The reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the initial period of the war (a brief overview). Part of 1

Since the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, 75 years have passed, but no one gave a clear answer to the question: why did we suffer such great losses since the beginning of the war and retreated all the way to Moscow? Could it all be different? Was the Red Army able to repel an attack by fascist Germany with fewer losses?

22 June 1941 became our black and tragic date. stories. It was from that day that Soviet history was divided into two large periods: before the war and after the war.

Many historians, writers and ordinary people have asked and are asking themselves today: why wasn’t the country ready for war, although they knew it was inevitable? Why was the Red Army, strong at that time, unable to wage a victorious war at the initial stage? How did it happen that we lost so many people? Why did the country's top leadership not take decisive action to prepare to repel aggression?

Everyone answers these questions in their own way. Some speak of surprise attacks. Others knew about the attack, but did not have time to get ready in time. Still others blame Stalin or the top military leadership. The fourth cause of our failures is the army’s unpreparedness for defensive actions. Fifth, they say that the process of rearmament was under way, and therefore we did not have equipment equal to German, etc. Each of them is right. All of the above can be attributed to the reasons for the defeat at the beginning of the war. But on the other hand, other questions arise: why was the attack sudden? What did the intelligence do? Why the army did not know how to defend? Etc.

Definitely answer all these questions is difficult and impossible. There is no one universal reason. There are many of them, and all of them only in a complex explain our defeats.

The purpose of this article is to recall briefly what the Barbarossa plan was, the general course of events in the initial period of the war, and to consider in more detail the complex of the main (in the author's opinion) causes of the defeat of the Red Army from 22.06 to 10.07.1941.

Plans and forces of the warring parties

Germany. The main goal of the war against the USSR was that the German imperialists put the destruction of the world's only socialist state, the conquest of its territory and the enslavement of the peoples of the Soviet Union.

The plan of attack on the Soviet Union and the preparatory measures for its implementation, the German command began to develop and conduct in 1940. Initial instructions for the development of the plan were given by Hitler in July. 9 of August was issued an order "On construction activities in the East" [Anfilov V.A. The beginning of World War II], according to which the future theater of war was to be prepared: the construction of barracks, highways, airfields, railways, communication lines, warehouses, training grounds and other facilities. 18 December 1940 was signed by Hitler's main directive (No. 21) of the “Barbarossa Plan”, which was later supplemented by other directives and orders.

The first page of the plan "Barbarossa"

Discussion of the plan of attack on the USSR

The fascist German command planned against the Soviet Union to conduct a “lightning war” (“blitzkrieg”). They believed that this war would take no more than 3-4 months, and therefore they hoped with a sudden and powerful blow to defeat the Soviet troops in the border areas and open their own path for unhindered advance into the Soviet Union. The immediate strategic goal of the Hitler strategists was the destruction of Soviet troops west of the r. Western Dvina and Dnieper. It was decided to conduct an offensive in three strategic directions: Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev. “The ultimate goal of the operation, as indicated in the Barbarossa plan, is to isolate itself from Asian Russia along the Arkhangelsk-Volga general line ... If necessary, the last industrial region remaining in Russia in the Urals can be paralyzed with aviation». [Dashichev V.I. Strategic planning of aggression against the USSR, s.30].

General scheme of attack on the USSR

The concentration of Nazi troops to attack the Soviet Union began in the summer of 1940. However, it was carried out most intensively from the beginning of 1941. After the directive on concentration of forces was issued on January 31. In this directive, the main command of the ground forces indicated the common goal of the war, set the task to army groups and field armies and tank the groups included in their composition were determined by the methods of interaction between the ground forces and aviation. In the appendices to the directive, the distribution of forces by army groups was indicated, the dates for the concentration of troops and their transfer from the areas of deployment and unloading to the waiting areas were established. They cited data on the situation of Soviet troops in the border districts and indicated objects that German aviation was supposed to strike in the early days of the war.

The concentration of troops was carried out mainly by rail. Ensuring the secrecy of strategic deployment was achieved by keeping in the strictest confidence of all preparatory activities for the war and a wide system of disinformation. The special "directive on enemy disinformation", signed by 15 February 1941, stated: "The strategic deployment of forces for Operation Barbarossa should be presented in light of the largest disinformation maneuver in history of wars to divert attention from the latest preparations for the invasion of England." So, the fascist German command was concentrating forces in the East in the form of a disinformation event, ostensibly to conceal preparations for the landing of a naval landing force in England. In order to create an impression of preparations for the landing of troops in England from the coast of Norway and France, special operations "Shark" and "Harpoon" were developed and carried out in parallel with the concentration of troops in the east. [Anfilov V.A. The beginning of the Great ..., p. 1].

Simultaneously with the implementation of disinformation and disguise measures, the Hitlerite command carried out a great deal of work on organizing and conducting reconnaissance in order to obtain information about the quantity and quality of the Soviet Armed Forces, the grouping of troops on the western borders and the nature of the fortifications. The department of aerial photography of the Air Force headquarters periodically conducted aerial surveys of the border regions of the Soviet Union. German intelligence also tried to uncover the base of our air force. Special attention was paid to the western direction. The German espionage network deployed throughout the border strip allowed the enemy to uncover many military targets, and in the early days of the war helped disrupt the management of Soviet troops.

10 June 1941 formations and units designed to wage war against the USSR began to be withdrawn to waiting areas equipped at a distance from the border in 7-20 km for infantry and in 20-30 km for tank and motorized divisions. Starting position for the offensive of the first echelon division began to occupy the 18 June. The deployment of the Nazi troops was completed before June 21. In addition to the German troops, the German satellite troops also prepared for the attack on the Soviet Union: Finland, Romania and Hungary. [The history of World War II 1939 - 1945: In 12-t. T. 4. - M, 1975, p.30].

In accordance with the Barbarossa plan, the German command created three large groups, each of which was to advance in one of the strategic directions.

On the sector from Memel (Klaipeda) to Goldap, on the 230-kilometer front, Army Group North was deployed (Commander-General Field Marshal von Leeb) consisting of 16 and 18 Armies and 4-TG (total 29 divisions, including including 3 tank and 3 motorized). Army Group "North" delivered the main blow from the Tilsit region in the general direction of Daugavpils, Pskov, in order to crush the Soviet troops in the Baltic States and create favorable conditions for a further offensive on Leningrad [Anfilov V.A. The beginning of the Great ..., p. 2].

Action Plan and Tasks of Army Group "North"

From Goldap to Wlodawa, the most powerful army group “Center” was concentrated on a 550-kilometer stretch (commander Field Marshal von Bock). It included the ninth and fourth armies, the third and second TGs (a total of 50 divisions, including 9 armored, 6 motorized and one cavalry and 2 brigades). Two shock groups were created in this group of armies, which, advancing in convergent directions, were to unite in the Minsk region with the aim of encircling and destroying Soviet troops in Belarus. Subsequently, the troops of this army group were to develop an offensive in the general direction of Smolensk, Moscow. The advance of Army Group Center, which dealt the main blow, was supported by the 2nd Air fleet, in which there were 1670 aircraft.

Action Plan and Tasks of Army Group "Center"

At the turn of Lublin to the mouth of the river. The Danube, the length of which reached 780 km, prepared for the offensive Army Group South (Commander Field Marshal von Rundstedt) consisting of 6, 17 and 11 of the German, 3 and 4 of the Romanian armies, 1 and TG Hungarian corps (total 57 divisions, including 5 tank and 4 motorized, and 13 brigades). The troops of this group, advancing in the general direction of Kiev, were to destroy the Soviet units in Western Ukraine. With access to Kiev, it was planned to seize a bridgehead on the left bank and advance mobile units along the right bank of the Dnieper in order to prevent the withdrawal of Soviet troops across the river, and then to destroy them from the front and rear. This army group was supposed to support the 4 th air fleet and the Romanian aviation (up to 1300 aircraft) [Dashichev V.I. Strategic planning ..., p.36-37].

Action Plan and Tasks for Army Group South

In addition to these army groups, the German army “Norway” and the Finnish armies: “South-Eastern” and “Karelian” were concentrated on the territory of Eastern Finland. The first of them was to advance on the Ukhta, Kandalaksha and Murmansk directions, and the Finnish armies - on the Karelian Isthmus and to the north of it, in order to unite with the troops of the Army Group "North" in the Leningrad region and on the r. Svir. The fighting of this group of forces (total 21 infantry division and 3 brigades) was supported by the 5 air fleet and Finnish aviation [Veremeev Yu.G. Defense in the North].

While hoping to defeat the Soviet Union in one fleeting campaign, Hitler's command sought to use the maximum force in the first strike, in order to defeat the main forces of the Red Army at the beginning of the war. To this end, the enemy deployed all field armies and tank groups in one echelon. The reserve ground command of the ground forces were 24 divisions, which were intended mainly to strengthen the army groups "Center" and "South" [Krivosheev G.F. On the eve of ,.16].

In total, enemy groups deployed against the Soviet Union included 181 division and 18 brigades, 3500 tanks, over 47 thousand guns and mortars, around 5000 aircraft. The total number of personnel of the armed forces of fascist Germany and its satellites deployed to act against the USSR, reached 5500000 people [Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century: Statistical research, s.219]. Other sources give other data. So, E. Molo speaks only of 153 German divisions totaling 2500000 people [Molo E. Armed Forces of the Second World War, c.187].

Thus, as a result of carrying out a whole complex of preparatory measures, fascist Germany launched large attack groups on the Soviet border at the beginning of the attack on the USSR, which were well-armed and equipped with everything necessary for the needs of the war. The fascist German troops to 22 June 1941 were in a state of full combat readiness to attack the Soviet Union.

Nomination schedule and location of German and Soviet parts on 22 June 1941.

THE USSR. Given that Hitler Germany would sooner or later attack the Soviet Union, the Soviet command was preparing troops to defend its borders. [Fedorov A. Unfading feat of the Armed Forces of the USSR, p. XXUM].

It was assumed that in the event of a perfidious attack, the fascist German army would strike the main blow, most likely from East Prussia [A.A. Martirosyan The tragedy of 22 Jun: Blitzkrieg or treason? C. 240]. In this regard, since February 1941 in the Baltic States have been intensively defensive work. The People's Commissar of Defense pointed out to the PribOVO Military Council that the construction of fortified areas to cover by East Prussia is the most important government task for 1941 for the district Anfilov V.A. The beginning of World War II c.2]. The Soviet command did not rule out the possibility of delivering a powerful strike from the area south of Polesye on the Kiev direction. Defense construction in Western Ukraine has developed in the same broad front as in the Baltic States [Zyuzin E.I. About the basics of the strategic deployment of the Red Army before the war, s.20].

By the spring of 1941, the General Staff developed the “Plan for the Defense of the State Border of 1941”, which in early May was brought to the military councils of the border districts. The troops of these districts were assigned the task of preventing the invasion of the ground and air enemy into the territory of the Soviet Union, stubborn defense in the fortified areas to cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment of troops. Anfilov V.A. The beginning of World War II c.2]. According to this plan, cover plans were drawn up in the counties. The destruction of the enemy groups that had broken through was supposed to be carried out by the second echelon of the covering armies - mechanized corps, anti-tank artillery brigades and aircraft. After repelling an enemy attack in the border zone, it was planned, under the special instructions of the High Command, to transfer military operations to the enemy’s territory [Koval M. To the history of border battles in Ukraine, s.10-12].

Actions of the Armed Forces of the Red Army in the European theater of operations, according to the May plans to cover the border of the border military districts 1941 g

Since the Soviet Union was not going to attack, in the western border districts there were only covering troops. Their task was to prevent the invasion of enemy troops on the territory and in the airspace of the USSR.

Those units that were not part of the covering armies were located in the depths of the territory of the districts at a distance of 400 km from the border. In the first echelon of covering armies, as a rule, rifle units were allocated, and in the second - mechanized corps. The air cover of the ground forces was assigned to the aviation of the border districts. On the eve of the war, the covering troops were in garrisons and camps located at a distance of 20-150 km from the border, which was guarded by a few border detachments. In addition to border guards, in many sections of the border there were engineer and construction battalions together with rifle subunits separated from combined-arms units to carry out engineering work in order to strengthen the basement. [Anfilov V.A. Beginning of World War II, c.3].

In the pre-war years, during the summer period of training troops, it was widely practiced to hold district, army and corps assemblies of various branches of troops as part of units. Such actions can be justified only by the fact that recruits were called up in the spring, and they had to be trained. For example, in the Kiev Special Military District in early June 1941 from rifle divisions artillery regiments, as well as anti-tank and anti-aircraft battalions were withdrawn to artillery training camps (army and corps polygons). Special units of divisional units and rifle regiments also underwent training. Part of the rifle divisions was at that time in defense construction. In the divisional camps there were only some rifle divisions and headquarters. Therefore, many infantry divisions were divided and, in fact, they were not combat-ready compounds. [Zakharov M.V. The General Staff in the prewar years, with. 56].

Thus, it is possible to draw a general conclusion that by the time of the attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union all the planned measures to increase the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces were not complete. The troops of the border districts were not sufficiently prepared to repel the sudden attacks of the aggressor, despite the fact that they had everything necessary for this [Kiev Kiev Red Banner: Essays on History. 1918 - 1988, p.140]. The rifle divisions of the first echelons of the covering armies were far from the border and therefore could not prevent the invasion of enemy troops into the territory of the USSR. By the beginning of the war, the troops of the border districts were not ready to repel an enemy strike. In addition, they have not completed the re-formation and re-equipment of the new material part. [Liddel Gard B. World War II, c.153]. All this made it extremely difficult to fight a strong and insidious enemy who possessed an experienced army deployed in advance on the borders of the USSR and who took advantage of the surprise attack on the Soviet Union.

The beginning of the war. Border Battles (22.06 - 10.07.1941)

And how many of us left in the skyscapes that summer
Himself covered their homeland?
But no one will tell us about this in the reports
After all, we died in the first battle.

V. Tretyakov "It was the fourth day of the war."

This issue is covered in sufficient detail, so we’ll dwell on it very briefly.

On the night of 21 on 22 on June 1941, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR sent the Directive No. XXUMX to the commanders of the border districts. It was prescribed that during the night of June 1 bring the troops on full alert and take up positions on the border, and be prepared to repel the German attack [A.A. Martirosyan The tragedy of 22 Jun: Blitzkrieg or treason ?, c.143-144]. In the districts, this directive was received at around one in the morning on June 22. In 2: 00 25 minutes, district commanders sent similar orders to the armies. These orders reached the troops with great delay. Therefore, practically until the attack of the Nazis, the troops could not follow these instructions. [Sharov A. “I did not commit adultery ...”, c.10].

It should be noted here that another 18 of June in the districts was sent encryption about the dispersal of aviation in the border strip and the transfer of headquarters to field control points.

The General Staff ordered the chairman of the SNK to order the commanders of the western military districts to take measures to increase the combat readiness of the troops. The commanders of the Baltic, Leningrad, Western, Kiev, and Odessa military districts, as well as the Baltic, Black Sea, and Northern fleets, received a corresponding order signed by Army General of the Army General GK. Zhukov. This cipher telegram was not found in the archives, but the mention of it is contained in the materials on the charges of the command of Zapov, where the testimony of the chief of communications of Zapov, Major General A.T. Grigorieva: “And after the telegram of the Chief of General Staff from 18 of June, the district troops were not alerted ...”. Similar testimonies are also contained in the answers of generals polled after the war, who commanded before the war in Western districts (materials of the commission under the leadership of Colonel-General A.Pokrovsky), as well as in separate documents of the command of the Baltic Special Military District, reports of fleet commanders about bringing the fleets in combat readiness number 2, dated 18 June, in particular, in the "Order of the Commander of the Baltic Special Military District number 00229 from 18 June 1941, the command and troops of the district about AI activities in order to quickly bring the embattled district military operations theater. " In accordance with it, the county troops were to occupy the initial areas (concentration areas) by June 21. [Makovsky V.B. Cover the state border on the eve of the war, c.54].

In the cipher telegram of the chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov from 19 June to the commander of the Kiev Special Military District, Colonel-General MP Kirponos was instructed: "By 22.06.1941, the administration should go to Ternopil, leaving the subordinate district administration in Kiev ... To keep the isolation and transfer of front control in the strictest confidence, what to warn the personnel of the district headquarters." The district command was warned of the possibility of a German attack in the coming days without a declaration of war. At the same time, the order to bring the troops into full combat readiness did not follow. [//zhistory.org.ua/haltur_2.htm].

The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union against Germany began on 22 on June 1941 of the year at 3 hours of 15 minutes from the air strikes of the German air force on the airfields of the Soviet border districts. As a result of the attack on the border airfields, the enemy during the first for got a full advantage for air superiority. With blows from the air, at headquarters and communications centers, the location of which he is well aware, he destroyed the command and control and created the prerequisites for a successful ground offensive. [A.A. Strokov History of military art, c.360].

Simultaneously with the air strikes, the German ground forces, after artillery preparation, crossed the USSR state border. The first to resist the enemy troops were the border guards, in some areas they were able to hold the enemy for several hours (according to German plans for overcoming the border, no more than 30 minutes were allotted). But, having a great advantage on the directions of the main attack, the German troops quickly advanced deep into Soviet territory.

Border guards are the only ones who met the enemy on full alert

The attack of the enemy found most of the Soviet units in the border zone in a tactically disadvantageous position. Some divisions, for example, in the Baltic Special Military District, managed to take their positions on the cover plan, but most only moved to designated defense sectors or areas of concentration and were forced to go into battle with the move [Statyuk I. Defense of the Baltic States. 1941, p. 15-16]. In this case, all this was done under the enemy's constant airstrikes. The air defense system was not on alert and therefore could not cover ground units.

As a result of the fighting from 22 June to 9 July, the troops of the North-Western Front did not fulfill the tasks set for them. They left the Baltics, suffered heavy losses, and allowed the enemy to advance 500 km deep into Soviet territory.

The troops of the Western Front from June 22 to July 9 suffered significant losses and were unable to complete the tasks assigned to them. The enemy moved deep into 550 km, captured almost all of Belarus and went to the Dnieper [The history of World War II 1939 - 1945: In 12-t. T.4., C. 47].

The troops of the South-Western Front (SWF) met an enemy strike with sturdy defenses and counterstrikes. With great difficulty and considerable losses of the German 1TG and the 6 Army, they still managed to advance from the Sokal area in the direction of Dubno [Davydenko A. Fire Triangle, p. 4]. The command of the USP, having determined the direction of the main attack of the enemy, decided to launch a counterstrike. Against the German 1TG, the 15, 8, 9 and 19 Mechanical Corps were advanced from the depths into the Brody area. But as a result of the lack of a unified leadership, proper intelligence (especially air), a clear interaction between tanks, aircraft and artillery, as well as the result of the corps engaging in parts, right from the march, the counter-attack turned into a series of separate counter-fights and achieved the goal [Koval M. To the history of border battles in Ukraine, c.77]. In this situation, the Soviet command decided to withdraw troops until July 9 and take up defense along the old line of fortifications on the border of 1939.

Soviet tanks on the outskirts of Dubno

The general withdrawal of the South-Western Front troops took place in a difficult situation. The rates of advance of the enemy’s tank and motorized divisions were higher than the maneuver of the Soviet reserves. 8 July 11th German Tank Division captured Berdichev. On July 9, the thirteenth tank division, breaking the unfinished northern front of the Novograd-Volynsky UR, broke into Zhytomyr, and on July 11, the 3-th motorized corps of the enemy entered Kiev UR [A.A. Strokov History of military art, c. 363].

Thus, the border battle ended for the USSR difficult. The Red Army did not fulfill the tasks assigned to it in repelling the enemy’s attack and preventing it from entering the territory of the USSR, and suffered great human and material losses. If before the war, the border districts had numerical superiority over the enemy in tanks and aircraft, in mid-July this advantage was lost. After the end of the period of border battles, the Soviet troops continued to conduct heavy defensive battles in the Leningrad and Smolensk sectors and in the territory of Ukraine for the next three months.

Sources:
Anfilov V.A. The beginning of World War II (htpp // www. Militera.ru)
Veremeev Yu.G. Defense in the North. (Htpp // www.armor.kiev.ua / army / hist / oborona-z.shtml).
Davydenko A. Fire Triangle // Military Knowledge, 1991.- №9.
Dashichev V.I. Strategic planning of aggression against the USSR // VIZH.- 1991.- №3.
Zyuzin E.I. About the basics of the strategic deployment of the Red Army before the war // VIZH.- 1992.- №2.
History of the Second World War 1939 - 1945: In 12-t. T.4. / Prev Ed Commission A.A. Grechko.- M.: Military Publishing, 1975.-535 p., L. silt
Red Banner Kiev: Essays on History. 1919-1988 / I. A. Gera-Simov, P.G. Osipov.- 3-ed., Corr. and additional M.: Politizdat of Ukraine, 1989.- 543 s., 40 l.il., maps.
Krivosheev G.F. On the eve // ​​VIZH.- 1991.- №6.
Makovsky V.B. Covering the state border on the eve of the war // VIZH.- 1993. No.5.
Martirosyan A.B. The tragedy of June 22: Blitzkrieg or treason? - M .: Yauza, Eksmo, 2006.- 784 with.
Petrov B.N. About the basics of the strategic deployment of the Red Army on the eve of the war // VIZH.- 1991.- №12.
Statyuk I. Defense of the Baltic States. 1941.- M.: Exprint, 2005. 40 with.
Strokov A.A. History of military art, M.: Military Publishing, 1966.- 656 p.
Fedorov A. The unfading feat of the Armed Forces of the USSR // Ukrainian Historical Journal. - 1985. No.5.
Sharov A. “I did not commit adultery ...” // Military Knowledge.- 1992.- №11.
Koval M. To the history of border battles in Ukraine // Ukrainian Historical Journal .- 1986.- №6.

Comments

[Kenneth]

What nonsense. Instead of a fresh look at the causes of defeats of the Red Army, tracing paper from old Soviet publications. Well, that would launch the twelfth volume of the history of the Second World War in the form of cycles of articles

[V.ic]

Quote: Kenneth

tracing paper from old Soviet editions.

Repetition = mother of learning!

[Kenneth]

It may be enough to memorize, but it's time to start thinking.

[V.ic]

Quote: Kenneth

it's time to start thinking.

The best thing would be to start with yourself, your beloved. And after all, judging by your comment, you already know EVERYTHING, read EVERYTHING ... Hurry to comment "zabatsat"?

[Kenneth]

Ahead of you. That is sadness. You can complain to the administrator about a violation of the rules. Only this will not make the article adequate to the stated topic.

[Simpsonian]

75 years have passed since the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, but no one gave a clear answer to the question:

We were in a hurry to play another ordered article for the date from the cycle "Is telepathy in the world to sit down?" ...
answers have been given long ago, and most of those responsible for the case of General Pavlov were shot, but not all.

[avt]

Quote: Kenneth

What nonsense. Instead of a fresh look at the causes of defeats of the Red Army, tracing paper from old Soviet publications.

For "a fresh look" at "Echo of Moscow" and Igor Chubais with his statement about how Vlasov broke through to Leningrad to create a stronghold of resistance to Stalin. There, with a fresh look, it stinks at a choice. The author gave, in accordance with the title, and a complete, BRIEF OVERVIEW with very specific links that he read, and did not pick out from anal sex, as in the previous cycle one figure did, smearing these your ... fantasy piece by piece. Want to refute

Quote: Kenneth

the twelfth volume of the history of the Second World War in the form of cycles of articles

VELCOM - an eagerness and with specific links to documents. Read, discuss.

[Stas57]

Quote: avt

For a fresh look at Ekho Moskvy and Igor Chubais

those. everything. or Soviet, or Echo of Moscow. and neither do you need Shein / Ulanov about tanks, Isaev about 41, Zamulin, Drabkin, Pykhalov, Aliyev on others?

[avt]

Quote: Stas57

those. everything. or Soviet, or Echo of Moscow. and neither do you need Shein / Ulanov about tanks, Isaev about 41, Zamulin, Drabkin, Pykhalov, Aliyev on others?

