Bookkeeping terror
After the attack on the humanitarian convoy in the province of Aleppo, it finally became clear: the “war party”, generously flavored with Saudi and Qatari finance, would do anything to disrupt a political settlement. When the Pentagon and the CIA committed frank sabotage in Geneva, the “strategic patience” of Russia was exhausted, as Sergei Lavrov put it.
It seems appropriate to highlight the following processes that characterize the development of the Syrian crisis.
1. The tactical merger of "moderate" and radical opposition groups with the unequivocal leadership of the radicals has been completed. Coordination between the flagships of the “absolute” and “relative” radicals — the Dzhebhat an-Nusroy and Ahrar ash-Sham, which was banned in Russia, was established. The dismantling of the radicals led, albeit with a partial loss of the results of the September offensive in Hama, to the merger of Jund al-Aqsa with An-Nusra.
2. The actual recognition of the union by Western patrons. The situation in the UN Security Council during the voting of the French and Russian draft resolutions, statements by the French and British foreign ministers, representatives of the US State Department and media signals show that the Western establishment has in fact recognized radical extremists as full partners.
3. Funding, support for the radical opposition is no longer covered by slogans and since October of this year has been open. Russia announced the confrontation in Syria on the Afghan scenario.
4. Having withdrawn the bulk of the controlled forces from Aleppo to the area of its own operation (SDF), Turkey clearly indicated its interest in the conflict - the creation of a controlled deep zone between the Kurdish cantons. The support of forces in Idlib and Aleppo is conducted by the Turks within the limits required by the country's internal security.
4. Moscow responded to the signals by the growth of military and political support of its ally, Damascus. The grouping of forces and assets in the Syrian theater of operations is increasing, the political position has become uncompromising.
All this suggests that the parties to the conflict reached an unspoken consensus: in the war between the government of the SAR, its allies and the radical army opposing them, directed by the Western and Middle Eastern patrons, there is no alternative to a forceful solution. This situation introduces more certainty than at the beginning of October 2015. The United States and its allies will increase material, technical, and informational assistance to all radical opposition without the direct intervention of their forces. Turkey will keep (but not strengthen) the existing supply chains, without engaging in open confrontation in Idlib and Aleppo, focusing on its own operation.
The experience gained by Syria, Russia and Iran, as well as the available resources, suggest that the Allies are capable of inflicting radical defeats in Idlib, Aleppo and Daraaa. One of the prerequisites for a successful campaign is an assessment of the enemy’s infrastructure, its material, technical and human resources, information and logistics channels, as well as directions and amounts of funding. The analysis of the expenditures on forces, which in the West are commonly called the “Syrian opposition”, is also interesting.
Information gangs
The tip of the iceberg is made up of relatively formalized organizations, endowed with partial legitimacy to participate in the international political debate, the National Coalition and the National Council. They are used to coordinate the Arab League, to participate in the intra-European dialogue on the Syrian crisis, to manage media resources. The main funding for these organizations, headquartered in Doha and Paris, lies with KSA and Qatar, with partial cash support being episodic US budget grants from NED / NDI.
Both management and line personnel receive regular salaries, at the European level they are provided with housing, office and hotel infrastructure in the capitals, partially protected by communications. Leaders and management there are up to 160 people, line personnel - up to 800. The cumulative costs of the National Coalition are estimated at 16,044 million dollars, the National Council - 48,9 million. In the cost structure, significant funds should be allocated for flights and business trips - up to 13,68 million. Total - 64,9 million dollars.
Information support for the anti-Assad and anti-Russian campaign goes through Internet communities, specialized media portals, and also European watch groups. All this is mainly aimed at covering the fighting, problems with refugees and the wounded and does not concern the issues of big politics - the scope of media holdings. Account Communities Spread news from the front, reports and lists of the dead - a kind of "reports on the expenditure of funds." An-Nusra community accounts: 3 basic, 320 – 330 reference, up to 2,3 million subscribers. “Moderate” account communities: 4 basic, 420 reference, up to 6 millions of subscribers. Media resources and instant distribution systems contain Arab countries, spending up to 4,17 million dollars. Even before 400 thousands are allocated with irregular western grants to the SOHR (Syrian Observatory), Bellingcat, SyriaEye groups. Total - 4,5 million dollars.
