Military Review

Russian fleet in the First World War and its combat effectiveness. Part of 4

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In 1916, the command of the Baltic fleet used 7 new Bars submarines, 5 English submarines and 4 old Crocodile submarines to fight on enemy communications.


Russian fleet in the First World War and its combat effectiveness. Part of 4

1. Submarine Bars.

So, in the first half of May, 1916 was carried out reconnaissance of the routes of movement of German transports and 3 of large vehicles were sunk by the total displacement of 8600 tons. The result of the second campaign (the second half of May) was the damage to the German destroyer. One boat did not return from the hike.

From the end of June to November, Russian submarines sank 2 vehicles and another 1 captured. The English boats were not successful during this period.

The record for trophies among Russian submarines in the Baltic was the "Wolf". May 4 "Wolf" in the Landsort area off the coast of Sweden detained, and then torpedoed the German transports "Hera" (4300 t), "Koljga" (2500 t) and "Bianka" (1800 t), and two months later drowned in the Gulf of Bothnia German transport "Derita" (6000 t) with a cargo of Swedish iron ore on board. Moreover, all actions of submariners were carried out in strict accordance with the law of the sea.


2. Submarine "Wolf".

Surface raids are organized, timed to coincide with the exit of large enemy convoys from Swedish ports, about which fleet headquarters received information from their intelligence agents. Ship units of 2 - 3 cruisers and 7 - 10 destroyers were to go on the routes of the convoys and strike at them. To cover surface ships and their reinforcement, submarines also entered the corresponding area.

It is worth noting the 18 battle of May 1916 in Norrköping Bay (the destroyers Novik, Thunder and Winner discovered a convoy at night, consisting of 14 German transports under cover of the auxiliary cruiser German and two convoy ships of the enemy escort ships were sunk, but the transports, taking advantage of the darkness and the fact that the convoy ships were tied up by the Russian destroyers, disappeared) and 30 in May 1916 (the destroyers Vushitelnyi and Vigilant made a raid on the Swedish coast in the Gulf of Bothnia, captured by German transports ORMs »(10000 t) and" Lisbon »(5000 t) with iron ore on board).

Mine was traditionally used to fight communications. weapon. In August, a minefield containing 821 mine was installed in the Olandsgaf Strait (a route of German transports carrying iron ore from Swedish ports in the Gulf of Bothnia). In October, two more mine setups were made in the North Quark strait (120 mines) and in Steinort (200 mines).

The Germans in the 1916 on Russian active and defensive minefields lost 15 ships, including 9 destroyers and destroyers, 2 minesweeper, 1 submarine.

From the side of the enemy it should be noted: 1) implementation of measures within the mine war and 2) attempt to break into the Gulf of Finland by destroyers in the autumn of 1916.

Thus, the Germans laid mines near the islands of Dago and Ezel, as well as in the Irbensky Strait, at Moonzund, at the fairways of the Abo-Aland skerries. German submarine minelayers, breaking into the Gulf of Finland, put up a few mine cans near the islands of Gotland, Nerva, B. Tyuters and Seskar. On the German mines in 1916, the minesweeper Shield, the destroyer Volunteer, military vehicles, three auxiliary ships and a merchant ship were killed; damaged armored cruiser "Rurik" (near the island of Gotland), three destroyers, minesweeper and several small vessels.

In the course of an operation to break into the Gulf of Finland, the 10 th mine fleet of Germans (11 of the newest destroyers) carried out a raid into the western part of the gulf in order to destroy the Russian sentinel ships located there and bombard the Baltic port. The operation began on October 29: when passing the minefield of the Advance position, the 2 of the ship sank and sank, the rest, forcing the Front position, conducted an unsuccessful search for the Russian guards and fired at the Baltic port (released on the port and city of the 162 projectile, which damaged several buildings and killed and wounded 18 man, including children). On the way back at the minefields of the Frontline, 5 destroyers were killed. The operation ended in a catastrophe that cost the German fleet of the seven newest destroyers (S-57, S-58, S-59, G-90, V-72, V-75, V-76) - the 10-I fleet was defeated.


3. German destroyers in the campaign.

The Russian fleet on the Baltic Sea in 1916 from the impact of the enemy lost the destroyer 2, the minesweeper 3, the submarine (the British submarine also died), several small vessels; German - 9 destroyers and destroyers, auxiliary cruiser, 2 minesweeper, several small vessels, 12 cargo ships.

