Secret hunters

15


The daily operational report of the High Command of the Wehrmacht in Berlin and Moscow was read almost simultaneously. This is just one example of the work of Soviet military intelligence officers.



After the revolution, the old army was reorganized. The situation in Soviet Russia and around it became aggravated - the Civil War flared up, the military intervention of a number of Entente countries and Japan began. The political leadership and military command required reliable intelligence. It was decided to concentrate all military intelligence under the jurisdiction of the Field Staff of the Revolutionary Military Council. In its structure of November 5 1918, the Registration Authority was formed.

Residents are not born

Under the leadership and control of Registerrupr, agent work was unfolded. Military intelligence officers operated in the frontal zone, in the rear of the enemy, as well as in the territory of neighboring countries. In the middle of 1919, the field headquarters were well aware of the situation in all directions, as reports and other Registrupr documents were regularly received there. His agents were in the headquarters of the white armies. For example, an operational officer Vera Berdnikova was introduced to Kolchak and extracted valuable information.

The daily operational report of the High Command of the Wehrmacht in Berlin and Moscow was read almost simultaneously. This is just one example of the work of Soviet military intelligence officers.

After the revolution, the old army was reorganized. The situation in Soviet Russia and around it became aggravated - the Civil War flared up, the military intervention of a number of Entente countries and Japan began. The political leadership and military command required reliable intelligence. It was decided to concentrate all military intelligence under the jurisdiction of the Field Staff of the Revolutionary Military Council. In its structure of November 5 1918, the Registration Authority was formed.

Residents are not born

Under the leadership and control of Registerrupr, agent work was unfolded. Military intelligence officers operated in the frontal zone, in the rear of the enemy, as well as in the territory of neighboring countries. In the middle of 1919, the field headquarters were well aware of the situation in all directions, as reports and other Registrupr documents were regularly received there. His agents were in the headquarters of the white armies. For example, an operational officer Vera Berdnikova was introduced to Kolchak and extracted valuable information.

Secret huntersWith the next reorganization in 1927, the Intelligence Agency was renamed the IV Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army Headquarters. The number of employees was increased, the range of tasks was expanded. Appeared centralized radio intelligence service and decryption.

In the early 30s, the situation in the world was significantly complicated. Hitler's rise to power in Germany meant the danger of war in Europe. In the Far East, Japan occupied Manchuria, thereby creating a bridgehead for the subsequent invasion of Soviet Primorye and Mongolia. This required the concentration of efforts of all military intelligence agencies on likely aggressor countries. Already in early 1934, documentary information began to arrive in Moscow that revealed the immediate political goals of the leadership of the Third Reich. Berlin intended to withdraw from the Treaty of Versailles and take a leading position in Europe. The country was rapidly recovering its military potential. In reports from Berlin, it was noted that Hitler personally deals with these issues and prepares the country for future aggressions. At his insistence, previous military plans were revised, which should become highly maneuverable due to massive use tanks and assault aviation.

Information was obtained by residency in Germany, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and other European countries. Rudolf Gernstadt worked extremely productively and attracted several valuable sources working in the structures of the German Foreign Ministry. One of them was in the pre-war period in the German embassy in Moscow as deputy head of the trade and political department. Important sources who extracted information on military matters were recruited by the illegal intelligence officer Oscar Stigga.

The Japanese leadership also inflamed tensions in the region. The imperial army was consolidated in China and organized numerous military provocations on the Soviet-Manchurian border. The Kwantung Army openly prepared for an attack on the USSR. The Anti-Comintern Pact, which had an anti-Soviet orientation, was signed between Japan and Germany.

Our military intelligence had a good undercover position in Japan. The illegal residency in Tokyo, led by Sorge, who had valuable sources of information close to the government circles, worked effectively. An illegal scout informed Moscow about the views of the country's top leadership on the possibility of war against the USSR, measures taken by the Japanese General Staff in Manchuria, additional troop movements to North China, warned about upcoming military provocations on the Soviet border.

