9-i company. Operation Highway

9-i company. Operation Highway 33 passed the year as Soviet troops entered the territory of Afghanistan. The time has come to understand the outcome of the participation of the Soviet military contingent in the Afghan civil war.

Afghanistan is located in the center of the Eurasian region and has always been interesting to American geopolitics, as an unstable region located near the Soviet borders.

The civil war was the result of the opposition of the leadership of Afghanistan, who tried to carry out reforms to bring the country to a new level of development, and the Islamic opposition, which was supported by the Mujahideen, part of the Afghan population and a number of countries of the Islamic world.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly rejected requests from the Afghan leadership to provide military support in the fight against the militarized units of the Islamic opposition. But in March, 1979, a so-called Herat revolt took place in Afghanistan: anti-government groups supported by the Afghan army launched an offensive against the government of the country with the slogan “Islamic revolution without Soviets and the West”. The insurgency became a catalyst for many uprisings that swept across Afghanistan. The Soviet leadership saw this as a threat to the security of the USSR and decided to take measures to strengthen the Russian border with Afghanistan and prepare for the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghan territory. In December 1979, a contingent of troops was deployed to Afghanistan by order of Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov.

The main tasks of the Soviet troops were aviation, artillery, sapper support for the Afghan troops, as well as the suppression of the supply of arms to the opposition troops from abroad.

In 1982, the leaders of the Mujahideen under the patronage of Pakistan created an alliance called the Alliance of Seven, which set as its goal the creation of an Islamic state in Afghanistan. And for this they decided to create an alternative government. The city of Khost was well suited for the role of the capital of “free Afghanistan”. This city is located on the border with Pakistan in remote mountains. From it from the center of the country one single road led through the Seti-Kandav pass. Therefore, the one who owns this pass, he controls the entire province of Khost. The main population of the province are nomadic tribes, the warriors of which are distinguished by their aggressiveness and good military training.

The Mujahideen built a Jawar stronghold in Khost province, which was a fortified base and a transit point for militants. Through it, up to 20% of deliveries of weapons, equipment and ammunition from Pakistan were carried out.

Soviet troops exercised control over the supply weapons and equipment on the roads leading from Khost to the central part of the country. The Soviet units were not part of the lair of the Mujahideen.

But the Afghan government, realizing the importance of having oppositional power, repeatedly took measures to destroy the Jawar base, but to no avail. The militants, capturing the Seti-Kandav pass and, creating an irresistible bastion there, formed a powerful Host fortified area called Srana. To destroy this fortified area, the Afghan leadership has repeatedly appealed to the Soviet government to assist in the liberation of Khost province from the Mujahideen. Gorbachev, knowing full well what losses the Soviet military contingent may incur in carrying out this military operation, nevertheless, gives this order.

Despite receiving instructions to provide military support to the Afghan army to unlock Khost, the military command of the Soviet group took steps to resolve this problem peacefully. Repeatedly, Gromov, commander of the 40 Army, tried to meet with the leaders of the Mujahideen, but to no avail. There was only one possible way to fulfill the order of the supreme commander-in-chief - to storm the pass and break through with the battle at Khost.

The operation to seize the militants' fortified area was code-named “Highway”. Twenty thousand mojaheds opposed the twenty-thousandth group of Soviet and Afghan troops. Planning and preparation for the largest-scale operation was carried out with the utmost secrecy. Even the leadership in Moscow was not dedicated to its details.

The special operation began with the landing of the landing over the Seti-Kandav pass. The militants opened heavy fire with all types of available weapons on paratroopers descending on parachutes. Meanwhile, reconnaissance aircraft, which accurately spotted all the firing points of the militants, flew near the transport workers. By a joint strike by artillery and aviation, skillfully adjusted by the observers, all the firing points of the Mujahideen were destroyed and, having risen to the height of motorized riflemen, Setiandav pass met with complete silence. In this battle, not a single soldier was killed, because military ingenuity was used - instead of real paratroopers, they dropped mannequins made of overalls, stones and rags instead of real paratroopers. The successful seizure of the pass was achieved thanks to the talent and professionalism of the command and rank and file structure of the Soviet-Afghan military formation.
Taking the pass allowed, under the cover of the airborne unit, to begin the transfer of special military units, equipment and food to Khost, as well as to carry out a sweep from the dushmans of the Srana fortified area.