It should be noted that hostilities in the Baltic in 1916 were limited. Both sides did not carry out large-scale offensive operations. The main forces of the Russian fleet, in fact, were inactive during the entire campaign. Passivity adversely affected including the morale and morale of sailors.

The actions of the German fleet did not differ in activity either. The undoubted result of the actions of the Baltic Fleet in this campaign was a significant impact on the intensity and volume of enemy sea transport (by about a third) [Kozlov D. Yu. Strategic calm. Some details of the 1916 campaign in the Baltic Sea // Militaryhistorical magazine. 2009. No. 3. P. 7], and the introduction by the Germans of a system of convoys led to tension in their Navy and distracted the ships from solving other problems. At the same time, the enemy began to increase the volume of supplies of iron ore, strategically important for him.

The 1916 campaign in the Baltic is referred to as naval historians as a period of “strategic calm”. The Baltic Fleet, with small interruptions, retained and in 1916 strengthened the operational regime that was favorable to itself in the Gulf of Riga, the Gulf of Bothnia, seriously leveling the efforts of the German forces operating against the coastal flank of the Northern Front.

For the 1916 campaign on the Black Sea, the following circumstances were decisive: 1) active actions of the Russian fleet on a tactical and strategic scale; 2) increased submarine danger from the German submarines.

The main task of the quantitatively and qualitatively Black Sea Fleet is to assist the troops of the Caucasian Front in its large-scale offensive operations.

Already at the beginning of the year, the fleet assisted units of the Primorsky Detachment of the Caucasian Army (Batumi detachment of ships - Rostislav, 4 destroyer and 2 gunboats). Assistance was expressed in the shelling of fortifications and enemy positions (according to the army command, very effective), the counter-battery struggle, the landing of assault forces and the transfer of reinforcements (for example, the 23 - 25 of March from Novorossiysk transported two cavalry, an equestrian artillery division, and a sapernoi artillery division, a sapernoi artillery division, a sapernoy of marines, two cavalry artillery, an equestrian artillery division, and a sapernoye march from Novorossiysk, an equestrian artillery division, and an engineer, the sapertny, in March, transported two Plastunsky brigades, an equestrian artillery division, and a sapernoi artillery division, a spaper, and an artillery squadron of the marines, two cavalry artillery units, and an artillery squadron, and an artillery unit. , rear units and wagons - 18000 man, around 3000 horses, 12 guns; in the framework of the Trebizond operation in May-June 2 infantry divisions were deployed - 34665 man, about 6000 horses, 36 guns). Since March, the battleships "Rostislav" and "Panteleimon" carried out direct support to the attacking troops. The organization of troop traffic on the Black Sea in 1916 is considered exemplary [see Dotsenko V. Fleets of the XX century. Ed. Admiral V.I. Kuroyedov. Prince 1. M., 2003]. Moreover, the assistance of the Black Sea Fleet to the troops of the Caucasian Front in this campaign acquired a large scale, was systematic, and played an important role in offensive operations.

Assistance to the Entente's ally, Romania, manifested itself in the fleet's activities in the second half of the year. Assistance was provided to the Romanian-Russian troops, interaction with them and supply (above all - the transport of troops along the Danube, the defense of the Danube and the Romanian Black Sea coast). In addition to the Expedition of Special Purpose, which was located on the theater of warfare from the 1914, a group of gunboats and a mine-artillery detachment (up to 1250 specialists - artillery, miners and sappers; 8 228-mm, 8 152-mm, 4 120-mm guns, and sapper; machine guns, 4 coastal torpedo tubes, river mines). These forces, in cooperation with the Romanian river flotilla, provided fire support to the Romanian troops, transported troops along the Danube, and set up minefields. For the defense of the Black Sea coast of Romania, a special detachment of special purpose of non-permanent composition was formed: in October, for example, it included the battleship Rostislav, 25 destroyers, 10 submarines, 2 minesweepers, 8 transport and an air squadron. The ships of the detachment were based on Constanza, and the aircraft on Lake Singol (near Constanta). Constanta was also used as an intermediate base for destroyers operating at Varna and the Bosporus.


4. Battleship Rostislav.

The most important task of the fleet was to strengthen the blockade of the Bosphorus, the coal and oil areas of the enemy, the struggle on the communications of the enemy. The main means of blockade were minefields. During the campaign, 14 barriers (2187 mines) were exposed - the Bosphorus was in fact clogged. Barrier operations were carried out by large fleet forces with the participation of the newest battleships, mines were laid by destroyers and the submarine “Crab”. After the end of the productions, a blockade patrol was established, which was provided by the actions of destroyers and submarines - in the second half of the year only submarines carried out 33 combat campaigns. The most productive were the trips of the submarine Seal, 4 times going out to the Bosphorus and sank the ship and three sailboats, seized a large ship and sailboat. From mid-December 1916, until the end of August, 1917 submarine sank and captured 8 ships for 25, and Narwhal submarine for the first half of 1917 sank and seized 23 sailing vessels. The list can be continued.