"Meat" of war
The infrastructure associated with the transit, accommodation and maintenance of refugees is quite costly compared to the media sphere. The main burden falls on Turkey and Jordan, which, with the very modest support of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, are forced to finance:
arrangement and maintenance of refugee camps, Turkey - 26 camps, 330 thousand people, up to 400 million dollars a year, Jordan - 34 camps, 430 thousand people, 522 million dollars;
the monthly maintenance of refugees outside the camps (cards, rations, payments), Turkey - 2,8 million people, 840 million dollars a year, Jordan - 240 thousand people and 84 million dollars.
The load that the maintenance of refugees imposes on the budget of these countries is so significant that they go to any means to minimize: sending to the EU countries via legal and illegal channels, blackmail of European Commission officials to receive compensation (for 2015 – 2016 years, EU volunteers and commissions paid to 583 million dollars.). The resources of the Arab monarchies are attracted, which finance not so much the maintenance of refugees in these countries, as payment for transit to Europe of family members in exchange for the participation of young people in the hostilities in Syria. Thus, refugee camps become a bottomless base for recruiting in illegal armed groups.
Similar recruitment methods are used by Arab monarchies in Libya, Tunisia, Sudan, Albania, Afghanistan, Iraq. Recorded parameters - up to 45 thousands of recruits with 172 thousands of family members sent through various channels in the EU (430 million dollars a year). It should be noted that young people in Europe remain in contact with their relatives “in the field”, participating in twitter campaigns, and disseminating information. In total - 1,681 million dollars net of European compensation.
The next item of expenditure of the “opposition” is recruitment of members of illegal armed groups, consisting of commission expenses to representatives on the ground, as well as the cost of delivery of the replenishment to the places of preparation. With the total demand of opposition groups in 46 – 48 thousands of people every year, these expenses are 70 million dollars and 93 million, respectively. Total - 163 million dollars.
Train recruited instructors from the USA, France, Great Britain, Qatar, Jordan, KSA and Turkey. Everyone gets a differentiated payment: from 9 thousand dollars per month for teaching field skills, driving and working with anti-tank systems, to 15 thousand dollars (communications, MANPADS, mining and IEDs) and more than 20 thousand dollars for training aircraft manufacturers. Instructors - up to 2600 people (324 million dollars per year).
The average number of illegal armed groups operating in western Syria against the SAR army in 2015 – 2016 decreased from 105 – 110 thousand to 73,5 thousand people. The costs of members of illegal armed groups participating in battles consist of a monthly rate, differentiated depending on the function and degree of responsibility, as well as bonus based on the results of actions confirmed by the command and video reports, communication costs (radio, field, satellite communications) and equipment. Over the course of 2016, expenses shifted from premiums “by results” to premiums for “continuous work”, return after treatment, etc. Wage rates ranged from 200 – 400 dollars per month (arrows, mechanics), 600 dollars (snipers, ATGM operators, mln. commanders), up to 1500 and above (middle command personnel, sappers, bomb experts). The estimated level of payment costs is 341 million dollars per year (ordinary drivers), 85 million dollars (specialists), 31 million dollars (command personnel), with investments in communications and equipment - 8,7 million and 7,4 million dollars, respectively. Total - 473,1 million dollars.
A weighty article is payments to the families of the deceased participants in the illegal armed groups, the costs of operations, treatment and rehabilitation in hospitals, payments, even if small (up to $ 200 per month), disability benefits, salaries during rehabilitation, and expenses for medicines for field surgery. Based on the data of the Russian Defense Ministry, the Turkish opposition press, the Syrian and Kurdish sources, we conclude that since October, the losses of the killed and unaccounted for by the illegal armed groups amounted to 2015 28 thousands since October, thousands 43 injured requiring hospital treatment, of which up to 15,5 thousands - disability incompatible with the continuation of hostilities. Based on the cost of surgery and rehabilitation in Turkey, the average hospital stay (up to 30 days) and the full rehabilitation period (up to 4 months), purely medical costs amount to 592 million dollars, disability payments - 37,7 million, compensation to the families of the victims - 28,6 million, field supply medicines - 15,6 million. Total - 673,9 million dollars.
