They betrayed Russia, betrayed themselves ...
for they shall be filled (From the Sermon on the Mount of Christ)
The events of the first war in Chechnya today are diligently trying to consign to oblivion, to hide all the responsibility that should have been placed on the shoulders of politicians who have committed these bloody events. There are very few materials regarding the development of the “Chechen conflict”, as it has been mistakenly called so far, and almost all of them offer us only the official or “convenient” interpretation of what happened. In essence, the Chechen campaign was a war.
From an interview with the former Russian Defense Minister Grachev, it follows that the blame for the blood of innocent soldiers in Grozny, for weapons at the disposal of the Dudayevites, for the humiliation and suffering of the peaceful inhabitants of the plains of Chechnya, lies with the whole environment of Yeltsin. Mr. Grachev is positioning himself as an executive official who has called on the plans of treacherous civilian ministers. Let's say right away, such words sound unconvincing, although there is some truth in them.
Back in early June, 1991 in Chechnya, a revolution occurred, as a result of which Dzhokhar Dudayev received tremendous power, his goals became apparent immediately and consisted in separating the republic into an independent state. However, along with the struggle for independence, murders and terror began in the cities, and the aggressive control of the Dudayevites was controlled. Their methods initially could not be called legal, civilians suffered from robbery and violence.
At the moment of intensification of the separatist movements, Yeltsin and his entourage behaved, to put it mildly, passively. At first, Dudayev’s personality was not given an objective assessment, and then indecision regarding his activities and the desire to resolve the conflict by “political means” provided the experienced and cunning leader with valuable time to thoroughly train the insurgents and equip them.
It should be noted, and the factor promoting the figure of Dudayev to the post of head of Chechnya. Communist military officer, a member of the Afghan war - this man had a positive response. According to colleagues on the 13-th Guards Heavy Bomber Aviation Division, Dudayev was a hot-tempered, emotional man, but “extremely honest and decent.” During the period of the collapse of the Soviet Union, various radical nationalist movements, including the Chechen ones, became more active; they needed a leader. Yes, and Dudayev himself at that time survived the breaking of character, the old communist ideals collapsed, nationalism took their place. Apparently, someone helped him in this process. It is clear that if it were not for the collapse of the USSR and Yeltsin’s stuffing in the summer of 1990, the most powerful destructive virus - the slogan “take as much sovereignty as you can swallow”, Dudayev would truly serve the country and beyond.
23 – 25 in November 1990, the Chechen National Congress (it was held in Grozny) elected an Executive Committee headed by Chairman Dzhokhar Dudayev. After that, Dudayev took the path of radical nationalism and "independence." Initially, the situation suited Yeltsin and his entourage — they broke the Soviet Union and the Chechen “national democrats” were their allies in this process. A major role in the negotiation process between Moscow and Grozny was played by the closest ally of Boris Yeltsin in the 1990-1992 years - Gennady Burbulis. The Yeltsin clan actually “made” Dudayev the leader of Chechnya. That is why it looks very dark story death of Dudayev. Apparently, some forces simply hid the ends in the water.
In November, Yeltsin was forced to take a decision on the imposition of a state of emergency throughout Chechnya and partly of Ingushetia. However, the real start of the war was the decision to export arms and military equipment, the execution of which was entrusted to the Minister of Defense Grachev. According to him, it was not possible for the Russian authorities to take out all the military equipment, since at that moment Dudayev had announced the requirement to transfer to him all the equipment, weapons and documents available in the new territory of the republic. Began serious negotiations, act in that neither the President nor any other, is not intended. The long skirmish in the higher echelons of power has become another proof of Ministers inability to control the situation. As a result, Grachev, appointed for this mission, agreed to export only 50 percent of the entire volume of weapons, which caused a strong protest in the press. Simultaneously with the operation for the withdrawal of weapons from the country were evacuated by soldiers and their families. Remain in the territory of Ichkeria, it was extremely dangerous, as the majority of the population was aggressive. The hostility spread by Dudaev’s information about the colonial intentions of Russia was heated, as a result of which the killings of Russian residents became more frequent.