5. Submarine "Seal".

On the obstacles and as a result of the blockade forces, the enemy at the Bosphorus lost: a gunboat, a submarine, a destroyer, several minesweepers; four transport, six ships, several dozen small ships. The blockade of the Bosphorus has led to serious difficulties in supplying the capital of Turkey and the fleet with fuel, food and raw materials. The scale of operations of the cruising forces and enemy submarines has decreased. Despite the energetic actions of the Black Sea Fleet, he still failed to achieve a complete blockade of the Bosporus.

Throughout the campaign, the Black Sea Fleet also blocked the coal region of Turkey. Inspection and shelling of the ports of the region (Zonguldak, Eregli, Kozlu) and search actions carried out ships of maneuverable groups. These actions played a big role in disrupting the enemy’s freight traffic.

The fight on the enemy’s sea lanes, primarily by destroyers, was quite successful. So, only in the first half of January 164 of the sailboat, 2 of the motorized vessels were sunk, shipyards in Samsun, Unie and Faz were shelled. During the Trebizond operation, up to 300 various ships were destroyed.

The actions of the Russian fleet on enemy communications in 1916 led to the disruption of its operational plans, and caused serious damage to the Turkish economy. According to far from complete data, only in the southwestern part of the sea did the Turks in 1916 lose six coal transports, sixteen steamers, and several hundred sailboats. By the end of the year, only two coal vehicles remained in service.

Compared to the Baltic aviation the fleet was used relatively poorly, although the Zunguldak aerial bombardment was quite successful, and seaplane attacks on enemy warships were practiced. Aviation assisted the ground forces, delivered strikes at bases and ports, conducted reconnaissance for the purpose of anti-submarine defense, and fought with enemy aircraft. And although the Black Sea Fleet aviation was used on a larger scale and more skillfully than before in this campaign, but because of the small number of aircraft that the fleet had, the actions of naval aviation did not acquire the necessary scope.

In total, 1916 mines were set up at 3677 near the Bosphorus, Constanta and Varna.

Active minefields and operations of Russian ships on sea lanes forced the German-Turkish fleet to significantly limit their combat activities.

The enemy could oppose to the actions of the Black Sea Fleet the tactics of disrupting Russian sea communications, measures to protect their communications, occasional exits of “Geben” and “Breslau” for shelling ports on the Caucasian coast and the positions of Russian troops and submarines. The actions of the cruisers were more psychological in nature and continued until August (before the installation of the main minefields at the Bosporus).


6. Ships of the Turkish Mediterranean division "Goeben" ("Sultan Selim Yavuz") and "Breslau" ("Midilli").

The submarines operated until November and were a major threat - during the campaign they carried out 42 combat campaigns. The losses of the Russian fleet from the actions of the German submarines in the 1916 campaign amounted to: 6 transports, 2 hospital ships, steamer and 13 sailing and motor-sailing ships sunk, 4 transport and 2 steamer damaged.

Underwater minelayer UC 15 and the Breslau cruiser 7 mine setups were carried out (a total of 177 mines were delivered). The Black Sea Fleet has lost the destroyer 2, transport, passenger steamer and several small vessels.

In the 1916 campaign, the enemy lost on the Black Sea: the 2 destroyer, the 4 submarine (in October UB 7 at the Chersonese lighthouse sank the Russian seaplane, on October 10, the UN 24 disappeared from the Russian minefield at UB 45, allegedly 1 disappeared from UC XNUM in November on the Russian minefield. at the Bosphorus on a mine UB 15), a gunboat, 46 transports, 6 tugs and steamers, 16 motor and 4 sailing ships. A. Gayer, a researcher of submarine actions, stated: “So, the Black Sea absorbed the victims without achieving any significant success” [Gayer A. German submarines during the 865-1914 war. L., 1918. C. 1933].

Total losses of the Black Sea Fleet: 2 destroyer, minesweeper, 9 transports, 2 hospital ships, 3 steamer, 22 sailing ships. Died from the internal explosion of a new battleship "Empress Maria."
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  1. Olgovich
    Olgovich 23 February 2017 07: 35
    +16
    A unique case in the world occurred on the Black Sea Fleet: a Russian seaplane boarded an enemy ship!

