Liman, Kupyansk, Kherson - then we are waiting for Melitopol?

In order to understand and risk predicting what will happen next in our lives, what fateful decisions and turns are destined for us, Staver and I sat over the map for quite some time. Map - it allows you to think for a long time and sometimes come to unexpected decisions.

Here is a map of the region to which all eyes are riveted and for a long time hundreds of thousands of eyes will be looking at this part of the earth's surface. With different feelings.




Our task was to try to understand how events in this part of Ukraine and Russia can develop further.

So what do we have today:

1. Kherson abandoned, apparently, Novaya Kakhovka will also be abandoned, the defense line will pass somewhere 5 km from the coastline of the Dnieper.

This, on the one hand, is very reasonable, because according to the laws of nature in this world, the left bank of the Dnieper is categorically flat and low. Unlike the right bank. Accordingly, it will be very easy to fire at the left bank from the right bank, but in response ... However, here is a perfect repetition of what happened 80 years ago, so we see no point in discussing this again.

The withdrawal of Russian troops from the coastline is due to the fact that now at any moment the Ukrainians can bring down on the left bank all the power of the water accumulated in the Kakhovka reservoir. The action is one-time, not capable of bringing tangible results, but it will have to be reckoned with, because we have no doubt that the Ukrainians will be able to undermine the dam. They can undermine and undermine.

Because, regrettably, but the coastal line will remain empty and the Russian army will keep the defense at a safe distance. This creates a certain opportunity for forcing the Dnieper (especially in winter) by sabotage groups that will disturb the line of defense of the Russian troops and keep them in suspense.

The fact that the Ukrainians have perfectly learned to use highly mobile DRGs on lightly armored vehicles, I hope no one will argue.

In parallel, it should be noted that the undermining of the dam of the Kakhovka reservoir simultaneously with the flooding of the lower territories will create two more problems.

The first is the dehydration of the Crimean Canal, which will again create a tense water situation on the peninsula. However, this is not the main problem in the Crimea.

The second is leaving the cooling system of the Zaporozhye NPP without water. This is also not a very big problem, because VVER-1000 reactors can (and should be) shut down in a good way, and this is done much easier than the memorable RBMK. Yes, a bunch of cities and villages in Ukraine will be left without electricity, but the problem of an emergency at a nuclear power plant will not be so acute.


2. Kherson is no longer a defense hub, this is a node to advance. And, unfortunately, not Russian, but Ukrainian troops. Having a large city with its infrastructure behind us, it is possible and necessary to provide the army with everything that is needed: repair of equipment, treatment of the wounded and sick in city hospitals, rest of units during rotation.

Yes, it should be noted that the Armed Forces of Ukraine know what it is - rotation.

The promised strengthening of troops in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions should not be expected. The Armed Forces of Ukraine will simply not be allowed to do this, and if such a regrouping suddenly occurs, the data on this will immediately be at the disposal of the Armed Forces of Ukraine thanks to American satellites. Accordingly, a simply trivial attempt to attack in the direction of Skadovsk will begin with the creation of a simply gorgeous cauldron. Or defiantly to Armyansk, for hello, Crimea.

In any case, the situation is rather stalemate, Russia will not attack for a bunch of reasons already told by "experts", Ukraine does not really need this either, there is where to make efforts.

3. Николаев. You can also forget about ambitions for this city for the next year, because Sultan Erdogan clearly said that he needed Nikolaev ports for a grain deal. Therefore, we simply forget about Nikolaev, especially since after the loss of Kherson, this is really problematic.


With regard to the Kinburn Spit, which will allegedly be handed over to ensure the security of the grain deal, from our point of view, this is too much. The MLRS placed on the spit will not help in any way in terms of sinking grain carriers, especially since from Ochakovo, which is under the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the entire spit is shot through simply luxuriously. There, the width of the bay is from 8 to 12 km, any artillery can handle it.

So those who speak on the topic that "Abandoning the Kinburn Spit for the sake of securing a grain deal - and Russia will be able to safely withdraw from the deal, because no one will notice anything" - these are people who are talking nonsense. Russia can indeed withdraw from the grain deal at any moment, and indeed no one will really notice anything, because the force that could impede the export of grain, namely the Black Sea Fleet, sits on bases in the Crimea. But this is a topic for a separate discussion.

In fact, the Kinburn Spit is nothing more than an attempt to wishful thinking. The real value of this place in military terms is small, but this does not mean that it should be left. Although in our country today almost all the objects and settlements left by Russia do not have any military value.

So the security of the grain deal for Ukraine is not guaranteed by the absence of Russia on the Kinburn Spit or the ships of the Black Sea fleet in the Odessa region, and the presence of Erdogan, who covers the deal.

We have dealt with the western direction, there will be no progress in the near future. We can't, the Ukrainians don't need it yet. But for now. Naturally, they will go to return their lands back, but only when they are told that it is time. Those who today coordinate and direct their actions.