Action Arsenals
A necessary condition for the conduct of hostilities is a full and timely supply and logistics. During the “Arab Spring” during 2011 – 2013, at least 35 percent of the armored vehicles of the government army, half of the rifle weapons and ammunition from storage and logistics depots in the provinces of Aleppo, Hama, Homs and Daraaa. The scale of casualties by an army of ATS of heavy machinery, small arms and ammunition can be estimated based on the standards for the formation of reserves of the Soviet army, which were used in manning, as well as the testimony of officers of ATS. It was captured ammunition: up 42 tons infantry and antitank, 11 tons to machine guns of large caliber and memory (12,7, 14,5, 23 mm), 130 thousand tonnes by armored vehicles, ACS, conventional artillery and mortar, 13 tons to rocket launchers; VVT: up to 1860 BMP-1 / 2, BTR, BRDM, 730 SAU and towed artillery units, up to 1400 MBT, 150 MLRS and 1100 ZU-23-3 / 4 and mortars, and also 160 MH and XMUM and XNUMX and mortars, as well as up to XNUMX MNU and XNUMX MNUs, and mortars, as well as to XNUMX MTH and XNUMX MNUs and towed artillery
Technique and arsenals, fell into the hands of the radicals, were significant, but not limitless. At the same time, the value of the funds received was leveled by the initial high wear (from 70 to 20%), the duration of the hostilities, as well as the chaotic and unsystematic use of technology that aggravated its condition. If we take as a basis the ammunition consumption characteristic of fighting in Chechnya, we can state: by the beginning of 2015, the Syrian radicals spent 88 percent of small arms ammunition, almost completely shots to RPG-7, 82-mm mortars, RSZO (type BM-21) . A resource has been developed for more than 130 thousands of small arms, 620 ZU, 710 BTR / BMP / BRDM and 640 MBT. Spent up to 72 percent shots to anti-tank systems.
By the spring of 2015, the opposition had significantly reduced the intensity of the use of heavy equipment and the consumption of ammunition for MBT and SAU (up to 10 and 20 units per barrel per day), and the time of active use - on average up to six days per month. Workshop on repair and restoration of weapons and military equipment, laboratories for the production of artisanal means of firing and ammunition found great importance. Mass transfer was carried out heavy pickups of different brands for installation on them starting blocks, large-caliber machine guns, etc.
Similarly, the "Syrian express" with might and main earned "American". Initially for the supply of spare parts, explosive components, small arms and ammunition from warehouses in Libya that have become considerably thinner over four years, then from Romania, the Czech Republic, Ukraine, Bulgaria and the connection of production in Serbia. The structure and volume of the needs of the Syrian militants is confirmed by the data obtained by the Jane's Defense edition: from the average batch of 980 tons 20 percent were 7,62 mm cartridges, 25 percent - 12,7 and 14,5 mm, 200 tons - 82 mm, 120 mm, 200 tons - AK-74 , SVD, PKM, RPG-7, 50 tons of shots to the RPG-7, as well as DShK machine guns. In the following batches, the distribution tended towards NAR (C-8, C-10), explosive components, PKM, Libyan and Ukrainian ZPU-2 / 4, ZU-23-2 and calibers to them, the Malyutka, Fagot ATGM . From the middle of 2016, American-made 81-mm mortars are included in the batch. Deliveries were made in equal parts to Aqaba (Jordan) and Tasuju (Turkey), which characterizes the equal intensity of the battles of that time in the south and north of the country
With the advent of Russian aviation the armored vehicles and self-propelled guns of the illegal armed groups began to be hidden, operations were shifted to evenings and nights. In the frontal areas of the front massively switched to artisanal heavy mortar-type installations ("Hellfire"). The average outfit of equipment for a detachment of 40 fighters looked like this: 8–9 heavy pickups with mortars, storage and launch units NAR, 1–2 BMP / BTR, 1 self-propelled guns or 1 MBT, 4–5 ATGMs. Dismantled infantry fighting vehicles began to be used for installing and conducting suicide attacks (up to 60 over the past year).
Russian aviation responded with the destruction of repair shops, handicrafts of explosives, ammunition depots received on the “American Express”, which was “snapped” by supplies of “humanitarian aid” in the form of NAR (C-8 / 10) BGM-71 TOW (up to 2 thousand units .) and other anti-tank weapons (up to 12 thousand units) and in a number of areas managed to significantly complicate the life of the SAR army. New and used heavy pick-ups (up to 2900 – 2960 units) were mass-shipped.
