Global missile defense becomes a leaky umbrella

Russian experts suggest resetting the West’s missile defense potential

Global missile defense becomes a leaky umbrellaThe US military-political leadership (CDF), despite the agreement reached on the Iranian nuclear dossier, continues to deploy the US-European missile defense global segment of the global missile defense system (PRO).


So, 12 May in Romania (Deveselu) was alerted to the land-based Ajis Eshor anti-missile system (PRK) with the Standard-3 anti-ballistic missiles mod. 1B. It is a ship system in which a part of the equipment is dismantled and transferred to land. The structure weighing about 900 t is supplemented with a vertical launch superstructure for 24 anti-missiles. On the same day, it became known about the start of construction of a similar PRK in Poland (Redzikovo) under the upgraded Standard-3 antimissile with commissioning until the end of 2018.

Thus, the deployment of the European missile defense system means that US President Barack Obama did not fulfill his promise made in Prague in 2009: "If you can resolve the Iranian nuclear program, the task of creating a European segment of missile defense will disappear." At the same time, the US-NATO leadership states that the PPK in Deveselu, Poland and the entire European missile defense system are not directed against Russia and are intended exclusively for the defense of NATO countries and the United States from the hypothetical attacks of Iranian and North Korean missiles.

In this regard, Russian President Vladimir Putin said: “The United States itself has signed an agreement with Iran. We supported this position of the US administration. Iran complies with the provisions of the agreement reached. Where are these nuclear threats from Iran now? They are not there, and the creation of an anti-missile defense system continues. ”

According to Russian and foreign experts, the EuroPRO system will still be deployed by 2020. The created anti-missile group of ground-based and sea-based European missile defense, due to mobility and the ability to quickly increase the combat strength by 2020, will to a certain extent devalue the Russian nuclear deterrence potential. This is confirmed by sufficient and sustainable funding for its creation. Thus, the costs for the construction of the EUROPRO facility in Romania amounted to 800 million dollars, in the future financing will amount to 20 million dollars per year. In addition, about NATO 150 million should provide NATO allies.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said in this connection: “The deployment of the US missile defense and Euro missile defense systems poses a threat to the security of the Russian Federation. This is not a defensive system. This is a part of the nuclear strategic potential of the United States, taken to the periphery. In this case, the periphery is Eastern Europe. And people who make the appropriate decisions should know that they still lived quietly, comfortably and safely. Now, after the deployment of these elements of the European missile defense system, we are forced to think to stop these threats. ” The head of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Army General Valery Gerasimov, in 2015, stated that "Russia will have to take military-technical measures in response to deploying a global US missile defense system, including with regard to the countries in which the objects of this system are located." “As a result, non-nuclear states, on whose territory anti-missile weapons are deployed,” Valery Gerasimov said, “become objects of immediate response.”

In this regard, the following complex of information, military-political, operational and organizational-technical measures is proposed to ensure the suppression and destruction of key infrastructure facilities and the breakthrough of the global US missile defense system and European missile defense system.

Information Measures

The leadership of many countries share the negative attitude of the CDF of Russia towards the deployment of European missile defense and other regional segments of the global US missile defense system. They are skeptical about these plans, and are in favor of a collective discussion of European missile defense issues. They objectively assess the risks associated with the deployment of these systems, and believe that any measures in the field of global security will be unviable without taking into account the interests of Russia.

Studies conducted in research organizations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Russian Defense Ministry and the organizations of the Russian defense industry show that the global US missile defense system and the European missile defense system are vulnerable because they are built on the basis of land-based and ship-based infrastructure objects of considerable size. low vitality and physical security. They are also characterized by insufficient effectiveness in defeating Russian ICBMs, SLBMs and long-range cruise missiles with promising types of combat equipment, since it is not possible to achieve accurate kinetic interception ("bullet into bullet") of a large number of maneuvering warheads covered with a complex of anti-missile defense weapons.

Moreover, in the course of nuclear planning, a certain quantitative redundancy of ICBMs, SLBMs and combat units is provided for the purpose of ensuring a breakthrough of the missile defense system and inflicting a given damage to the military-economic potential of the enemy. It is strange that the leadership and the public of the alliance countries, who place on their territory the facilities of the European missile defense and tactical nuclear weapons (TNW), naively believing that they will be securely covered with an anti-missile umbrella. Actually, the aforementioned countries are becoming hostages, since the main elements of the EuroMD system will be destroyed first of all with the start of a strategic operation in the European theater of operations.