What is the request, this is the answer. Tovarisch longs for "hot", he

Quote: Kenneth

tracing paper from old Soviet editions

disgusts - a bit bland, the pepper wanted it, and this is for Chubais, well, "historian", Igor. And for the first time I got acquainted with the same reference book by Mueller Hildebrant in the translation in the Soviet edition, but only in contrast to the 90th edition in the list parts of the SS did not indicate the same name of the division "Galicia" and the first part was missing, well, before returning to the Rhineland, it seems, again, the notes of the head of intelligence of the 6th army, Wieder, were also read in the Soviet edition in Soviet times. Well, if I wanted to, I enrolled in the Foreign Literature Library near Yaze without any problems.

[Beefeater]

Quote: Kenneth

What nonsense. Instead of a fresh look at the causes of defeats of the Red Army, tracing paper of the old Soviet editions. Well, that would launch the twelfth volume of the history of the Second World War in the form of cycles of articles

This is a summary of the first volume. The author said that there will be several articles.

[PKK]

Such articles were good in the 90s and earlier. Now readers have become so adequate that reprints from old materials do not roll. A fresh look is needed.

[cast iron]

For a fresh look, designed for uneducated hysterical infantile youths, run straight to Yulenka Latynina. She, in her own words, is not a rocket launcher or a military man, but she will tell you ALL THE SCARY TRUTH about that war.

[yehat]

I agree - the information is very outdated
according to the latest estimates, the forces of the Wehrmacht on the border of the USSR were almost twice as high -
about 7000 units of armored vehicles (sapper and engineering tanks, assault guns, anti-tank self-propelled guns, etc. are included, and previously only "clean" tanks were considered)
the number of the most conservative estimates 5.5 million
Estimation of the number of aircraft was slightly changed - about 1000 strike aircraft of the old types were added, which were actively engaged in attack in the early days of the war.
according to the latest data, it turns out that even if the USSR collected everything that it had and prepared, the Germans would have more strength.
It was thanks to such an overwhelming numerical superiority, reinforced by the colossal superiority in equipping with transport and other "means" that it was possible to quickly break through the defense.

For example, Guderian complains in his memoirs that he had only 1 regiment great Germany in reserve, but if you decipher it, you will see that this is actually half the motorized division with a large number of towed artillery, and it was elite in composition part. Feel the difference? If he had in reserve an analogue of the usual infantry regiment of the Red Army (as many people think), then these forces could not have recaptured the flank counterattacks, and after 3 weeks of fighting Guderian would have cuckered surrounded by all his striking forces.
This is the difference between 2.5 million troops and 5.5 million according to later estimates.

[Beefeater]

You just look in the directories and ask what the Wehrmacht armored vehicles were in the summer of 41. These are mainly light tanks with short-barreled guns. A creepy type of self-propelled guns based on T1. As for motorized divisions, the Germans did not have tanks and self-propelled guns in them. With towed artillery, it is very difficult to storm the trenches bristled with machine guns about this entire experience of the First World War.

[Stas57]

Quote: Beefeater

You just look in the directories and ask what the Wehrmacht armored vehicles were in the summer of 41. These are mainly light tanks with short-barreled guns. A creepy type of self-propelled guns based on T1. As for motorized divisions, the Germans did not have tanks and self-propelled guns in them. With towed artillery, it is very difficult to storm the trenches bristled with machine guns about this entire experience of the First World War.

again you smack nonsense, and she squeals ..
first treshka was a very modern car.
second self-propelled guns were in the divisions. which were transferred to the front as necessary, so it makes no sense to keep the tanks in front
thirdly, with towed artillery, trenches stormed the entire war - called artillery preparation.

[Beefeater]

Quote: Stas57

Quote: Beefeater

You just look in the directories and ask what the Wehrmacht armored vehicles were in the summer of 41. These are mainly light tanks with short-barreled guns. A creepy type of self-propelled guns based on T1. As for motorized divisions, the Germans did not have tanks and self-propelled guns in them. With towed artillery, it is very difficult to storm the trenches bristled with machine guns about this entire experience of the First World War.

again you smack nonsense, and she squeals ..
first treshka was a very modern car.
second self-propelled guns were in the divisions. which were transferred to the front as necessary, so it makes no sense to keep the tanks in front
thirdly, with towed artillery, trenches stormed the entire war - called artillery preparation.

This is you smashing nonsense. in the 41st, the Germans did not have enough equipment to equip the existing tank divisions, there was no talk of giving some strength to the infantry units.
With towed artillery in World War I, infantry pushed for months on the spot in the trenches, unable to break through the front.
Your modern three-ruble coin was very quickly removed from service by the Germans themselves, already by the 43rd.
But half of the tank fleet were T-2 and T-38.
In addition, we like to consider tanks of sattelites, Romanians, for example, with French Renault and Somoa ... and all this is four times less than ours.

[Stas57]

Quote: Beefeater

This is you smashing nonsense. in 41, the Germans didn’t have the equipment to equip the existing tank divisions, there’s no talk of giving some strength to the infantry units

Dododo
Shtugabtaylungi, divisions of the RGC (MOT) no one gave the front, yeah.
Already by 43 the KV2 was extremely modern for the 41 year, so what?

Quote: Beefeater

... and all this is four times less than ours.

Oh yes, come on, call me 10, etc. French-equipped, I’m waiting

[yehat]

I can imagine that the armored vehicles were in service with the Wehrmacht. to be precise:
versions of tanks from t1 to t4, Czech38 (t), stugIII, jagdanzer-1, the first versions of self-propelled artillery like a bison, several dozen French B-1 bis (flamethrower) and Somua, as well as various alterations based on captured tanks.

[cast iron]

It's like that. For some reason, no one goes into details that Germany concentrated 3 divisions of 180-15 thousand people in 18 directions in 150 directions. And against them, across the many thousands of borders of the USSR, 8 red army divisions were concentrated, numbering 12-50 thousand people in three echelons, about XNUMX divisions each, at a fairly considerable distance from each other. Plus, the complete failure of the Western Front, and yet a year before the start of the war, Zhukov defeated Pavlov in a similar scenario at military strategic games. Pavlov did not draw any conclusions and left everything as it is without changes. Plus, a frank failure in disguising and dispersing aviation in the North and West. In terms of aviation, the Southern Front fought the Nazis and, on the whole, survived.

[sherp2015]

Quote: Kenneth

What nonsense. Instead of a fresh look at the causes of defeats of the Red Army, tracing paper from old Soviet publications. Well, that would launch the twelfth volume of the history of the Second World War in the form of cycles of articles

The reasons include the fact that in the Red Army there were such inquisitors as the monster Mehlis, who, through his denunciations of commanders by repression, helped to mow down the officers
No wonder he was called both the Inquisitor and the Red Demon

[Kenneth]

Well here is the answer. Now everything is clear to me. Thanks you.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: sherp2015

The reasons include the fact that in the Red Army there were such inquisitors as the monster Mehlis, who, through his denunciations of commanders by repression, helped to mow down the officers

Tell me, what should Comrade Mehlis do with such a divisional commander:

CHUIKOV: - You were warned that the enemy’s active actions are likely against you [?]
VINOGRADOV: - I was warned by you at 2.00 1.1 and immediately went to the front. When I was informed for information that 163 s.d. [rifle division] withdrew [,] in defense, I was preparing for the offensive.
CHUYKOV: - You always said in your reports that the division was ready for the offensive.
GRAPES: - Yes, except for food and ammunition.
MEHLIS: - readiness for the offensive is not a platonic concept, but material. If the division didn’t have food and ammunition, that means it wasn’t ready for the offensive ... Let’s take a look at how he sat at 26 km, how he managed, how he organized, to pave the way no longer forward, but back to the east, and how, as a matter of fact, he left the division and himself with the company of the company, or with thirty people ...

CHUIKOV: - When did you decide to retreat [?]
GRAPES: - Hours at 16 [January 6].
CHUIKOV: - Why didn’t they convey [?]
VINOGRADOV: - I was afraid to report, because the Finns eavesdropped on us and everyone knew, since I was surrounded on three sides.
MEHLIS: - One could even convey in plain text, only find the formula. Where did you decide to go [?]
GRAPES: - At 19 km.
MEHLIS: - Who was there [?]
GRAPES: - The third battalion, commander Vorobyov.
MEKHLIS: - You could tell Volkov without a cipher: "I'm moving to Vorobyov."
MEKHLIS: - If you advise where you are going, then you could count on the help of the staff [division headquarters], army headquarters, and aviation. You should have informed that you were going there, and you had the opportunity to notify even if you did not have a code.

VINOGRADOV: - Allow me to continue the report. <...>
The fourth day is unsuccessful. 4.1. on the night of 2/146 [the 2nd battalion 146 joint venture] threw up a front that covered the left flank of the division and came to me. The commander explained to me that people had not eaten for four days.
MEHLIS: - This is a lie. There were fats, there was sugar, there was tea. In the end, they got products on the farm.
VINOGRADOV: - The battalion commander reported so.
MEHLIS: - Why didn’t you arrest him [?]
VINOGRADOV: - I was in such a mood, but when I looked at people, I did not. The battalion dispersed, it was torn from all bases and the commander reported that from 1 to 4 they did not receive food.
MEHLIS: - You were told a lie, and you covered.

Moreover, when the actions of this division were disassembled at VIF2-NE, it turned out that the Finns built blockages and blocked roads, being within the range of the division artillery.

[yehat]

And you will fight after fats and tea with sugar for 4 days in a row, actively moving!
Mehlis is not right in assessing combat effectiveness. A part in this state could only move with short march-throws, which virtually eliminated the chances of retreat. The fighting ability of people was also low.
on such a diet you can really only stay for 2 days without problems.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: yehat

And you will fight after fats and tea with sugar for 4 days in a row, actively moving!

Do you fundamentally ignore the phrase "In the end they got food on the farm"?
In addition, the battalion did not advance - he held the left flank of the SD.

Quote: yehat

Mehlis is not right in assessing combat effectiveness.

This is not Mehlis wrong, but a divisional commander who initially sent out amazing reports that the division was ready for the offensive except for food and ammunition. How was he going to fight without it, huh?
And he began to retreat without even notifying the battalion, in the area of ​​which a breakthrough was planned.

By the way, enchanting character was generally found in the same regions - the headquarters of 47 sk Kudryavtsev Tikhon Vladimirovich:

Kudryavtsev, Tikhon Vladimirovich, born in 1896, a native of the former. Oryol province, Livinsky district, Novivensky volost, Vyazovoye village - Dubrovka, non-partisan, priest's son, ex. Ensign, from August 1919 to May 1920 he served in the army of Denikin. In 1918, he took an active part in the kulak uprising in Lebanon district.
Kudryavtsev hid his service in the white army, as well as his participation in the August uprising until 1933, and only after being questioned on these issues did he admit that he really took part in the kulak uprising, but allegedly did not play an active role, but was supposedly only as an ordinary scout. Regarding service in the white army, Kudryavtsev testified that he did not voluntarily go to service, but was taken prisoner while serving in the Red Army.
Being in the service of 48 p.p. in the post of chief of staff, Kudryavtsev repeatedly noticed in anti-Soviet statements, for example, “Sov. I do not sympathize with the authorities, but serve only out of necessity. ” In the same regiment, Kudryavtsev was grouped around himself by senior officers from the former. officers and celebrations were celebrated ex. officers led by Kudryavtsev.
During the departure of parts 47 s.k. from Suomussalmi Kudryavtsev in the group early. composition said: "Puolanok and Peranok not to see us now as their ears."

None of Mehlis’s reports with a request to remove Kudryavtsev from his post was satisfied. Kudryavtsev lived to 1969 and had the rank of major general.

As the uv. slon_76:

I can objectively judge his activities only by the "Winter War", and I can note that his work in the 9th Army was rather constructive, although Chuikov also complained about him after the war.
If, for example, he would have listened to his proposals for the withdrawal of the 44th division to the front, 90% would have managed to avoid the catastrophe near Suomussalmi.
In addition, Mehlis was VERY busy with issues that the large commanders had no time to deal with. For example, bath-laundry service for fighters, hygiene issues and other household issues. As well as skiing. As a result, for example, when the Swedes appeared on the front of the 9th Army, they were unpleasantly surprised that in this respect the Red Army at the front is at a significantly higher level than they are.

[Beefeater]

Tell me why the Mehlis earned such your trust. he is not a military man, he is just the secretary of Stalin. And the People's Commissar of State Control. Why do you trust him so much? This is generally wildness. A non-war person gives instructions to the generals. Mehlis especially proved himself in the Crimea during an attempt to carry out an amphibious operation.

[avt]

Quote: Beefeater

He’s just the secretary of Stalin. And the People’s Commissar of State Control. Why do you trust him so much? It's actually wildness.

Study, study and study again. And not according to feature films according to the script, even Stadnyuk. Then you can gain knowledge about what the People's Commissariat of State Control actually was.

[Aleksander]

Quote: Alexey RA

Tell me, what should Comrade Mehlis do with such a division commander?

Nothing. He is NOTHING and NOTHING for the army and it is not his business to get into the army affairs for professionals. If the brigade commander is to blame, he must answer in accordance with the law, and not listen to this ...... a, ... a and .... a.

[Stas57]

Quote: Aleksander

Nothing. He is NOTHING and NOTHING for the army and it is not his business to get into the army affairs for professionals. If the brigade commander is to blame, he must answer in accordance with the law, and not listen to this ...... a, ... a and .... a.

he is the representative of the headquarters, a member of the Sun.
You hold the strange position of an outside observer who is not responsible for the affairs of the Crimean Front. This position is very convenient, but it is rotten through and through. On the Crimean Front, you are not an outside observer, but a responsible representative of the Headquarters, responsible for all the successes and failures of the front and obliged to correct the mistakes of the command on the spot.
Stalin

Gorbatov said well about him
At every meeting with me until the release of Orel, Mehlis did not miss the opportunity to ask me any question that could lead to a dead end. I answered simply and probably not always the way he wanted to. However, it was noticeable that, although with difficulty, he was changing for the better his former attitude towards me. When we were already behind the Eagle, he suddenly said:
- I have looked closely at you for a long time and I must say that I like you as a commander and as a communist. I followed your every step after your departure from Moscow, and I did not quite believe that I heard good things about you. Now I see that I was wrong.
Thanking for my frankness, I said:
- I will not hide from you that I didn’t really like you then in Moscow, I went through many unpleasant hours. I also saw how wary you met me at the front. But first of all, I'm used to thinking about business. Very happy with what you just told me.
After this conversation, L.Z. Mehlis began to visit our army more often, he was late for tea drinking and even told me and my wife compliments, which was completely out of his habit. He was a tireless worker, but a stern and suspicious person, single-minded to fanaticism, a man of extreme opinions and inflexible - that is why his energy did not always bring good results. Characteristically, he never instructed anyone to write encryption, and wrote it only himself, in his original handwriting

[Sergej1972]

This Mechlis is a peculiar character. After all, he behaved towards Stalin without any servility, as many memoirists recalled. Mehlis is somewhat similar to Rosalia Zemlyachka. Both of the commissioners of the Civil era, both belonged to the category of figures who themselves participated in the repression, but then for the most part were physically destroyed in the second half of the 30s. However, Mehlis and Zemlyachka avoided this fate. Moreover, they held important government posts in the late 30s and 40s, died their own deaths, and both were buried in the Kremlin wall. Shkiryatov’s biography is somewhat similar (there are some differences from these two figures). Also, in theory, had to end his life in the same way as Berry or Ezhov. However, he died his death in 1954, holding a high post, and is also buried in the Kremlin wall.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Aleksander

Nothing. He is NOTHING and NOTHING for the army and it is not his business to get into the army affairs for professionals.

This, by the way, is not of those professionals who managed to drive several divisions into boilers. Moreover, each time the environment took place according to the same pattern.

Here is how the army professionals organized the motti defense in the Lemetti area:

Lemetti's southern defense was organized spontaneously, units and units that arrived in Lemetti built a defense where they stopped to directly protect themselves. This led to the fact that the defense area was stretched along the road for 2 km, and had a width of only 400-800 m.This width of the defense put the garrison in an extremely difficult position, since the enemy shot it with real fire from all types of weapons. The mistake made in the organization of defense led to the fact that the height “A”, which was of great tactical value, was not occupied, and the command height above the southern Lemetti area was occupied by insufficient forces (60 people with one machine gun and therefore, during the first enemy attack The enemy, having occupied the heights, was given the full opportunity to point-blank to shoot people, military and transport vehicles, to observe the behavior and actions of the garrison ... Most of the 34 ltbr and 201 htb tanks were not placed as firing points, but were located directly on the road. .. It’s not possible to establish exactly the number of ammunition rounds, but it must be said that there were enough of them, by the time they got out of the encirclement ... there were up to 12 thousand shells and 40-45 thousand rounds. By January 5, the tanks had up to two gas stations. This made it possible to put them in more convenient positions for defense, which was not done ...

[Aleksander]

Alexey RA This, by the way, is not of those professionals who managed to drive several divisions into boilers

No, this is an hour about the "professional" who ruined the Kerch defensive operation of 1942, for which he was Stalin lowered by two steps

Konstantin Simonov about this.:
[Quote]] “The offensive began very unsuccessfully, - in February a blizzard began to rain, everything was incredibly transported, everything literally stood up, the tanks did not go, and the density of troops, fitted Mehlis, who led this offensive, replacing the actual front commander General Kozlov, was monstrous. Everything was pushed close to the front, and every German shell, every mine, every bomb, bursting, inflicted huge losses on us... In a kilometer - two - three - five - seven from the front line, everything was in the corpses ...
In a word - it was a picture of a mediocre military leadership and a complete, monstrous mess. Plus to that - complete neglect of people, a complete lack of concern for saving manpower, for saving people from unnecessary losses ..."[/ Quote

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Aleksander

No, this is an hour about the "professional" who ruined the Kerch defensive operation of 1942, for which he was demoted by Stalin by two steps

Actually, the Kerch offensive. Which suddenly turned into a defensive one.
By the way, it was Mehlis who knocked out most of the forces for the future offensive.

[sherp2015]

Quote: Alexey RA

By the way, it was Mehlis who knocked out most of the forces for the future offensive.

Knock out a lot of mind is not necessary. The question is that these forces were knocked out as "cannon fodder"

[avt]

Quote: Aleksander

Nothing. He is NOTHING and NOTHING for the army and it is not his business to get into the army affairs for professionals.

Quote: Alexey RA

This, by the way, is not of those professionals who managed to drive several divisions into boilers.

Quote: Aleksander

No, this is an hour about the "professional" who ruined the Kerch defensive operation of 1942, for which he was demoted by Stalin by two steps

Konstantin Simonov about it .:

You either put on your panties, or take off the cross. And then the words of the "military professional" Simonov should be cited as proof of mediocrity

Quote: Stas57

the representative of the headquarters, a member of the Sun, fulfills the role assigned to him — independent control of the party and government over the actions of the military.

This is of course an argument.

Quote: Serg65

What else do you know about this "monster"? And why the "recently reclined" comrade Meretskov. Being the commander of the 7th Separate Army, he begged Stalin not to recall a member of the Military Council of the army Mehlis at the disposal of the Headquarters and leave him in the army?

Phy fse frote! "military professional" Simonov did not write about this! So it never happened.

[super.ufu]

Quote: avt

Phy fse frote! ,, military professional "Simonov did not write about this! So it never happened

Well, even if he saw something, it's just the opinion of a person on the issue who "saw it this way", which means nothing at all.

[Aleksander]

Quote: avt

You either put on your panties, or take off the cross. And then the words of the "military professional" Simonov should be cited as proof of mediocrity

With your underpants removed, you managed to fasten the cross with THERE: Simonov, who was already an experienced war correspondent, is given here as a witness and an eyewitness stupid activity of mehlis: to describe "heaps of corpses in a seven-kilometer zone" from the front due to the wild density of troops caused by the activities of an arrogant bewilder-DO NOT BE A PRO.
As a military professional, I did not mention it: you yourself invented it, you yourself expose it ("with yourself" (C).
To me, his opinion is valuable and reliable.
Once again: Stalin lowered the Mehlis for the FAILURE of the Kerch operation.

[avt]

Quote: Aleksander

: Simonov, who was already an experienced war correspondent,

What fronts did an experienced war correspondent command? Which strategic, even tactical operations, were allowed to plan?

Quote: super.ufu

Well, even if he saw something, it's just the opinion of a person on the issue who "saw it this way", which means nothing at all.

That is what I Saw, it means, and when, on the basis of his descriptions in the artistic style of his own life, a talented description - "The so-called personal life" is quite an interesting reading matter. just like now

Quote: Aleksander

an eyewitness to the stupid activity of mechlis: to describe "heaps of corpses in a seven-kilometer zone" from the front due to the wild density of troops caused by the activities of an arrogant idiot, you DO NOT need to be a professional.

Well, dad Nikita Mikhalkov, also a war correspondent, like walking around with buttonholes and insignia. Well ? You will bring his invaluable experience as an aviator wholeheartedly

Quote: Aleksander

To me, his opinion is valuable and reliable.

and blindly believing in it ??? Despite the fact that it’s already possible now, it will certainly take time and labor to look for archival documents. BUT! this reading is not a couple of fiction, it also requires a certain brain function to realize the dry facts set forth by the clerical ezik.

[Serg65]

Quote: sherp2015

The reasons include the fact that in the Red Army there were such inquisitors as the monster Mehlis

What else do you know about this "monster"? And why the "recently reclined" comrade Meretskov. Being the commander of the 7th Separate Army, he begged Stalin not to recall a member of the Military Council of the army Mehlis at the disposal of the Headquarters and leave him in the army?

[Stas57]

Quote: sherp2015

The reasons include the fact that in the Red Army there were such inquisitors as the monster Mehlis, who, through his denunciations of commanders by repression, helped to mow down the officers
No wonder he was called both the Inquisitor and the Red Demon
Reply Citir

But Isaev, quite rightly believes that if not for Comrade Mehlis, then in general everything would be covered and not even with a copper basin

[Beefeater]

Quote: Stas57

But Isaev, quite rightly believes that if not for Comrade Mehlis, then in general everything would be covered and not even with a copper basin

Isaev is a great master around sharp corners. For example, he shared his discovery about low-quality 45-mm shells.
His main thought was that the army fought beautifully and steadily, but withdrew.

[Stas57]

Quote: Beefeater

His main thought was that the army fought beautifully and steadily, but withdrew.

Well, your idea that no one wanted to fight for the damned scoop is known to us.
the army really fought steadily

[voyaka uh]

"Isaev is a great master of avoiding sharp corners." ////

You correctly noticed it. He, in principle, is a good historian,
but an even better "politician". Do not quarrel with MO historians - one
of its principles.

[yehat]

Mehlis is a complex person. Yes, he was involved in politics in the army, however, he was also useful in organizing the army, namely in staff work and the tasks of supporting combat effectiveness. What he definitely didn’t have was enough understanding in the management of hostilities.
For example, he was prone to unreasonably attacking tactics.
However, he thought differently, because of which more than once there were painful lesions.

[Beefeater]

As you beautifully said, "prone to unreasonably attacking tactics"
On universal, this means throwing people at machine guns without artillery preparation

[Stas57]

Quote: Beefeater

As you beautifully said, "prone to unreasonably attacking tactics"
On universal, this means throwing people at machine guns without artillery preparation

Quote: Beefeater

With towed artillery, it is very difficult to storm the trenches bristled with machine guns about this entire experience of the First World War.

you already decide.

[avt]

]

Quote: Beefeater

On universal, this means throwing people at machine guns without artillery preparation

Quote: Stas57

you already decide.

Well, he also writes about the "common human language", he began to be determined. But what amazes me, however, is the blatant decline in knowledge of at least some facts among these newly drawn "common people". Well, you must agree - three years ago here the debaters were steeper, the mountain-a-azdo was more literate and owned by the texture, but these ..... a good term, however, - "common people", "common human language" sweep like a broomstick all the knowledge from Wikipedia.

[Stas57]

Quote: avt

Well, he also writes about the "common human language", he began to be determined. But what amazes me, however, is the blatant decline in knowledge of at least some facts among these newly drawn "common people". Well, you must agree - three years ago here the debaters were steeper, the mountain-a-azdo was more literate and owned by the texture, but these ..... a good term, however, - "common people", "common human language" sweep like a broomstick all the knowledge from Wikipedia.

the boy still burned in yesterday’s mannerheim, I must say. that worship of the RCMC uniquely dilutes the brain.