    On March 3, 1917, a seaplane under the command of Lieutenant Sergeyev attacked and fired a Turkish schooner from a machine gun, forcing the crew to lie down on deck. Then he splashed down, and while the navigator held the command under the gun, Sergeyev climbed onto the deck and, threatening with a revolver, locked the whole team in the hold. The nearest Russian destroyer delivered a prize to Sevastopol.

    So our sea pilots famously fought!

    Thanks to the author again
    1. murriou
      murriou 9 March 2017 21: 40
      +1
      Quote: Olgovich
      So our sea pilots famously fought!

      With unarmed feluks, yes laughing
  2. Amurets
    Amurets 23 February 2017 07: 37
    +13
    The Germans in the 1916 on Russian active and defensive minefields lost 15 ships, including 9 destroyers and destroyers, 2 minesweeper, 1 submarine.
    What is said in these materials, you can’t say better, I’ll just provide links.
    The Legendary Anna Revelskaya made a great contribution to the losses of the German fleet. https://topwar.ru/26240-anna-revelskaya-russkaya-
    mata-hari.html. She saved the Baltic Fleet from defeat three times. This is not my opinion, but the opinion of N.G. Kuznetsova.
    http://www.liveinternet.ru/community/2281209/post
    250566006
    On the campaigns of the submarine "Wolf" there are memories of V. A Poderni: "On a submarine in 1916." and link internet materials. http://www.livejournal.com/media/87765.html
    http://genrogge.ru/submariner/5.htm
    Most importantly, I almost forgot. Happy holiday forum users. Happy Soviet, Russian Army and Navy. All the very best, and most importantly Health, the rest will follow. You cannot buy health anywhere, Losing it is easy, to find it, sometimes it is impossible.
  3. parusnik
    parusnik 23 February 2017 08: 09
    +11
    Hmm, nice, "Wolf" worked .. ate "red caps" with pies ..
    1. murriou
      murriou 9 March 2017 21: 53
      0
      On unarmed transports, yeah, a feat.

      The British in the Baltic, in spite of their small numbers, had a much higher transport efficiency, but they also recorded warships at their own expense - as many large warships as the whole Baltic Fleet sank: BrKr (moreover, damage, and then in another episode drowning, the bakers would have recorded damage for a separate result), and a light cruiser.
  4. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 23 February 2017 12: 08
    +2
    On the Black Sea, they lost the latest battleship, another battleship and battlecruiser were not completed, only a lot of money was spent on them. It’s good that they drowned a myriad of sailboats, fishing boats and so on, but what is the ratio lost in rubles or stamps? What damage did the economy of the enemy do, and so on?
    1. V.ic
      V.ic 23 February 2017 13: 05
      +12
      Quote: Kostadinov
      What is the ratio of losses in rubles or stamps? What damage did the economy of the enemy do, and so on?

      ... so you were allies with the Turks, so from them / they / ask! If in Russian churches they prayed for defeating the adversary and granting victory to the Orthodox army, then I can assume that in the Bulgarian churches: on granting victory to the Bulgarian army and its allies: the Turkish Sultan and the German Kaiser over the Russian Orthodox army?
      1. murriou
        murriou 9 March 2017 21: 46
        0
        The Bulgarian and Greek sailors in the 1st Balkan War of 1912, despite their very weak forces and the overwhelming superiority of the Turks, acted incomparably more efficiently and courageously than their Russian colleagues in the WWI.

        As for the choice of a party in the WWI, these are the consequences of the 2nd Balkan War, when Austrian diplomats, with the approval of the Russians, quarreled allies in the anti-Turkish bloc and minimized the consequences of their glorious victories.

        It was as a result of such a betrayal that Greece in the WWI acted on the side of the Entente, but did NOT coordinate actions with the Russians - only with the British and French.

        As for the Bulgarians, they fought not for the Turks and not for the Germans, and not against the Russians, but against the Serbs. Also the consequences of the 2nd Balkan war.
  5. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 23 February 2017 17: 50
    0
    Quote: V.ic
    Quote: Kostadinov
    What is the ratio of losses in rubles or stamps? What damage did the economy of the enemy do, and so on?

    ... so you were allies with the Turks, so from them / they / ask! If in Russian churches they prayed for defeating the adversary and granting victory to the Orthodox army, then I can assume that in the Bulgarian churches: on granting victory to the Bulgarian army and its allies: the Turkish Sultan and the German Kaiser over the Russian Orthodox army?