Based on the number of members of the illegal armed formations, the nature and intensity of armed clashes, the number and types of weapons used, the logistics of the BP, the residual weapon life, and the disposals of personnel, including those with weapons lost, it can be assumed that the need for radical groups of the “Syrian opposition” has RF operations in Syria: up to 38 thousand tons of rifle ammunition and RPGs, 3,5 thousand tons to large-caliber machine guns, 14,4 thousand tons of projectiles to the NAR and MLRS, 63 thousand tons to artillery systems, mortars, armor equipment and MBT for the amount, taking into account the price of the black market 484,6 million dollars.
Also, taking into account the disposal, it can be calculated that at least 109 thousand units were required for the conduct of hostilities. small arms and 33 thousand units. ATGMs and shots to them (including TOW), up to 230 units. Memory and NAR units worth up to 509,1 million dollars. The fleet of heavy pick-ups demanded replenishment - up to 1420 units, based on reports of the Russian and Syrian MO, worth at least 58 million dollars.
This kind of logistics (based on the data on the volume of transportation of the average consignment) amounted to 130 sea container flights and to 5,7 thousands of motor vehicles with 7,5 million and 11,3 million dollars, respectively. Estimated equipment demand for fuel and fuel - at least 51,8 thousand liters or 40 thousand tons for the period under consideration - 18,1 million dollars in black market prices
Preliminary results of the confrontation
1. The cost of a military campaign by anti-government illegal armed groups in Syria in 2015 – 2016 prices amounted to 4,454 billion dollars. This conditional "cost" of the process. It does not take into account the inevitable corruption component, which can not be adequately modeled in principle. Nevertheless, I assume that the Arab monarchies over spending the allocated funds led to a multistage control, which is confirmed by fixation, a kind of reporting, as well as the frequent elimination of unreliable command and intermediaries.
2. Taking into account the use of Syrian warehouse resources in the first two years of the conflict, the total amount of expenditures for a campaign can be conditionally estimated at 14 billions of dollars with 78 – 80 thousands of eliminated illegal armed groups.
3. In the cost structure of the military campaign, the main part is occupied by the maintenance and support of hostilities (61%), the maintenance of refugees (38%). At the same time, directly in military expenditures 1 / 4 part - the cost of medical care and the maintenance of the families of the dead and disabled. Every year of the conflict, this proportion increases.
4. Given the number of potential and de facto displaced persons, as well as funding opportunities for the sponsoring states, the mobilization resource of the campaign from the illegal armed groups can be estimated at 77 – 85 thousand people or three years of the current intensity campaign, taking into account their retirement and rotation.
5. Based on the number of armed pro-Turkish formations (up to 6 thousand people) withdrawn from Idlib and Aleppo and the burden on the maintenance of refugees, as well as the hospital component, it can be assumed that Turkey now bears the bulk of military campaign support costs (42% or 1,864 billion Doll.). The remaining costs are shared between Qatar and KSA. The United States provides and covers the logistics of "express", organizes the training of recruits.
6. With the exception of Turkey for the main sponsors of the Syrian campaign, the costs are insignificant and uncritical. They do not have a direct impact on foreign exchange reserves and budgets of these countries. However, for Turkey, the cost of 2015 – 2016 results is unjustified. It is possible that this circumstance explains the reformatting by Ankara of its participation in the military campaign. At the same time, without supporting the transit of arms in the old regime, Turkey will not seek to completely block the borders, given the influx of refugees from the north of Syria.
7. Taking into account the intensity of armed clashes and the calculated parameters of the weapons and military equipment received, it can be assumed that the technical resources of the illegal armed groups opposing the Syrian government are at the limit. The last major use of heavy weapons and military equipment was during the breakthrough of the blockade of Aleppo, where the AIA and the RF AU was destroyed and disabled up to 115 units. On the rest of the front heavy equipment is used pointwise. The composition of weapons and military equipment in illegal armed formations can be estimated in 1550 units with an average residual resource of 22 percent (1,5 of the campaign year).
8. In 2016 – 2017, anti-government forces will delay the campaign as much as possible, investing in the recruitment of “cannon-fodder” and the maximum creation of an informational image of the “anti-human and barbarous coalition of Assad and Russia”. Especially since the costs of sponsoring countries for information resources are minimal.