4. In the east (or more precisely, in the northeast), we have another node under consideration for the offensive. Zaporozhye. No less serious knot than Kherson, moreover, not weakened by the evacuation actions of the Russian side. That is, we explain: there are workers in the factories, medical personnel in hospitals, the city is serviced, the infrastructure is being repaired, and all this is in much better condition than today in Kherson, from where about a hundred thousand residents fled.

And from Zaporozhye, as a supply hub (it is worth remembering that bridges and railways in Ukraine are inviolable for the Russian army), options for a further offensive on the territories under Russian control can be considered.

The front line runs in the Stepnogorsk-Orekhove region, so Zaporozhye, which is located 50 km to the north, is quite the rear. Kherson, for comparison, will be located 10 kilometers from the front end.

When this material is released, many bloggers and journalists will already speak on the topic of further developments. The names of different cities will be pronounced, among which there will certainly be Mariupol, Melitopol and Berdyansk.

Mariupol and Berdyansk can safely be put aside for now. They are not interesting, and Mariupol is also complicated due to the location of the DPR nearby, from whose troops you can easily get in the side.

Indeed, these settlements are of no particular value, either as points on the political or as points on the economic maps. Especially Mariupol, where we walked through the infrastructure with all our heart. Yes, restoration work is going on there in full, so it makes sense to wait until they are over and come to the ready, if possible.

Rђ RІRѕS, Melitopol… These are, as they say in Odessa, two very big differences.

First, it is the Russian center of the Zaporozhye region, which, according to the referendum, joined the Russian Federation. So the capture of Melitopol is another deafening slap in the face of Russia.

Second: the capture of Melitopol is a completely blocked so-called land route to the Crimea. Moreover, completely blocked, both by rail and by road.

Third. In military terms, everything is simply luxurious: Russian generals will not be able to transfer units from near Kherson simply because they will immediately receive a blow in the back, or, also quite an option, the attack on Melitopol will come from two directions, Zaporozhye and Kherson. And where the process goes better, there and develop success.

And it will not be easy to determine where the main blow will be, given our level of intelligence development. Although something tells us that Zaporozhye, almost untouched by the war, will still be more profitable.

By the way, the captive senior lieutenant of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Lepikhin also speaks in favor of our version, who seemed to have heard from instructors there that there would be an attack on the Kursk and Belgorod regions in winter. In fact, from our point of view, a distraction would be just fine. Yes, it will be easy (the Armed Forces of Ukraine can afford it, they have an army larger than the Russian one) to send a certain number of units to direct a nix with all sorts of special effects to the Russian border.

It is too early for the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Ukrainian authorities to really seize Russian lands until their own are liberated. But under the cover of such a maneuver, and even with stirrings near Kherson, it may work out.

Effects? Well, they're not really deadly. The territory cut in half, controlled by Russian troops, is not so bad. The western/Kherson part will be supplied from the Crimea and, if something happens, it will withdraw there according to the next regrouping plan. The eastern one will be supplied, as before, through the territories of the LDNR.

In fact, there will be another win, nothing more. The benefits of such an offensive will be more political than military, although in military terms, success can also be very significant. It's not that the Russian army will "crumble", but in our time, anything can happen.

Considering that behind all the “regroupings” and outright flight there are some strange gestures that are commonly called “agreements”, one should not be surprised. But look at the list of what started around the abandonment of Kherson:

- The US Treasury allows transactions for the operation of Russian diplomatic and consular missions;
- 20 tons of Russian fertilizers for Malawi were unblocked in the port of Rotterdam (Netherlands);
- The United States extended the permit for energy-related transactions with the largest banks in Russia and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation until May 15, 2023;
- The London Metal Exchange (LME) decided not to impose a ban on the supply of metals from Russia;
- The United States said it was waiting for signals of readiness for serious negotiations on Ukraine from Russia.
- The Russian Foreign Ministry has repeatedly stated that it is ready for negotiations with Kyiv without any conditions.

So Melitopol, by virtue of the above arguments, can easily become the subject of another deal. After all, now it is a subject of the Federation, a regional center of the Russian Federation. Nothing, in our opinion, is worse than Kherson or Nikolaev. So - everything is in order, the value has been announced, what will become the subject of the transaction is a separate issue. But the fact that in our time any city in that region can become a deal is indisputable.

Speaking essentially, apart from the horrendous political losses that Russia has suffered, from a military point of view, everything is not as sad as it might seem. However, there is one nuance: despite the “opinion of the military” shown to us, politicians and economists really rule this notorious NWO. There is more than enough evidence for this today.

Is it possible to win the started war of Russia? Yes, definitely. But for this it is necessary to drive politicians and oligarchs as far as possible from command and control and setting tasks. It is necessary to inflict damage on the enemy's infrastructure without regard to who receives income from it and who is the true owner of factories, roads, steamships ...