In anticipation of a massive rocket strike! Russian videoconferencing in Syria preparing for unpredictable outcome scenarios
As the combat stability of formations of the Islamist terrorist organization of the IG, most of its fortified areas in the Syrian theater of operations has been destroyed, is due to the high coherence and network-centric character of the actions of the Russian Aerospace Forces, the Syrian air force, the regular units of the Syrian army (CAA), Tiger Forces, of individual units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, in the comments to the new front-line reports from the ATS, there are more and more reservations regarding the “immediate outcome” of the multilateral Syrian confede ta. And these reservations cannot be interpreted under any sauce as the usual warlike fantasies of our readers, after all, not a two-three, but a number of factors point to the approaching day of a large-scale clash between the pro-government forces of Syria and SDF (SDS) units, including Kurdish troops self defense YPG / YPJ. All these formations, as well as ISIS (banned in the Russian Federation), receive tremendous logistical support from Washington and quite fruitfully interact with Islamists in matters of trade in oil and oil. weapons.
Even more interesting facts “surfaced” at the end of September 2017, when, through aerial photography carried out by Russian Aerospace Forces to obtain high-resolution images, the 100% interaction between the IG units stationed north of Deir-ez-Zora, as well as the United States and Sdf. Thus, by agreement with the US military, the Islamists organized the Green Corridor for the Kurds in order to transfer to the northeastern approaches to Deir ez-Zor the most combat-ready units that are very likely to be sectorally engaged in deterring and blocking the Syrian forces liberating rich oil fields located southeast and east of Deir ez-Zor. Similar “reconciliation” strongholds of the American army in the territories controlled by the IG were noticed at once near several localities, among which Abu-Hashab, El-Marazij, Mohamed El-Shag, etc. were noted.
This did not cause much surprise, because at the time of the forcing of the Euphrates by the CAA units, barrage of artillery fire was directed not so much from the eastern operational direction (IG position), but from the northern IT, assigned mainly to the Kurdish units of the Syrian Democratic Forces and the US military from the MTR. Moreover, directly during the forcing of the river, the flow velocity suddenly increased from 1 to 2 m / s, and the water level rose markedly, which indicated only one thing - preventing the transfer of the Syrian Arab army to the eastern bank of the Euphrates from the American-controlled Kurdish divisions which is a large number of dams located north of Deir ez-Zor. Recall that all this happened after the verbal assurances from the official representative of the Kurdish opposition "Syrian Democratic Forces" Talal Salu that the SDF did not intend to block the advance of the Syrian army in Deir ez-Zor and its surroundings. Once again, we saw that such assurances and promises are worthless, especially when their authors are pro-American pseudo-democratic groups that very quickly change the profile of work from fighting IG to a fight with the Syrian armed forces, the final goal of which is to maximally undermine the Bashar al-Assad regime and take control of the most oil-bearing regions of the republic. Consequently, an attempt to build with the Kurdish self-defense detachments of any military-political "intricacies" may still hurt the strategic interests of Moscow in the Syrian theater of operations, because the first will invariably remain the main trump card of Washington, as well as the IG.
It is quite predictable that after the suppression of large IK enclaves near Akerbat, Tafas, south of Deir-ez-Zor, as well as around Abu Hamam and Abu Kemal (southeast of the country), only CAA will remain the main players in the Syrian theater. with their supporting units, Hezbollah and the IRGC, on the one hand, and the SDF, on the other. The third “player” will be the pro-Turkish formations of the PAS (“Syrian Free Army”, FSA), operating mainly in the north and north-west of the country with direct Turkish support. Thus, units of the Turkish army moved to the province of Idlib in order to support the FSA in confronting the terrorist group Hayat Tahrir ash-Sham, supported by Saudi Arabia.
