Of Future Word project director, August Cole, who works on the Atlantic Council. The spread of intellectual capital of ISIS depends on the number of young engineers joining the ranks of its branches. According to researchers at Oxford University, at least 48% of the recruits of jihadist groups from non-Western countries attended colleges, and almost half of them studied engineering. Of the 25 participants in the September 11 attacks, at least 13 people went to college, and eight were engineers. Among them are the two main organizers of the terrorist attacks, Mohammed Atta and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Mohammed holds a degree in mechanical engineering from the University of North Carolina. The Associated Press reported that, while in a US prison, he received permission to create a vacuum cleaner from scratch. What is this - a meaningless hobby, according to the CIA, or a distinctive feature of the inventor? Drawings vacuum cleaner Mohammed downloaded on the Internet.
Spliters had only two days to study the munitions factories in Tall Afar. On the last evening, he was in a great hurry, trying to do as much work as possible. ISIS uses distributed production methods. Each site specializes in a specific task, as in a car factory. And Spliters tried to describe and document all these sites and jobs. “We have only one hour left,” he said, looking at the sun, inexorably bending towards the horizon. At the first plant, the Splitters found a huge melting furnace, around which the raw materials lay, waiting for their turn to be melted down: engine assemblies, scrap metal, heaps of copper wire. In the same place there was a vice with molds for fuses, with plumage for mortar shells lying next to them. All this was waiting for its turn to build in the next shop. These works were carried out on the lower floor of a three-story building that was once a market. The stove was also installed on the lower level, because of the incredible heat coming from it. The whole city of Tall Afar was turned into a production base.
Splitters quickly ends the collection of evidence. “Is there anything else left?” He asks the major of the Iraqi army. “Yes, there is,” the major replies, approaching the next door. There is a large stove in the foyer, which ISIS militants covered with imprints of their hands, dipping them in paint. It was like a childhood picture of first-graders. In the corridors lay clay molds for mass production of 119,5 caliber mm shells. In the next courtyard is something like a research laboratory. Everywhere are ammunition, new and old, lighting projectiles, layouts in the section. Tables littered with exploded fuses and huge ammunition caliber 220 mm. This is the largest caliber created by ISIS engineers. In addition, there were large tubes used as launchers. They were about the size of a telephone pole.
The sun begins to set. Splitters asks again if there is anything else. The major again answers in the affirmative. In 24 hours we visited six enterprises, and I understand that no matter how much Splitters ask their question, the answer will always be the same. But the evening comes, and the time at Spliters ends. The remaining plants will remain unexplored, at least until the next time.