[97110]

Quote: sherp2015

No wonder he was called both the Inquisitor and the Red Demon

Something mowed, mowed, straight all mowed down. A direct explanation for the complete lack of command and control. There would be no monster and demon Mehlis, we would give them (Germans, ess) but. And in 1941, and in 1942. And in the Northwest, and in the West, and in the South. Odessa would not have been given away, Sevastopol - no, no. And near Kharkov, only the Mehlis pissed off, without him the Germans would not have seen Stalingrad, they would have immediately arranged a Korsun-Shevchenkovsky boiler. Repeating this old song about the main thing is not worth it. Nobody likes the person who makes you work. Especially if rightly forcing.

[Beefeater]

Quote: sherp2015

Quote: Kenneth

What nonsense. Instead of a fresh look at the causes of defeats of the Red Army, tracing paper from old Soviet publications. Well, that would launch the twelfth volume of the history of the Second World War in the form of cycles of articles

The reasons include the fact that in the Red Army there were such inquisitors as the monster Mehlis, who, through his denunciations of commanders by repression, helped to mow down the officers
No wonder he was called both the Inquisitor and the Red Demon

Is this the Mehlis whose niece Brezhnev married? Well, so Stalin was a great master, he paired the Mehlis with Petrov, although they hated each other.

[Rust0626]

It is because of such articles that people like Rezun flourish.

[Raven]

I do not see in this article any new thoughts that would belong to the author ... maybe you should not rewrite old literature?

[Serg65]

"The reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the initial period of the war"
So what are the reasons? The fact that the Germans were preparing for the attack? Or is that the Red Army did not have time to turn around? Something very briefly describes the beginning of the war and the reasons for the defeat in border battles are practically not indicated! Whether Stalin was reluctant to believe intelligence or was it not - these are indirect reasons. Why did the General Staff of the Red Army in the person of Zhukov under the leadership of Tymoshenko practically step back from preparing to repel the invasion? why did the NKVD and RKKF troops receive orders for increased combat readiness in advance? Did they serve in another state? Paradoxically, 75 years have passed since the beginning of the BBO, we still don’t know the truth

[Beefeater]

Quote: Serg65

"The reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the initial period of the war"
So what are the reasons? The fact that the Germans were preparing for the attack? Or is that the Red Army did not have time to turn around? Something very briefly describes the beginning of the war and the reasons for the defeat in border battles are practically not indicated! Whether Stalin was reluctant to believe intelligence or was it not - these are indirect reasons. Why did the General Staff of the Red Army in the person of Zhukov under the leadership of Tymoshenko practically step back from preparing to repel the invasion? why did the NKVD and RKKF troops receive orders for increased combat readiness in advance? Did they serve in another state? Paradoxically, 75 years have passed since the beginning of the BBO, we still don’t know the truth

Very unpleasant answers will be to your questions.
First of all, in the political sense. It is easier to proclaim the great Victory over fascism.

[Serg65]

Quote: Beefeater

It is easier to proclaim the great Victory over fascism.

It is necessary and even necessary to proclaim the Great Victory! But it is also necessary to find out the reasons for defeats, one another is not a hindrance!

[cast iron]

We were attacked by the best army in the world. And even you couldn't have stopped her in 1941, "expert."

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Serg65

why did the NKVD and RKKF troops receive orders for increased combat readiness in advance?

Heh heh heh ... You still ask - why did the troops of PribOVO also receive this order in advance and began deploying? And why did these partially deployed troops lose the border battle faster than even the ZAPOVO - and rolled back to the beginning of July right up to Pskov.

Proactive mobilization and deployment is a terrible thing. But emergency reforms and rearmament of the army, coupled with the impossibility of manning the army on a mobplan on average until mid-1942, is even worse.

Quote: Serg65

Why did the General Staff of the Red Army in the person of Zhukov under the leadership of Tymoshenko practically step back from preparing to repel the invasion?

And what was GS supposed to do?

[cast iron]

The truth is that the BEST ARMY IN THE WORLD attacked us. That basically says it all. Only the poorly educated youth can call the Red Army of the 1940-1941 model powerful and effective. The number of tanks and planes does not automatically make the army efficient and better.

[Internal combustion engine]

In 1812, they also retreated. It was a shame, the battle was waiting ... The Scythian tactics of luring a strong enemy deep into the territory worked in 1812, and in 1941 too. But in our time, such tactics will not work. Because we do not already have those territorial spaces. If we continue to help the West to undermine Lukashenko’s regime out of selfish interests, NATO tanks will be under Smolensk. Then it will be necessary to transfer the capital to Nizhny Novgorod, otherwise the NATO troops will march from Smolensk to Moscow in the morning, and will roll into the Kremlin in the evening.

[Essex62]

Well it’s vryat. On tanks they won’t reach Schmolengs, we’ll chop all their dishes from the borders. How many total units are there at our theater? And indeed now everything is visible from space in full view. The concentration of the armor will be checked and measures will be taken. Is it in vain that Putin and Shoigu have been chasing all districts for the second year with combat readiness tests and exercises? No, they won’t take us abruptly. But gradually they will begin to choke. There are many of them, the potential is higher, they will crush the mass. And here again the nuance of the gut - then they get sick when the losses are exorbitant? She is a gentle geyropa now, not like the blond beasts of Henry in the 40s and XNUMXth centuries. Well, tactile nuclear weapons should be lightly stroked, if it’s not at all possible. Well, then they won’t be able to puddle over the puddle in full.

[voyaka uh]

"The Scythian tactics of luring a strong enemy deep into the territory worked in 1812 and in 1941 too." ///

ABOUT! Well done!
I think it will be written in Russian school textbooks in 100 years.
They deliberately lured the enemy to the Volga, they deprived the aggressor of forces and drove him back.
Briefly - and understandable to students.
And in 1812 - exactly the same.

[nekot]

Quote: voyaka uh

And in 1812 - exactly the same.

Have you gathered and rewrite the history of the war of 1812? Share, pliz, your concept and description of the heavy defeats of the Russian army on the way to Moscow))

[Knizhnik]

The irony counted +1
With the external similarities, the situations of 1812 and 1941 are still different. In 1812, a strategy for evading the general battle, exhausting and bleeding was originally present. The Great, however, retreated of course forcedly. As they stood near Moscow, so probably no one will stand, although they could have retreated, as in 1812. Nevertheless, I share my concerns about the interpretation of events as components of a certain ingenious plan. I believe that our dead ancestors do not need this, and neither do we.

[avt]

Quote: Knizhnik

. In 1812, a strategy for evading the general battle, exhausting and bleeding was originally present. The Great, however, retreated of course forcedly.

Up to which city, inclusively, to the east of the western border of the USSR were maps ordered for units of the Red Army BEFORE THE WAR ??? Then we'll talk about the "strategy".

[Aleksander]

The main goal of the war against the USSR was that the German imperialists put the destruction of the world's only socialist state, the conquest of its territory and the enslavement of the peoples of the Soviet Union.

Interestingly, France, Poland, Greece, Belgium, etc. were not socialist states, but were nevertheless conquered. An attack would be in the case of any system.

The General Staff, by order of the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, ordered the commander of the western military districts to take measures to increase the combat readiness of the troops. The commanders of the Baltic, Leningrad, Western, Kiev, Odessa military districts, as well as the Baltic, Black Sea and Northern Fleets received a corresponding order signed by the head of the General Staff of the Red Army, Army General G.K. Zhukov. This cipher telegram not found in archivesbut it’s mentioned

Does the author himself believe in this nonsense? How could the SENT telegram to the General Staff and the ACCEPTED telegram to EIGHT counties and fleets?

In the vision of the everyday perceived danger of German attacks, to deprive artillery divisions, to disperse infantry divisions, not to disperse aircraft, to concentrate huge warehouses practically on the border, etc. speaks of criminal negligence and incompetence of both the military and political leadership of the country.
HOW the Hitlerites will act (maximum concentration of forces in the direction of the strike, tank wedges, swift sweeps, surprise attack) -the leadership ALSO knew very well from the experience of France and Poland, but no conclusions were put into practice, it was not made: everything was repeated with ABSOLUTE accuracy.

[avt]

Quote: Aleksander

Interestingly, France, Poland, Greece, Belgium, etc. were not socialist states, but were nevertheless conquered. An attack would be in the case of any system.

It is interesting, especially if you educate us unreasonable in terms of how they actually behaved with the civilian population in Europe in comparison with the USSR. Here are direct orders and directives, or some kind of plan "West", well, by analogy with the plan "Ost" give.

[Beefeater]

Quote: avt

Quote: Aleksander

Interestingly, France, Poland, Greece, Belgium, etc. were not socialist states, but were nevertheless conquered. An attack would be in the case of any system.

It is interesting, especially if you educate us unreasonable in terms of how they actually behaved with the civilian population in Europe in comparison with the USSR. Here are direct orders and directives, or some kind of plan "West", well, by analogy with the plan "Ost" give.

They did the same. Jews and communists to the wall rest arbeiten to great Germany. In Poland, for example, the intelligentsia and bureaucracy were destroyed.

[avt]

Quote: Beefeater

They did the same. Jews and communists to the wall rest arbeiten to great Germany.

Another victim of the exam? But digging around weakly and know the difference between those who were driven to work from the USSR and those from France? At least as the Germans called them, in Kugs? Or a drum?

Quote: Beefeater

In Poland, for example, the intelligentsia and bureaucracy were destroyed.

Was Poland a general governorship in general and the number of local officials and policemen is known? And can you bring the heroic exploits of the Regional Army following the example of Belarus? The Warsaw uprising, which the Poles themselves wrote in the museum, was in order to show Stalin who the boss is in the house and for the defeat of which, in direct connection with the fact that they did not agree with the same Stalin, he was declared guilty. So they’re putting it right in their museums — they raised a pier against him — to draw a line before communism, but he didn’t help such a bastard.

[Beefeater]

A telegram may simply be in another folder.
The second range of the German bomber is small, only part of the forces, percent 20, was defeated, a militia was put under arms, which also disappeared entirely.
So, it’s not a sudden matter, but the incompetence of the leadership and the unwillingness to fight the people at that time

[Stas57]

Quote: Beefeater

A telegram may simply be in another folder.
The second range of the German bomber is small, only part of the forces, percent 20, was defeated, a militia was put under arms, which also disappeared entirely.
It means, not in a sudden matter, but in the incompetence of the leadership and the unwillingness of the people howling at that time

will you again denounce the bloody scoop? for which the people did not go to war?
I repeat - surprise first of all - preemption in deployment,

[kalibr]

Army pay so that there is no surprise. So that everything has an answer. Otherwise, it is not an army.

[Stas57]

Quote: kalibr

Army pay so that there is no surprise. So that everything has an answer. Otherwise, it is not an army.

our army has already begun to decide when it mobilizes, when to fight and when not?

[kalibr]

You perfectly understand that the army must have intelligence, which must know everything, plans for all types of attacks, including sudden ones. And she presents all this upward and receives "good" or not. But then at least it is known who exactly the "ram"? And there was the experience of the Russian-Japanese war, by the way ... Or am I wrong?

[Stas57]

Quote: kalibr

You perfectly understand that the army must have intelligence, which must know everything, plans for all types of attacks, including surprise ones.

where does the army intelligence then?
the Germans were concentrated on the border for a long time, intelligence did not reveal a hidden build-up, then what, switch to general mobilization and de facto start the war in April or May, but the Germans did not attack, and so what, everyone goes home?
trifle what a million there, a million here

[Essex62]

The perfect solution. In April they were not yet ready, the defense on the Polish border was purely symbolic .. The Wehrmacht was preparing for an attack, it could well have developed. What was reported to Him, but he did not believe, probably nonsense. Koba's head "boiled". Why didn't you give the order to mobilize and start in accordance with the doctrine "on foreign territory"? It is difficult to understand great people. Maybe he understood that it would not work with little blood, but I certainly did not believe in the friendly disposition of the demoniac. In general, this is characteristic of our people, maybe they will carry it, the curve will take it out.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: kalibr

You perfectly understand that the army must have intelligence, which must know everything, plans for all types of attacks, including sudden ones. And she presents all this upstairs and receives "good" or does not receive

So intelligence reported all spring 1941 that there is no concentration of troops. And she was absolutely right - for according to the schedule of concentration of forces for Barabarossa, the main transfer began in June.

On the basis of what to start mobilization? Especially during agricultural work?

[Aleksander]

Quote: Alexey RA

So intelligence reported all spring 1941 that there is no concentration of troops. And she was absolutely right - for according to the schedule of concentration of forces for Barabarossa, the main transfer began in June.

Colonel Vladimir N. KARPOV, Foreign Intelligence Services of Russia:
-4 On August 1940, the residency in Vichy announced the start of the transfer of Nazi troops from France to the Soviet borders ... In total, from July 1940 to June 1941, intelligence sent to the Soviet leadership more than 120 detailed reports about German military preparations for an attack on the USSR.
In May 1941, it was possible to find out not only the number of divisions pulled to our borders, but also the places of their deployment - up to the location of battalions, headquarters of units. Even the firing positions of the batteries were being clarified. In April - May 1941, Stalin was informed of the measures of the German command on the last preparations for the strike. "Corsican" - Arvid Harnak, a leading employee of the Ministry of Economics, reported that the formation of German troops on the border with the USSR exactly repeats their formation on the eve of the invasion of France.

Intelligence also informed Germany about the economic and political preparations for the exploitation of the Soviet territories - government officials were appointed to large Soviet cities, measures were taken to ensure calm on the Western Front, etc.

June 17, 1941 "Corsican" and "Petty Officer" - Chief Lieutenant Harro Schulze-Boysen (nephew of Grand Admiral Tirpitz) reported that "Germany's military preparations for an armed attack on the USSR are completely over and a strike can be expected at any time ". Information about the impending war came from residencies in Helsinki, Rome, Vichy, Shanghai, Berlin, Geneva, Tokyo ...

That is, without knowing the exact date, by the beginning of June (and especially by the 17 of June) it was still clear that millions of German soldiers focused on the border and it’s not even necessary to know: they’ll attack, they will not attack: it’s terrible potential threat and in any case, it should immediately be stopped and any politician and military should have been obliged to put the troops on alert, IMHO. Moreover, (small chance), having seen Hitler’s troops ready for defense, he would have been careful, fearing losses, in my opinion. But it was done late.

Quote: Alexey RA

On the basis of what to start mobilization? Especially during agricultural work?

This, after all, is, first of all, about alerting the troops already deployed there. Secondly, a partial mobilization in the form of a call for training was carried out.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Aleksander

Colonel Vladimir N. KARPOV, Foreign Intelligence Services of Russia:

Comrade Colonel masterfully mastered the art of selective citation of sources, no worse than Rezun. However, this is understandable - corporate solidarity and uniform honor after all.
But what Comrade Colonel forgot to report was that the "Corsican" had already twice predicted Germany's attack on the USSR - and twice canceled it.

9th of March: "The issue of military action against the Soviet Union is resolved this spring, with the expectation that the Russians will not be able to set fire to green bread during the retreat, and the Germans will take advantage of this crop. Tsekhlin from two German field marshals knows that a speech is planned on 1 May».
April 2: “Rosenberg’s referent for the USSR, Leibrandt told Tsekhlin that the issue of armed action against the USSR is resolved... The anti-Soviet campaign will begin 15 April».
April 24th: "The action against the USSR seems to be relegated to the background».
April 30th: "The question of Germany’s opposition to the Soviet Union is finally settled and it should be expected from day to day».
May 9: “The issue of the attack on the Soviet Union is settled, performance scheduled for the near future... In conversations among staff officers, the date is often called 20 May as the start date of the war. Others believe the performance is scheduled for June. ”
May 14:"Plans for the Soviet Union are delayed.... The circles of authoritative officers believe that simultaneous operations against the British and against the USSR are hardly possible. ”
June 11: "The question of the attack on the Soviet Union is finally resolved."
June 16: "All German military measures to prepare an armed uprising against the USSR are completely over, and a strike can be expected at any time."

What - shall we believe the shepherd boy who shouts "wolves!"

By the way, the same "Corsican" and "Sergeant Major" reported four times that Germany would put forward diplomatic demands before the attack - that is, there would be no surprise attack.

The outbreak of hostilities should be preceded by an ultimatum to the Soviet Union

[Aleksander]

Quote: Alexey RA

Comrade Colonel masterfully mastered the art of selective citation of sources, no worse than Rezun

Why is this? We read it ONCE AGAIN:

In total, from July 1940 to June 1941, intelligence sent to the Soviet leadership more 120 detailed messages about Germany’s military preparations for an attack on the USSR.

He mentions in detail, of course, the LAST messages on 22 June
Your selectivity, at the same time, yes, is surprising: you DO NOT see the main thing his posts:
-

В May 1941 was able to find out not only the number of divisions pulled to our borders, but also the places of their deployment

.
Post Corsican (and others) -particular.
Once again, I note that by the beginning of June (and even more so by the 17 of June) it was still clear that millions of German soldiers focused on the border and it’s not even necessary to know: they’ll attack, they will not attack: it's scary potential threat and in any case, it should stop immediately! And any politician and military had to put the troops on alert,

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Aleksander

He mentions in detail, of course, the LAST messages on 22 June

He mentions only those messages in which "Corsican" and "Sergeant Major" were not mistaken. And implicitly gives the impression that everything more than 120 detailed messages were just as accurate.

Quote: Aleksander

Your selectivity, at the same time, yes, is surprising: you DO NOT see his main message:

I see. But Comrade Colonel again escapes with general words.
In fact, on May 15, 1941, intelligence reported the presence of 114-119 German divisions on the border. Of the 280 that the same intelligence counted in the Wehrmacht.

Quote: Aleksander

Once again, I note that by the beginning of June (and even more so by June 17) it was still clear that millions of German soldiers were concentrated on the border and it was not even necessary to know: they would attack, they would not attack: this is a terrible potential threat and in any case it should stop immediately! And any politician and military had to put the troops on alert,

The deployment of the troops of the border districts began on June 18, 1941. In "Malinovka" there are orders for the PribOVO on the withdrawal of formations from the PPD to the concentration areas and to alert the air defense.

[Alexey RA]

And yet, regarding the exact number of German troops:

According to the special message of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army No. 660279ss dated March 11, 1941, as of March 1, 61 German divisions were in the East, including 52 infantry, 5 motorized and 4 tank.
In a special communication of the Intelligence Agency No. 660370 dated April 4, it was stated that German forces in the border with the USSR reach 83–84 divisions, including 61 infantry, 6 motorized and 6–7 tank divisions along the border from East Prussia to Slovakia and 9 infantry and 1 motorized in Romania.
According to special communication of the Intelligence Agency No. 660448ss dated April 26, by April 25, 95-100 German divisions (without cavalry units) were concentrated on the border of the Soviet Union with Germany and Romania. In addition, one German division was in Finland.
In a special communication of the Intelligence Directorate No. 660477ss dated May 5, it was said that the total number of German troops concentrated against the USSR supposedly amounted to 103-107 divisions (not counting units located in Finland), while the number of tank divisions increased from 25 April up to 9, motorized (including motorcycle divisions) - from 12 to 7, mountain - from 8 to 2 divisions.
According to a special report of the Intelligence Administration No. 66050bss dated May 15, 1941, the total number of German troops at our borders reached 114–119 divisions, of which 82–87 were infantry, 6 mountain, 13 tank, 12 motorized and 1 cavalry.

Total intelligence reports on the presence on the border on May 15, 1941 114-119 German divisions. It seems to be a lot.

But the trouble is sadness - the same intelligence reports that

At present, Germany, according to the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, has about 230 infantry, 22 tank, 20 motorized, 8 air and 4 cavalry divisions, and only about 284 divisions.

That is, the forces deployed on the border with the USSR are approximately 2/5 of the total number of German troops. There are clearly few of them for an attack on the USSR. But they ideally fit into the misinformation about 120 divisions in the East to protect against possible actions of the USSR in the event of Germany's "Sea Lion".

[Aleksander]

Quote: Alexey RA

They are clearly not enough for an attack on the USSR

about 4 million soldiers ready for battle at the border, few?
You give the numbers yourself: from April, in just a month, the number of deployed divisions of the Nazis increased by 42%! Anyone should have been alarmed to see the TREND.
And a month later, it turned out to be more than enough.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Aleksander

You yourself give the figures: since April, in just a month, the number of deployed divisions of the Nazis increased by 42%! Anyone should have been alarmed to see the TREND.

Heh heh heh .. so in May the TREND was gone:

according to special report of the Intelligence Administration No. 660569 of May 31, 1941, on June 1, 1941, 120–122 German divisions were concentrated against the USSR.

That is, the complete impression is that in mid-May the Germans completed the formation of a border group, stopping at 120 divisions.

Nevertheless, the leadership of the USSR began a symmetrical transfer of troops of the internal districts to the rear areas of the border military units, and from the middle of June - the deployment of troops of the border districts themselves. But they didn’t carry out the BUS - the political situation and intelligence data until mid-June did not provide sufficient grounds for covert mobilization.

The problem was that the Reich did not put forward any diplomatic demands. In addition, due to the overestimation by intelligence of the total number of German divisions (296 on 25.04.1941/120/120), these XNUMX divisions have not yet crossed the "alarm threshold". And the third - the notorious misinformation on "Sea Lion". XNUMX divisions are just the forces assigned to defend against possible sharp actions of the USSR.

If intelligence had given the correct number of Wehrmacht divisions, then they would have raised the alarm in May, starting the BUS.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Aleksander

This, after all, is, first of all, about alerting the troops already deployed there.

And what kind of readiness will the division have, in which there are traction for 1 division in the artillery regiments, and there are only enough vehicles to support the normal activities of the division in the RPA? Everything else should do mobilization.
Soldiers fired at a wearable BC, guns fired at stockpiles on firing - finite.

Quote: Aleksander

Secondly, a partial mobilization in the form of a call for training was carried out.

Was not. The ordinary and non-commissioned officers were called up for ordinary training. And packed over staff in cropped divisions. The result was 12000 divisions with 30-40% of officers, cropped vehicles and tractors - but with a double set of privates and sergeants. The combat effectiveness of such divisions was approximately at the level of the original manned divisions-6000, which was confirmed, for example, near Libau.
Mobilization of vehicles, tractors and horses was not carried out. As well as there was no mass understaffing to the states of the cropped parts. And without this, the combat effectiveness of the rifle units was impossible to raise.

[Aleksander]

Quote: Alexey RA

a partial mobilization in the form of a call for training was held.

I didn’t invent it and called it that, secondly, you yourself confirm:

The ordinary and sergeant squad was called up for ordinary training

Therefore, the term PARTIAL is applied.
The fact that they were not able to dispose of this is another matter.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Aleksander

Therefore, the term PARTIAL is applied.
The fact that they were not able to dispose of this is another matter.

This is not mobilization. These are annual enrollment fees.
Otherwise, we have mobilization - every year.

The difference between at least partial mobilization and training is that during mobilization there is a massive re-equipment of divisions in all positions - from combat units to the rear - by officers and rank-and-file personnel, as well as equipment. An example of such a mobilization is BUS-39, when 634 thousand horses, 117 vehicles and 300 tractors were seized from N / x.

However, it is impossible to carry out such a staffing with the personal composition called up for the training - just as it is impossible to cook a boiler of normal borsch, having only 2 bags of beets and 50 grams of meat from the ingredients. How many do not stuff the division with sergeants and privates - its combat readiness will not rise. Because, for example, the basis of the division’s firepower - the artillery regiment - will remain partly in the park without traction from the battlefield and partly on the fire without shells (because the vehicles that drive them are also not mobilized). An example is 529 hap, which did not receive a tractor mobilization and was captured by the Germans directly in the PDP.

[avt]

Quote: Aleksander

June 17, 1941 "Corsican" and "Petty Officer" - Chief Lieutenant Harro Schulze-Boysen

It was on his report on the exact date of the German attack on the USSR that Stalin wrote - "Send your source to her ... mother!", And BEFORE that Bolsen gave at least three more exact dates of the attack on the USSR. chapel ', and not 11 telegrams from Sorge with no less accurate dates of the attack.

Quote: Aleksander

e, and it’s not even necessary to know: they will attack, they will not attack: this is a terrible potential threat and in any case should immediately be stopped and any politician and military should have been obliged to put the troops on alert, IMHO.