    What does anyone have to do with whom and for what prayed in churches or mosques to the issue of fleet efficiency? And why should the Turks be asked about the effectiveness of the Russian fleet. If a Turkish author wrote about the effectiveness of the Turkish fleet, another matter.
    And the effectiveness of the policies of the Bulgarian king Ferdinand of Koburgot and his government will be enough to say that they led the country twice to military defeat, surrender and two national disasters.
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. soldier
      soldier 23 February 2017 18: 57
      +18
      If we talk about the effectiveness of the Black Sea Fleet in relation to the Bulgarian-German naval forces, then the Russian destroyer Varna killed the Bulgarian destroyer "Shumni" and killed 5 German submarines and submarine mine loaders based on Bulgarian ports: in November 1915-UC-13 , and in 1916 - UB-46, UC-15, UB-7, UB-45.
      That is, almost the entire submarine group of Germans, based on the Bulgarian ports, was covered.
      Efficiency was not zero - on the contrary
    3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 February 2017 20: 09
      +9
      Quote: Kostadinov
      What does anyone have to do with whom and for what prayed in churches or mosques to the issue of fleet efficiency?

      And what do your questions have to do with the effectiveness of the Black Sea Fleet? The Black Sea Fleet fulfilled absolutely all the tasks it faced - blocking the coastal shipping of Turkey, supporting the flank of the army, conducting joint operations with the army (landing large landings behind enemy lines as part of the overall operational plan). If not for the 1917th - would have participated in the capture of the Straits :)
      Quote: Kostadinov
      but what is the ratio lost in rubles or stamps?

      Well, estimate how many Russian soldiers did not die as a result of the actions of the fleet (successful operations to support the flanks / assault forces behind enemy lines) i.e. evaluate the actions of the Black Sea Fleet with the view of the general increase in the effectiveness of ground operations (including due to the fact that the supply of the Turkish army by sea was impossible, which is why the Turks had considerable problems with providing the army), then evaluate the person’s life in rubles or stamps, and hit a debit with a loan. negative
      1. murriou
        murriou 9 March 2017 21: 49
        0
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        If not for the 1917th - would have participated in the capture of the Straits

        You’re kind of a literate person, albeit of a crystal-baked sense. Do you really evaluate the plan of the Bosphorus landing operation as something really feasible?
  6. moreman78
    moreman78 24 February 2017 01: 42
    +1
    Quote: Kostadinov
    On the Black Sea, they lost the latest battleship, another battleship and battlecruiser were not completed, only a lot of money was spent on them. It’s good that they drowned a myriad of sailboats, fishing boats and so on, but what is the ratio lost in rubles or stamps? What damage did the economy of the enemy do, and so on?

    Why not ask stupid questions - LEARN THE HISTORY!
  7. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 24 February 2017 11: 06
    0
    Quote: soldier
    If we talk about the effectiveness of the Black Sea Fleet in relation to the Bulgarian-German naval forces, then the Russian destroyer Varna killed the Bulgarian destroyer "Shumni" and killed 5 German submarines and submarine mine loaders based on Bulgarian ports: in November 1915-UC-13 , and in 1916 - UB-46, UC-15, UB-7, UB-45.
    That is, almost the entire submarine group of Germans, based on the Bulgarian ports, was covered.
    Efficiency was not zero - on the contrary

    Of course, the effectiveness of the Russian fleet did not hit zero, and the effectiveness of using Russian mines is very high. But I think that this could be achieved even without the construction of 4 latest battleships.
    1. murriou
      murriou 9 March 2017 23: 23
      0
      Quote: Kostadinov
      But I think that this could be achieved even without the construction of 4 latest battleships.

      “Sevastopoli” in the Baltic stood uselessly near the capital for the entire WWI, each being one and a half times more expensive than the British superdreadnoughts, which were inferior in all military lines very much. Several times they went out to “cover up” the mine production without needing cover, and it seemed like once or twice they played the role of gunboats, firing at enemy ground positions from a safe distance. Due to the particular flimsy nature, it was contraindicated for them to climb into battle with an opponent comparable in class.

      On the account of the “empresses" the loss of one of them from sloppiness and other unexplained reasons, also several outlets in the role of incomparably cheaper gunboats, for shelling ground positions, one (!) Futile pursuit of the Goeben and two unsuccessful pursuits for the easy (!) the cruiser Breslau. From a gun on sparrows.