The internal political struggle of 1937 – 1939 has caused significant damage to the Soviet military intelligence. Young officers selected by the troops and educational institutions of the Red Army came to the places of the repressed and tried to quickly acquire specific professional skills, but lacked the experience that their predecessors had. New cadres, despite the mistakes, managed to keep the foreign network of agents and activate its work, as required by the situation.

For example, in Belgium, illegal residences “Otto”, “Pascal” and “Kent” were deployed, in France - “Harry” and “Zola”, in Switzerland - “Dora”, in Italy - “Phoenix”, in Japan - “Ramzai” ". In Berlin, there was an agent group "Alta", which obtained a lot of valuable information. These residencies were headed by Soviet intelligence agents, illegals Konstantin Efremov, Aron Gurevich, Mikhail Makarov, Ursula Kuchinsky (https://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/36555), Richard Sorge, and also foreigners loyal to the USSR: Leopold Trepper, Shandor Rado , Arnold Schnee, Ilse Stebe and others.

Important information was sent to Moscow by Soviet military attaches Vasily Tupikov, Ivan Susloparov (https://www.vpk-news.ru/node/39410), Alexander Samokhin, Grigory Eremin, Nikolai Nikitushev, Nikolai Lyakhterov, Vasily Mazunov. Together with other intelligence agents, they did considerable work during the difficult prewar years, especially in areas where illegal structures could not operate for various reasons.

By June 1941, more than 900 people worked abroad for military intelligence. 600 of them were illegal and sources of information. In an extremely complex and controversial situation in Europe and large-scale disinformation measures by the Germans, the preparation of fascist Germany to attack the USSR, the Wehrmacht’s offensive groups, the directions of their first strikes and the likely timing of the unleashing of aggression were revealed quite fully and reliably.

At the same time, in the neighboring countries in the western direction, the intelligence departments of the border districts have deployed their own network of agents. It consisted of about a thousand people. In the last pre-war months, the PribOVO, ZOVOVO and KOVO intelligence agencies received massive reports from routeing agents and other foreign sources about the concentration of German troops in the border areas of Poland, East Prussia, Romania and Hungary.

The district radio intelligence units and the decryption units also received information indicating the deployment of a large number of divisional and army headquarters in the adjacent zone, and the content of intercepted negotiations and correspondence indicated that the German army was preparing to attack the USSR.

All intelligence information was analyzed, generalized reports were prepared at the Center to Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, the Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff. The district intelligence agencies informed about the situation at the border of their commanders and chiefs of staff. These data were taken into account by the political and military leadership of the country, who took steps to prepare for repelling aggression. Thus, since April 1941, the General Staff launched a covert partial mobilization of troops and the deployment of armies of the second strategic echelon to the operational areas in the territory of the Western and Kiev special military districts.

200 thousand Stirlitz

The unfavorable military-strategic situation after 22 Jun urgently demanded a quick restructuring of the entire military intelligence system. The main efforts of all its organs were aimed at obtaining information about the military potential of Germany, the opening of the operational-strategic plans of its command on the Soviet-German front, the economic possibilities of the Third Reich for a prolonged confrontation.

Despite the difficult conditions of intelligence, our illegal residency continued to operate in France, Belgium, the Netherlands and in other countries. Moscow received reliable data on the transfer of Wehrmacht troops from the west to the Eastern Front, and other important information. The illegal group of Yana Chernyak, who obtained information on the production of modern weapons, radar equipment and other military equipment in Germany, worked productively. Sorge sent information to Moscow that the Japanese government at a closed meeting decided not to start a war against the USSR in 1941 during the year, which made it possible to redeploy a number of connections from the Far Eastern direction under Moscow at the most difficult moment.

Legal residencies in Switzerland, Sweden, Bulgaria, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States also conducted active intelligence work against Germany. The Soviet resident Brion acted efficiently in London. Maurice in Washington created a residency, which by the number of extracted materials about the German army was recognized as one of the best. Great success was achieved in Sweden, where a resident of the Intelligence Agency personally attracted to cooperation a person who had access to the materials of Swedish codebreakers. That managed to decode the closed German correspondence. From the beginning of the Great Patriotic War and up to 1943, the Wehrmacht High Command daily operational report on the situation on the Eastern Front was read not only in the Swedish General Staff, but also in the Intelligence Agency in Moscow.