Well, yes, well, yes ... the truth is all the same they began to lead ... BUT there is an opinion that, based on the calculation of the available forces and means of both sides, the Soviet leadership really thought that the attack in April-May was real, but that the Wehrmacht THREE months before the cold weather will decide everything according to the plan, "Barbarossa" starting at the end of July - an unrealistic gamble. It seems to be the truth, especially if you consider that in the leadership headed by Stalin there were people who could make mistakes, another thing is the price of THEIR mistakes if they are wrong Although they prepared maps for the "Vanka platoon commander" to the east into the interior of the USSR along Smolensk.

[Aleksander]

Quote: avt

It was on his report on the exact date of the German attack on the USSR that Stalin wrote - "Send your source to your mother ...!"

Yes, yes, but after only five days, biting his elbows, he, I think, sent already .... another person ....

Quote: avt

there is an opinion that, based on the calculation of the available forces and means of both parties, the Soviet leadership really thought that the attack in April-May is real, but that the Wehrmacht three months before the cold weather will decide everything according to plan

The calculation may be true or false, but it is customary to proceed from the Worst case, and proceed from the GOOD for yourself. Why on earth?

[Stas57]

Quote: Aleksander

Quote: Alexey RA

So intelligence reported all spring 1941 that there is no concentration of troops. And she was absolutely right - for according to the schedule of concentration of forces for Barabarossa, the main transfer began in June.

Colonel Vladimir N. KARPOV, Foreign Intelligence Services of Russia:
[i] -4 On August 1940, the residency in Vichy announced the start of the transfer of Hitler troops from France to the Soviet borders ... In total, from July 1940 to June 1941, intelligence sent to the Soviet leadership more than 120 detailed reports on German military preparations for the attack to the USSR.
In May 1941, it was possible to find out not only the number of divisions pulled to our borders, but also the places of their deployment - up to the location of battalions, headquarters of units. Even the firing positions of the batteries were being clarified. In April - May 1941, Stalin was informed of the measures of the German command on the last preparations for the strike. "Corsican" - Arvid Harnak, a leading employee of the Ministry of Economics, reported that the formation of German troops on the border with the USSR exactly repeats their formation on the eve of the invasion of France.

yawning, but what about this?

[I]
14 April 1941 of the year: “The start of hostilities should be preceded by an ultimatum to the Soviet Union with a proposal to accede to the Covenant of Three.”

5 May: “Germany will be required from the USSR to speak out against England on the side of the Axis powers. As a guarantee that the USSR will fight on the Axis side to a decisive end, Germany will demand from the USSR the occupation by the German army of Ukraine and, possibly, also the Baltic states. ”

May 9: “First, Germany will present an ultimatum to the Soviet Union demanding wider exports to Germany and the rejection of communist propaganda ... An ultimatum will be preceded by a“ war of nerves ”in order to demoralize the Soviet Union.”

9 of June: “Germany will present to the USSR a demand for the Germans to be given economic leadership in Ukraine and on the use of the Soviet Navy against England.” [/ I]
Well, which of the options worked?
ultimatum?
Demand?
so it was a surprise, and it reported intelligence, yeah

[Aleksander]

Quote: Stas57

Well, which of the options worked?

It is this:

In May 1941, it was possible to find out not only the number of divisions pulled to our borders, but also the places of their deployment

ie 4 million trained German soldiers (by the end of May, their number was growing rapidly), about which было is known Stalin, but the troops on alert, were not given ..

[avt]

Quote: Stas57

yawning, but what about this?

Quote: Stas57

so it was a surprise, and it reported intelligence, yeah

Quote: Aleksander

Quote: Stas57
Well, which of the options worked?

It is this:

Yes, I look at least now you can appoint a president! What insight and analytic nothing is wasted! ETOGES is necessary - like this, a gathering to determine from several different reports the exact date of the attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941 ... straight June 22 .... 2016 Probably, when what kind of problem book came across, first they looked at the answers, well, and then they customized the solution for them?

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Aleksander

those. 4 million trained German soldiers (by the end of May their number was growing rapidly), which was known to Stalin, but the troops were not prepared for it.

The "skyrocketing", according to intelligence, ended on May 15. At the end of May, the number of German divisions on the border with the USSR, according to these data, increased by as much as 3 pieces.

Our response was the transfer of divisions of the internal districts.

[yehat]

But what do you think of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor?
But how do you feel about the German offensive through the Ardennes on May 10-12, 1940?
But how do you feel about the offensive during the Bagration operation?
and how do you feel about the capture of English Singapore by the Japanese?

What turns out all over the world some non-army fought?
in my opinion, on the contrary, the army fought, and you have problems with logic.

[Beefeater]

Quote: Stas57

Quote: Beefeater

A telegram may simply be in another folder.
The second range of the German bomber is small, only part of the forces, percent 20, was defeated, a militia was put under arms, which also disappeared entirely.
It means, not in a sudden matter, but in the incompetence of the leadership and the unwillingness of the people howling at that time

will you again denounce the bloody scoop? for which the people did not go to war?
I repeat - surprise first of all - preemption in deployment,

Well, what a surprise. Several million soldiers, tanks, airfields ...
You think ours didn’t know and didn’t know, having a intelligence network in Poland and Romania.
Or Stalin believed that Hitler was going to India.
In ancient Rome, the Gracchus brothers started a reform, began to distribute land to the peasants. What is the reason? Everything is simple. Landless proletarians did not want to fight for the Roman Republic. But what for, they have nothing to lose. And it was 2000 years before the 41st

[Stas57]

Quote: Beefeater

You think ours didn’t know and didn’t know, having a intelligence network in Poland and Romania.
Or Stalin believed that Hitler was going to India.

do you read at all
further warning in deployment and mobilization.
moreover, he believed or did not believe, because our people knew something, it didn’t become easier.
it was believed that before the war there would be a certain threatened period in which both countries would conduct mobilization and concentration

[kalibr]

The great proletarian poet Mayakovsky wrote about this even when he wrote: "You can fight and die, and be torn apart by a bombardment. You can die for the earth for your own, but how to die for the common ?!"

[Filing]

Zhukov and Khrushchev came to power and cleaned all the archives.

[V.ic]

Border guards are the only ones who met the enemy in full alert By Mikhail Feshchuk

The author, this is right about the border guards, but you deigned to forget about the RKKF! That's who really introduced the system of degrees of readiness, so it was the People's Commissar N.G. Kuznetsov. Eternal memory to him!

[Kenneth]

The fleet openly overslept the enemy’s mine production, which caused losses in the early days. In general, in the absence of enemy ships, he suffered such heavy losses that it was a question of preserving the latter. The management regularly evaluated Kuznetsov’s merits lowering him in rank.

[Serg65]

Quote: Kenneth

in the absence of enemy ships suffered such heavy losses that it was a question of preserving the latter

Kindly open the topic!

[Aleksandr72]

Losses of the Baltic Fleet in 1941 (only specially built surface ships):
destroyers of the Novik type:
"Yakov Sverdlov" sunk on August 28, 1941, m. Yuminda, mine
Engels sunk on August 24, 1941, m. Uminda, mine
"Artem" sunk on August 29, 1941, m. Yuminda, mine
Volodarsky sunk on August 28, 1941, m. Yuminda, mine
"Lenin" sunk June 24, 1941, Libau, flooded by the crew for repair
Kalinin sunk on August 28, 1941, m. Yuminda, mine
type "7":
"Wrathful" damaged June 24, 1941, app. Tahkuns, mine, sunk on June 24, 1941 by esm artillery fire. "Proud"
"The guardian" sunk on September 21, 19 41, Kronstadt, German. Aviation / St. G2, KG77,
The "sharp-witted" was sunk on November 4, 1941, east. about. Osmusaar, mine
"Proud" sunk November 14, 1941, sowing. about. Keri, mine
type "7U":
“Brave” damaged July 27, 1941 Irbensky Strait, mine / aircraft attack; according to some reports, the Sov. TKA, for others - it. TKA S54, S57?
"Angry" damaged July 19, 1941 Ave. Muhu-Vyain / o. Worms dumb. Aviation / K. Fl. Gr. 806 (4 Yu-88), sunk July 22, 1941, flooded
"Statny" damaged on August 18, 1941 58 ° 58 ', 2 "N 23 ° 16'1" E, bottom mine, sunk on August 24, 1941 while being towed into a storm in the Rohukul region
"Fast" sunk September 28, 1941, m. Yuminda, mine
"Severe" was sunk on November 14, 1941 3 meters from about. Keri / 59 ° 44 ', 4 "N 25 ° 55', 9" E etc., mine
esm leader. (pr 38) Minsk was sunk on September 23, 1941 Bol. Kronstad. raid him. Aviation / St. G2, KG77, raised in August 1942, put into operation on June 22, 1943
patrol ships of the Storm type:
Cyclone sunk on August 28, 1941, m. Yuminda, mine
"Snow" sunk August 28, 1941, ibid.
"Whirlwind" sunk September 21, 1941, Kronstadt, German. aircraft, raised in 1943, in 1944 - in operation
auxiliary TFR of different types:
"Topaz" sunk on August 28, 1941, m. Yuminda, mine
Shchors (a former tugboat of the Izhorets type) was sunk on September 29, 1941, near Lavensaari, a mine
the Azimut network trap (former GISU) was sunk on November 22, 1941, east. Hanko, mine
mine loaders:
Amur training minisan sunk August 28, 1941, Tallinn, sunk
"Suurop" sunk on August 11, 1941, district Kuyvastu, German. aviation
basic TGas type "Landmine" (BTSC):
BTSC-201 “Zaryad” was sunk on July 30, 1941 (August 3, 1941?), Mk Ristna, mine
BTSC-202 "Buoy" sunk on August 14, 1941, m. Yumanda, mine
BTSC-203 "Cartridge" sunk October 24, 1941, rn about. Kern, mine
BTSC-206 "Verp" sunk November 13, 1941, rn about. Kern, mine
BTSC-208 sunk on June 23, 1941, sowing. entrance to Mukhu-vayn Ave. (Glotova Bank), mines it. TCA S35 and S60
BTSC-209 "Knecht" sunk on August 24, 1941, m. Yuminda, mine
BTSC-212 "Stag" sunk on August 3, 1941 app. part of Soelo-Vine Ave. mine
BTShch-213 "Krambol" was sunk on 11 August 1941, Cape Yuminda (59 ° 46 ', 8 "N 25 ° 17', 2" E) mine
BTSC-214 "The yoke" was sunk on August 24, 1941, rn about. Keri, mine
BTShch-216 sunk on August 5, 1941, near Takhkun m-ka (59 ° 09 ', 5 "N w 22 ° 37', 5" E), mine
gunboats:
"Pioneer" sunk September 27, 1941 Leningrad, pestilence. channel, it. aircraft, October 29, 1943 raised, November 30, 1945 - in operation
I-8 ("Kronstadt") sunk on August 28, 1941, m. Uminda, mine
special construction minesweepers of other types:
T-297 Virsaitis sunk December 3, 1941, east. Hanko, mine (sunk 246)
T-298 "Imanta" sunk July 1, 1941, b. Taga-laht, mine
TSH No. 56 “Klyuz” was sunk on November 25, 1941, east. Hanko, mine
Most of the ships were killed by mines during the Tallinn passage. In the first days of the war in the Baltic, only the "Lenin" EM, which was being repaired in Libau, died. I had to blow it up.

[Kenneth]

Already 23June blew up Angry and Maxim Gorky

[Aleksandr72]

EM "Wrath" was blown up while sweeping the Apolda minefield, set up by the German minelayers "Tannenberg", "Hansestadt Danzig" and "Brummer" at Cape Tahkun on the night of June 21-22, 1941. Moreover, the ship was first finished off with artillery EM "Proud", but was finally sunk by three German dive bombers Ju-88 only on June 25, 1941. KR "Maxim Gorky" then blew up on the same minefield, but managed to reach Tallinn, from where it was transferred to Kronstadt where a new nose piece was attached to it.
Losses of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla in 1941 (only surface ships and submarines of special construction):
Cruiser Chervona Ukraine sunk November 13, 1941, Sevastopol, aviation
destroyer leaders "Moscow" sunk June 26, 1941, east. Constanцыa, a mine sunk by a coastal
destroyers of the Novik type:
"Frunze" sunk September 21, 1941, sowing. Tendra Spit, aviation
type "7":
"Quick" sunk July 1, 1941, Sevastopol, bottom mine
type "7U"
"Perfect" damaged September 30, 1941, metro Khersones, mine; damaged November 12, 1941, Sevastopol, aircraft (in the dock); June 8, 1942, Sevastopol, blown up at the dock
submarines
type "M"
M-34 sunk? November 1941, room. pob.,?
M-58 sunk October 21, 1941, rn Constanta, mine
M-59 sunk on December 5, 1941, Suliny district, ram room. esm. Reggie Ferdinad 1
M-54 damaged December 10, 1941, rn Anapa, sat on the stones
type "Щ"
Щ-206 sunk on June 26, 1941, near Konstatstsi, erroneously esm. "Smart"
Щ-211 sunk on November 16, 1941, Varna, mine m / s S18
Щ-204 sunk on December 6, 1941, 20 miles from Varna, Ch. bombs and artillery fire SKA Belomorets and Chernomorets (when trying to land a Bulgarian reconnaissance group)
type "C"
S-34 sunk on November 14, 1941, m. Emine, mine
type "D"
404. D-6 damaged on August 18, 1941, 60 miles west. Sevastopol, aviation; damaged November 12, 1941, Sevastopol, aviation (about the dock); sunk June 26, 1942, Sevastopol, blown up
minelayers
"Ostrovsky" sunk March 23, 1942, Tuapse, German. aviation
"Syzran" sunk July 29, 1941, m. Takil, mine (raised)
gunboats
"Red Armenia" sunk on September 21, 1941, Tendra Spit, German. aviation
basic trawls (BTSC)
T-402 "Minrep" sunk September 12, 1941, rn Feodosia, bottom mine
auxiliary minesweepers
T-504 ("Worker") sunk November 5, 1941, m. Ai-Todor, German. aviation
T-507 ("Delegate") sunk October 27, 1941, Kerch, German. aviation
T-491 (Kiziltash) was damaged on December 27, 1941, Kerch Ave, German. Aviation sunk March 2, 1942, rn Kuchugur, sank while towing
T-493 ("Hadzhibey") sunk September 6, 1941, Odessa, German. aviation (raised
Germans)
T-497 (Egurcha) sunk November 2, 1941, Novorossiysk Bay, bottom mine
T-516 ("Maykop") sunk November 19, 1941, rn Anapa, German. aviation (raised and put into operation)
T-484 ("Henkin") sunk November 7, 1941, metro Sarych, thrown ashore by storm
T-485 ("Kakhovka") sunk on December 28, 1941; Kerch Ave, by aviation (raised); sunk February 25, 1942, Kamysh-Burun raid, by air
T-487 ("Ochakov Canal") sunk on August 19, 1941, Kherson, coastal artillery (raised by the Germans)
T-503 ("Baikal" sunk on August 18, 1941, Ochakov, coastal artillery (raised by the Germans)
As we can see, in the first days of the war, one ship perished on the Black Sea - the leader "Moskva". was blown up in the Romanian defensive minefield near Constanta, finished off by coastal artillery.

[Serg65]

Quote: Kenneth

Already 23June blew up Angry and Maxim Gorky

Sentinel minesweeper BTSC-216, even at dawn on June 22, discovered a minefield north of Hiium Island, as reported to the fleet headquarters. But the report was lost at headquarters. There was enough sloppiness in the navy, no one denies this! The actions of Svyatov’s cautorang, as the commander of the cover detachment, are full of mistakes made and this is true. However, 22 June 1941 attack of the enemy fleet did not oversleep or is it wrong Constantine?

[sherp2015]

Quote: Serg65

Sentinel minesweeper BTSC-216, even at dawn on June 22, discovered a minefield north of Hiium Island, as reported to the fleet headquarters. But the report was lost at headquarters.

Quote: Serg65

Who is to blame. that naval bases were surrendered to the ground forces of the Wehrmacht? In your opinion, Kuznetsov is to blame for this

Quote: Kenneth

Who was responsible for her preparation. Who was responsible for naval planning. Why there were not enough minesweepers. Why weak anti-aircraft weapons of ships. They didn’t think so. And who should have thought about this before the war

Here are your Mehlis and guilty. They settled in the headquarters.
Like now in the Kremlin

[Serg65]

Quote: sherp2015

Here are your Mehlis and guilty. They settled in the headquarters.
Like now in the Kremlin

Creative but not convincing! .... Develop your thought! Putin is the enemy of the people and further down the list ...

[Kenneth]

He specializes in Jews.

[Kenneth]

The BSF and BF did not have worthy opponents. Where are the German battleships, cruisers. Two Finnish battleships .... some kind of Romanian live. Germans crushed our fleets with aircraft and mines. And they finished up to the fact that until 1944 large ships stopped going to sea. There was a different situation on the Northern Fleet but the Allied fleet was operating there.

[Serg65]

Quote: Kenneth

. Germans crushed our fleets with aircraft and mines. And they finished up to the fact that before the 1944 year, large ships stopped going to sea

Who is to blame for the fact that the dominance of the Luftwaffe in the initial period of the war was overwhelming? Who is to blame. that naval bases were surrendered to the ground forces of the Wehrmacht? In your opinion, is Kuznetsov or Tributs with Oktyabrsky to blame for this ???

[Kenneth]

And they too. The fleets had their own aviation. Who was responsible for her preparation. Who was responsible for naval planning. Why there were not enough minesweepers. Why weak anti-aircraft weapons of ships. They didn’t think so. And who should have thought about this before the war. My grandfathers who fought in the trenches or admiral. Why not analyze the experience of the beginning of the Second World War. Air strikes of the British and Germans, a mine war in the Baltic and the Black Sea in the First World War. Everything was for analysis and preparation.

[Beefeater]

Quote: Kenneth

And they too. The fleets had their own aviation. Who was responsible for her preparation. Who was responsible for naval planning. Why there were not enough minesweepers. Why weak anti-aircraft weapons of ships. They didn’t think so. And who should have thought about this before the war. My grandfathers who fought in the trenches or admiral. Why not analyze the experience of the beginning of the Second World War. Air strikes of the British and Germans, a mine war in the Baltic and the Black Sea in the First World War. Everything was for analysis and preparation.

It is believed that the aircraft did not have gasoline. Something there did not grow together in the oil industry and the output of gasoline was only a few percent
For the same reason, the ZiS5 engine was deformed, as a girl the Autocar

[Uncle Murzik]

whose opinion, give a link! or again your fantasies!

[Beefeater]

Quote: Uncle Murzik

whose opinion, give a link! or again your fantasies!

Not at all fancy. Aviabenzene was obtained by direct distillation, receiving less than a hundred pounds per ton. We did not indulge in cracking, for nothing. Mikhail Kaganovich, the People's Commissar shot himself from an upset. Then the American additives used tetraethyl lead or Aomerov’s gasoline. They were full of these materials on the net.

[Kenneth]

The opinion is fundamentally wrong. It even happened that at the border, with huge losses of other equipment, there were no particularly large fuel and lubricant depots.

[Serg65]

Quote: Kenneth

Who was responsible for naval planning.

Hmmm, this is an interesting question! From 1931 to 1939, FIVE Commissars changed, Kuznetsov became the sixth on April 29 of 1939 (two years remained before 22.06.41) ... which of the six Commissars was responsible for planning?

Quote: Kenneth

Why there were not enough minesweepers

Because to design and build the same minesweeper is not like frying pies in a frying pan! According to the results of the Spanish War, the pr.59 squadron minesweeper was developed. The first two ships of this project were laid down in 1939 and underwent acceptance tests before the war. A total of 11 ships were laid down. The most massive minesweeper was Project 53 "Fugas", which was constantly modernized due to the rapidly changing naval theory (as many as four subprojects), 44 ships were built in total.

Quote: Kenneth

Why weak anti-aircraft weapons of ships

More modern ships began to be designed at the beginning of the 30's, when aviation was still underdeveloped, at that time it was believed that the available anti-aircraft artillery was quite enough, later projects had not been built before the war for a number of reasonable reasons.

Quote: Kenneth

Why not analyze the experience of the beginning of the Second World War. Air strikes of the British and Germans, a mine war in the Baltic and the Black Sea in the First World War.

Why did you decide that?

[Kenneth]

You answered all the questions perfectly. And why did I decide so. And because in the first world we mined the adversaries in mines and in the second they us. Errors of planning, logistics and lack of professionalism of the leadership are the main reasons for this start of the war.

[Serg65]

Quote: Kenneth

Errors of planning, logistics and lack of professionalism of the leadership are the main reasons for this start of the war.

Ahhh, yes, yes. I totally agree with you! Stalin is walking. fate gave him a magic wand, and he was a simpleton picking it in his nose! Not that a bunch of minesweepers would wave to you, waved a second time and on the anti-aircraft gun on the entire deck including the latrine ... not a professional, what to take from it!

[Kenneth]

Who is to blame for the frequent change of command of the fleets, who is to blame for the fleets commanded by young people with no planning experience and just leadership experience. Who created a nervous atmosphere that killed all initiative in the Navy. Who decided to lay LKr and LK when there were no minesweepers. These are direct schools of planning and preparation for which the leadership of the country and the army are responsible. And not because it happened.

[Serg65]

Quote: Kenneth

Who is to blame for the frequent change of command of the fleets, who is to blame for the fleets commanded by young people with no planning experience and just leadership experience. Who created a nervous atmosphere that killed all initiative in the Navy

Constant disruption of the naval shipbuilding program, a large accident rate in the navy. lack of discipline both in command and in the rank and file - this is

Quote: Kenneth

These are direct schools of planning and preparation for which the leadership of the country and the army are responsible

Quote: Kenneth

And not because it happened.

Now at the moment you as a specialist what do you think about the development of the Russian Navy? What ships need to be built? Many complain about the oil needle, how would you find funds to finance shipbuilding and army reform?

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Kenneth

The fleets had their own aviation. Who was responsible for her preparation.

If you know how to cook aviation without gasoline and training machines - share it.
The situation with gasoline was such that at the meeting following the results of 1940, Novikov Air Force Commander of the Air Defense Forces of Lvov told the top military leadership of the country that the district air force combat aircraft sit on the ground all summer - there is no fuel. And the number of training machines is such that it does not allow either to maintain the raid of the existing staff, nor to commission pilots from schools. In the remaining districts and in the fleet, the situation was no better.
The reason is simple - the oil industry was able to fulfill the plan only for B-70 / KB-70 aviation gasoline, which was almost out of use. And the plan for the B-78 was frustrated.
It is not surprising that on 01.06.41 there were only 1139 combat-ready crews on 441 naval fighters. Moreover, for the most popular machine - I-16 - there were 563 crews for 222 fighters.
The situation was no better for the bombers: 549 vehicles, and 213 combat-ready crews.

In addition, the Air Force fleets almost from the beginning of the war were thrown to the land front. So, 1 mtb KBF suffered huge losses when working on the ferry near Dvinsk on June 30, 1941.

Quote: Kenneth

Why there were not enough minesweepers.

And who told you that they were missing? The problem was not in quantity. The problem was the inappropriate use of HSC - for example, as high-speed transports (and accompanied by other HMS). And the fact that the command of the KBF with its passivity actually gave the enemy communication between the warhead and the rear naval base, allowing him to freely conduct mine productions.

Quote: Kenneth

Why weak anti-aircraft weapons of ships.

Because POISO and synchronous servo drives at that time are like microprocessors or high-precision multi-axis CNC machines now. The USSR simply did not pull up a massive high-tech for the fleet, throwing all its forces into the army.
It’s good that 21-K as a naval MZA began to change to 70-K.

[Kenneth]

Anti-aircraft machine guns are also high-tech? It's hard to get into the ship. It is necessary to dive on it or on a shaving torpedo. Or maybe a high-tech small-caliber gun.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Kenneth

Anti-aircraft machine guns are also high-tech?

Another one! Degtyaryov-large-caliber brought to mind 7 years!

... field tests of the recreation center in 1934 showed that the machine gun is unsuitable for fighting fast-moving targets due to insufficient combat rate of fire caused by the low rate of fire, heavy and bulky magazines. In 1935, the issue of the Palace of Culture was completely stopped.