      So I do not see the slightest objection to such a judgment of the Bulgarian colleague.
  8. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 24 February 2017 11: 16
    0
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Well, estimate how many Russian soldiers did not die as a result of the actions of the fleet (successful operations to support the flanks / assault forces behind enemy lines) i.e. evaluate the actions of the Black Sea Fleet with the view of the general increase in the effectiveness of ground operations (including due to the fact that the supply of the Turkish army by sea was impossible, which is why the Turks had considerable problems with providing the army), then evaluate the person’s life in rubles or stamps, and hit a debit with a loan.

    And all UTB could not be done without 3 or 4 new battleships?
    And how many cannons and shells could land forces receive from 1914-1916 to replace battleships? How many soldier lives to save? Then maybe not only the Straits and Sophia but also Berlin and Vienna could take the bi back in 1914 and no revolution beat the bi in 1917?
    1. soldier
      soldier 24 February 2017 21: 05
      +16
      The new battleships made it possible, by creating operational groups, each of which was stronger than Goeben, to seize dominance at sea. And in anticipation of the upcoming Bosphorus operation, this was very important.
      That is, it was a strategic weapon, and they were built for good reason. Another thing is that events unfolded a little different than they thought
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 25 February 2017 18: 18
      +2
      Quote: Kostadinov
      And how many cannons and shells could land forces receive from 1914-1916 to replace battleships?

      Not at all. Because the construction of only one shell department at the new steel mill near Kamensky, according to estimates, threatened to cost 138 million rubles, which is much more expensive than all 4 Black Sea dreadnoughts.
      Quote: Kostadinov
      And how many cannons and shells could land forces receive from 1914-1916 to replace battleships? How many soldier lives to save? Then maybe not only the Straits and Sophia but also Berlin and Vienna could take the bi back in 1914 and no revolution beat the bi in 1917?

      Or maybe, instead of engaging in futile fantasies, just a little read and count? And to find out that, for example, in 1910, 1 million rubles were allocated for the needs of the ground army, while 030 million rubles were allocated for the needs of the fleet? And in 197 (when funds were allocated for the Black Sea dreadnoughts) did this ratio amount to 1911 million and 1 million rubles?
      Maybe you should find out that in Russia before the WWII the fleet was financed on a residual basis? Maybe it’s worth to find out that the bulk of the funds went specifically to the Wishlist of the generals?
      Maybe it makes sense to dig into the sources and find out that the same shell hunger arose not because the Empire did not have money for shells, but because the generals would be sure that there would be enough available production capacities and stocks? The WWII began and the shortage of rifles became clear, and you know that before the WWII rifle production was stopped, because it was believed that they were already more than enough?
      Do you even understand how the cost of the same rifles and dreadnoughts correlates? Three Black Sea battleships cost about 28 million each - a total of 84 million. The urgent construction program adopted by the GAU during the war in order to provide the army with everything necessary exceeded 600 million. This is ONLY construction, without the cost of producing ammunition shells and so on at these plants.
      And now attention, a question. What would Mr. Kostadinov write if the start of the war was postponed until 1915, and Turkey had 3 latest dreadnought at its disposal, as it had planned, and the battleships of the Empress Maria type were never laid down?
  9. fenist82
    fenist82 24 February 2017 23: 09
    +12
    What I would like to note, battleships, like any weapon, are as useful as they are used. Battleships were needed, the time of aircraft carriers had not yet come, how not to twist it was the main skeleton of the fleet. If the battleships would lead the invasion of the Bosphorus, we would write differently ... In addition, their battleships, by the fact of their existence, had an impact on the operational situation in the theater. And the latter, during the years of the Second World War, they played a certain role in the defense of Leningrad and the operation to lift the blockade, the defense of Sevastopol, in general, found their application. And only the decision of the top Soviet leadership did not allow the battleships to show themselves more actively during the Second World War (for example, to take part in disrupting the partial evacuation of Axis troops from the Crimea), which their peers in other countries did quite successfully.
  10. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 28 February 2017 17: 56
    +1
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Not at all. Because the construction of only one shell department at the new steel mill near Kamensky, according to estimates, threatened to cost 138 million rubles, which is much more expensive than all 4 Black Sea dreadnoughts.

    And why is it necessary to build new factories, but it is impossible to use the existing backwaters producing ammunition for the fleet?
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Do you even understand how the cost of the same rifles and dreadnoughts correlates? Three Black Sea battleships cost about 28 million each - a total of 84 million. The urgent construction program adopted by the GAU during the war to provide the army with everything necessary exceeded 600 million.