In this regard, Russia, the SAR and Iran should maximize the military operations in the north of Syria, avoiding delays and "truce." Islamists are able to tighten the campaign and cause significant damage to the reputation of the opposing side.
It seems appropriate to highlight the following processes that characterize the development of the Syrian crisis.
1. The tactical merger of "moderate" and radical opposition groups with the unequivocal leadership of the radicals has been completed. Coordination between the flagships of the “absolute” and “relative” radicals — the Dzhebhat an-Nusroy and Ahrar ash-Sham, which was banned in Russia, was established. The dismantling of the radicals led, albeit with a partial loss of the results of the September offensive in Hama, to the merger of Jund al-Aqsa with An-Nusra.
2. The actual recognition of the union by Western patrons. The situation in the UN Security Council during the voting of the French and Russian draft resolutions, statements by the French and British foreign ministers, representatives of the US State Department and media signals show that the Western establishment has in fact recognized radical extremists as full partners.
3. Funding, support for the radical opposition is no longer covered by slogans and since October of this year has been open. Russia announced the confrontation in Syria on the Afghan scenario.
4. Having withdrawn the bulk of the controlled forces from Aleppo to the area of its own operation (SDF), Turkey clearly indicated its interest in the conflict - the creation of a controlled deep zone between the Kurdish cantons. The support of forces in Idlib and Aleppo is conducted by the Turks within the limits required by the country's internal security.
4. Moscow responded to the signals by the growth of military and political support of its ally, Damascus. The grouping of forces and assets in the Syrian theater of operations is increasing, the political position has become uncompromising.
All this suggests that the parties to the conflict reached an unspoken consensus: in the war between the government of the SAR, its allies and the radical army opposing them, directed by the Western and Middle Eastern patrons, there is no alternative to a forceful solution. This situation introduces more certainty than at the beginning of October 2015. The United States and its allies will increase material, technical, and informational assistance to all radical opposition without the direct intervention of their forces. Turkey will keep (but not strengthen) the existing supply chains, without engaging in open confrontation in Idlib and Aleppo, focusing on its own operation.The experience gained by Syria, Russia and Iran, as well as the available resources, suggest that the Allies are capable of inflicting radical defeats in Idlib, Aleppo and Daraaa. One of the prerequisites for a successful campaign is an assessment of the enemy’s infrastructure, its material, technical and human resources, information and logistics channels, as well as directions and amounts of funding. The analysis of the expenditures on forces, which in the West are commonly called the “Syrian opposition”, is also interesting.
Information gangs
The tip of the iceberg is made up of relatively formalized organizations, endowed with partial legitimacy to participate in the international political debate, the National Coalition and the National Council. They are used to coordinate the Arab League, to participate in the intra-European dialogue on the Syrian crisis, to manage media resources. The main funding for these organizations, headquartered in Doha and Paris, lies with KSA and Qatar, with partial cash support being episodic US budget grants from NED / NDI.
Both management and line personnel receive regular salaries, at the European level they are provided with housing, office and hotel infrastructure in the capitals, partially protected by communications. Leaders and management there are up to 160 people, line personnel - up to 800. The cumulative costs of the National Coalition are estimated at 16,044 million dollars, the National Council - 48,9 million. In the cost structure, significant funds should be allocated for flights and business trips - up to 13,68 million. Total - 64,9 million dollars.
Information support for the anti-Assad and anti-Russian campaign goes through Internet communities, specialized media portals, and also European watch groups. All this is mainly aimed at covering the fighting, problems with refugees and the wounded and does not concern the issues of big politics - the scope of media holdings. Account Communities Spread news from the front, reports and lists of the dead - a kind of "reports on the expenditure of funds." An-Nusra community accounts: 3 basic, 320 – 330 reference, up to 2,3 million subscribers. “Moderate” account communities: 4 basic, 420 reference, up to 6 millions of subscribers. Media resources and instant distribution systems contain Arab countries, spending up to 4,17 million dollars. Even before 400 thousands are allocated with irregular western grants to the SOHR (Syrian Observatory), Bellingcat, SyriaEye groups. Total - 4,5 million dollars.