If the FSA, against the background of improved Russian-Turkish relations and the upcoming fulfillment of the C-400 air defense system, is unlikely to go into direct confrontation with the Syrian armed forces, and especially the Russian contingent in Hama and Latakia, the Kurds are quite ready for this, and the intentions were confirmed during a fire attack on the CAA, which forces the Euphrates in the previous month. And here the Americans will certainly support the SDF by all available means (from the transfer of precision weapons to massive strikes with BGM / UGM-109E “Tomahawk Block IV” cruise missiles at Syrian military sites). In parallel, high-precision HIMARS multiple-launch rocket systems and ATACMS operational tactical missile systems deployed in the fortified areas of the KMP and MTR US in the At-Tanfa region and in the northern part of Syria, which is controlled by the Kurdish self-defense detachments, can be involved. This collision can be decisive in the fate of Russia's continued presence in the Middle East, and everything will depend solely on the speed of taking countermeasures from both the Syrian armed forces and the Russian videoconferencing. Washington today is considering a number of acceptable “casus belli” that can generate another round of conflict in Syria: it can be both a provocative self-shelling of its own positions in the same At-Tanf using the Gradov’s opposition and the already predictable and habitual the prosecution of the Syrian army in the use of bombs and artillery shells with chemical "equipment". A similar accusation can be made by the SDF, which will be an excellent reason to start the decisive phase of the junction, which is so often mentioned in recent comments.
Loading the start-up truss with guides on the M142 "HIMARS" BM
However, there is plenty of time to prepare for a likely large-scale conflict in the Syrian theater of operations, both in the Russian videoconferencing and in the Syrian army. To suppress IS centers in the Deir-ez-Zor area, where the pseudochaliphate leaves no attempts to launch a counterattack, as well as in the vicinity of As-Sukhne (here the IG keeps under control a huge “tactical horn” with the possibility of fire impact on the Palmyra-Deir- Ez-Zor ”) will take at least 4 - 7 months, and only then it will be clearly visible in which direction to proceed. As it became known recently, the Aerospace Forces of Russia do not waste precious weeks, and, in parallel with the destruction of the last strongholds of terrorism, carry out large-scale operational and tactical measures to create the most powerful stories foreign antimissile zone of restriction and prohibition of access and maneuver "A2 / AD". Currently, aerospace A2 / AD frontiers are established over the western and central governorates of the Syrian Arab Republic (Lattakia, Tartus, Hama), where the main RTR, EW and air defense units of the Russian army are deployed. This region must be under unprecedented protection at the time of the escalation outbreak with the direct participation of the Navy and the US Air Force.
In view of this, all the mistakes made during the massive Tomahawks targeted missile strike on the Syrai Shairat airbase were taken into account. That night, 7 of April 2017 of the year, the operators of the AEgis BIUS for the destroyers of the DDG-71 USS "Ross" and the DDG-78 USS "Porter", based on the data of the DER of the aircrafts deployed on the F-22A fighter jets and on the RER RC-aircraft 135V / W, were able to correctly calculate the flight trajectory of the BGM-109E TFR, bypassing the Russian C-300B4 and C-400 Triumph zones, given the complex terrain of Syria in the area of the Jabel Ansariy mountain range located in 25 km from the Mediterranean; .
The warning about the upcoming strike by the US Navy to the closed radio channel of communication was received by the command of the Russian Aerospace Forces in the SAR only 2 hours before the Tomahawks approach, while neither the Su-35S multipurpose fighter jets nor the A-50U aircraft were ready for urgent take off on combat duty and intercept the TFR. As a result, part of the Toporov, in the following terrain mode, passed dangerous frontiers outside the low-altitude range of C-300В4 and С-400 (at a distance of more than 35 - 38 km) and yet reached Avb Shirarat in the number of 23 units. The loss of 1 / 3 missiles could be associated solely with selective destruction on the trajectory by means of the Pantsir-С1 SCRA, or by suppressing their on-board NAVSTAR modules using electronic warfare devices that happened to be near the flight trajectory of the cruise missiles. As a result, we observed an unpleasant picture, in which our best air defense systems of the last generation did not cope with the interception of enemy precision weapons. Then we could only hope that the operators “Anthea” and “Triumph” deliberately did not turn on the multifunction radar 9C32М and 92H6, so as not to give the radar modes to the operators of the American Rivet Joint.