As a result, we got a DShK, which in the late 30s cost more than 13,5 thousand rubles. - almost like a 45th gun. And this device was still produced in homeopathic quantities.

In total, in 1940, Plant No. 2 in Kovrov produced 566 DShK. In the first half of 41 years - 234 machine guns (in total for 1941, with a plan of 4 thousand DShK, about 1,6 thousand were received). In total, as of June 22, 1941, there were about 2,2 thousand heavy machine guns in the units of the Red Army.

What do you think - from a good life in the beginning of 1941 ours bought quad Vickers from Britain?

At the beginning of the war, the Navy had 830 machine guns, and in total during the war received 4018 pieces from industry and another 1146 were transferred to the fleet from the Red Army.

To replace the DShK, a 14,5-mm machine gun was made. And it seems that Vladimirov even began to get something. They even managed to put a cartridge into the series. But the war began - and touched the 14,5 mm caliber went to the production of PTR.

Quote: Kenneth

Or maybe a high-tech small-caliber gun.

In order to put the 40-mm Bofors into a series, American companies had to work for 2 years. Ready gun under license with all documentation!
And they developed their own 28-mm machine gun from the beginning of the 30s - and as a result buried it. Like the American 37 mm cannon, the first contract for which turned out to be the last one - it was left in production only until the first serial 40 mm cannons were received.

Our factories and design bureaus in the 30s in the same way consistently ruined all "approaches to the projectile" in terms of MZA - and were able to develop a normally working sample only in the late 30s.

[Beefeater]

Quote: Kenneth

Anti-aircraft machine guns are also high-tech? It's hard to get into the ship. It is necessary to dive on it or on a shaving torpedo. Or maybe a high-tech small-caliber gun.

Small-caliber erlicons are really high-tech, they could establish their production only after the war, although our intelligence stole their drawings in France

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Beefeater

Small-caliber erlicons are really high-tech, they could establish their production only after the war, although our intelligence stole their drawings in France

And what is our system that became a copy of "Erlikon"?
The naval 25mm and 37mm are rooted in Bofors.
Navy 30-mm are aliens from aviation.
ZU-23-2 - this is groundwork for the land Volkov-Yartsev + understanding of the experience of war on the chassis for the MZA (abandonment of a heavy four-wheeled platform in favor of a two-wheel drive).

[overb]

Quote: Kenneth

Anti-aircraft machine guns are also high-tech?

For the USSR of those times, yes. Not only anti-aircraft, all land. DShK how many years they mocked, so really at that time they didn’t snarl. Although this is the best that was in the Red Army at that time.
DS, to replace the ancient Maxim, failed.
DP, despite the bravura marches, was not a machine gun. He was just called that. For solidity, I guess.

Quote: Alexey RA

A 14,5 mm machine gun was made to replace the DShK

They did not make a 14,5 mm machine gun. From the very beginning it was a cartridge for PTR.

Quote: Alexey RA

In order to put the 40-mm Bofors into a series, American companies had to work for 2 years. Ready gun under license with all documentation!

In the air-cooled version, the Americans quickly mastered this g ***. But it didn’t really interest them. It was harder to remake it into a water-cooled version. This really took time. But in return, Bofors is known only for such water-cooled guns.

Quote: Alexey RA

Our response was the transfer of divisions of the internal districts.

Did the soldiers of the remaining divisions have external organs? Use some muffled terminology, by golly.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: overb

They did not make a 14,5 mm machine gun. From the very beginning it was a cartridge for PTR.

Vika, of course, is a powerful source - but the trouble is, they write it on the basis of the scientific era of the USSR.
In fact, the cartridge 14,5x114 was created for use in automatic weapons. Since the end of the 20s, the Red Army dreamed of a 15-20 mm machine gun. And before the war, Degtyarev and Shpagin, Simonin and Vladimirov were engaged in its development.
A PTR were only a by-product of these works.

Quote: overb

In the air-cooled version, the Americans quickly mastered this g ***. But it didn’t really interest them. It was harder to remake it into a water-cooled version. This really took time.

It was an answer in the style of Bader - very weighty and half a meter past. © ABS
Nobody remade anything for water cooling. The Americans immediately bought licenses for both types of AUs - from the ZhO for the fleet and from the VO for the army:

Under this contract, the Bofors 40mm AA gun might be made for the American services as follows: water-cooled for the Navy; twin mounts for the Navy; air-cooled for the Army; field carriages, under us Patent 2,103,670, for the Army; and ammunition.

The problem was different - the production at "Bofors" was small-scale. The acquired technology for manufacturing the gun and the design itself were not adapted for large-scale production on the conveyor. The TD regularly encountered phrases so pleasing to the technologists of serial production as "drill in place after assembly", "drive in place", "make a 12-kg part from a 3-kg workpiece", etc.
And such a giant as "Chrysler" 2 years brought the gun and technology to mind, having received as a result practically a new weapon.
As for "not interested", then the option with air cooling. in fact, there was a single army MZA in the United States, and even supplied to the UK.

In the 30s, the USSR had exactly the same problems with MZA: if it was possible to create working prototypes of weapons, then this was done manually by highly qualified personnel. And during the transition to the series, it turned out that the technology used for the prototype was not applicable for the series. And for the serial technology, the weapon turned out to be either too complicated, or "did not fit into the series" at all.

[overb]

Quote: Alexey RA

Since the end of the 20s, the Red Army dreamed of a 15-20 mm machine gun.

A very powerful "argument". And nothing that the technologies of that time did not allow effectively cooling the barrel with a DE of 31 kJ. Even DShK with its 17 kJ coped with this very poorly. And here it is almost 2 times more. There was no way in those days to do land machine gun on such a cartridge. Therefore, he was not there.

Quote: Alexey RA

It was an answer in the style of Bader - very weighty and half a meter past.

Where to me. Whether it's you.

Quote: Alexey RA

Nobody remade anything for water cooling.

Quote: Alexey RA

And such a giant as "Chrysler" 2 years brought the gun and technology to mind, having received as a result practically a new weapon.

Do you have a split personality? How can you "get a practically new tool as a result" without altering anything?

Quote: Alexey RA

And during the transition to the series, it turned out that the technology used for the prototype was not applicable for the series.

Do not fantasize. It's not about technology, it's about lack of mind. If in the West they made a 40-mm anti-aircraft gun, then in the USSR, of course, they did 45 mm. Inikak no less. Why? But because. This is a universal Soviet answer to many questions. I learned it back then.
Then they guessed to experience this 45-mm miracle. And only then it was "accidentally found out" that IT would not work. Heat dissipation too weak. Then the hole in the barrel was made smaller, and they switched to a smaller caliber. From which the heat supply was smaller. This did not radically solve the problem, but it turned out better than in the 45-mm caliber. The result is an ordinary Soviet city ... on a stick. Those. could work, but bad.
In fairness, it must be said that the land Bofors was about the same ...
The USSR could probably provide itself with the MZA. And there was a gun for this, VY. But the mustachioed Joe stopped this business in the bud, he took all the VY for his beloved games, IL-2. Where they were like a cow saddle.

[V.ic]

Quote: Kenneth

The management regularly evaluated Kuznetsov’s merits lowering him in rank.

So you and "dear Nikita Sergeevich" are one-thinkers? Congratulations! Your role model has been chosen flawlessly! When will you start sowing corn on the loggia?

[Kenneth]

If you took the trouble to read books and not copy them, you would know that Comrade Stalin ambiguously evaluated the merits of the naval commander. To say the least. In general, you got me. You will continue to insult; you will learn a lot about yourself. Have something to say write on the case.

[V.ic]

Quote: Kenneth

You will continue to insult; you will learn a lot about yourself.

It would be desirable, of course, to find out about yourself ... You are not from the CIA, for an hour, but to m. Mi-6? By the way, what did you see as an insult?

Quote: Kenneth

Have something to say write on business

So you have already opened a case for me? By the way, I didn’t drink on the Brudershaft with you, so poking apply to your famous place.

[sherp2015]

Quote: Kenneth

The fleet openly overslept the enemy’s mine production, which caused losses in the early days. In general, in the absence of enemy ships, he suffered such heavy losses that it was a question of preserving the latter. The management regularly evaluated Kuznetsov’s merits lowering him in rank.

Well, if the merits of a real military commander Kuznetsov were evaluated by your fellow countryman - the mediocre master of undercover intrigues the executioner and the monster Mehlis is nothing surprising. How many thousands of officers were injured and died from this wretch One Almighty

[Kenneth]

I wonder how Odessa Mehlis can be a fellow countryman of the Leningrad. By the way, Kuznetsov personally commanded only one ship in his career. And by the beginning of the war he was 37 years old. In such a position.

[Serg65]

Quote: sherp2015

Well, if the merits of a real military commander Kuznetsov were evaluated by your fellow countryman - the mediocre master of undercover intrigues the executioner and the monster Mehlis is nothing surprising.

As I understand it, Mehlis owes you money?

[brn521]

Quote: Kenneth

The fleet openly overslept the enemy’s mine production, which caused losses in the early days.

And still interesting, but what could be done? The war has not yet begun. Directives are in force not to provoke a potential enemy, not to meddle with ships and aircraft in the zone of his interests. And then it was too late. Peaceful German mine loaders, devoid of sight, were thrown on the fairways of peaceful German sea mines. Normally the hands were untied only at the border guards thanks to clear instructions: the border has been violated - must be stopped. And what should the same pilots do? The Germans used to fly across the border, but these were provocations that were ordered not to give in. And then they also began to bomb. Is it still provocation or is it time to fight? If there was an order, it did not reach the bottom. Same thing with the fleet.

[Kenneth]

It’s not fate to keep track of mine settings and circle minefields. If you do not oppose, then at least know where.

[brn521]

Quote: Kenneth

it’s not destiny to follow mine production and to clear minefields.

So what am I talking about. To follow you must be present. Scatter observers in the fairways, drive the aircraft. But there was an order not to shine. And what to do in such a situation?

[Kenneth]

Stalin is to blame

[V.ic]

Quote: Kenneth

Stalin is to blame

Then Stalin was appointed guilty, now Putin?
For some reason, the "chosen ones" are always untouchable.

[Kostya Andreev]

Well, and that I had to read a new and interesting article. I saw the name, I thought now there will be some kind of research, a new thought, new unknown details. and as a result, compilation from various sources, and the name of the author, the type worked. This topic is such that it will not work out briefly, and the author has failed.
Although maybe someone will be interested. but in many, if not all, people know about the causes of the beginning of warriors, many different theories.

[Aleksander]

Quote: Kostya Andreev

as a result, compilation from different sources, and the set name of the author, such as worked. This topic is such that it will not work out briefly, and the author has failed.

Firstly, this is only the 1 part. Secondly, the author has the right to express his point of view, which can be expressed by specially selected calculations.
I also did not like the article, but the author’s point of view, I think, should be respected in any case.

[Kostya Andreev]

so the author promised briefly, but it turns out there will still be parts. I agree that the author has the right to his point of view, and this author is engaged in retelling and plagiarism, and his point of view is not. I always respect the authors, but not the plagiarists!
I repeat, here in VO, there are people who know this topic clearly by the author of this article. and they know different visions of this problem from different angles. Do not believe, read the haiaba comments under this article, they are more informative, informative, interesting than what the author wrote
You can’t briefly describe this topic; too much has happened during these days and months of the summer 41.

[Alex]

Quote: Kostya Andreev

so the author promised briefly, but it turns out there will still be parts.

Well, the concepts "long - short" are relative. The topic is extensive, but "briefly" in one publication did not fit. Let's see what happens next, so far there is not much interest.

[cast iron]

Only a military historian with the rank of no lower than a colonel can tell you the reasons for the defeat. A person in military terms should be competent at the level of a division commander, not lower.

[Filxnumx]

Quote: V.ic

Quote: Kenneth

tracing paper from old Soviet editions.

Repetition = mother of learning!

Repetition of delirium does not lead to anything good. Only the smart learns from mistakes, only repeats all his own and others' mistakes. Article is uniquely mined

[V.ic]

Quote: Fil743

Repetition delirium doesn’t lead to anything good

Great said! Now indicate the specific paragraphs in the article where this is present, pliz zz!

[Alex]

Quote: V.ic

Now indicate the specific paragraphs in the article where this is present, pliz sz!

Without sharing harshly emotional statements FilxnumxI will give one example:

Since the Soviet Union was not going to attack, in the western border districts there were only covering troops. Their task was to prevent the invasion of enemy troops on the territory and in the airspace of the USSR.
Those formations that were not part of the covering armies were located in the interior of the districts at a distance of 400 km from the border. As a rule, rifle armies stood out in the first echelon of cover armies, and mechanized corps in the second echelon.
According to the map above, on the border itself (and not 400 km from it) are the 10 and 3 armies. We look at the composition.
10 Army:
1-th and 5-th SK (four SD), 6-th and 13-th MK (four TD and two MD), 6-th Cossack Caucasus (two KavD) and two separate SD. Well, plus a dozen other formations.
3-I army. This one looks a bit more modest:
4-th SK (two SD, two AP), 11-th MK (two TD. One MD) and two SD subordinate to the army headquarters.
To the south, but also on the line of the state border, and not in depth, according to the author, deployed 4-th Army consisting of:
28-th SK (two SD, two regiments of corps artillery), 14-th MK (two TD, one MD) and two separate SD.
Thus, only in a small section of the border do we have four MKs, four SKs, and one KavK. Considering that the USSR at that time had about a dozen mechanized corps (according to their numbers, EMNIP, about 22's, but the rest were certainly at the stage of formation and replenishment of equipment), all this looks somewhat strange against the background of the thesis previously expressed by the author about plans of the General Staff of the USSR at the beginning of the war.

I don’t know exactly what Zhukov and Tymoshenko were guided by issuing directives on just such an arrangement of troops (in the memoirs this issue is bypassed smoothly), but the author should have a somewhat more responsible attitude to the materials that he brings together in one article. In any case, at least give the exact locations of those mechanized corps, which are talked about so much.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Alex

10 Army:
1-th and 5-th SK (four SD), 6-th and 13-th MK (four TD and two MD), 6-th Cossack Caucasus (two KavD) and two separate SD. Well, plus a dozen other formations.

It defends cover area No. 2 - about 40% of the state border within the district.

Quote: Alex

3rd army. This one looks a bit more modest:
4-th SK (two SD, two AP), 11-th MK (two TD. One MD) and two SD subordinate to the army headquarters.

It defends cover area No. 1 - about 20% of the state border within the district.

Quote: Alex

Farther south, but also on the state border line, and not in depth, as the author claims, the 4th Army is deployed

Read the ZAPOVO cover plan.

To cover the state border from the district troops from M – 1 to M-15 are allocated:
a) controls 3, 10, 13 and 4th Army;

So there are no contradictions: 4 A is one of the cover armies, and its place is at the state border.

Quote: Alex

Thus, only in a small section of the border do we have four MKs, four SKs, and one KavK.

In fact, we have one MK - 6 MK Khatskilevich.
11, 13 and 14 MK - this is the formation corps of the spring of 1941 and in June 1941 their combat effectiveness is at an extremely low level.
At 13 MK there was partially combat ready 25 TD, at 31 TD there was no materiel.
At 14 MK, the equipment was not operational, and half of the personnel came from the 1941 spring draft.

[Alex]

Quote: Alexey RA

So there are no contradictions

Alexey, I am not discussing plans to cover the border, this is already a military strategy, I am not very strong in it. I pointed out to the author that he clearly contradicts himself: in the text - the mechanized corps "at a distance of 400 km from the border", on the map - in the immediate vicinity. This suggests that the author is either incompetent in the issues discussed, or could not cope with such an extensive topic, or did not bother with a valid analysis of the locations of the MK (at least a dozen). I'm not even talking about the fact that it would be necessary to give a picture of the disposition of the troops of the first and second echelons, to determine their composition and structure, to designate the concentration areas and URs on which they relied, etc. But it turned out as always: the attacking Wehrmacht was examined almost under a microscope, and the defending Red Army - in general terms.

And one more interesting question. Why were these MKs created, about which there is so much debate and talk? If these are powerful movable joints, then they are an attack tool (like a long sharpened spoke). If these are short and thick nails, the task of which is to bite into the ground and carry out the knocking out of an adversary's army, then why such a huge amount of machinery? It’s clear that no defense is possible without counterattacks and counterattacks, but to concentrate such a mass of armored personnel carriers almost on the border itself, and even to pull aviation there ... Something is wrong here, is it? Either there was a plan at the General Staff (maybe too cunning and adventurous), which for some reason did not work, or the entire military-political leadership was suddenly defeated by insanity amid collective dementia and insanity. However, a third option is possible: my personal knowledge of the strategy, to put it mildly, is not very ...

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Alex

Alexey, I am not discussing plans to cover the border, this is already a military strategy, I am not very strong in it. I pointed out to the author that he clearly contradicts himself: in the text - the mechanized corps "at a distance of 400 km from the border", on the map - in the immediate vicinity.

And where did you see in the text mechanized corps "at a distance of up to 400 km from the border"?

Those formations that were not part of the covering armies were located in the interior of the districts at a distance of 400 km from the border. As a rule, rifle armies stood out in the first echelon of cover armies, and mechanized corps in the second echelon.

I decipher: in depth, at a distance of up to 400 km from the border, there were formations that were not part of the covering armies.
Cover armies stood at the border. And these armies included their own mechanized corps, which also stood at the border, but in the second echelon, behind the infantry.

Simply put, the formation of the troops of the districts was two-echelon: cover armies and reserves. In turn, the construction of first-tier cover armies also had their 2 echelons: infantry in front and "penetration-sealing" mobile (in theory) mechanized corps behind. These mechanized corps of the covering armies were at the border.

Quote: Alex

And one more interesting question. Why were these MKs created, about which there is so much debate and talk? If these are powerful movable joints, then they are an attack tool (like a long sharpened spoke). If these are short and thick nails, the task of which is to bite into the ground and carry out the knocking out of an adversary's army, then why such a huge amount of machinery

MK were planned as a universal tool. In the offensive, they enter a "clear breakthrough" or break through the enemy's second line of defense together with the infantry - and then go along the enemy's rear.
In defense, the MK’s task is to be the mobile reserve of the commander or commander, ready, in cooperation with the Iptabr and infantry, to seal the breakthrough of the enemy’s mechanical connection. Ideally, iptabr slows down the head of the wedge, and MK hits the base.

The problem is that ours did not have the "ideal section" of the OSH. For this "cut" requires the experience of a real war. Moreover, copying someone else's "sections" does not make sense - OSHS very much depends on the average level of training of command personnel and privates. Where the Germans calmly worked as a combined hodgepodge of Kampfgroups from various units, ours eventually had to switch to using ready-made "bricks" of ready-made mixed formations - tank and mechanized brigades (our combined tactical formations in 1941 simply fell apart).
In 1940, we tried to copy the German OShS, and the old one, before the war with France, and not the true one, but "according to intelligence data." The resulting MK turned out to be overloaded with equipment, underloaded with infantry and artillery, poorly controlled and clogging all the roads of the army's rear. This was first revealed at the 1940 KSHU. According to their results, Khatskilevich reported at a meeting following the results of 1940 that the MK, even stripped to the thread in terms of rear services, did not fit into the authorized breakthrough strip. As a result, Zhukov issued an order to conduct an experimental exercise "MK in the offensive, defense and on the march" of a fully equipped MK in September 1941 - because until that time it was impossible to equip at least one MK in the state. Based on the results of these exercises, the OShS MK was to be reorganized. But alas - they didn't have time.

[Alex]

Alex, thank you, a lot of things were explained. And now you can think about it.

[Uncle Murzik]

Maybe you don’t need to look for a cat in a black room, everything has already been written and painted for a long time!

[Predator]

We were never told who was to blame, why the troops did not form groups, but were scattered over a vast territory, why the Wehrmacht strike groups met separate regiments and divisions, and almost all of them had to march from 10 to 30 km to the cover line , who and why did not comply with the order of the NGOs dated 15.06.41. Who reported and why, that the districts were provided with fuel and lubricants by 100%, having really only 1 gas station? was the deadline for camouflage and dispersal of aviation set on July 5, 15? Why did the cover divisions remain without transport when in the 1941st quarter of 1 they sent more than 1941 thousand vehicles and transporters that hadn’t arrived by June 20, 22.06.41? and the General Staff (you can’t hide this), but you didn’t take retaliatory measures. You can’t transfer them to the border (for any reason), take 50-100 km from the border and create groups there. And much more that needs to be done, but .. .... Therefore and it happened as it could and could not be otherwise. But the army is not a faceless creature, and each miss has specific people who had to be asked why?! And to pay what they deserved.

[Uncle Murzik]

Well, it would be better to understand for a start not such distant events, but for example the defeat in the first Chechen company and punish those who are to blame for this! they are at least still alive!

[Beefeater]

Quote: Uncle Murzik

Well, it would be better to understand for a start not such distant events, but for example the defeat in the first Chechen company and punish those who are to blame for this! they are at least still alive!

Dig out Yeltsin from the grave and hang on the Red Square. Joke.

[alexej123]

And there you don’t have to figure it out - TRIESTION, and at the very top.

[blizart]

We haven’t been told yet, who is to blame, why ...

Considering all the reasons for the failures of the initial period of the war given in the article and in the comments to have passed the test of time, i.e. taking place, one must nevertheless recognize them as just a consequence of one - the most important. The only state at that time with a unique social system, different from everyone else, could not afford to form an alliance against it, in comparison with which "Axis" would be a toy. And this development of events was more than real. From a purely military point of view, a blow by a fully mobilized army against an army like the Red at the initial stage of the war leaves the latter no chance. This is not only the configuration of the formation of troops, their training, the staff of the units, it is simply the need for time to get angry and step over that natural and terrible line before killing one's own kind.

[Essex62]

This is very precisely noticed! All the time, from the pioneer age, I was tormented by the question - why did our soldiers surrender in tens of thousands, abandoned serviceable equipment? The question is psychology, our people were not ready for murder for the most part, they were not ready for cruelty. And the foolishness of the "great commanders" zhora and timokha strikes in the eyes even if you do not seriously dig. One Rzhev meat grinder is worth something.

[Beefeater]

What does the unmobilized division have to do with it.
Think for yourself.
You should have 500 tanks in your hull. But it didn’t grow together. And the tanks in the hulls you have on 200-300. Unmobilized means. But the cases you have 50 and the total number of equipment this will not affect in any way.
And everything is mobilized from the enemy, but the armored vehicles in 5 are fewer times.
So that’s not the point. But the matter is inept command. And the soldier’s reluctance to fight. Kiev boiler lasted a week. Summer. Paulus near Stalingrad in the winter - two months and still had to finish with difficulty
By the way, in every German regiment there were ten officers with experience of the First World War. We with the gold miners acted in all severity.

[Stas57]

Quote: Beefeater

What does the unmobilized division have to do with it.
Think for yourself.
You should have 500 tanks in your hull. But it didn’t grow together. And the tanks in the hulls you have on 200-300. Unmobilized means. But the cases you have 50 and the total number of equipment this will not affect in any way.
And everything is mobilized from the enemy, but the armored vehicles in 5 are fewer times.

moreover
if you didn’t come here to scoop up kicks, but to study history, you would know that in addition to tanks in the division, there are cars that are in this pub ... they come according to the mobilization plan from

Quote: Beefeater

So that’s not the point. But the matter is inept command. And the soldier’s reluctance to fight. Kiev boiler lasted a week. Summer. Paulus near Stalingrad in the winter - two months and still had to finish with difficulty
By the way, in every German regiment there were ten officers with experience of the First World War. We with the gold miners acted in all severity.