"Meat" of war
The infrastructure associated with the transit, accommodation and maintenance of refugees is quite costly compared to the media sphere. The main burden falls on Turkey and Jordan, which, with the very modest support of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, are forced to finance:
arrangement and maintenance of refugee camps, Turkey - 26 camps, 330 thousand people, up to 400 million dollars a year, Jordan - 34 camps, 430 thousand people, 522 million dollars;
the monthly maintenance of refugees outside the camps (cards, rations, payments), Turkey - 2,8 million people, 840 million dollars a year, Jordan - 240 thousand people and 84 million dollars.
The load that the maintenance of refugees imposes on the budget of these countries is so significant that they go to any means to minimize: sending to the EU countries via legal and illegal channels, blackmail of European Commission officials to receive compensation (for 2015 – 2016 years, EU volunteers and commissions paid to 583 million dollars.). The resources of the Arab monarchies are attracted, which finance not so much the maintenance of refugees in these countries, as payment for transit to Europe of family members in exchange for the participation of young people in the hostilities in Syria. Thus, refugee camps become a bottomless base for recruiting in illegal armed groups.
Similar recruitment methods are used by Arab monarchies in Libya, Tunisia, Sudan, Albania, Afghanistan, Iraq. Recorded parameters - up to 45 thousands of recruits with 172 thousands of family members sent through various channels in the EU (430 million dollars a year). It should be noted that young people in Europe remain in contact with their relatives “in the field”, participating in twitter campaigns, and disseminating information. In total - 1,681 million dollars net of European compensation.
The next item of expenditure of the “opposition” is recruitment of members of illegal armed groups, consisting of commission expenses to representatives on the ground, as well as the cost of delivery of the replenishment to the places of preparation. With the total demand of opposition groups in 46 – 48 thousands of people every year, these expenses are 70 million dollars and 93 million, respectively. Total - 163 million dollars.
Train recruited instructors from the USA, France, Great Britain, Qatar, Jordan, KSA and Turkey. Everyone gets a differentiated payment: from 9 thousand dollars per month for teaching field skills, driving and working with anti-tank systems, to 15 thousand dollars (communications, MANPADS, mining and IEDs) and more than 20 thousand dollars for training aircraft manufacturers. Instructors - up to 2600 people (324 million dollars per year).
The average number of illegal armed groups operating in western Syria against the SAR army in 2015 – 2016 decreased from 105 – 110 thousand to 73,5 thousand people. The costs of members of illegal armed groups participating in battles consist of a monthly rate, differentiated depending on the function and degree of responsibility, as well as bonus based on the results of actions confirmed by the command and video reports, communication costs (radio, field, satellite communications) and equipment. Over the course of 2016, expenses shifted from premiums “by results” to premiums for “continuous work”, return after treatment, etc. Wage rates ranged from 200 – 400 dollars per month (arrows, mechanics), 600 dollars (snipers, ATGM operators, mln. commanders), up to 1500 and above (middle command personnel, sappers, bomb experts). The estimated level of payment costs is 341 million dollars per year (ordinary drivers), 85 million dollars (specialists), 31 million dollars (command personnel), with investments in communications and equipment - 8,7 million and 7,4 million dollars, respectively. Total - 473,1 million dollars.
A weighty article is payments to the families of the deceased participants in the illegal armed groups, the costs of operations, treatment and rehabilitation in hospitals, payments, even if small (up to $ 200 per month), disability benefits, salaries during rehabilitation, and expenses for medicines for field surgery. Based on the data of the Russian Defense Ministry, the Turkish opposition press, the Syrian and Kurdish sources, we conclude that since October, the losses of the killed and unaccounted for by the illegal armed groups amounted to 2015 28 thousands since October, thousands 43 injured requiring hospital treatment, of which up to 15,5 thousands - disability incompatible with the continuation of hostilities. Based on the cost of surgery and rehabilitation in Turkey, the average hospital stay (up to 30 days) and the full rehabilitation period (up to 4 months), purely medical costs amount to 592 million dollars, disability payments - 37,7 million, compensation to the families of the victims - 28,6 million, field supply medicines - 15,6 million. Total - 673,9 million dollars.