Most European leaders soberly assess the potential threats to their states if their policy on European missile defense turns out to be in the same vein as Washington’s political missile ambitions. Therefore, it is important to carry out information campaigns with the aim of delaying and in the long term - disrupting the process of implementing the American plans to create EuroMAN; to discredit the missile defense system among the population of the states involved by the Americans in the missile defense program, with an emphasis on the futility of its use against Russian BMs and their combat equipment of the new generation, capable of easily overcome any modern missile defense system; the formation of public opinion among the population of the states that their participation in the European missile defense program, the deployment of its elements, as well as US tactical nuclear weapons on their territory pose a real threat to the security of the states themselves, turning them into objects of primary defeat in the event of any military conflict.

To this end, it is necessary to engage the CDF of the state, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense of Russia and other agencies with representatives of Russian and foreign media to communicate to the international community Russia's position on the deployment of European missile defense, its negative impact on strategic stability and international security in the world; more extensive use of the media, including the possibilities of electronic networks, to distribute materials about the negative consequences of the US deployment of the European missile defense system; to intensify the work of non-governmental organizations in the United States, whose activities are in Russia's interests, including in areas that allow one way or another to counteract the deployment of anti-missile defense, etc.


In this regard, it seems very effective to use these arguments in the interests of strengthening the information confrontation and forming world public opinion about the questionable effectiveness and futility of the European missile defense system. In electronic and print media, various Internet resources, in the course of discussions, forums and briefings it is reasoned to justify threats to the security of the public of those countries that host objects of the European missile defense system and US tactical nuclear weapons on their territory.

It is also proposed to use the principle of enhancing the mood of the population, which consists in the fact that in countries where it is planned to deploy or have already deployed elements of the European missile defense system, to initiate protest movements of the local population in order to prevent the implementation of these plans or complicate the functioning of this system.

The proposal of the military analyst Konstantin Sivkov deserves attention, that in information work with the population one should refer to the possible use of geophysical destructive processes created by ammunition of a certain TNT as the main damaging factors. So a hypothetical impact of even a single ammunition of this type on such geophysically vulnerable points of the United States as the Yellowstone Volcano, can lead to the eruption of this supervolcano, which will lead to the complete destruction of the United States as a state. Several such munitions, exploded simultaneously in the calculated points of the Atlantic or Pacific Ocean, can produce superzuns capable of flooding the United States to a depth of several hundred kilometers from the coast with the destruction of almost all the infrastructure in these areas. The catastrophic consequences of Hurricane Kathryn in the state of California are graphic evidence of this.

It is necessary to intensify the work of the relevant structures of Russia to study the problems of the vulnerability of the territory of the United States and other European countries that have deployed in the territory the facilities of the European missile defense system and the US tactical nuclear weapons with a report of the results to the Russian Defense Ministry. Thus, the US military leadership, assessing the effects of the nuclear-missile strikes of the DPRK, announced the lack of protection of infrastructure facilities from the effects of electromagnetic pulses arising from high-altitude nuclear explosions or the action of special EMR generators.

Another example. Announced the start of work on the modernization of 150 – 200 nuclear bombs of type B-61-3, -4, -7, located in storage facilities in five countries - members of the alliance. It is planned to develop a new type B61-12 aerial bombs. In this case, the main work on its creation will be carried out in the continental part of the United States, which is associated with a large number of air and sea transfers of bombs back and forth. This means that the preparation and transportation of these bombs are attractive targets for terrorist attacks with unpredictable consequences for the US-NATO leadership and civilians. Is this not a topic for planning and conducting information campaigns on the part of numerous Russian structures of information confrontation and the media?

Politico-military measures

The Russian side has the opportunity to consider the following set of military-political measures.