    I don’t know the cost of rifles, but somewhere I found that the cost of one 3 dm guns arr. 1902, together with a gun carriage, less than 5000 rubles. It turns out three Black Sea battleships plus one unfinished UTB somewhere around 20 guns.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    in 1910, 1 million rubles were allocated for the needs of the land army, while 030 million rubles were allocated for the needs of the fleet? And in 197 (when funds were allocated for the Black Sea dreadnoughts) did this ratio amount to 1911 million and 1 million rubles?

    1910. The War Department - 485 million rubles, the Marine - 113 million rubles, and through water consumption - 124 million rubles. It doesn’t work out 1030 million rubles. only for the army. The same thing in the following years. (Source: Khromov. 1950). Maybe a bit is a bad source?
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    And now attention, a question. What would Mr. Kostadinov write if the start of the war was postponed until 1915, and Turkey had 3 latest dreadnought at its disposal, as it had planned, and the battleships of the Empress Maria type were never laid down?

    Let's say it happened. Turkey has 3 latest dreadnought and about one field army less (dreadnought and their escort must be kept). She will do nothing more than Germany in the Baltic in 1915.
    The Russians will have more than one field army (in place of the dreadnoughts). This is enough to defeat Austria-Hungary in 1915. Then the defeat of Germany in 1916 follows. The Bulgarian government, seeing the Russian victories, does not make a mistake, and we have one less national disaster. And Mr. (formerly comrade) Kostadinov praises the victories of the Russian army.
  11. murriou
    murriou 9 March 2017 20: 57
    0
    It is worth noting the battle on May 18, 1916 in Norrköping Bay (the destroyers Novik, Grom and Pobeditel discovered a convoy consisting of 14 German transports under cover of the auxiliary cruiser German and two escort ships — Russian ships — enemy convoys at night were sunk, but the transports, taking advantage of the darkness and the fact that the escort ships connected the Russian destroyers in battle, disappeared)

    Yes, it’s worth noting.
    In a very crispy description, this operation looks very gorgeous: "the Russian squadron attacked the German fleet and sunk the cruiser" laughing laughing laughing
    Just another Jutland in world history. It is a pity the Germans did not know about this. lol

    1. Information about the passage of the convoy was received from the English Embassy in Sweden, but did not "stumble" at all laughing

    2. The previous convoy, which was also pointed at by the British, was a valiant Russian fleet lost from under its nose. The reason and excuse was called the lack of planning of the operation.

    3. This operation, the second time on a silver platter brought by the British to the Russian fleet, was personally failed by the idol of the bakers and the first traitor to their beloved His Imperial Nothingness of Nikolashka, later the self-styled Admiral Kolchak.

    4. After this failure, the British did not trust the long-eyed allies with such information, and immediately entrusted their submariners, who acted much more efficiently.

    5. For starters, look at the composition of the Russian forces for this operation.
    They included: 3 destroyers of the Novik type, 8 destroyers of the volunteer class, and a cruising detachment worthy of a separate listing:
    “Bogatyr”, “Russian” cruiser of German manufacture, armored, but seriously armed, quite fast: 24,0 - 24,5 knots (especially in comparison with vehicles and then analogues of Russian production).
    Rurik-2, the “Russian” English-made cruiser, the largest in its class for Russia and one of the largest in the world, not bad for its class, armored and armed, speed 21 knots - not a fountain for the cruiser at the time of the WWII, but for the tsar’s fleet and for transport is also good.
    “Oleg” is the Russian copy of the “Bogatyr”, therefore, much less speed, 20,5 knots, but again for the Russian fleet of that time and for the current task it is quite enough, but with weapons and armor everything is at the original level.
    As you can see, for the destruction of the convoy of 14 slow-moving unarmed galoshes - more than enough forces.

    6. However, Kolchak needed not the service of Russia, not the destruction of the convoy, but his personal career.

    Therefore, contrary to the plan of the operation, he decided to do everything alone and on the “novices”, arbitrarily, he broke away from the main forces — commanded by Rear Admiral Trukhachev, among other things — the detachment head and the Head of Kolchak for the duration of this operation. As well as Kolchak's competitor in the queue for promotion.

    7. To destroy the Convoy, Kolchak had to, upon the discovery of the enemy, immediately inform the main forces and cut off the convoy return to Swedish waters.
    But then the main forces would have destroyed the convoy themselves, and Kolchak would have remained on the supporting role.