A significant amount of work to obtain information about the enemy in the areas of military operations was carried out by the intelligence departments of the front headquarters and their subordinate bodies. In this case, special attention was paid to the deployment of intelligence officers to the rear of the German troops. From 10 July to 1 August 1941, only intelligence from the Western Front was prepared and abandoned by German forces around 500 reconnaissance, 17 guerrilla and 29 reconnaissance and sabotage groups. By the end of 1941, there were already 220 reconnaissance groups in the enemy rear in this area. They attacked small garrisons and units of the German army, organized explosions of military echelons, destroyed bridges and other important objects. At the same time, observation was carried out, all the information obtained was immediately transferred to the intelligence department of the fronts. Troop intelligence also improved performance. Regimental and divisional reconnaissance groups seized languages, valuable documents, revealed the composition of the groups opposing the Soviet troops.

In the initial period of the war there was a lot of obscureness in the actions and plans of the Wehrmacht, now the reports of military intelligence began to be more detailed and specific. Information received from all the extractive agencies of the strategic, operational and tactical level, gradually turned into a factor on which the course and outcome of the military operations depended.

The main feature of the work of military intelligence was that it acted as a single coherent system. The most reliable and complete information about the enemy was determined subject to the operational coordination of the efforts of all its types, forces and means. This work was organized by the central military intelligence agencies.

In 1943, by decision of the politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), there were two of them. The Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff was responsible for ensuring the fighting on the fronts. The Central Intelligence Agency of the Red Army was in charge of work in the territory of foreign countries. Between them maintained close interaction.

RU GSH organized combat activities of front and troop reconnaissance, radio and aerial reconnaissance, receiving from them information about the location and condition of divisions, corps and armies of the Wehrmacht, preparing their operations on the Soviet-German front, transferring reserves in the front zone and in operational depth. From May 1943 to May 1945, 1236 intelligence and intelligence and sabotage groups of about 10 thousand people were sent to the German forces. They, pursued by gendarmerie and punitive, risking their lives, blocked all the main directions of movement of the enemy, revealed his regroupings and the location of the most important objects.

A significant amount of combat and reconnaissance tasks were solved by guerrilla units created according to military intelligence plans that controlled large areas in the German rear. They attacked the enemy garrisons, derailed trains with manpower and military equipment of the Nazis, interrupting at the necessary moments all the railway communication and the supply of the front edge of the Wehrmacht. The guerrillas actively conducted reconnaissance, having their sources at all important enemy targets.

In difficult conditions, the distant strategic intelligence agent of the GRU KA acted. The Gestapo and other German special services managed to reveal the work of our illegal structures in Germany and a number of occupied countries. Residencies were crushed, many of the captured scouts and their agents were executed. However, in Switzerland, a valuable illegal group, led by Sandor Rado, remained. It included about 80 people, including 55 sources, there were four undercover radio stations through which communication was maintained with the Center. Among the informers of the group were local military and civilian officials, foreign diplomats, as well as military in Germany, including those serving in the Wehrmacht High Command. This allowed Rado to send important military information to Moscow. Only in the first half of 1943, the Center received more than 700 reports from it, which contained information on the situation in certain sectors of the Soviet-German front, the number and combat composition of the Wehrmacht troops, and their rearrangements. Unfortunately, at the end of 1943, the activity of this residency was also terminated. Under pressure from Berlin, the Swiss counterintelligence arrested her radio operators and part of the intelligence sources. But the activities of the GRU CA in Western Europe continued. Germany still mined important military-technical information sources Chernyak. There were 14 illegal groups in other countries. Work was intensified on the territory of the allies and neutrals, and links were established with the resistance movement in the occupied European states. All this made it possible to extract valuable data about Germany, its military potential. On their basis, the country's leadership and the General Staff prepared reports in which information was disclosed about the groupings and the deployment of German troops in France, Belgium, Holland, Norway and the Third Reich, and redeployment to the Eastern Front. The GRU of the Spacecraft also received information about the development of new combat equipment in Germany, including jet fighters and the V-1 and V-2 missile systems.