Action Arsenals
A necessary condition for the conduct of hostilities is a full and timely supply and logistics. During the “Arab Spring” during 2011 – 2013, at least 35 percent of the armored vehicles of the government army, half of the rifle weapons and ammunition from storage and logistics depots in the provinces of Aleppo, Hama, Homs and Daraaa. The scale of casualties by an army of ATS of heavy machinery, small arms and ammunition can be estimated based on the standards for the formation of reserves of the Soviet army, which were used in manning, as well as the testimony of officers of ATS. It was captured ammunition: up 42 tons infantry and antitank, 11 tons to machine guns of large caliber and memory (12,7, 14,5, 23 mm), 130 thousand tonnes by armored vehicles, ACS, conventional artillery and mortar, 13 tons to rocket launchers; VVT: up to 1860 BMP-1 / 2, BTR, BRDM, 730 SAU and towed artillery units, up to 1400 MBT, 150 MLRS and 1100 ZU-23-3 / 4 and mortars, and also 160 MH and XMUM and XNUMX and mortars, as well as up to XNUMX MNU and XNUMX MNUs, and mortars, as well as to XNUMX MTH and XNUMX MNUs and towed artillery
Technique and arsenals, fell into the hands of the radicals, were significant, but not limitless. At the same time, the value of the funds received was leveled by the initial high wear (from 70 to 20%), the duration of the hostilities, as well as the chaotic and unsystematic use of technology that aggravated its condition. If we take as a basis the ammunition consumption characteristic of fighting in Chechnya, we can state: by the beginning of 2015, the Syrian radicals spent 88 percent of small arms ammunition, almost completely shots to RPG-7, 82-mm mortars, RSZO (type BM-21) . A resource has been developed for more than 130 thousands of small arms, 620 ZU, 710 BTR / BMP / BRDM and 640 MBT. Spent up to 72 percent shots to anti-tank systems.
By the spring of 2015, the opposition had significantly reduced the intensity of the use of heavy equipment and the consumption of ammunition for MBT and SAU (up to 10 and 20 units per barrel per day), and the time of active use - on average up to six days per month. Workshop on repair and restoration of weapons and military equipment, laboratories for the production of artisanal means of firing and ammunition found great importance. Mass transfer was carried out heavy pickups of different brands for installation on them starting blocks, large-caliber machine guns, etc.
Similarly, the "Syrian express" with might and main earned "American". Initially for the supply of spare parts, explosive components, small arms and ammunition from warehouses in Libya that have become considerably thinner over four years, then from Romania, the Czech Republic, Ukraine, Bulgaria and the connection of production in Serbia. The structure and volume of the needs of the Syrian militants is confirmed by the data obtained by the Jane's Defense edition: from the average batch of 980 tons 20 percent were 7,62 mm cartridges, 25 percent - 12,7 and 14,5 mm, 200 tons - 82 mm, 120 mm, 200 tons - AK-74 , SVD, PKM, RPG-7, 50 tons of shots to the RPG-7, as well as DShK machine guns. In the following batches, the distribution tended towards NAR (C-8, C-10), explosive components, PKM, Libyan and Ukrainian ZPU-2 / 4, ZU-23-2 and calibers to them, the Malyutka, Fagot ATGM . From the middle of 2016, American-made 81-mm mortars are included in the batch. Deliveries were made in equal parts to Aqaba (Jordan) and Tasuju (Turkey), which characterizes the equal intensity of the battles of that time in the south and north of the country
With the advent of Russian aviation the armored vehicles and self-propelled guns of the illegal armed groups began to be hidden, operations were shifted to evenings and nights. In the frontal areas of the front massively switched to artisanal heavy mortar-type installations ("Hellfire"). The average outfit of equipment for a detachment of 40 fighters looked like this: 8–9 heavy pickups with mortars, storage and launch units NAR, 1–2 BMP / BTR, 1 self-propelled guns or 1 MBT, 4–5 ATGMs. Dismantled infantry fighting vehicles began to be used for installing and conducting suicide attacks (up to 60 over the past year).
Russian aviation responded with the destruction of repair shops, handicrafts of explosives, ammunition depots received on the “American Express”, which was “snapped” by supplies of “humanitarian aid” in the form of NAR (C-8 / 10) BGM-71 TOW (up to 2 thousand units .) and other anti-tank weapons (up to 12 thousand units) and in a number of areas managed to significantly complicate the life of the SAR army. New and used heavy pick-ups (up to 2900 – 2960 units) were mass-shipped.