    8. Kolchak instead gave a warning shot, hoping for an instant surrender of the Germans.
    Those, of course, gave dera to Swedish waters, leaving the so-called auxiliary cruiser "German".
    = * =
  12. murriou
    murriou 9 March 2017 21: 09
    0
    = * =
    9. Semi-literate bakers often speculate in terms of hoping for even more illiterate readers. So it is here.
    The "auxiliary cruiser", if anyone did not know, is a CIVIL ship, mobilized for military needs and hastily adapted to them somehow. As a rule, these are several laden guns put on deck, and hastily trained (at best) calculations for them.

    10. Such was the "Hermann", exalted to the rank of the great Kolchak victory.
    Displacement 2 thousand tons (Kolchak estimated at 4 thousand tons laughing if where such a figure is given - this is from his report), 4 105mm guns, of which only half could fire on one side, untrained calculations with them, no SDAs and other luxuries, in general - not an opponent of the Russian destroyer, even one.

    11. However, the sinking of this galosh turned out to be slow. The talents of the tsarist naval commanders and commanders were, as we know, outstanding, and there are no difficulties that they could not have created out of the blue lol
    "Novik", which was Kolchak, fired at a large, slow and weakly armed victim, an ideal target, at point blank range of three torpedoes - not one exploded. "Thunder", later ingloriously sunk in the Kassar Reach, released two more, one worked. This ultimately led to the sinking of the ship.

    12. All this time the main forces were at a distance of 15 miles and did not know ANYTHING about what was happening!

    13. Another shameful detail is that, contrary to laws and customs, Kolchak limited himself to picking up several. man to establish which ship sank, and then GONE, leaving dozens of drowning people. 29 people drowned.
    Later, in order to justify the VLAL, he, as usual, as if “the silhouettes of some ships showed up, and shells began to fall near us” - of course, there was nothing of the kind in reality.

    14. Another LITTLE of Kolchak was that he used the wonderful art of multiple launch rocket and sank all escort ships, as well as several departing convoy ships.
    "After a successful search in the Norrköping District for cruisers and destroyers on June 1, which ended with the sinking of the enemy auxiliary cruiser" Herman ", two armed sentinel ships and, apparently, a number of ships ..."

    At night, outside of visibility, with weak 102mm shells fired in small quantities, it showed efficiency several times better than it was during the day in ideal conditions at firing range. Sure sure laughing laughing laughing
    In reality, according to the Germans, who were much better acquainted with the situation, “Hermann” was the only victim of the Russian operation.

    15. However, the command and the newspapers needed a peermog, and the lender Kolchak got into the stream, as did Rudnev in Chemulpo. The naval commander who failed the operation doomed to success was promoted and appointed to the post of commander of the Black Sea Fleet.
  13. murriou
    murriou 9 March 2017 21: 27
    0
    In 1916, the command of the Baltic Fleet used for the fight on enemy communications 7 new submarines of the Bars type, the 5 of the British submarines and the 4 old submarines of the Crocodile type.

    The British enjoyed great freedom of action, planned operations on their own initiative, did not obey the command of the Baltic Fleet, and had no idea that they were being used laughing

    At the same time, the real successes of the British were comparable with the successes of the entire Baltic Fleet and incomparably greater than that of the Russian colleagues, despite the small number of Englishmen and the much larger number of Russian submarines ..
    The warships of the enemy were not sunk by Russian submarines in WWI NEVER, and generally open battle * especially valiant * Russian sailors usually avoided.
  14. murriou
    murriou 9 March 2017 21: 39
    0
    The Germans in the 1916 on Russian active and defensive minefields lost 15 ships, including 9 destroyers and destroyers, 2 minesweeper, 1 submarine.

    If the author described Russian losses of the same composition, it would be called "several small vessels"(TM) was not considered a serious loss. lol
    And here - the ships, wars, paramoga-paramoga! laughing

    By the way, the so-called the destroyers sunk by the valiant Russian fleet, when raising their real data, usually at best turn out to be just destroyers - “torpedo boats”, and the destroyer - “tsertorer”.

    In many cases, the German so-called “destroyers” turn out to be bearing the name with the letter “T”, so the outdated destroyers of the late 19th century were designated, conceived used as minesweepers or auxiliary vessels, because their combat value was already close to zero.

    The new battleship Empress Maria died from an internal explosion.

    Non-combat loss, yes.

    But non-combat losses of the enemy by the bakers are carefully added to the battle ones, as if stones, rocks, navigational errors and weather, along with the English submariners, are also credited to the valiant royal fleet laughing laughing laughing - but non-combat losses from the Russian side are also carefully ignored.