Thus, already at the beginning stage of a company, one can speak, if not of treason, then of a serious miscalculation on the part of the country's top leadership with regard to policy in the Caucasus. 12 March 92 –th year an independent state called the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria appeared, which the Russian leadership refused to recognize. However, Dudayev was unable to implement the program of the adopted constitution, and the criminal situation in the republic sharply worsened. Residents fled from their places of residence in an endless stream, fleeing from rapists and murderers, walking freely through the streets of the capital. In the province to talk about the law was not necessary at all, because the only judge and ruler became weapons and force.
Violent opponents of the entry of Russian troops on the territory of Ichkeria should be remembered that in just a year the existence of an “independent state” the territory has become a center of terrorism, counterfeiting, slave trade. Through the territory of Chechnya, the import of narcotic drugs into Russia was carried out in enormous quantities, which could not go unnoticed. The military campaign was necessary, but the army did not have a competent leader. Neither Yeltsin nor his ministers could develop an effective plan of action, and all their attempts to stabilize the situation in the Caucasus led to disastrous consequences. The offensive program was developed in a hurry and, as a result, was imperfect. Most of the ministers, including Rybkin and Chernomyrdin, spoke in favor of a hasty introduction of troops, the rest remained silent, fearing to be accused of cowardice. Grachev offered to delay the introduction of troops until the spring, but Yeltsin remained adamant. Russian soldiers were to enter the territory of the so-called Ichkeria in December 94 year.
According to the Minister of Defense's plan, the Russian forces moved in three directions: Mozdok, Vladikavkaz and Kizlyarsky. According to officials, the entry into Chechnya was calm, but in the very first days there were wounded and killed. The population took to the streets in arms and fired at the columns, the women lay down on the road, the children threw grenades. Active propaganda of anti-Russian sentiments has done its job, and the locals were ready to die, considering Russian soldiers as invaders.
Nevertheless, Russian troops occupied the northern regions of Ichkeria quickly enough. Actively participated in the promotion of the military contingent. aviationthat bombed Khinkala and Kalinovsky airfield. The next flagrant fact of the mediocre military leadership was the assault on Grozny. According to Chief of Staff Potapov, the assault plan was worked out the day before and included the following actions:
• troops were to enter the city from three directions;
• each assault detachment was reinforced by a shock group in case of resistance;
• Soldiers were allowed to take only the buildings of the administrative complex.
Resent the fact that the question of resistance on the part of Dudayev, the generals did not elaborated upon. The misconception about this was too “expensive” for the Russian army. The detachments were torn apart by the Chechens, since they did not have enough weapons to withstand, they did not have a clear scheme of actions at their disposal. They did not even give commanders exact maps. Mocking words of Khmelevskiy a question of one of the commanders on the location of the station; “Look at the signs!” By that time, most of the squares, streets and neighborhoods in the city were renamed, and some of the signs were missing, so the search for the intended targets was completely assigned to the assault troops. As a result, the soldiers simply got lost in an unfamiliar city and lost many soldiers in the throwing through the streets of the city. Only the courage and talented command of the officers, and the bravery of the rank and file allowed for a long time to fight on the streets of Grozny.
Before the assault, the 131 Squad of motorized riflemen repeatedly stated that they were in a disastrous situation and were unable to fully fight for the city, but such statements were viewed by the leadership as cowardice and were not taken into account. Meanwhile, the statements were objective in nature, the attack aircraft were young and inexperienced boys who had little control with machine guns and had no real battles before Chechnya. The attackers did not have warm clothes and cruelly froze, and the antediluvian radio communication was easily intercepted by the militants. The equipment of the federal troops was significantly inferior to the Chechen one. However, it was these guys who had to take the capital of Ichkeria. A thoughtless utterance of Grachev about the possibility of occupying Grozny in two hours with small forces played a fatal joke with the command of the armies. Yeltsin and his entourage expected lightning-fast capture, but did not prepare for real resistance.