Based on the number of members of the illegal armed formations, the nature and intensity of armed clashes, the number and types of weapons used, the logistics of the BP, the residual weapon life, and the disposals of personnel, including those with weapons lost, it can be assumed that the need for radical groups of the “Syrian opposition” has RF operations in Syria: up to 38 thousand tons of rifle ammunition and RPGs, 3,5 thousand tons to large-caliber machine guns, 14,4 thousand tons of projectiles to the NAR and MLRS, 63 thousand tons to artillery systems, mortars, armor equipment and MBT for the amount, taking into account the price of the black market 484,6 million dollars.
Also, taking into account the disposal, it can be calculated that at least 109 thousand units were required for the conduct of hostilities. small arms and 33 thousand units. ATGMs and shots to them (including TOW), up to 230 units. Memory and NAR units worth up to 509,1 million dollars. The fleet of heavy pick-ups demanded replenishment - up to 1420 units, based on reports of the Russian and Syrian MO, worth at least 58 million dollars.
This kind of logistics (based on the data on the volume of transportation of the average consignment) amounted to 130 sea container flights and to 5,7 thousands of motor vehicles with 7,5 million and 11,3 million dollars, respectively. Estimated equipment demand for fuel and fuel - at least 51,8 thousand liters or 40 thousand tons for the period under consideration - 18,1 million dollars in black market prices
Preliminary results of the confrontation
1. The cost of a military campaign by anti-government illegal armed groups in Syria in 2015 – 2016 prices amounted to 4,454 billion dollars. This conditional "cost" of the process. It does not take into account the inevitable corruption component, which can not be adequately modeled in principle. Nevertheless, I assume that the Arab monarchies over spending the allocated funds led to a multistage control, which is confirmed by fixation, a kind of reporting, as well as the frequent elimination of unreliable command and intermediaries.
2. Taking into account the use of Syrian warehouse resources in the first two years of the conflict, the total amount of expenditures for a campaign can be conditionally estimated at 14 billions of dollars with 78 – 80 thousands of eliminated illegal armed groups.
3. In the cost structure of the military campaign, the main part is occupied by the maintenance and support of hostilities (61%), the maintenance of refugees (38%). At the same time, directly in military expenditures 1 / 4 part - the cost of medical care and the maintenance of the families of the dead and disabled. Every year of the conflict, this proportion increases.
4. Given the number of potential and de facto displaced persons, as well as funding opportunities for the sponsoring states, the mobilization resource of the campaign from the illegal armed groups can be estimated at 77 – 85 thousand people or three years of the current intensity campaign, taking into account their retirement and rotation.
5. Based on the number of armed pro-Turkish formations (up to 6 thousand people) withdrawn from Idlib and Aleppo and the burden on the maintenance of refugees, as well as the hospital component, it can be assumed that Turkey now bears the bulk of military campaign support costs (42% or 1,864 billion Doll.). The remaining costs are shared between Qatar and KSA. The United States provides and covers the logistics of "express", organizes the training of recruits.
6. With the exception of Turkey for the main sponsors of the Syrian campaign, the costs are insignificant and uncritical. They do not have a direct impact on foreign exchange reserves and budgets of these countries. However, for Turkey, the cost of 2015 – 2016 results is unjustified. It is possible that this circumstance explains the reformatting by Ankara of its participation in the military campaign. At the same time, without supporting the transit of arms in the old regime, Turkey will not seek to completely block the borders, given the influx of refugees from the north of Syria.
7. Taking into account the intensity of armed clashes and the calculated parameters of the weapons and military equipment received, it can be assumed that the technical resources of the illegal armed groups opposing the Syrian government are at the limit. The last major use of heavy weapons and military equipment was during the breakthrough of the blockade of Aleppo, where the AIA and the RF AU was destroyed and disabled up to 115 units. On the rest of the front heavy equipment is used pointwise. The composition of weapons and military equipment in illegal armed formations can be estimated in 1550 units with an average residual resource of 22 percent (1,5 of the campaign year).
8. In 2016 – 2017, anti-government forces will delay the campaign as much as possible, investing in the recruitment of “cannon-fodder” and the maximum creation of an informational image of the “anti-human and barbarous coalition of Assad and Russia”. Especially since the costs of sponsoring countries for information resources are minimal.
In this regard, Russia, the SAR and Iran should maximize the military operations in the north of Syria, avoiding delays and "truce." Islamists are able to tighten the campaign and cause significant damage to the reputation of the opposing side.
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