Today, the command of the Russian Aerospace Forces is taking significant steps to increase the combat capabilities of the missile defense system over the SAR. In particular, this is achieved by separating the lines of interception of enemy air attack weapons, as well as by blocking the blind low-altitude sections of the airspace in the region of the above-mentioned Jebel Ansaria mountain range. Most importantly, the emphasis is on the Lebanese-Syrian section of the ridge, which is a favorite air destination for long-range raids by Israeli tactical fighters F-15I "Ra'am" and F-16I "Sufa". It was from this mountainous sector, the most difficult for the radar patrol, that the tactical aviation Hel Haavir at the time of the launch of a missile strike on a strategically important enterprise in the city of Masyaf (Hama province). What steps are we talking about?
9C15М / 2 "Review-3" radar detector, which is part of the Antey-300 and C-2500B300 C-4BM anti-aircraft missile systems
First of all, it is the deployment of an additional anti-aircraft missile batteries C-400 «Triumph» in 13 km north-west from the city of Masyaf as a part of all-altitude detector 96L6E, radar illumination and guidance 92N6E and 4-x launchers 5P85SM dowry Syrian SART P-14 "Lena". There is clearly traced an important detail. If the radar detection tools then battery radar of the new “Four-Hundreds” near Masjaf will cope with this task on “9 +”. Consequently, for covering the airspace above Avb Hmeimim and М PSTO Tartus "Anthea" and "Triumph", the sudden appearance of enemy cruise missiles from Ansarius will not turn into something out of the ordinary. Also, the 15L2E all-altitude radar will be able to notify the Russian VKS command in Syria about the approach of air attack from the eastern and southeast operational directions, where the US Air Force has transfer points such as El-Udeid Air Base (Qatar), Al-Dafra (United Arab Emirates) ) and Al-Jafar (Jordan). Finding the Triumph C-3 battery at a height of several hundred meters above sea level significantly increases the radio horizon to detect and intercept such ultra-low-level targets as the tactical AGM-96B JASSM-ER long-range cruise missiles. When reviewing the eastern air direction from the elevated positions of the new “Four-hundred” dislocation, the radio horizon can be from 6 to 9 km.
Satellite photos of the deployment site of the additional S-400 Triumph battery, provided by authors Sean O'Connor and Jeremy Binia in a publication for Jane's Defense Weekly magazine, is not the only positive news last days. An equally important summary can also be considered the confirmed fact of the interception of two 122-mm unguided missiles of the 9М22 / Y family (MLRS 9K51 “Grad”) with the help of the Pantsir-С1 self-propelled missile system in the province of Hama.
The destruction of the NURS Grada, launched from the standpoint of terrorists, finally confirmed the fact that the use of radio command guidance along with the app sock and centimeter 1PC2 / 1PC2 and 1E radar Slam and the optical-electronic sighting system 10ESXNHXXXXXUMUM 1Е 9XXXXXNXX331 XMNUMX 1 57 6 XMHRX Israeli Tamir missiles, which are part of the air defense system of the Iron Dome. After all, before this, the capabilities of anti-aircraft guided missiles with radio command guidance of the 9М22 "Tor-М0,05" and 2Е1900Е types were regularly questioned. Uncontrolled rocket projectile 2200М1У is an extremely difficult target with an EPR within XNUMX m XNUMX and average flight speed XNUMX - XNUMX km / h; consequently, “Pantsiri-СXNUMX” in combat conditions confirmed the readiness to meet with the more dangerous “goodies” of western production. Naturally, many shortcomings remain in the equally important air component of the air defense of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Syria, but we will tell about this in our next works as we approach this interchange.
Information sources:
https://rg.ru/2017/10/01/v-sirii-razmeshchen-vtoroj-divizion-s-400.html
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/c300v/c300v.shtml
http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-593.html
http://www.pravda-tv.ru/2017/09/30/322197/novosti-sirii-segodnya-30-sentyabrya-2017-update
Information