Firstly, it is the constant informing of the Russian and world community about the gross violations by the United States of the provisions of the indefinite INF Treaty. Thus, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation has repeatedly stated that in violation of this Treaty, the Americans are creating target missiles of shorter and medium range, which are used in testing elements of the missile defense system. In the near future, the Americans are planning to move to the next stage of tests of anti-missile missile systems with interception of strategic target missiles, which will be associated with violations of the START Treaty. It should be constantly emphasized that the American leadership did not support the Russian-Chinese initiative for the globalization of the INF Treaty, which led to the proliferation of medium-range and shorter-range missiles. In this regard, Russian President Vladimir Putin noted: “Launchers deployed in Romania can be easily converted to accommodate medium and short-range missiles. This is a clear violation of the INF Treaty. Moreover, the re-equipment is carried out in a very short time and it’s really unnoticeable for us and us what is happening there. We can't even control it. ” According to Russian experts, it is not a serious technical problem to equip these missiles with Tomahawk type cruise missiles. IV, which is a serious threat to us. The Americans also cannot guarantee that it will be the interceptor missiles that will be launched from the US warships, and not completely new long-range missiles flying along a ballistic trajectory.

It seems that the Russian side should pragmatically approach compliance with the INF Treaty, especially with regard to the production and deployment of the Iskander type RK, including those with long-range cruise missiles. Moreover, the State Duma of the Russian Federation has already announced the possibility of preparing a draft statement on Russia's withdrawal from the INF Treaty. It should also periodically announce the possibility of restoring the INF range in the Eastern region of the Russian Federation, which will cause concern to the Chinese strategic partners. It becomes possible to work out with the leadership of China and other states of the Asia-Pacific region, of coordinated measures to counter US plans to deploy a global missile defense system and a missile defense system for the APR. It is important to note that Viktor Ozerov, Chairman of the Federation Council Committee on Defense and Security, did not rule out Russia's withdrawal from the START Treaty in response to the deployment of EuroMDF facilities: “Of course, this is an extreme measure, and I hope it will not come to it. However, a way out of strategic offensive arms is possible if Russia sees that the deployment of the European missile defense elements is irreversible and there is a real threat to our security. ”

Secondly, it is relevant to develop a dialogue with the above-mentioned NATO members, on whose territory infrastructure objects of the European Missile Defense System, tactical nuclear weapons and hypersonic weapon systems (GGDW) are located, in order to convince them of the United States anti-missile umbrella that they are hopeless. It is appropriate to inform the leadership of these states that these objects are considered strategic. To defeat them in advance, the necessary outfit of ICBMs, SLBMs and long-range WTOs deployed in remote regions and maritime areas of the Russian Federation that are outside the range of forces and facilities of the European missile defense system is planned. To emphasize that various variants of inaccurate kinetic interceptions of combat units of ICBMs and SLBMs by means of antimissile defense systems (THAAD, Patriot PAK-3 systems) will occur at the final leg of their flight over the territories of states with all the ensuing consequences. It is also useful to remind NATO members that the list of targets to be affected may include storage facilities with American tactical nuclear weapons, their carrier bases in Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Turkey, where there are 150 – 200 nuclear bombs of the B61 type with a total power of 20 Mt.

Other military and political measures include further expansion of military-political cooperation with the Republic of Belarus in matters of the possible deployment of Iskander-M missile systems and the organization of a joint air defense system; engaging the potential of the CIS, the CSTO and the SCO to solve the problems of the collective security of states in the context of global and European missile defense deployment; the use of contradictions between the United States and some states of the NATO bloc on the deployment and financing of the construction of Euro missile defense facilities and ensuring the safety of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, etc.

Operational, organizational and technical measures

The composition of operational measures currently includes: the creation of promising types of missile systems and combat equipment of ICBMs and SLBMs, taking into account the global and European missile defense capabilities; optimal target distribution in nuclear planning in order to prevent ballistic flight routes of missiles from falling within the reach of global information and impact missile systems; the possibility of relocation of the Topol, Topol-M and Yars PGRK to new positional areas; selection and concealment of the combat patrol areas of Russian missile-propelled rocket launchers, where the interception of launching SLBMs using US missile defense systems is impossible; improvement of existing and development of new forms and methods of combat use of the Strategic Missile Forces, NSNF and ANSN to break the European missile defense system; the organization of operational camouflage when conducting combat training and test launches of ICBMs, SLBMs and prospective types of combat equipment; planning to work out conditional tasks for the destruction of Euro missile defense facilities during operational and combat training activities, etc.