The fighters of the elite unit of the Mujahideen "Black Storks" made a desperate attempt to break out of the encirclement and, if luck was on their side, seize control of the only road to the base Javar. This unit was created by the secret services of Pakistan. It consisted of both Afghan militants and mercenaries from different countries of the world (Jordan, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the PRC). The “Black Stork” fighters were professionally trained: they owned all types of weapons and communications equipment, the ability to make non-standard decisions. The main location of the “black storks” was inaccessible high-altitude areas near the borders with Pakistan. Chernoaistniki participated in the organization of ambushes on military units of the Soviet troops. The name of the unit corresponded to the color of the clothes worn by the militants. They were all followers of radical Islam. In a fight, any fighter of this special unit could take unjustified actions (become full-length and open fire on the enemy, read during the battle through the loudspeaker of the sura from the book "Storks"). They believed that this could break the morale of the Soviet soldiers.

On their way there were fighters of the 9th Airborne Company - 39 people. The paratroopers occupied a fairly successful position at the height of 3234. Dushmans had a numerical superiority - according to available information, there were about 400 people.

At the beginning of the battle, the position of the fighters of the 9 Company was subjected to the most severe shelling from guns, mortars, grenade launchers, rockets. Using the folds of the terrain, the black iron came to the positions of the paratroopers at a distance of 200 meters. With the onset of dusk, they rushed from all sides to attack.

Loss of dushmans amounted to: 15 killed and 30 injured. In the reflection of the next assault, the junior sergeant V. Aleksandrov died. His colleagues said that the black-shirts, brutal from their failure, launched an attack on the paratroopers' position in full growth. This allowed Slava Alexandrov to conduct aimed fire from a machine gun. Even when the machine gun failed, he accurately sent five grenades into the target, and then fired at the Mujahideen from a machine gun. When changing positions, he was seriously wounded and died in the hands of his comrades.

At night, spooks went to the next attack: they were not even stopped by a minefield - they literally walked over the corpses of their co-religionists and they managed to get closer to the positions of the paratroopers at a distance less than 50 meters. The soldiers under the command of Sergeant A. Kuznetsov, despite the numerous wounds received, repulsed the attack, but the sergeant himself was killed.

At the most intense moment of the battle, a reconnaissance platoon came to the aid of the paratroopers and delivered ammunition to the positions. At this time, the defenders had only one magazine of ammunition left and grenades were completely absent.

A special role in repelling the onslaught of black-shirts was played by artillery. The spotter Ivan Babenko skillfully corrected artillery fire, and at critical moments caused fire at a close distance from the position of the company. Precise strikes of guns cut off the attacking dushmans from the location of the paratroopers.

The fighters of the 9 Company over a twelve-hour battle repulsed all the attacks of the Black Storks and forced them to retreat. After the end of the battle, the defenders of the height saw abandoned guns around the position, a large number of machine guns, as well as foreign-made grenade launchers and small arms.

Operation Highway should be included in textbooks on military strategy and tactics as the most successful battle conducted by the Soviet command in Afghanistan. But, unfortunately, this victory was practically stolen from the officers and fighters - in the information spread by the media, this operation and the feat of the paratroopers were called a carnage.

The new generation of Russia should remember the young guys who have fulfilled their military duty to the end: Vladimir Krishtopenko, Andrei Melnikov, Andrei Tsvetkov, Andrei Fedotov, Anatoly Kuznetsov and Vyacheslav Aleksandrov.

And although much is becoming known about the war in Afghanistan, so far many events have not received their real assessment.

But even on the basis of the available information, it can be reasonably assumed that this was a successfully planned and organized strategic operation, which had the goal of destroying the socialist bloc and the Soviet Union. This war showed all the inconsistency of the solution of political problems by force. This conclusion is especially relevant now, when joint resolutions on the forceful resolution of regional conflicts are adopted under the auspices of international forums and organizations.
Afghanistan. Operation Highway. 1988 year. M. Leshinsky

Part of the documentary (the beginning unfortunately has not survived) M. Leshchinsky - Operation Mainline.
Participants of the operation (45 ISP, 345 regiment (in particular 9-i company) and many others) is dedicated.