The GRU KA informed the country's leadership about the activities of the Western allies. They, according to sources of strategic intelligence, often behaved insincerely, fearing the "Bolshevization" of Europe as a result of the successful offensive operations of the Red Army. Military intelligence officers learned that Great Britain and the United States were hiding information from the USSR on two important issues: the success of the English interpreters who discovered the Enigma secret and were able to read the closed German military correspondence, as well as on the work on nuclear weapons.

The residency of military intelligence in the UK, thanks to the source of Dolly, quickly enough received the opportunity to send German secret materials deciphered in London to the Center. Arthur Adams, Jan Chernyak, Georges Koval, Ursula Kuczinski and others obtained during the war about six thousand sheets of secret documents on the production technology of atomic weapons in the USA and 25 samples related to its manufacture (uranium, its compounds, heavy water, graphite, etc. .).

Strategic intelligence agents acted deep in the rear of the enemy. On the eve of the war, she correctly estimated the potential of the aggressor, warned about preparations for an attack on the USSR. In the future, the scouts reported on the transfer of troops to the Soviet-German front, the preparation of strategic operations, the desire of Berlin to change the course of the war through the creation and use of "secret weapons".

Front and troop intelligence agencies and associated partisans during the war years carried out about 400 thousands of operations. As a result, over 400 of thousands of soldiers and officers of the German army were captured, about 200 of thousands of secret documents, a large amount of weapons were obtained.

The Soviet military intelligence with its vigorous actions, successful operations, and the information it obtained contributed significantly to the victory over Nazi Germany. For the successful resolution of combat missions, the courage and bravery of more than 500 military intelligence representatives were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. Around 200, thousands of scouts received other awards for their exploits.

Gru responsibility

After the victory over fascist Germany in the summer of 1945, by the decision of the leadership of the country, the GRU and the GS GS were merged, on their basis a single Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces was created. This was due to the reduction of military intelligence tasks in peacetime.

However, our former allies - the United States and Great Britain soon began to pursue an anti-Soviet course; they called for the organization of a crusade against the USSR and the countries of people's democracy. New tasks have become a serious test for military intelligence, but successfully solved. Significant results were achieved by the employees of strategic intelligence agents operating in the USA, Great Britain and other leading NATO countries. Thanks to the efforts of Georgy Bolshakov (“Khrushchev's Messenger and Kennedy”), Mikhail Lyubimov, Maria Dobrova and many others, the country's leadership and the command of the Soviet army received documentary information on the plans of the North Atlantic alliance, including nuclear warfare against the USSR, with a list of targets to be destruction, the possible actions of the United States during the Caribbean crisis, on other important issues, which made it possible to take timely measures to contain a potential adversary.

During the Cold War, military intelligence officers Vitaly Nikolsky, Vasily Denisenko, Yevgeny Ivanov, Konstantin Sukhoruchkin and others distinguished themselves, having achieved high results in a very difficult operational situation while countering the enemy’s counterintelligence agencies.

Obtaining important information about the threats to the military security of the USSR was also engaged in radio and space intelligence. The activities of NATO military facilities were under constant control.

In recent years, threats to our country once again resound, the North Atlantic bloc is increasing its activity in the border areas, and the centers of conflicts that affect Russia's national interests remain. Already new generations of military intelligence officers ensure the safety of the Fatherland, using and multiplying the experience of their predecessors. And many receive the highest state awards for feats that are not yet time to talk.
15 comments
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  1. +6
    6 November 2017 06: 38
    And many receive the highest state awards for feats of which it is not yet time to talk about.


    Oh, how interesting ... what I would like to know more, but the CIA and MI-6 of the Anglo-Saxons are not asleep ... we won’t know more than what was supposed to be.