As for technical measures, a significant part of them is implemented in the existing missile systems of the Strategic Missile Forces and NSNF. These include: the presence of a short active portion of the flight of solid-propellant rockets; use of separable warheads with individual homing warheads; reduction of radar and optical visibility of combat units; their masking on the transatmospheric part of the trajectory due to the use of passive false targets; manning platforms for dilution of warheads with active jamming stations for suppressing pro-information media, etc.

Regarding promising ICBMs and SLBMs, one can refer to the statements of Academician Yuri Solomon “on the creation of a fundamentally new type of combat equipment that will put an end to all the conversations regarding our struggle with a non-existent missile defense system of a potential enemy. It only remains to adapt the development to the existing missile systems. ” According to representatives of the defense industry of the Russian Federation, such an adaptation was taken into account in the State Armaments Program up to 2020. In addition, promising missile systems with enhanced capabilities for overcoming missile defense are under development: a missile system with the “heavy” ICBM “Sarmat”, RK “Rubezh” and the combat railway complex “Barguzin”. It is important to note that in the START Treaty, unlike in the previous START-1 Treaty, there are no restrictions on throwing weight. This creates favorable conditions for assembling platforms of the head part of the ICBM and SLBM warheads and means of overcoming missile defense (PCB missile defense) in the required ratio of their weight parameters depending on the type and characteristics of the object of destruction.

It seems reasonable to apply measures of asymmetrical counteraction to the global and European missile defense. The most realistic of them are: preventive destruction of information missile facilities of the European missile defense system by means of the WTO, including the involvement of the Iskander-M RK, Caliber type cruise missiles and X-101 / 102; functional suppression of the SPRNU, SCCR and ABM radar stations located in the territory of the European countries of NATO; destruction of control and communications facilities located in the territory of a number of NATO countries, which will lead to disruption of information exchange between radars and global and European missile defense control points, etc. The effective response to the European missile defense system will be the destruction of the control points of the US armed forces in the European zone, where preparation and anti-missile operations (Ramstein Air Base).

The most convincing and effective measure to overcome the US global missile defense system and its regional segments is the use of promising strategic missiles at targets in the United States across the South Pole. It is known that the territory of the United States from this strategic direction is not covered, except as a radar station at Eglin airbase, which is clearly not enough. What possibilities open up for justifying the US Congress of the need for an arms race and the formation of orders for the US military-industrial complex, as regards the development and deployment of additional strategic defensive arms!

In the interests of Russia's security

The Pentagon continues to repeat that the EuroPRO system is not capable of intercepting Russian ICBMs and SLBMs. They say that from the point of view of geography and physics it is impossible to knock down these missiles from points located in Romania or Poland. It is emphasized once again that the main objective of deploying a missile defense system in Europe is countering the missile threat from Iran. And that the 41 Mk launchers do not plan to deploy medium-range and cruise missiles, and the interceptor missiles will not have a high-explosive warhead.

It is legitimate to repeat the question to the US-NATO leadership. Why should the European missile defense facilities not be located in Turkey, Iceland, Great Britain and Canada - NATO allies, which would alleviate a number of Russia's concerns?

At a meeting with the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the DIC of the Russian Federation in Sochi, Russian President Vladimir Putin said: “Placing American missile defense systems in Europe is not a defense, but building up the US nuclear potential in Eastern Europe, these are additional steps to swinging the international security system and launching a new race weapons. But we will not be involved in this race and we will go our own way, we will work carefully. But we will adjust plans to stop threats to Russia's security. "

It is obvious that the above measures of stopping are not a start to a new arms race, but are a set of regular tasks and functions of the state and military authorities of the Russian Federation, the focus of which should be clarified in accordance with the evolving military-political and strategic situation and implemented within the allocated allocations . As for military-technical measures, tactical-technical requirements for countering missile defense of potential enemies are always laid out in promising types of strategic offensive arms. As is known, the construction and development of the Strategic Nuclear Forces of the RF Armed Forces is determined by the corresponding plans, the START Treaty, the State Armaments Program and state defense orders. Additional funding is required.
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