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  1. +9
    3 February 2012 09: 35
    Again, despite all the propaganda, the facts prove that the Soviet army could and knew how to fight. And the statistics of the ratio of losses of the Mujahideen and our soldiers speaks of the coordinated work of various branches of the armed forces - artillery, aviation, motorized infantry. Why wasn’t this in Chechnya, when the convoys went without air escort, when infantry were thrown at fortified militants without artillery preparation and so on? Or is all this a consequence of some sinister design?
    1. dmitri077
      3 February 2012 12: 04
      “Once again, despite all the propaganda, the facts prove that the Soviet army could and knew how to fight” - and who exactly is “propagandizing” slander? laughing the Soviet army has always fought with "numbers" and thoughtless "carpet" bombings! I don’t see today the hysterical shouts of the “patriots” about the thousands of peaceful lives of Afghans killed under the bombs of Soviet “falcons” ... who will answer for “this”? Why is it that today the United States notice a "peace man" in the amount of 3 people after being hit by a UAV, and amnesia sets in for its "tire" kishlaks completely destroying them? or doesn't it stink? the crimes of the Soviet troops must be given INCREASED attention ... many must be dealt with .. it was not for nothing that General of the Army Sailors destroyed official documents with boxes .. And in general, it is very strange - the war ended in February of the distant 1989 and the "white" spots SEA! all this is strange ...
      1. Tyumen
        3 February 2012 12: 20
        Quote: dmitri077
        and who exactly is "promoting" slander? laughing the Soviet army has always fought with "numbers" and thoughtless "carpet" bombings!

        You answered yourself.
      2. +8
        3 February 2012 13: 19
        Quote: dmitri077
        the Soviet army has always fought with "numbers" and thoughtless "carpet" bombings! I don’t see today the hysterical shouts of the “patriots” about the thousands of civilian Afghans killed in the lives of those killed under the bombs of the Soviet “falcons” ..

        In Afghanistan there was no clear front line, there the war was already going directly beyond the territory of the military base, so everything came from the batch from where the fire came - this does not justify, of course, but the blame should not be shifted onto one shoulder.
        And as for the number fought - can I have examples in the studio? Or do you think that offensive operations are always planned with the numerical minority of the attacking side?
      3. _CAMOBAP_
        3 February 2012 14: 30
        //..I don’t see hysterical screams of "patriotics" today // - and you won’t see, your hysterical screeching is quite enough.
      4. +6
        3 February 2012 23: 53
        Well then, let's remember who first applied the carpet bombing, Dresden, Vietnam, Korea, or did the Russians bomb there too, or are your favorite democrats still?
    2. Tyumen
      3 February 2012 12: 19
      Quote: Prometey
      Why this was not in Chechnya

      Because there was no longer a concept * international duty *, and a serious enemy was underestimated. And hat-tinging moods in our country disappear from century to century only after good puzzles. Then the generals begin to remember what they were taught at the academies. And untrained boys are stronger than trained militants.
  2. +18
    3 February 2012 10: 58
    Almost 30 years ago, the brainchild of the famous terrorists Gulbeddin Hekmatyar and Osama bin Laden - the elite special unit of the Afghan mujahideen "Black Stork" - for the first time suffered a crushing defeat. 23 soldiers of the special forces of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the USSR acted as the offenders of the feathered spirits
    The "Black Stork" unit was organized by Gulbeddin Hekmatyar from the best cutthroats who underwent intensive training under the guidance of American and Pakistani instructors. Each "stork" simultaneously performed the duties of a radio operator, sniper, miner, etc. In addition, the soldiers of this special unit, created for conducting sabotage operations, owned almost all types of small arms and were distinguished by animal cruelty: they tortured Soviet prisoners of war no worse than the Gestapo.

    Subsequently, the intelligence center of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan received information that in that battle, our group had destroyed 372 trained militants. It also turned out that they were commanded by a young and little-known then Osama bin Laden. The agents testified that after this battle, the future famous terrorist, beside himself with rage, trampled on his own turban and with the last words of the wings of his assistants. This defeat fell on the "storks" with an indelible stain of shame. A week of mourning was declared in all Afghan villages controlled by the "spirits", and the leaders of the Mujahideen vowed to destroy our entire 459th company.

    You can read more at http://afgan-reconstr.at.ua/publ/interesnaja_informacija/pozor_chernykh_aistov/5
    1. Volkhov
      4 February 2012 04: 13
      In the filming of an interview in the 2000s, Bin Laden was unable to fire a Browning machine gun - and he led the commando? He is a politician, his business is communication and money.

      Problem Aug. and Chechnya - why the command so took care of the epaulettes and did not insist on increasing the numbers and completely guarding the border and roads - there were people and weapons. The wounded, whom I saw in 84, did not see the enemy - a mine or an ambush from afar, i.e. few consciously fought.

      The Americans later admitted that an increase in numbers to 1 million did not leave them a chance, but owls. gene. did not want to argue with the Politburo.
      1. Stealth
        6 February 2012 01: 26
        Quote: Volkhov
        In the filming of an interview in the 2000s, Bin Laden was unable to fire a Browning machine gun - and he led the commando? He is a politician, his business is communication and money.