Yes, it’s clear that you or the people didn’t want to fight for scoops, or Lenin is a bloody ghoul. or Stalin shot everyone, and Mannerheim is a hero.
but the fact that Germany is fighting 2 of the year is certainly unknown to you

[Beefeater]

Quote: Stas57

but the fact that Germany is fighting 2 of the year is certainly unknown to you

Germany fought 2 of the month in France. We are on Hassan and Halhingol.
They are in Poland, we are in Poland.
They are in Norway and Greece - we are in Finland.
They are in Yugoslavia, we are in Romania ... You don’t know that we also fought, and military production threshed in 3 shifts.
What does it have to do with mobilized divisions if we have an advantage over all the main types of weapons, multiple. Then we fought without any trucks, almost all the war for our two

[Stas57]

Quote: Beefeater

Germany fought 2 of the month in France. We are on Hassan and Halhingol.
They are in Poland, we are in Poland.
They are in Norway and Greece - we are in Finland.
They are in Yugoslavia, we are in Romania ... You don’t know that we also fought, and military production threshed in 3 shifts

ohospidi, in truth RCMP softens the moss

Poland
Company 1 500 000 people
USSR 617 thousand people

France
Germany 3 350 000 people

the USSR
Hassan 15 thousand people
Finland 425 640
about Romania, Norway, etc. skip because of insignificance
once again, 1.5 million against 617 thousand in Poland, and less than half a million participants in Finnish and 3.5 million for France. who has more experience?

[Beefeater]

The figures are quite comparable. Only war is not a maneuver.
The Germans still participated in the Battle of England. A considerable number of German aces were lost there forever along with the accumulated experience.

[Stas57]

Quote: Beefeater

The figures are quite comparable. Only war is not a maneuver.
The Germans still participated in the Battle of England. A considerable number of German aces were lost there forever along with the accumulated experience.

OU. 500 thousand and 3.5 ml can be compared? Wow Wow

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Beefeater

Germany fought 2 of the month in France. We are on Hassan and Halhingol.

And where were the front-level operations in Khalkhin Gol, in which the tank armies broke through the prepared long-term enemy defenses and fought a battle with the enemy tank formations?
Khalkhin-Gol - this is fuss in the sandbox of the level of the case. It ended with the fact that the main forces of the Japanese simply left the planned cauldron - because ours closed it for almost a week, knocking out parts of the enemy covering the retreat successively from all fortified positions.
Oh yes, almost all the units participating in that conflict remained in the Far East.

Quote: Beefeater

What does it have to do with mobilized divisions if we have an advantage over all the main types of weapons, multiple.

Despite the fact that the weapons themselves do not fight. How long will an artillery battery last without traction and shells - because its cars and tractors run near Kiev and Moscow? How many tanks will be fought without fuel, shells and repairs - their cars are about the same, and repairmen work in factories and it’s forbidden to even call them for training.
Without mobilization, an army is a skeleton.

Quote: Beefeater

Then we fought without any trucks, for our two almost the entire war

Come on ... on 21.08.1941 there were 271400 cars in the army. At the end of 1943 - 496000. In 1944 - 600000. And in 1945 - more than 660000.

In addition to cars, there were horses (in non-motorized units). But there is an ambush with them too - for the most part they also come to the army to mobilize (in peacetime, horsemen in the required quantities are only in the cavalry - and even in combat units).

[blizart]

What does the unmobilized division have to do with it.
Think for yourself.

The staff of the German tank division had an artillery unit designed to fight tanks, a combat engineer battalion, staffing with 2: 1 wheeled vehicles, in general, everything the Red Army reached to the 43 year.

[Beefeater]

Quote: blizart

What does the unmobilized division have to do with it.
Think for yourself.

The staff of the German tank division had an artillery unit designed to fight tanks, a combat engineer battalion, staffing with 2: 1 wheeled vehicles, in general, everything the Red Army reached to the 43 year.

In principle, any Soviet tank was, due to powerful weapons, an enemy tank destroyer. Sense of having a special art division of tank destroyers?

[blizart]

In principle, any Soviet tank was, due to powerful weapons, an enemy tank destroyer. Sense of having a special art division of tank destroyers?

IPTAP are deployed in tank-dangerous directions, while their own tanks should preferably operate in tank-safe ones. The great complexity of the tank to the gun. Dimensions, and therefore mobility and camouflage, etc. It’s just that the tank units of the Wehrmacht at the initial stage of the war were a more flexible and effective tool than the same ones in the Red Army and were controlled by more experienced commanders. Let’s say a trifle, a pontoon-bridge company, and the unit with it becomes much more mobile in a deep breakthrough. And such trifles can not be counted, only they are extracted with blood.

[Stas57]

Quote: Beefeater

In principle, any Soviet tank was, due to powerful weapons, an enemy tank destroyer. Sense of having a special art division of tank destroyers?

45mm ТNUMX gun did not penetrate 26 + 30 further than 30-400 m.
, while the armor of the T26 itself was struck even by the German PTR

[Beefeater]

Quote: Stas57

Quote: Beefeater

In principle, any Soviet tank was, due to powerful weapons, an enemy tank destroyer. Sense of having a special art division of tank destroyers?

45mm ТNUMX gun did not penetrate 26 + 30 further than 30-400 m.
, while the armor of the T26 itself was struck even by the German PTR

500 m is not bad.
Subsequently, the T34-85 had a chance to hit the Tiger from a distance of no more than 500 m, and the T-34-76 could only prevent the Tiger from falling into a caterpillar from 200-300 m. And they coped, won back.
On the Kursk Bulge, several Panthers were struck from the magpie into the back hatch of the tower,
the Germans, from the analogue of the "forty-five" of their 37-mm "mallet", even in the 41st beat our tanks with a sub-caliber shell. Then such a projectile appeared with us.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Stas57

45mm ТNUMX gun did not penetrate 26 + 30 further than 30-400 m.

Worse. Until November 1941, a 45-mm cannon pierced 30 mm German KC armor with projectiles from a distance of 150-200 m.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Beefeater

In principle, any Soviet tank was, due to powerful weapons, an enemy tank destroyer. Sense of having a special art division of tank destroyers?

The point is not to distract the tanks from the main task - the fight against enemy infantry.

Tanks do not fulfill their main task of destroying enemy infantry, but are distracted by the battle with enemy tanks and artillery. The established practice of opposing our enemy’s tank attacks and getting involved in tank battles is wrong and harmful.

The corps should not get involved in tank battles with enemy tanks, unless there is a clear superiority over the enemy. In the event of encountering large enemy tank units, the corps detaches anti-tank artillery and part of the tanks against the enemy tanks, the infantry, in turn, puts forward its anti-tank artillery, and the corps, obscured by all these means, bypasses the enemy tanks with its main forces and hits the enemy infantry with the aim of tear it from enemy tanks and paralyze the actions of enemy tanks. The main task of the tank corps is the destruction of enemy infantry.

Yes, and the tank BC is not rubber. And the vast majority of shells in it OFS.

And the worst thing is that almost all Soviet tanks of the beginning of the war had guns, armor-piercing shells of which pierced a maximum of 30 mm of KC armor from 150-200 m.
The reasons are simple:
45-mm tank (and anti-tank) gun - unsuccessful design of the projectile; even with quality workmanship, it collapses on cemented armor.
76 mm tank gun - no armor-piercing shells. NKBP thwarted all production plans, and in the border districts in the BC of tanks as armor-piercing was "shrapnel for a blow". The situation with the BR-350A was so awful that even in the spring of 1942, instructions were issued on the use of other types of shells (OFS, OS, USH) to combat enemy tanks.

[Essex62]

And to take down to the pigs a monument to the equestrian lover of carpets and crystal at the Kremlin wall. For all the ruined, senseless, soldier's lives, he is entitled to an aspen stake. "Women give birth to ..." his words.

[Kenneth]

These are not his words. In the troops under the command of Zhukov, losses were usually less than those of the neighbors. And if you work hard, you will find his instructions on reducing losses and avoiding fishing attacks
About minefields and Eisenhower, too, by the way fake.

[Beefeater]

Quote: Kenneth

These are not his words. In the troops under the command of Zhukov, losses were usually less than those of the neighbors. And if you work hard, you will find his instructions on reducing losses and avoiding fishing attacks
About minefields and Eisenhower, too, by the way fake.

And the assault on the Zeelov Heights, with stupid spotlights, how did he first want to go to Berlin.

[chenia]

Quote: Beefeater

And the assault on the Zeelov Heights, with stupid spotlights, how did he first want to go to Berlin.

It is better to remain silent and look like an idiot than to open your mouth and dispel all doubts.

360 trunks per km. front, I’m an artilleryman and then I can’t imagine such a thing (something from the war of the twelfth year - guns wheel to wheel).

And how "fun" it was for the Germans, gifts flew to them in wagons.

The pace of the offensive (7-8 km. / Day.) And show that at first there was fire, and then our infantry with a bunch of tanks. finishing in the trenches of rare o ... xs from the horror of the Germans.

[Beefeater]

It’s for sure you better close your mouth.
Konev entered Berlin from the south, without any stupid assaults.
At the Zeelovsky heights, the Germans moved from the first line of the trenches to the second and returned when we stopped hammering with our hotels. You didn’t know that, smartass?

[chenia]

I suggested to be silent, you will look smarter.

Advanced positions and combat protection involves such an event, but only if the art. the preparation was frail.

I explain. (as I understand it. in this regard, you are far away and heard a ringing, not knowing where he is).
Before the onset. try to get the language, in order to determine the saturation of defense.
Demonstration of a reinforced platoon in the BO that they would take him for the norm battalion.

If it turns out that this is a forward position (up to 5 km) or combat security (up to 2 km), then it’s easy to send echelons of shells there. And after a frail artillery preparation, they throw infantry with tanks (possibly fines).
And then the platoon should hold the position. before the approach of his battalion. Here is the race of someone.

But when a full-scale artillery preparation (of such a density) fire along several lines and transferring fire 400 m from our chain .-

AN ENEMY DOESN'T RUN WHERE — THEY ALL PRAY.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Beefeater

It’s for sure you better close your mouth.
Konev entered Berlin from the south, without any stupid assaults.

Uh-huh ... really missed 9 A from the Halb cauldron. And he didn’t give a damn about the counterstrike of 57 TK, "Hermann Goering" and others in the flank, which cost the front of the defeat of the 7th Guards. MK and heavy losses from the 2nd (Polish) Army.

Zhukov rushed through the Seelow Heights to prevent the Germans from retreating to the city. In real life, they "only got their ears to Berlin" - only the fairly pounded 56 TC managed to escape.
If Zhukov would have been torn to Berlin - 9 And it would have gone into the city, and not through Konev.

[overb]

Quote: chenia

360 trunks per km. front, I’m an artilleryman and then I can’t imagine such a thing (something from the war of the twelfth year - guns wheel to wheel).

Actually, not 360, but at the stage of the assault on the second frontier (Seeelovskie heights) there were 250-270 barrels per 1 kilometer of the front. And the artillery preparation was 30-40 minutes, instead of 30 minutes during the assault on the first frontier (then there were up to 300 barrels per 1 km). In addition, it was conducted without shooting, which is no longer good. Therefore, the cover of their own troops with their artillery happened, and more than once.
Usually recommended 90-140 minutes of fire at a density of 150-300 barrels per 1 km. So with artillery preparation, Zhukov was not doing very well. And the enemy’s defense on the first line of defense was not destroyed by it (artillery preparation), which was confirmed by the enormous losses of the tank armies of Katukov and Bogdanov, which Zhukov, contrary to the order of the Headquarters (General Staff), threw into battle to break through the defense. On this occasion, in the evening of the same day, Zhukov even got a scolding from a mustached Joe.

Quote: chenia

The pace of the offensive (7-8 km. / Day.) And show that at first there was fire, and then our infantry with a bunch of tanks. finishing in the trenches of rare o ... xs from the horror of the Germans.

The memoirs of military leaders (not Zhukov) are not so optimistic.
N. Popel later wrote in his memoirs: “ In the afternoon, Marshal Zhukov could not stand it: he refused the initial idea to bring us into a clean breakthrough and accepted Katukov’s proposal to put the tank army into battle immediately. But the only road among the floodplain swamps to Zeelov was shot through by enemy cannons. Soon, our wrecked tanks blocked the roadway, then the ditches were clogged: fighting vehicles got stuck in them too. By the evening a disappointing result could be drawn: the first day of the general offensive was not marked by the development of the success of the 1st Belorussian Front»[17].

[Beefeater]

For blind admirers of Zhukov, this is just propaganda with the goal of denigrating

[chenia]

Quote: overb

there were 250-270 trunks per 1 kilometer of the front. And the artillery preparation was 30-40 minutes, instead of 30 minutes during the assault on the first frontier (then there were up to 300 barrels per 1 km).

Up to 360 trunks is the maximum count. artillery in selected areas.
100-150 trunks / km is already a good norm.
And more because people were cherished.

Quote: overb

In addition, it was conducted without shooting, which is no longer good. Therefore, the cover of their own troops with their artillery happened, and more than once.

Nehrenna did not understand.
To get started, take the trouble to learn about the complete preparation of data, periods of artillery attacks and types of fire. Then planning
this event.
What a sight? The transfer of fire (in case of uneven advance of our troops) was prohibited for individual artillery units (adn) and even artillery groups (the prerogative of the combined arms commander, or senior artillery chief - the head of the division’s art).
One of the reasons is the inability to accurately determine the front of the breaks of this artillery unit.
Sighting in a sea of ​​fire, a fun activity is the main hopeless.

Quote: overb

the first day of the general offensive was not marked by the development of the success of the 1st Belorussian Front ”[17].

So I say. art. intelligence (and other types of intelligence) detected and set targets. They planned the art. the offensive and, pulled up artillery with the corresponding BC, brought the data to the guns (in view of the sometimes poor training of some artillery officers, it happened)
And in the morning, they worked to the fullest.

So, before a new movement of artillery (determined by firing range).

[nivander]

somehow sourly all this has long been gnawed, although there are more than enough secrets and inconsistencies (especially among the Germans). For example, in the first edition of Tippelkirch's fundamental work "Land Forces"
DAS HEER is so different from the edition of the 2000s. For example, it mentions the 32nd Army Corps (231pd, 239pd) as part of the 1TG. And in subsequent editions the 32nd Army Corps appears only in 1945 near Berlin. And the chest just opened exactly 32 -th corps fell under the iron roller of the 8th MK corps of Mr. D. Ryabyshev and ... was annihilated. In subsequent studies, the authoritative uncles and aunts say that Ryabyshev was lucky and he hit ... the void (open flank of the 55th corps) which was covered by the reconnaissance ... battalion of the SS Viking division under the command of K. Mayer (a future famous man, only the wounded Mayer and 27 Zoldat survived). Ryabyshe describes a dense anti-tank defense and "crowds of German soldiers"

[V.ic]

Quote: nivasander

The 32nd army corps (231pd, 239pd) as part of 1TG. And in subsequent editions 32 army corps appeared only in 1945 near Berlin.

If the banner is not lost, then there is no crime, form at least five to ten times. Although your comment was a plus.

[nivander]

dear friend according to the same Tippelskirch (arr 2000) 231 and 239 divisions were disbanded immediately after the French Company, and in the same book published in the 50s it literally says "... by order for GA" YUG "dated 31/07/41 to disband231,236,239 , 32 pd due to heavy, irreparable losses "not a word about corps management number 1945 - until April 3, when this number appeared in the XNUMXTA

[Shadowcat]

I seem not to be mistaken, but there weren’t any banners in the Third Reich. With banners, this is our concept.

[Beefeater]

Quote: ShadowCat

I seem not to be mistaken, but there weren’t any banners in the Third Reich. With banners, this is our concept.

In the Museum of the Army lie. I personally saw it. They were thrown at the Victory Parade, pieces 200

[Shadowcat]

A. That's right.
On August 28, 1944, Hitler ordered all banners and military flags to be removed from the front zones to Wehrmacht museums.
It confused me.

[igorka357]

Lord, how much you can taldychit one by one, tired already!

[parusnik]

In 1812, the situation was almost similar ... they knew that the enemy would attack, did not know the exact date, they carried out activities .. By the way, the enemy also attacked in three directions ... In June they attacked, in October they were in Moscow ... And nobody throws stones especially ... in the leadership of the country ... Not in the army command ... What happened in June 1941? ... The Germans were well prepared ... in all directions ... in the military, political .. Alas, what can not be said about the USSR ... That's when, what war Russia-USSR .. were ready for ..? Yes, almost never .. always started with some kind of confusion .. Alas, tradition ..

[Kenneth]

In 1812, the Russian army was several times inferior to the enemy. As soon as approximately equalized, a general battle was given. In 1941, the Wehrmacht was inferior in number of tanks to aircraft guns, but nevertheless defeated the personnel army
This causes many years of questions and discussions.

[Uncle Murzik]

and that the general battle was won in 1812! like Moscow surrendered

[Kenneth]

We are talking about causes and effects. The reason for the retreat of 1812 was the inequality of forces, and in 1941 from the defeat of the army at the border. The outcome of individual battles is particular. In 1812 Kiev, Minsk, Odessa were not lost, St. Petersburg was surrounded. The cadre army was not destroyed, and the adversary, after moving away from Moscow, flew to the very border, and did not reach the Volga next year

[Uncle Murzik]

as always you do not dissemble a lot, no matter how Moscow was surrendered in 1941! Well, in the Russo-Japanese War the personnel army was also not defeated but the defeat was, as in the Crimean War of 1853-1856!

[Kenneth]

You follow my work in such detail that you know as always. Not worth it. I explained to you the difference between 1812 and 1941 in terms of the reasons for the retreat. Russian-Japanese is something else and you don’t have to fly it. And to talk about what is taken or not taken after so many years is generally pointless. Kutuzov did not have Siberian divisions, he had a personnel army, the one that was retreating from the border. And which was very battered. And the French had reserves and came up. In 1941, everything was exactly the opposite.

[Uncle Murzik]

and the Siberian divisions are not a cadre army which, as you write, was defeated! these cadre Siberian divisions reached Berlin! The result is important to me Moscow did not surrender, we won the war!

[Kenneth]

Well, so in 1812 they drove the adversary. And besides the result, price also matters. Although of course the result is more important. And the value of Moscow as an industrial and railway hub is slightly different in 1812 and 1941. In 1812 it was not even the capital but a large provincial city

[Uncle Murzik]

only Kutuzov called Moscow the heart of Russia!

[Alex]

Quote: Uncle Murzik

only Kutuzov called Moscow the heart of Russia!

As far as we know, it was Napoleon who gave such a description to Moscow: "St. Petersburg is the head of the empire, Kiev is its legs. But Moscow is the heart of Russia. By striking in the heart, we will end the war." This is according to Stendhal's diaries, how much truth is difficult to judge, but the fact remains: Napoleon gathered all his forces into a single army and went to Moscow. Kutuzov understood the full severity of the decision, but he just said: "Defending Moscow, we will lose the army. With the loss of Moscow, Russia is not lost, and with the loss of the army, we will lose Russia."

[Uncle Murzik]

Thank you! Regards!

[Beefeater]

Quote: Uncle Murzik

and the Siberian divisions are not a cadre army which, as you write, was defeated! these cadre Siberian divisions reached Berlin! The result is important to me Moscow did not surrender, we won the war!

Victory for 25 million lives won. Players etit.

[Shadowcat]

Lost? yes .... see wiku
The Patriotic War 1812 years
France 610k people with 1370 equipment
Russia 600k people with 1600 guns + 400k militias

[V.ic]

Quote: ShadowCat

Russia 600k people with 1600 guns + 400k militias

And how many "kilos" of the militia took part in the Battle of Borodino or Maloyaroslavets?

[Kenneth]

Click the down arrow and read the wiki article further. Pay attention to the keywords. On the border, in the first line, in the second line. Troops were also needed from Turkey and Persia. If you read further, there is a comparison in terms of population. Etc. Do not limit yourself to headers

[Shadowcat]

Well done. Noticed. And now I notice. We are interested in the personnel of the divisions of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht. We are interested in the meaning of the cropped division.
Oh yes. Do not forget to remember how many units were in addition to the Wehrmacht ... let me remember - Finland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, France, Spain, Italy, Romania, Bulgaria ... who forgot?
And you said very well that the troops on the other borders should have been.
So, although there were not a few people on the western front, the ratio was not in favor of the Red Army.

[Kenneth]

In this case, it makes sense to compare in the border zone (as in the case of 1812). In three strategic echelons near the border, we had an advantage in numbers in terms of people, tanks, planes and artillery barrels. But as it turned out, this is not the main thing. Moreover, the quality of troops. And in 1812 the quality of the Russian troops was not lower than that of Napoleon

[Nehist]

They didn’t have an advantage in people, but in technology they had an overwhelming result! Just for 1 tank with a crew of 4 people you need 10 servants, but this was the problem

[Shadowcat]

Now already at the border ...
And they are all "Ale-op" and at recruiting stations. Hit the floor with your head and armed and prepared.

But seriously - the enemy is actively attacking i.e. essentially, only the third tier can be fully staffed, and then people from remote farms will not work - they simply will not have time. And also to put them on, put on shoes, let them remember that the storekeepers knew how ... And again, those who were mobilized should not run away after the first battles (Remember the memoirs of Marshal Rokossovsky)

At the same time, in 1812 there were so-called military settlements - in fact, a full-fledged military unit. Oh yes. For some reason, before the WWII, somehow the states were scored on the border and only one general goal was.

[Beefeater]

Quote: Kenneth

Troops were also needed from Turkey and Persia. If you read further, there is a comparison in terms of population. Etc. Do not limit yourself to headers

We have just signed peace with Turkey, and even an alliance with Sweden. Why keep troops there

[Kenneth]

You believe the Turks and confuse Sweden with Persia. not all are such optimists.

[Beefeater]

Quote: ShadowCat

Lost? yes .... see wiku
The Patriotic War 1812 years
France 610k people with 1370 equipment
Russia 600k people with 1600 guns + 400k militias

And what is Vick to watch.
Firstly, something is wrong with the militias. 400 is too much. Trained staff in Moscow Kutuzov expected 000
Secondly, you cannot send an untrained peasant into battle. They were used in household works.
trenches and redoubts dug at Borodino.
Thirdly, the Great Army numbered a million people, taking into account the forces left in Europe

[Beefeater]

Napoleon advanced on a narrow front in a hundred kilometers. Losses therefore from the occupation by the French were small. Hitler went to the front in 2000 km. Incomparably

[parusnik]

But in narrow strategically important sectors of the front, the Germans achieved a significant advantage ... It makes no sense to compare 1812 and 1941, but there is something in common ... But there are differences ... For example ... the French did not manage to encircle the Russian armies, the Germans successfully created boilers: Minsk, Umansky, Kiev ... In addition, the Germans successfully, with the help of sent agents, created panic in the rear of both the Red Army and civilian objects ... Of course, the quality of the training of command personnel ... A simple episode .. if you remember, the book "Timur and his team" ... There is an engineer, Timur's uncle, is called up to the army as a reserve officer ..

[Kenneth]

It is impossible to discuss the article. If the author had bothered not only to copy-paste the old books, but really to understand the reasons for the defeat, he would start with the reasons. Military planning, logistics, the organization of ind training, failures in organizing communications, the management of the general staff by a man who himself wrote that he was not intended for such work, the complete absence of spare parts for old and new equipment, the deployment of non-mobile buildings at the border, and much more. There is something to discuss. But the author went the other way and I hope the article will not continue in the selected format.

[V.ic]

Quote: Kenneth

It is impossible to discuss the article.

So your comment is listed first! Make the impossible possible? Otminusuyu.

Quote: Kenneth

started with reasons. Military planning, logistics, the organization of ind training, failures in organizing communications, the management of the general staff by a man who himself wrote that he was not intended for such work, the complete absence of spare parts for old and new equipment, the placement of non-mobile buildings at the border,

Well, finally, there are signs of rational thought! I will do it... In aggregate for this comment from me personally, "zero".