The assault took place on New Year's Eve, when Moscow generals celebrated and, for the most part, were drunk! Huge loss of Mr. Grachev said the words that the soldiers died with a smile. The source of such information from the puppet minister is unknown. His words against the background of the brutally killed young boys, who had been thoughtlessly thrown into battle with experienced and well-armed militants, looked blasphemous.
Thus, the second betrayal of the center in relation to the Russian soldiers had again committed generals together.
After the terrible, chilling events and numerous victims, Yeltsin and his entourage were already aware of their mistake regarding the possibility of conducting a lightning military campaign in Chechnya. The ruling elite has lost the confidence of the people and wanted to return it in any way. The fear of losing power caused the third betrayal.
The Khasavyurt armistice agreements were aimed at the immediate withdrawal of troops and the cessation of further clashes and casualties. The agreement was signed by the respected in Russia, General Lebed, who crossed out all his merits to the fatherland with this ill-fated signature. What was this truce, which still provokes indignation in the hearts of the military and their families?
Lebed signed an agreement that:
• all troops will be withdrawn from the republic;
• Chechen prisoners of war will be released;
• fighting on the territory of the republic will stop.
The text of the treaty did not specify the conditions for the return to the homeland of Russian prisoners who were in the slavery of militants. Many soldiers and officers remained in the Chechen hell only because the government had to urgently withdraw its troops. Yeltsin's position was shaky, needed someone who enjoyed the people's confidence. Such a general was Alexander Lebed. His military and political achievements were greatly exaggerated in the press, moreover, this man had the imposing appearance of a typical military man that they loved so much in Russia. Lebed was in order to sign an agreement and deep background. A dangerous people's favorite could claim power in the upcoming presidential elections, and the signing of such a unilateral treaty should greatly discredit the general. Is Swan understand the full responsibility assumed by the decision is unknown. Later he claimed that faithfully served the fatherland and following orders. Is it possible to justify the betrayal of thousands of Russian citizens by a command order?
More likely no than yes. Betrayal is not justified either by the fear of losing office, or by the threat of any responsibility, or by internal convictions.
As a result of the Khasavyurt truce, Russian soldiers and officers remained in captivity, whose mothers went looking for and rescuing them. The Russian government not only does not provide any assistance in this event, it has tried not to publicize such a move. Talk about how many women have experienced an accident in the territory of the Chechen Republic for hours. In the context of this publication, we only say that the humiliation was terrible. Mothers killed by grief were killed at best. Among the few “noble” militants who treat mothers with respect, there were also moral monsters who came up with such tortures that a mentally healthy person could not even think of. Defenseless women were taught to mock juvenile Chechens, they were used as labor, and so on. How many Russian mothers died on the territory of Chechnya is still unknown for sure, since the authorities not only did not keep records, but also concealed the most terrible facts.
The first Chechen war, planned by Yeltsin’s entourage as instant and victorious, was the bloodiest event in the history of the Russian Federation. Reckless step or intentional betrayal? - this is what the political scientists are arguing about today. Most of them are inclined to believe that the victims of the Chechen company are the result of incompetent leadership and the lack of close cooperation in the higher echelons of power. Despite the fact that each of the officials at the state helm at that time had his own point of view and subsequently tried to justify himself, it must be admitted that the betrayal was common. Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin, Grachev, Lebed and other names and names that are no less famous in Russia are responsible for the shameful war with the militants. As if the truth is not hidden, it still will be made public, even after decades. The judgment of history is already beginning to administer on those who betrayed the Russian soldiers and sent them to certain death. The government followed its ambitions and did not want to think over and count military enterprises, which made young and inexperienced boys recruits cannon fodder.
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