    Thanks to the author for an excursion into the past of our intelligence. hi
    1. +2
      6 November 2017 13: 05
      Quote: The same LYOKHA
      Thanks to the author for an excursion into the past of our intelligence.

      I join in the words of gratitude. good hi
    2. 0
      6 November 2017 13: 48
      Quote: The same LYOKHA
      Oh, how interesting ... I would like to know more, but the CIA and MI-6 of the Anglo-Saxons are not asleep ... we won’t know what was supposed to be more.

      because there’s not much they’ll say about them, and what the writers are supposed to do and will do, so don’t have to scold. And the same MI-6 and the CIA describe their victories in the subordinate media that you understand where the best minds work ....
  2. +3
    6 November 2017 08: 05
    Not a bad review, thanks to the author ...
  3. +16
    6 November 2017 08: 41
    Interesting stuff
  4. +1
    6 November 2017 11: 30
    If to summarize.
    The USSR was not a resident in the high command in Berlin.
    ("Shtirlitsa" was not.)
    In London, the affairs of the GRU were indeed more successful.
    1. +8
      6 November 2017 15: 55
      Well, firstly, no one knows whether the resident was or was not. I think after 75 years these papers will not be declassified. Secondly, in addition to military intelligence, the intelligence of the NKVD was also active. Also had its own agents, residents, etc. And for Leopold Trepper - after moving to Israel, he began to write books. And he wrote one-sidedly, exposed himself as a hero, smeared Gurevich’s outcast, although the arrested man incited Panvits, the leader of the team working against the Red Chapel, to collaborate.
      For those who are interested, I can advise the book Alta v Barbarossa, just for the intelligence network of military intelligence in the Third Reich.
  5. +2
    6 November 2017 12: 16
    "Invisible - see! Inaudible - hear!" (with)
    With the past!
  6. +2
    6 November 2017 15: 43
    It seems that Bormann himself is suspected of transmitting particularly important information, judging by the level of the informant. But they didn’t figure out exactly who it was ... He was silent himself in the last days of the Reich, and that’s all.
  7. +3
    6 November 2017 16: 02
    The theme is gorgeous. There are a great many examples of courage and cowardice and stupidity of leadership.
    An example of a “red chapel”: a “Corsican” walkie-talkie “died”, and the leadership requires information ... The Gestapo took direction, but someone could not stand the interrogation and the whole group fell asleep.
    The famous Kuzmin-Karavaev was given out by a former political instructor, she rescued him from a concentration camp, and he “thanked” her
    There is a lot of literature about this, but beat me with a shovel, if this literature tells everything.
    . Rather, after careful reading and comparison, there will be new questions and versions
  8. +3
    6 November 2017 16: 04
    Quote: voyaka uh
    If to summarize.
    The USSR was not a resident in the high command in Berlin.
    ("Shtirlitsa" was not.)
    In London, the affairs of the GRU were indeed more successful.

    But what about Willy Lehman "Breitnbach" (about him was on the site)?
    1. +2
      6 November 2017 17: 27
      Lehman acted in the 30s. Then the Gestapo split him.
      Some elements of truth were in "17 moments" (the film is good).
      According to not too reliable information:
      Muller split and forced Stirlitz to work for himself, but
      Stirlitz managed to inform the USSR about the failure. But soon Mueller about it
      guessed. But since Mueller wanted to escape to the USSR (!) (By making "plastic") in exchange for
      all lists of the Gestapo (Nazi criminals), then "Shtirlitsa" did not kill ...
      I read something like that ... But like Bormann, Keitel wanted a valuable “double agent” for himself.
      Which is described in the film.
      1. +1
        7 November 2017 06: 37
        What are the elements of truth in your opinion in the continuation of “17 instants ...”: “Ordered to survive”, “Expansion-1,2,3”?
        1. 0
          7 November 2017 15: 58
          I did not look (and did not read), unfortunately.
        2. +5
          11 November 2017 22: 08
          After there were Despair and Bomb for the Chair.