[sherp2015]

[quote = Kenneth] ...
Leo Mehlis. Inquisitor of the Red Army
Each terror has its own performer ... the head of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the Red Army Lev Zakharovich Mehlis.
The future “Inquisitor of the Red Army” Lev Zakharovich Mehlis was born in Odessa in 1889. From 1907 he became a functionary of the Jewish party “Poalei Zion”, ideologically close to the Bund Union.
In 1921, he transferred to the People’s Commissariat of the Workers 'and Peasants' Inspectorate of the RSFSR, in 1926 he became Stalin’s assistant. In 1930, he served as editor-in-chief of the newspaper Pravda in 1939 and became a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B. ) ... Mehlis constantly demanded increased repression against "enemies of the people", he himself was preparing denunciations. Heading the Political Directorate of the Red Army, launched a campaign of repression and discredit of the highest command and political staff. As a result of his actions, the top and middle ranks of the Red Army were destroyed, and he not only “assisted” the state security organs, but also took the initiative himself, demanding more and more arrests of the “conspirators”, and made decisions with his authority regarding the lower ranks. So, having arrived in the Far East in 1938, he immediately ordered the arrest of most of the commanders of the Far Eastern Army.
With the outbreak of World War II, Mehlis became deputy Supreme Commander, while continuing to head the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army.
In 1942, the Supreme sent Mehlis to the Crimean Front. Crimean front was overwhelmed by repression. Field courts exterminated commanders and privates with no less intensity than the Germans did. Sometimes the delirium of a fanatical man was clearly visible ... General Manstein could not even believe in the reality of what was happening on the other side of the front. He drove reconnaissance planes dozens of times until he was convinced that instead of carefully strengthening the borders, Soviet troops began to settle down like targets on a training ground ...
The Red Star war correspondent Konstantin Simonov wrote: “The blizzard with the rain, the density of troops fitted by the Mehlis, who led this attack, was monstrous. Everything was pulled up close, and every German shell, every mine, every bomb, bursting, inflicted huge losses on us ... In a kilometer - two - three - five - seven from the front line, everything was in the corpses ... it was a picture of a mediocre military leadership. .. February - April 1942 the loss amounted to more than 225 thousand people! But nothing could stop the ambitious leader of the extermination of the soldier mass. He demanded reserves, received them, threw them under German artillery and demanded cannon fodder again ... Pathological cruelty affected not only his own, Germans captured prisoners no less. Mehlis wrote to his son: “I order the fascist prisoners to finish. And Fisunov is doing well here. With special satisfaction destroys the robbers "..
June 4, 1942 L.Z. Mehlis, who did not ensure the implementation of Stalin's directives, was removed from the post of Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and Head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, and also demoted to the corps commissar. But already from the same 1942 and until 1945 he was again a member of the Military Councils of the 6th Army and many fronts. In all positions in the army, Mehlis continues to constantly intervene in the decisions of the commanders, demanding "be guided by the decisions of the party" regardless of the strategic and tactical tasks of the troops. He constantly writes denunciations to the Central Committee about the commanders, demanding that they be brought to justice.
SERGEY CHENNYFirst Crimean N 71, APRIL 22 / APRIL 28, 2005

[avia12005]

What about the mass abandonment of the front by corps and divisions formed from units and formations of the armies of the former Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania and joined the Red Army.

They already 22 June not only fled, but also started on the night from 21 to 22 June to kill commanders and political workers? It was to them that radiograms were received about the beginning of actions from the Abwehr on the night of June 22. And it was they who took active, motivated actions to destroy the Jews immediately after the start of the war.

It was their betrayal that made it possible for the northern strike group of Army Group Center, the 3rd Panzer Group of armies under the command of Colonel-General G. Goth, to bypass Minsk from the north through the Baltic republics and take it on 28 June.

It is clear that in Soviet times they were silent about this, but now what is stopping ???

The topic of the betrayal of the Balts as the main reason for the defeats of 41 on the Western Front - this is what requires real historical research!

[Kenneth]

The Baltic states had no motive to fight for the USSR. What you describe is not a betrayal of the Balts, but the stupidity of those who put them into operation. Similar problems were with Western Ukrainians. But decided
In general, the Baltic units fought in the Red Army until the end of the war quite successfully.

[Beefeater]

Quote: Kenneth

The Baltic states had no motive to fight for the USSR. What you describe is not a betrayal of the Balts, but the stupidity of those who put them into operation. Similar problems were with Western Ukrainians. But decided
In general, the Baltic units fought in the Red Army until the end of the war quite successfully.

This is not stupidity, but a class flair.
The Baltic states in the Red Army could not fight because the entire mobilization resource went to the acquisition of SS legions. In the Red Army there were units with Baltic names manned by the Slavs and all the other only non-Baltic states

[Kenneth]

Lithuanians were almost entirely Jews

[Stas57]

Quote: Beefeater

The Baltic states in the Red Army could not fight because the entire mobilization resource went to the acquisition of SS legions. In the Red Army there were units with Baltic names manned by the Slavs and all the other only non-Baltic states

again, the damned balts for scoops did not want, so, my young admirer of Mannerheim?

8-TH ESTONIAN ARROW CASE
Its personnel was composed of citizens of the ESSR - soldiers of the former 22 th Estonian territorial rifle corps of the Red Army, fighter battalions and working regiments, draftees and mobilized from the reserve. The core of the division consisted of battle-hardened soldiers, among whom there were many Estonians who had time to go through front-line hardening in various units and formations of the Red Army. But the majority, almost three quarters of the personnel, were people who had not yet been in battle and had no military training.
Estonian military units were recruited by ordinary and sergeant personnel from citizens of the Estonian SSR - conscripts, conscripted military personnel, military personnel in the army and in the rear military units, as well as returning from hospitals after treatment.
The corps at the end of the formation consisted of 75,7% of workers, 6,6% of peasants, 7,2% of employees and others - 10,5%. As of May 15 of 1942, Estonians made up 88,8% of the corps (19 658 people), Russians - 9,9%

16-I LITHUANIAN RIVER DIVISION

At the 1 of January 1943 of the year, there were 10 250 people in the division, of whom about 7 thousand were Lithuanians or residents of Lithuania. According to the national composition, its personnel was distributed as follows: Lithuanians - 36,3%, Russians - 29,9%, Jews - 29%, representatives of other nationalities - 4,8%.

130-I LATISH ARROW CASE
Already in September of the 1941 of the year the number of the division was 10 348 people. [5] At 90% they were Latvians and citizens of the Latvian SSR of other nationalities.
Workers made up 62% of personnel, employees - 29%, peasants - 9%. At 70% they were volunteers. The national composition of the division was as follows: Latvians - 51%, Russians - 26%, Jews - 17%, Poles - 3%, representatives of other nationalities - 6%. Colonel (later Major General) Janis Weikin was appointed commander of the division. So in a relatively short period of time, units and divisions of the Latvian division were mainly formed.

[avia12005]

Specify for yourself from whom they were completed? Of those who lived before the war outside the Baltic states, the smallest part was of those who were from there. Now compare for yourself: for example, the 130 Corps, there were about 5 thousands of Latvians, and how many were fighting in the SS ??? Do not deceive the story.

[super.ufu]

sorry Arnold Mary died, you would definitely go to spit on him, without deceiving the story.

A lot of Latvians fought on our side, and Estonians, and so on, and a lot of them.
And before the war, outside the Baltic states, because the bourgeois regime expelled them or they fled from repression.

[avia12005]

Without emotion, read the literature. Google to help you.

[Beefeater]

Dear Stas, a lover of Kuusinen and Latvian red shooters.
You know, there is a small lie, there is a big lie, and there are statistics. Bismarck also said.
In 39, they decided to create a Finnish army for the entry of the rebel Finnish proletariat into
Helsinki. Rowed several battalions all over the Finns and Karelians alliance. Few. Then the Finns recorded the Belarusians. A saying has survived. "Minsk Finns went to Finnish mines."
The same story happened with the pro-Soviet Polish army, there were also written by Poles and Western Ukrainians and Belarusians. If only the report was smooth. The NKVD had great masters in this regard.
What attitude towards us on the part of the Balts, I can observe personally, without your fake statistics, gleaned from the mossy "Quick Reference of a Party Worker." Latvian old men of the SS are marching through the streets of Riga, but your "Latvians" are not seen or heard, probably simply because they were not there.

[Stas57]

Dear Alexander.
I repeat, if you do not understand, a lot of Baltic states honestly fought on our side, and then, after the war, created the Soviet Baltic.
What relation do they have to those who look at you askance somewhere?

[Robbihood]

Not only conscripts from the Baltic states deserted en masse in the first days of the war, but also from Western Belarus and the West. Ukraine. But this is a minuscule., From the composition of the First echelon of the Red Army. Well, how many were there? 2-3 divisions? Estimate the total population of the Baltic states.

[Military Builder]

Quote: parusnik

That's when, what war Russia-USSR .. were ready ..?

we are never ready for the beginning of the heating season, for the flood, for the sowing season, for the harvest, these "events" occur annually and the start dates are known, but still not ready, and you are talking about wars

[V.ic]

Quote: War Builder

we are never ready for the beginning of the heating season, for the flood, for the sowing season, for the harvest, these "events" occur annually and the start dates are known, but still not ready, and you are talking about wars

Bravo! Bravo! Bravo!

[Robbihood]

The list of used literature lacks leaflets scattered over the positions of the Germans. And the collection "The Communist Party of the USSR - the organizer and inspirer of all our victories."

[V.ic]

Quote: robbihood

"The Communist Party of the USSR is the organizer and inspirer of all our victories."

In relation to 1941-1945 very reasonable!

[Lieutenant Teterin]

The article is uninformative. As the forum users correctly noted, the main content of the article is the rewritten old materials. If we talk about the reasons for the defeat in the Border Battle, then after analyzing the recollections of the participants of the Great Patriotic War and the works of historians, we can distinguish the following reasons:
1 - the order not to succumb to provocations led to the fact that on the ground many units did not have time to understand that 22.6 is the beginning of the war, until this awareness came, the Wehrmacht managed to cut the first strategic echelon deep enough, which made it impossible to create frontiers defense, which could cover the deployment of the second strategic echelon.
2 - a high level of mechanization of the shock units of the Wehrmacht, which increased their maneuverability and allowed the Germans to quickly create a numerical superiority in the breakthrough areas, as well as to transfer troops to the places of the Red Army counterattacks.
3 - well-established interaction between German tank troops, artillery and front-line aviation.
4 - the notorious repression led to a decrease in initiative among the junior and middle command staff of the Red Army. Commanders re-learned to be proactive already during the war. Of course, not all commanders were like that, there were many active and brave people in command posts, but still not the majority.
5 is a controversial factor, but still highlighted by some researchers. Collectivization, which implicitly split Soviet society. The peasants were divided into those who supported her and those who reacted negatively. The latter have formed not only a negative attitude towards collectivization itself, but also towards the USSR. It is this factor that some researchers explain the completely wild facts of the surrender of certain parts at the beginning of the war.
This list can not be called comprehensive, it is only what I was able to now recall offhand.

[overb]

Quote: Mikhail Feshchuk

Germany. The German imperialists set the goal of the war against the USSR to destroy the only socialist state in the world.

Enchanting. Bolshevik nonsense immediately, from the very first words.
The Germans wanted to sneeze on "the first in the world." And on "mustachioed Joe" they also wanted to sneeze. They did not intend to destroy the "first in the world" at all, but planned to push it beyond the Volga and North. Dvina. By depriving the mob. and prom. potentials, and securing their rear in the upcoming big war with Britain. Most likely the further fate of the "first in the world" east of the Volga and North. Dvina, judging by the lack of plans, did not interest them at all.

Quote: Mikhail Feshchuk

Given that Hitler Germany would sooner or later attack the Soviet Union, the Soviet command was preparing troops to defend its borders.

And therefore, in unimaginable quantities built a means of attack, tanks? Which were equipped with absolutely not defensive structures, mechanized corps? Oh well. Something similar to the pre-war mechanized corps during the war was called tank armies and was not used at all for defense.
The prewar volume of tank construction in the USSR was enormous. Only 3 factories worked in full force, and another 3 were supposed to work in full force during 1941. The USSR was most prepared for war, but not for the summer of 1941. Moreover, if in the summer of 1941. he still did not have enough forces for an attack, then there was even an abundance of forces for a successful defense. However, the troops were not preparing for any defense. Therefore, in the summer of 1941. and what happened is what happened.

Quote: Mikhail Feshchuk

Since the Soviet Union was not going to attack

Did you build tanks in such numbers to hold parades? Where were the parades supposed to take place? And did you develop your blitzkrieg doctrine (with little blood and on foreign territory) for what? But I agree on one thing, in the summer of 1941, I was not going to, I was not yet ready.

Quote: Mikhail Feshchuk

As a result of the attack on border airfields, the enemy during the first for received a complete advantage for air supremacy.

Nonsense. Quantitatively aircraft (and tanks, too) in the Red Army was like a stray dog ​​fleas. Therefore, these losses meant little to her.
But there was no gasoline for them. This is socialism, the "miracles" of the planned economy, in the end, and brought it to the handle. Fuel supplies from the USA from the beginning of the Second World War to 30.09.41/79/132446. accounted for XNUMX% (XNUMX tons) of the total US deliveries during that period.

Quote: Mikhail Feshchuk

With air strikes at headquarters and communication centers, the location of which he is well aware, he destroyed the command and control and created the prerequisites for a successful offensive by ground forces

Another nonsense. How did they know that? And then, that no one assumed that the headquarters and communications centers could be subjected to air strikes? They assumed. Any important structure has an understudy.

Quote: Mikhail Feshchuk

If before the war, the border districts had a numerical superiority over the enemy in tanks and aircraft

Border counties existed. But they did not have tanks and heavy weapons. And obeyed the NKVD. The author confuses the border and military districts adjacent to the borders.

[Shadowcat]

1. Plan Ost. Chiathem. We think about the line and the Bavarian sausages.
2. The position of the tank corps and infantry corps with the strengthening of the border. WHEN it was the Germans' TC that advanced to the border.
3. The length of the border of the USSR determines the number of equipment and composition of the army. Or do you think the world revolves around Europe? Asia burned since 1936
4. The number of deposits in the USSR for the 1940-1945th do not tell me their flow rate? Also, recall how the aircraft of the USSR were wound up.
5. Enchanting nonsense about a duplicated headquarters system. The commander must be one; otherwise there will be anarchy. And if there are two headquarters? how to find out which one is active?

[alexej123]

Enchanting, and the phrase of S. Lavrov is spinning in the language. About "push aside" - is it Uncle Adolf whispered in your ear? Read the story - the centuries-old "Drang nach Osten", not "push back", not "move", not "ask to move", but DESTROY.

[overb]

Quote: alexej123

and it turns in the language

If something is spinning on the tongue, spit it out immediately. It is not known what was thrown out there in that garbage dump.

Quote: alexej123

Read the story - the centuries-old "Drang nach Osten", not "push away", not "move", not "ask to move", but DESTROY

I would be very grateful if you stop hysteria, and provide links to the Germans plans to force the Volga and the North. Dvins. Desirable in details, dates, dates, etc.

Quote: alexej123

1. Plan Ost. Chiathem. We think about the line and the Bavarian sausages.

I read it very carefully. As soon as you drop a link to it. Not the comments of "venerable historians about the Ost plan," but a reference to the Ost plan itself. With the date of approval, deadlines and everything else.

Quote: ShadowCat

5. Enchanting nonsense about a duplicated headquarters system. The commander must be one; otherwise there will be anarchy. And if there are two headquarters? how to find out which one is active?

At least you would be ashamed to write such nonsense. If you have nothing to do with the army, then do not write anything better.

[alexej123]

Yes, you will be ashamed to carry nonsense. More than 27 million victims in the USSR alone as a result of aggression - is it "to move"? THIS IS DIRECT DESTRUCTION. And in the rest of the occupied countries? It is from people like you that the glorification of Nazism occurs, something like "onyzhedeti", "onychoteleto only push." You are not mistaken with the resource? And the "dump" - your Europe began to turn into it, and first of all because of such "smart people" like you, who assure that Hitler only wanted to "move". Did you have little living space? And then try on the words of SB Lavrov, like "D ... l b .. d".

[overb]

Quote: alexej123

Yes, you will be ashamed to carry nonsense. More than 27 million victims in the USSR alone as a result of aggression - is it "to move"? THIS IS DIRECT DESTRUCTION. And in the rest of the occupied countries? It is from people like you that the glorification of Nazism occurs, something like "onizhedeti", "onychoteleto only push." You are not mistaken with the resource?

But he only asked him to provide links to the German plans for the military company of 1942. Links, as I understand it, will not be. He does not have them. But in the presence of slop, which immediately blew me from head to toe.
Judging by your manners, you, my dear, are a scoundrel. Nobody told you this? I think they did. And more than once. I'm not the only one so observant.
And to attract for your fraud the mention of 27 million innocent victims, it’s not just meanness, it’s blasphemy of you.

Quote: alexej123

and primarily because of such "smart guys" like you, who claim that Hitler only wanted to "move"

What does "just move" mean? What are you thinking of here for "only"? You're juggling again. Do you need to personally explain how the borders of states are moved by armed means? And what follows after that, you don't know either?
You know, but you turn out and impersonate. Habit, apparently.

Quote: alexej123

And then try on the words of SB Lavrov, like "D ... l b .. d".

Exactly. It concerns you. Better not to say.


But at the same time.
If anyone has any links to Germany’s plans for a military company in 1942, they still interest me.
If there are links to the Ost plan, then they interest me too.
There are many forums on these topics on the Internet. But I have never come across specific material. Maximum someone's comments. There are a lot of them and everyone comments in their own way. Therefore, links to specific material would be interesting to me.
Thanks in advance.

[super.ufu]

Quote: overb

overb

Rolls of wallpaper, how long have you not been banned yet?

[Robbihood]

There is no practical meaning in the lesson that two generations of Soviet historians practiced, and now thousands of amateurs continue to deal with them with great enthusiasm in countless online forums. All these gigabytes of words spent on discussing the design of the air filter of the T-34 tank engine, the generals genius (or mediocrity) Zhukov, the percentage of provision of aviation regiments with fueling funnels and ladders - all this is an empty, pointless chatter. From the very first days of the war, most of the Red Army personnel dropped their weapons and scattered through the forests. Motives in this case do not matter, it is quite sufficient to establish the very fact of turning the army into an armed and rapidly disarming crowd. The crowd is not capable of fighting. This is the diagnosis of the causes of the defeat of the Red Army in the summer of 1941.

[chenia]

Quote: robbihood

The crowd is not capable of fighting. This is the diagnosis of the causes of the defeat of the Red Army in the summer of 1941.

Late in deployment (so the crowd), yes. And they had to throw the Germans at their feet. like logs, unprepared compounds, just to slow down the progress.
And as soon as we caught up with the Germans in this component, the war went differently. From the end of 1941, and in 1942 (training), we mainly attacked (Rzhev, Leningrad and even in the South - where an unsuccessful attack turned into a significant retreat) .

That's where crowd, so it is in the West (8 months of preparation, 2 weeks of fighting, even 3 weeks the Germans chased after those who signed the surrender.

[bakhshiyan rachik]

lacked stupidity and betrayal and incompetence

[brn521]

Quote: robbihood

The crowd is not capable of fighting. This is the diagnosis of the causes of the defeat of the Red Army in the summer of 1941.

The patient died because his heart stopped. And the heart stopped because the patient died. And in fact, what is there to discuss, everything is simple and logical :). The diagnosis, the conclusion of the pathologist - all this is useless. After all, it is clear that if the heart stops, the person dies, and if the army loses organization and structure, then it loses. Why did you lose? Because it is disorganized. And disorganized because she lost. Captain obvious.

[Robbihood]

Every totalitarian state along with the cult of the deified Leader instills the myth of the People endowed with all conceivable virtues. This People shines in the reflected light radiated by the sun-shining Leader, before it everyone should bow down obediently. The war, to which the Leader will send his people, can only be Holy, Great and Patriotic. The participation of the People in the Holy War shows the world a model of unprecedented mass heroism in history. "In battle, forward, in pitch fire / He goes, holy and sinful / Russian miracle man ..."
Everything in the world has a price. The dubious pleasure of enjoying the tales of their holiness and miracles was not provided to the Soviet people for free. And the rejection of freedom, the right to decide something in one’s country was only a small part of the price. It was also necessary to live in a barrack with “convenience in the yard”, hunch over hard labor for a penny (two-thirds of the population worked on collective farms and even for “sticks”), freeze in line for a rusty herring and suppress the fear driven by subconscious vodka. But this is not the whole price! The main payment is the obligation “at the first call of the party and government” to go to war on their own and give their children to slaughter. Where to go and with whom to fight? Where comrade Stalin sends you into battle, there you go ...
The Soviet (now Russian) people came at a high price for a beautiful fairy tale, everything else was stolen from him step by step, and humanly I perfectly understand those who showered me with streams of perfect abuse (“the latter takes away, you bastard!”). But even better I understand those veterans who told me in dozens of letters about how happy it was for them to live up to the time when the curtain of lies that covered the history of that terrible war began to crumble.
A calm, sober look at the past of your country, a willingness to admit the mistakes made, a sense of shame for the crimes committed on behalf of and at the hands of your people is a luxury accessible only to a healthy society, firmly and confidently building its future. Will Russia ever be able to afford such a luxury - God knows ...
M. Solonin

[Uncle Murzik]

Solonin is another perestroika, "the beacon of democracy", you are still talking about Gozman, Nadezhdin, Nemtsov! Thank you for living with them in the nineties!

[kalibr]

And what is really poorly written or something is wrong? Because you scolded him everything that Solonin wrote did not get any worse. So you write lived under them in 90 ... And now you live in 20 without problems? And your salary, as in Japan ... And if Solonin was to blame, who is to blame now? Again, Chubais, that all the money was stolen and transferred to nanostructures? And by the way, if not for democracy, all this would not be written now. And even though steam is released!

[Uncle Murzik]

yes, I live an order of magnitude better than in the nineties, and problems have always been and will always be! you apparently forgot the Chechen war, hundreds of thousands of people fleeing from the republics, hundreds of thousands thrown and killed by bandits because of apartments, continuous unemployment, and who worked the salary was delayed for months, even pensions were delayed! you tell me about the "repressions", gee gee gee

[kalibr]

If problems have always been and will be, then what has Solonin to do with it? And now they also kill for apartments and delay salaries, although not to the same extent. And where does "repression" have to do with it. We seem to be discussing another topic? But here it is interesting ... Much better ... Was it an order of magnitude because of your personal work? Did the state allow you to do this or is it a consequence of something else?

[Uncle Murzik]

I am certainly not a rich man and not a "new Russian", I have normal housing and more than one, I drive a new Japanese car that is not yet a year old! And this is how not only I live, all my friends now live an order of magnitude better! Everyone works honestly, without stealing or robbing!

[kalibr]

That is, society is gradually developing. There are new opportunities to work without stealing or robbing, and this is good. Even J. Orwell wrote about three types of people and that the situation of people of the third type is also gradually improving. This is human progress. But all this allows you to have a state on which we all depend. Someone is allowed more, someone less - but it has always been so. Moreover, it was the 90s that laid the foundation for your success now. That's why I asked "where did it come from." There is no "only bad" and "only good." That's what it is about.

[Beefeater]

Quote: kalibr

And what is really poorly written or something is wrong? Because you scolded him everything that Solonin wrote did not get any worse. So you write lived under them in 90 ... And now you live in 20 without problems? And your salary, as in Japan ... And if Solonin was to blame, who is to blame now? Again, Chubais, that all the money was stolen and transferred to nanostructures? And by the way, if not for democracy, all this would not be written now. And even though steam is released!

They always have others to blame. You need to look in the mirror more often.

[kalibr]

And this is scary, Alexander! It's easier to think that "hell is others", and by the way, this is how it is!

[Uncle Murzik]

I’ll tell you a terrible secret. I lived even better in the USSR!

[V.ic]

Quote: robbihood

Will Russia ever be able to afford such a luxury - God knows ...
M. Solonin

At least you put "quotes" in the quote or are you a co-author?

[skeptic2999]

The main reason for the defeat is that the German army at that time was the best in the world. our fighters did everything they could. Over time, the Red Army became the best army in the world. She won the war.

[Stas57]

It included the ninth and fourth armies, the third and second TG

second and third tank group

It was assumed that in the event of a perfidious attack, the fascist German army would strike the main blow, most likely from East Prussia

it was assumed that there will be a type of war both in the WWI and the USSR, there will be time for mobilization and deployment.

Since the Soviet Union was not going to attack, in the western border districts there were only covering troops. Their task was to prevent the invasion of enemy troops on the territory and in the airspace of the USSR.

https://youtu.be/r5sCPyJjeso коротко видео про данный вопрос

In this case, all this was done under the enemy's constant airstrikes. The air defense system was not on alert and therefore could not cover ground units.

more video on
https://youtu.be/iQkJXqVOCCA
https://youtu.be/W7IWnrdzGiQ

Sources:

it is nevertheless necessary to use modern literature on the issue, otherwise it’s all naphthalene

[Idiot]

Quote: Aleksander

Does the author himself believe in this nonsense? How could the SENT telegram in the General Staff and the ACCEPTED telegram in the EIGHT districts and fleets not be preserved?