        Well, here the principle says the same thing:
        “It's a pity that none of us put a bullet in bin Laden: the world would have been much quieter now and the Twin Towers in New York would now be in place. True, he was unlikely to run to the attack with the“ storks ”. Probably hiding behind some kind of bump. "
        So no contradictions)))
  3. Strabo
    3 February 2012 11: 28
    Although many consider this war senseless, but it showed the combat readiness of the army, the ability to fight, the spirit of a soldier. And what is the experience of fighting in mountain conditions. It is only a pity that the experience gained in blood is forgotten and not learned from mistakes. Eternal memory to those who did not return.
  4. Hans grohman
    3 February 2012 14: 54
    Thanks to the author for the article.
  5. 755962
    3 February 2012 16: 22
    memorial to the Afghan warriors in Vologda. We have 81 soldiers ... Eternal memory!
  6. Kostyan
    3 February 2012 18: 04
    what ours put 15 thousand .. and the Yankees only 3 for the same period .. well, or the alliance there ... how did we fight ??? why are we always in ... ???? what the ...... how they didn’t know how to do it ... we don’t know how to do it ...
    1. Aleksey67
      3 February 2012 18: 10
      Quote: Kostyan
      what ours put 15 thousand .. and the Yankees only 3 for the same period .. well, or the alliance there ... how did we fight?

      If Russia supplied the Mujahideen with modern weapons, how much would the losses increase? Then the pendos had a sly account of losses, this was repeatedly written
    2. +4
      3 February 2012 19: 34
      The coalition came to the country, which had been in a state of civil war for more than 20 years, and almost the entire population of Afghanistan resisted the Soviet grouping + inexhaustible assistance from Pakistan and the Arab countries. In fact, we were in the same situation as the Yankees in Vietnam (and the losses they had there, respectively, were immeasurably greater).
      1. Aleksey67
        3 February 2012 19: 36
        There Pendostan advisers and Stingers not badly lit up
    3. +3
      3 February 2012 21: 12
      Kostyan, than they washed their brains, don’t believe the Pindos lost falsehood and they sit in their bases without sticking their nose (they come out with a few exceptions to see how the poppy matured) Tomuzh there they built schools houses irrigated the land as the Mujahideen are now looking at the Pindos very much regret it and it’s only a drop of what I know and what was good for the Afghans
    4. Zynaps
      4 February 2012 01: 59
      son, it is common practice for NATO and US troops in particular to play down their own losses. for example, the so-called. "UN troops" in Korea have lost more than half a million soldiers, and officially they count only 70 thousand.

      in the "valley of MiGs" for one of our downed fighters there are at least 3.4 American aircraft of various classes (Americans do not even remember about Black Thursday, when they knocked down a bunch of their "super fortresses").

      in Afghanistan, the "spirits" opposing NATO forces do not have international support, there are no constant financial and material injections. NATO members do not wage war with caravans and large enemy bases on a permanent basis. NATO members pissed off to destroy the crops of the opium poppy, so as not to anger the "spirits". it is a wonderful example of powerful strategy and tactics.
  7. Kostyan
    3 February 2012 22: 29
    I agree with everyone .... just don’t forget that we shoved and how much to Vietnam .. remember at least the air defense system ...... and my opinion is that we should then sit at the bases and not succumb anywhere. ... it would be better ... but one disorder .....
    1. +2
      4 February 2012 00: 35
      So at first it was planned. We thought that our instructors would train the government troops to fight, and then, like in Vietnam - the locals themselves will establish order in their country - but it didn't work out. The Tajiks turned out to be bad students, and fled immediately in open battle. We had to maintain the "constitutional order" in Afghanistan. And at the bases it was not possible to sit out, when from a peaceful village during the day, at night they were already firing rockets.
    2. Zynaps
      4 February 2012 02: 15
      "sit on the bases and not poke your nose". strategy, I suppose, in a special vocational school for global strategic planning took place? books should be read smart. on strategy and tactics. defending is always harder. moreover, active actions prevent the enemy from seizing and strengthening the initiative. on bases from raids and from diarrhea three times more would have been lost.
  8. Odesit
    4 February 2012 11: 41
    Well done guys!
    It is a pity I was not there, I was still young.
    Glory to YOU ​​and Low bow!
  9. 0
    26 December 2012 10: 35
    That's what a well-built defense can do with a trained unit.
  10. Dec
    28 August 2013 12: 43
    Interaction with artillery pleased of course, well, and scouts came to help on time.
    P.S. Film 9th company, in my opinion, complete garbage! Bondarchuk needs to throw off a link to this site)) I hope Stalingrad he will not be upset.

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