And how did the allegedly secret and allegedly genuine documents on the "Non-Aggression Pact" dated 23.08.1939 appear in our archives? and the shooting of Polish officers? Hand-made articles sewn with white thread are recognized as originals by authoritative historical scholars. They are studied and referenced in fundamental pseudo-historical works. Receive grants and awards. How did it happen and how did these papers (it's dumb to call documents) got into the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense? In the same way, centrally, under Khrushchev, a number of documents about the initial period of the war were seized and destroyed. Understand that the directive of the NCO dated 18.06.1941/1949/1953. - death sentence for the highest generals. After the generals brought Khrushchev to power, the first thing they demanded was to clean the archives. When did the writing of memoirs begin in droves? And familiarize yourself with the contents of the five questions of the Pokrovsky commission, which worked from 18.06.1941 to 1989. (in a strange way, it stopped its work immediately after Stalin's death). These five questions contain the whole essence of the directive dated XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX, which supposedly does not exist. In XNUMX. The VIZh began publishing the answers of the military leadership to these questions, but they quickly caught on (the defeat of the USSR was about to begin. Yakovlev, like a fucking Stakhanovite, a new historical version of the jew's harp) and the publication was rapidly curtailed ... And this article, in my opinion, is a custom article. For the first time I saw that they were referring to A.B. Martirosyan. (and twice!). A primitive imitation of Vitya Suvorov: extensive references are given, nor are sources allegedly confirming the author's thoughts. Upon closer reading, the thoughts are indeed partially confirmed (after all, one cannot lie about everything or deny the obvious), but, as a rule, these sources have nothing to do with the author's thoughts. I know Martirosyan's work, he clearly sets priorities about the initial period of the war: how it was and who is to blame. Do not believe me, check out ...

[kalibr]

Quote: pft, fkb

Crafts sewn with white thread are recognized by authoritative historical scholars for the originals. They are studied, referenced in fundamental pseudo-historical works.

How do you know this? Are you a fake specialist? And if recognized as authoritative ... then you mean more authoritative than them?

[Uncle Murzik]

and what do you really prick eyes?

[kalibr]

Colitis is a disease. But how is it known that this is true if a person writes "about authoritative specialists" who recognized the fake as true? I'm just curious to learn what I don't know. And you all know, right?

[Uncle Murzik]

On June 18, 2012, the European Court made a sensational decision that the “documents” provided by Gorbachev and Yeltsin, indicating that Stalin and the Soviet side were to blame for the execution of tens of thousands of Polish officers near Katyn, were fake.

The liberal RS Echo of Moscow is silent, the Grani is silent, the Novaya Gazeta is silent. But this is a world-class top sensation. And now what to do with all these?

Russia is not responsible for the mass shooting of Polish officers in Katyn - a decision recently made by the European Court of Human Rights. The decision is sensational: it turns out that over the past 20 years, the leadership of our country has tirelessly repented of the crime that someone else committed in the 40s. It turns out that the documents on the Katyn execution, which appeared in the late 80s from the sleeve of a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Alexander Yakovlev, are nothing more than fake - the court did not even accept them for consideration.

vgil.ru ›2012/06/24 / evropeyskiy-sud ... dokumentyi-po / but I'm 100% sure you write all this is not true!

[kalibr]

Why should I rebel against the evidence? You knew it - well! I did not know, that's all. Thanks for the info. And ... see how useful it is to ask? For example, I did not know this. The European court is an authoritative thing. And if this is so, then it is necessary to inform people about it in the widest possible way!

[Idiot]

Quote: kalibr

How do you know this? Are you a fake specialist? And if recognized as authoritative ... then you mean more authoritative than them?

I have been working with secret paperwork for twelve years. Requirements for the regime of secrecy in the forties were tougher than now. Then, for example, there were no electronic storage media, etc. Believe me, in general, the essence of orders has not changed. Therefore, yes! I am a specialist in fakes. If I were to draw up secret, especially Soviet secret documents, I would be sent to prison for divulging state secrets ...

[kalibr]

Clear! Then all questions disappear. I used to trust specialists in my field. Thanks for the substantive answer.

[voyaka uh]

"And how did the allegedly secret and allegedly genuine documents on the" Non-Aggression Pact "dated 23.08.1939 appear in our archives"

They have exact copies in German in the archive of the German Foreign Ministry. Reprinted on a typewriter in duplicate
in Russian and German, like all other contracts, trade agreements.

[unknown]

Somehow, it all seemed strange.
In 1953, the conspirators killed Stalin. In the United States, Eisenhower took over as president. And in Britain, Elizabeth became the queen (according to some versions, his daughter). In the USSR, the destruction of historical literature of the Stalin period begins. A new version of the history is being created not only of the Soviet period, but also of the pre-revolutionary one.

The impression is that the conspirators, behind Stalin's back, have come to an agreement with the "world behind the scenes." Including, about a new version of the interpretation of world history.

[nivander]

by the way --- but never mind the Germans in 6 weeks finished off the fully mobilized and ready to fight French army sitting in the world's best concrete ravines of the Mozhino line, And the English expeditionary corps, too, in slag, and quite modern armies of Belgium, Holland, and before Denmark and Norway. would have captured Sweden, but the Swedes fell to their knees and fully complied with all the requirements of Adolf Aloizovich - the passage of troops, the use of territorial waters, an extraterritorial corridor from the protectorate of Norway to Finland, uninterrupted supplies of ore, ball bearings,. OIL !!!! and many other pleasant things

[Kenneth]

And you compare how much FR Army retreated in 6 weeks and how much ours
The territory of the FR is over. Although of course there were colonies

[nivander]

for 6 weeks, the Germans reached the current to Smolensk and got stuck there, by July 30, in the south, the Germans managed to drive the army in the Uman region 6 and 12 into the boiler and the last sparks of resistance went out by August 10, only one tank group participated in the French company (r Colonel E. Fon Kleist) and three detachments of a motorized corps (six in total), then four tank groups 10 motorized corps against the Soviet Socialist Republic + one (40th) in reserve (he stayed until September 1941, then he received 3 TGRs

[Alex]

Quote: nivasander

but the Germans in 6 weeks finished off the fully mobilized and ready to fight French army sitting in the world's best concrete ravines of the Mozhino line, And the English expeditionary corps is also in the slag

Yes, the operation to capture France was just brilliant. They say there was such euphoria in Germany that they were already preparing to buy tickets to England for the victory parade in London. True, the "Sea Lion" never sailed anywhere.

quite modern armies of Belgium, Holland

Well, those armies were just good for maneuvers and parades ...

and before that Denmark

Completely, a colleague, Denmark, figuratively speaking, legs spread apart before the Wehrmacht took off his pants. What is the order of the General Staff in no case to open fire on the Germans (those three dead border guards, obviously, either did not receive an order, or turned out to be honest people) and congratulations to the King of Denmark of the Germans on the brilliant occupation of their own country.

The Swedes were not particularly to fall into their feet: they themselves hated the USSR. But it was more profitable for Hitler to have a formally independent and neutral European country than to occupy it and then break his head, how to organize the supply of strategic raw materials from the same States.

[Selevc]

75 years have passed since the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, but no one gave a clear answer to the question: why did we suffer such great losses with the start of the war and retreated to Moscow itself?

Yes, and then the USSR drove the Germans right up to Berlin and Germany was never able to turn the tide of the war ... Turning the tide of war is generally very difficult - the enemy advances, owns the initiative, he is organized, motivated, united, he has security + trophies. You retreat, fight back, suffer losses, chaos, disorganization, constant lack of everything, loss of communications, air attacks, refugee flows, moral humiliation. During the offensive, the army is one huge mechanism, and in the case of Germany, it also worked perfectly, harmoniously - during the retreat, this mechanism falls apart and if some links work then others collapse ... On one section of the front, soldiers can heroically repel enemy attacks and on the other soldiers quickly retreating - the heroism of some is leveled by the defeat of others ...
The most fierce battles of the 2nd World War are precisely the crucial battles - Stalingrad, Kursk, Novorossiysk, Leningrad and so on ...
The retreat of the Soviet army - especially the events of the 41st half of the year this can generally be called catastrophic - it is simply amazing how the country survived !!! And keep in mind that the enemy was very experienced - Hitler’s generals had vast experience in waging war - from the 1st World War to the defeat of France !!!
I also want to note that the 2nd World War is sometimes called the Mobile War (as opposed to the 1st World War) or the Motor War !!! That is, events unfolded very quickly and it was necessary to respond to them just as quickly !!! Given the colossal length of the front line, delivering unexpected strikes was easier than organizing a defense in such vast spaces !!!

[chenia]

The most important reasons for this defeat at the beginning of the war are two.

first- planning errors (Meretskov, Zhukov) - push 2/3 of all MKs and their subsequent use into the first operational echelon.
After Halkin-Gol, it was believed that a powerful strike (by several formations) would "calm down" the Germans, like the Japanese did then (by the way, if the strike had been well prepared, something could have happened), and the war would not continue beyond the border conflict ...

second, the main thing is delay in deployment. When we talk about Siberian divisions, their main strength is 2-3 months of combat coordination. If we had these months. war would figuratively begin in 1942. lossless forty-first. By the way, the main difference from the war in the West in 1940 when the Franco-British had 8 months for this event.

[Idiot]

Quote: chenia

the first is planning errors (Meretskov, Zhukov

Bonaparte, at one time said: this is worse than betrayal - this is a mistake!
How many times have our strategic commanders hung with stars mistaken?

[Serg65]

Quote: chenia

The most important reasons for this defeat at the beginning of the war are two.

Most coherent explanation to date

[Alexey RA]

Quote: chenia

the first is planning errors (Meretskov, Zhukov) - to push 2/3 of all MKs and their subsequent use into the first operational echelon.
After Halkin-Gol, it was believed that a powerful strike (by several formations) would "calm down" the Germans, like the Japanese did then (by the way, if the strike had been well prepared, something could have happened), and the war would not continue beyond the border conflict ...

This is already a consequence.
The root cause is the full confidence of the highest political and military leadership that the German attack on the USSR will take place in the traditional way. That is, first - diplomatic claims, then negotiations, and only then war. Just like with Czechoslovakia, Finland or Poland.
The key point of this strategic concept was that before the war there will be a certain threatened period in which both countries will conduct mobilization and concentration. And even if the attack occurs during this period, when our army will not be fully mobilized, then the forces of the attacker will not constitute a fully mobilized army.

The USSR did not believe in the possibility of an attack by a completely mobilized army without diplomatic foreplay.

[chenia]

Quote: Alexey RA

The key point of this strategic concept was that before the war there will be a certain threatened period in which both countries will mobilize and concentrate

I will tell you that, given the lack of an adequate reserve, two or three weeks of the threatened period for bringing the units and formations into a combat-ready state will not be enough (and the reserve is stressful).

Naturally. this time favorably influenced the preparation of equipment (as a rule, serviceable equipment removed from storage (combat group) in the first 3-5 days "flies" on trifles (mainly clogging of pipelines, adjustments, etc.) that can be eliminated in a short time. ) and subdivisions of technical and logistic support.

And after there would be time (marches, combat coordination) to take "slack" from the equipment (and not minor breakdowns already during the execution of a combat mission) and solving elementary problems of support and supply, it is still not enough time to create a real combat-ready formation.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: chenia

I will tell you that, given the lack of an adequate reserve, two or three weeks of the threatened period for bringing the units and formations into a combat-ready state will not be enough (and the reserve is stressful).

The theoretical term for the mobilization and deployment of the Red Army is 30 days.

[Stas57]

Quote: chenia

I will tell you that, given the lack of an adequate reserve, two or three weeks of the threatened period for bringing the units and formations into a combat-ready state will not be enough (and the reserve is stressful).

some are not many years old, however, the fleet of so on and so on needed to be replenished with vehicles occupied in the cx, otherwise the army had a quarter / third of the fleet, well, they weren’t collected and that’s all, they didn’t have rear support.

[engineer]

Just no one wanted to fight for the Communists. In the first months, more than 3 million soldiers of the Red Army simply surrendered to the Germans. But in Ukraine and in the Baltic states Germans were met with flowers. But when they realized that the Germans were not going to liberate from the Communists, but to liberate their living space from the Slavs ... then the great patriotic one began.

[Stas57]

Quote: engineer

Just no one wanted to fight for the Communists. In the first months, more than 3 million soldiers of the Red Army simply surrendered to the Germans. But in Ukraine and in the Baltic states Germans were met with flowers. But when they realized that the Germans were not going to liberate from the Communists, but to liberate their living space from the Slavs ... then the great patriotic one began.

one more vysra.sya

so no one wanted the queues in the military commissariats to stand, people tore the reservation and left.

[chenia]

What are you? But the French and British (8 months of preparation) clearly, (and to a much greater extent) did not want to fight for the capitalists (following your logic).

[Uncle Murzik]

why do we have to sprinkle ash on our heads all the time! The USSR was faced with the strongest army in the world, not only with Germany but with all of Europe! How much the French army fought not inferior to Germany, and even surpassed the Wehrmacht in tanks, besides still having English divisions! How many the army fought Poland, which was considered one of the strongest armies in Europe! Why is the same France and Poland not looking for the guilty, and even consider themselves winners in the war!

[yehat]

because their infrastructure and population suffered small losses,
and the USSR received almost 2/3 of the European part in the form of a scorched desert.

[Uncle Murzik]

Well, according to your logic, you had to give up like France! Bravo !!!

[yehat]

this is YOUR logic
I’m just explaining where they get such an opinion about the end of the war.
as for the change, there was no sense in it:
the Germans planned genocide in the occupied territory, as well as the complete destruction of several large cities.
Therefore, the country's leadership did not even have a dilemma - there was only a simple choice, to fight back or die.

[Uncle Murzik]

sorry! misunderstood you!

[voyaka uh]

Who is not lazy, can independently look through the script
documents mentioned in the article - Soviet and German (in German and translations)
from the Central Archive.

http://mil.ru/files/files/camo/gallery_1.html

[GAndr]

And I put the article "+". And even if everything that has been written here is not news for a long time, but this is another reminder - readiness must be constant and extreme!
Moreover, as in 1941, the enemy is getting closer and closer to our borders. And this enemy is much stronger than Nazi Germany with its pack in 1941.
I am glad that recently in the leadership some have come to this.
Now the FSA with its jackals holds out little hands ...

[antivirus]

My summary of your (all) discussion:
1. the difference in cultural and educational level (the transition to the speed of learning and further to adaptation to the changing environment around every day (and not just along the front) did not allow to keep the front from Murman to Odessa.
2. The same, only in profile: the interaction between anti-tank and infantry and tank and aviation and the rear (no one wanted to die while there are no shells and die on the delivery of shells: let them die on the front end while I carry shells)
the people and the army are one!
The peasants paid with blood for training and allocated Heroes from their midst, and threw out wimps (and prisoners)
The official army of Syria was losing the igil until it was strictly subordinated to (our?) Advisers, including the speed of connecting aircraft and transmitting data from intelligence?. (Understanding of the future actions of the enemy)
It is impossible here to briefly formulate the ways of development of the people (what is the main thing and at what cost?)

[Sergey TT]

In my opinion, the most serious study on the failures of the outbreak of war was by Alexei Isaev. Thoughtful analysis and debunking of established myths.

[egor670]

the command of the red army from the lowest commanders to the top did not understand how to fight the enemy in the first months of the war, a mess reigned everywhere, as is usual in Russia. We have a construction superintendent stupid man full! I imagine that such and commanded in the war.

[xomaNN]

Of course, I would like to read an objective "debriefing" of the first military failures of the Red Army in June 41. But for now, alas Waiting, sir ...

[Strashila]

We have taken 41 ... 41, a difficult year. But no less difficult and tragic was 42.
The factors that led to the incident are many, gouging, cowardice, betrayal ... but all this overpowered responsibility, courage, perseverance.
France ... not the last power in the world was blown away ... and it was they who waved face to face with Germany, and this despite the support of Britain, the same not the most backward country of that time.
The USSR accepted and withstood the blow, as they would say from a united Europe.
The fact that the Germans worked for intelligence is a fact, and its main merit is victories.
Add the mobilized army and industry according to wartime standards ... our ancestors had a hard time, oh hard.
But they survived and won.

[Old warrior]

Those who did everything right, they not only repulsed the enemy’s attack, but also counter-attacked the enemy into its territory: an example of this is the successful operations of the Red Army, on June 22, 1941, near Ishmael and Przemysl.

[Old warrior]

Interesting minus. I would like to know on what basis it is made. Or is it full of liberal rats?

[Old warrior]

Interesting minus. I would like to know on what basis it is made. Or is it full of liberal rats?

[engineer]

Nonsense. The reason is that no one wanted to fight for the Communists. And when the Germans showed that they were not going to liberate from the Communists. They are going to destroy the Russians. Then the institute of commissioners was liquidated (they were transferred to the political councils), unity of command was restored, officer ranks were returned, etc. this allowed to defeat an excellent army. And before that, in Ukraine and in the Baltic states Germans were met with flowers.

[fsb_buzuk]

Quote: Lieutenant Teterin

The article is uninformative. As the forum users correctly noted, the main content of the article is the rewritten old materials. If we talk about the reasons for the defeat in the Border Battle, then after analyzing the recollections of the participants of the Great Patriotic War and the works of historians, we can distinguish the following reasons:
1 - the order not to succumb to provocations led to the fact that on the ground many units did not have time to understand that 22.6 is the beginning of the war, until this awareness came, the Wehrmacht managed to cut the first strategic echelon deep enough, which made it impossible to create frontiers defense, which could cover the deployment of the second strategic echelon.
2 - a high level of mechanization of the shock units of the Wehrmacht, which increased their maneuverability and allowed the Germans to quickly create a numerical superiority in the breakthrough areas, as well as to transfer troops to the places of the Red Army counterattacks.
3 - well-established interaction between German tank troops, artillery and front-line aviation.
4 - the notorious repression led to a decrease in initiative among the junior and middle command staff of the Red Army. Commanders re-learned to be proactive already during the war. Of course, not all commanders were like that, there were many active and brave people in command posts, but still not the majority.
5 is a controversial factor, but still highlighted by some researchers. Collectivization, which implicitly split Soviet society. The peasants were divided into those who supported her and those who reacted negatively. The latter have formed not only a negative attitude towards collectivization itself, but also towards the USSR. It is this factor that some researchers explain the completely wild facts of the surrender of certain parts at the beginning of the war.
This list can not be called comprehensive, it is only what I was able to now recall offhand.

And they missed a very important factor - the betrayal of the highest military command, the same Pavlov.

[Beefeater]

Pavlov from 1916 to 1918 was in German captivity. Captivity has always been a good place to recruit.
As well as Tukhachevsky

[Filxnumx]

[quote = stas57] [quote = Bifiter] A telegram can simply be in another folder.
The second range of the German bomber is small, only part of the forces, percent 20, was defeated, a militia was put under arms, which also disappeared entirely.
So, it’s not a sudden matter, but the incompetence of the leadership and the reluctance of howling people at that time [/ quote]
will you again denounce the bloody scoop? for which the people did not go to war?
I repeat - surprise first of all - preemptive deployment
And almost 1,5 million deserters until the end of 1941. Not sickly people fought for Sovvlast? As long as the Germans did not touch the people, the people by and large on them (Germans and Soviet power) were violet. The people rose to fight the invaders when they really began to carry out repressions (taking hostages, sending them to concentration camps, hijacking to Germany, executions). And then the Great Patriotic War in the USSR began.

[Beefeater]

I agree with you. The people fought and won, and the commissars, using modern terms, wrote down bonuses for themselves. And entered Europe on the shoulders of a simple soldier

[Stas57]

Quote: Fil743

And almost 1,5 million deserters until the end of 1941 year. Not sickly people fought for Sovvlast? As long as the Germans did not touch the people, the people by and large on them (Germans and Soviet power) were violet.

you’re out, to your friend RKMPshnik in the ears of the lie and not to me, I at least generally know the history of my country

Only in the period from the beginning of the war until the end of the 1941 year, the NKVD authorities detained over 710 thousand deserters and more than 71 thousand evaders.
yes, just in case, I’ll clarify so that they don’t sing about the damned scoop again.
V.V. Galin believes
that “from February to November 1917 the number of deserters was almost 200 000
monthly, only about 1 518 thousand people. And that's not counting the hidden desertion,
when the soldiers refused to comply
orders and go into battle. AND

[Mordvin 3]

Quote: Stas57

when soldiers refused to obey orders and go into battle

So they quite legally refused, on the basis of an order, they numbered one.

[Nikoha.2010]

Health to all! Today I walked past a significant place where the script of the Day of Sorrow and Remembrance was rehearsed. I heard Levitan's voice through modern loudspeakers, stopped, and then a thought arose for a second: And what would I do on June 22, 1941 in our place? Fat or not? And in the head with a gun, no, not sucked! No ! Fight against the Nazis definitely! Yes! Until Victory! Eternal memory to all of us! A low bow to everyone who has embarked on the struggle against fascism! Remember and grieve!

[Vadim2013]

The Red Army was not ready for an attack by Nazi Germany due to many factors due to the fault of the leadership of the USSR.

[bionik]

The reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the initial period of the warOne can argue and discuss endlessly on this subject (liberals have one truth, Communists have their own, others have a third)

[Ivan Tartugai]

Quote: bionik

(liberals have one truth, Communists have their own, others have a third)

The truth is one at all.
The events of World War II have already taken place.
You can’t change them anymore. The whole thing is done, neither add nor diminish.
But these global events of the Second World War can be partially hidden, or you can come up with and stick to the history of the Second World War, you can partially embellish or vice versa, i.e. can be perverted.
An official historian, by order of the authorities, can inflate a small episode of a war into a strategic action by troops and vice versa reduce the strategic actions of an army to an insignificant episode of a war.
But all this will no longer be true about the war.
The truth is one at all.. She is often hidden, but they are looking for her.
It is a lie liberals have one lie, members of the CPSU (a member of the CPSU does not automatically mean a communist) has their own, others have a third.

[Old warrior]

Then the Communist Party was not, was the CPSU (B). Put all this lie about political officers into your ass. Would any of you be able to raise an undercover unit to attack? And the political instructor SHOULD do this. They would be interested in books of some kind, and not perceive this liberal vyser as Truth in the Last Instance. Stalin would be revered about the importance of political work in the troops.

[Farisey]

Dear Formuccans, help me find the article!
I read it at VO during 2018 and thought that I had saved it, but as it turned out, I only thought (((
The article describes the preparations for war, both in Germany and the USSR, with figures for the growth of industries, the number of equipment and weapons.
The main conclusion of the article was that by June 1941 the balance and the balance of forces and potentials were most favorable for the USSR to start the war. And what if the war started later, then the Germans would have increased their military power even more, which, in proportion to our growth, would still exceed and decide the outcome of the war in favor of Germany. What if it started earlier, then we would have been defeated immediately, and if later, then a little later.
I apologize for the confusing explanation. It is unlikely, of course, that one can understand which article is being discussed, but it may still pop up in someone’s mind ...
And please tell me also where it is better to ask this question at VO.
thank you

[Mordvin 3]

Quote: Farisey

The main conclusion of the article was that by June 1941 the balance and the balance of forces and potentials were most favorable for the USSR to start the war. And what if the war had begun later, then the Germans would have increased their military power even more, which in proportion to our growth would still exceed and decide the outcome of the war in favor of Germany.

This is Kaptsov’s article, probably.
https://topwar.ru/151746-napadenie-germanii-na-sssr-v-1942-godu.html

[Farisey]

Thank you very much for your answer Mordvin 3.
This article is very similar to the one I spoke about and the meaning is the same, but still it is not her.
But it suits me for my purposes.
Thanks again.
I will continue to search

[Mordvin 3]

Quote: Farisey

I will continue to search

You must search either in the heading "history" or "opinions". Hold it still.
https://topwar.ru/140491-udar-sssr-po-fashistskoy-germanii-v-1938-godu.html

[Farisey]

You must search either in the heading "history" or "opinions"
Thank. I will ask my question there