Repair tanks during World War II was of great importance. Suffice it to say that over the years of the war, 430 repairs of tanks and self-propelled artillery (SPG) were carried out. On average, every tank and self-propelled guns released by industry went through the hands of repairmen more than four times! In tank armies, for example, each tank (self-propelled guns) failed two or three times and the same number of times the efforts of repairmen returned to battle.
The main role in the repair of tanks played military mobile repair tools. Their share in the total repair of armored vehicles was 82,6%. Restored tanks and self-propelled guns were the main source of compensation for the losses of tank units. The repairmen managed to achieve such high results due to the widespread introduction into practice of the aggregate method of repairing combat vehicles in field conditions.
In the prewar years, the Soviet government launched a great deal of work to strengthen the army, including the further development of armored troops, the creation and production of new tank designs, the improvement of tank engineering, the training of command and engineering personnel. However, by the time the war began, this tremendous job was not completed.
The theoretical foundations of the organization and technology of repairing tanks in the field before the Great Patriotic War were developed insufficiently, repair facilities, especially mobile ones, were poorly developed, and there was an acute shortage of working capital of engines and components and spare parts for their repair. The repair of new T-34 and KV tanks at that time was not yet ready. Evacuation facilities were very poorly developed. All this adversely affected the combat effectiveness of the armored forces. On 15 June 1941, 29% of old type tanks (BT and T-26) needed, for example, a major overhaul and 44% on average. Military repair units with the start of hostilities could not cope even with the current repair of tanks.
As a result of the adoption of urgent measures in the second half of the year 1941, 48 mobile repair bases (PRB) were formed for the average repair of equipment on the battlefield. By January 1 1943, the troops already had 108 prb, 23 separate repair battalion (orvb) and 19 army repair and restore battalions (arvb). To evacuate damaged armored vehicles from the battlefield, an 56 evacuation was formed. The formation of repair tools went on and on. The output of tanks from the repair continuously increased.
However, an increase in prb and rvb-type repair parts did not solve the main task - their technical equipment was such that they could not overhaul tank units and were not intended for this purpose.
Due to the acute shortage of spare tank units, especially engines, repairmen, despite tremendous efforts, could not cope with the repair of tanks on the battlefield. Industrial plants and stationary repair factories located deep in the rear could only supply their own production of tanks and their repair with aggregates. There were very few revolving aggregates. In addition, the delivery of units from the deep rear was accompanied by great difficulties or was eliminated altogether due to the overload of vehicles. In offensive operations, destroyed and worn-out tanks, due to the lack of spare units, stood idle for a long time on the battlefield. When sending them for repair to the deep rear there were many complications with evacuation and transportation. As a result, many months passed before the tanks returned to service.
In 1943, tank repair problems became particularly acute. This was due to the formation of tank armies and the beginning of major offensive operations by the Soviet troops. The army repair facilities that existed at that time, despite their large numbers, could not cope with the tasks in offensive operations, did not provide the necessary survivability of the tank forces in difficult weather conditions. The following facts eloquently speak about it: 2-I tank army of the Central Front, performing 12-19 February 1943, march from the Efremov region to the Fatezh district (200 km), in conditions of strong snow drifts and off-road, left 226 tanks on routes for technical reasons from 408; in the four tank corps of the Southwestern Front, by the beginning of the counter-offensive of the German fascist armies "South" (February 19 1943), only 20 tanks remained in the ranks, and all the non-motorized tanks were buried and turned into fixed firing points.
Many tanks that failed in battle could not be restored due to the lack of a revolving stock of tank units, primarily engines. The situation was such that each engine for the front was equivalent to a tank. Among the few repair units of the Soviet Army, the 1-I stationary armored repair shop (sbtrm) of the North-Western Front had mastered the overhaul of tank diesel engines in Vyshny Volochok by the beginning of 1943. Repairmen used industry best practices, as well as all the best that was in the repair technology at the Moscow Central Military Repair Plant. Repair of tank diesel engines in the 1 sbtrm was established at the time on the instructions of the commander of the armored and mechanized forces of the front, General B.G. Vershinina.
At the end of February 1943, the chief of the 1 Sbtrm major engineer P.P. Ponomarev, being in Moscow, met at the reception of the Main Armored Directorate (GBTU) with the commander of the 4 Guards Kantemirovsky Tank Corps General P.P. Poluboyarov. The general spoke about the difficult situation with the repair of equipment in the army, spoke in favor of a radical improvement in the organization of repair of tanks on the battlefield. The same question has been worrying repairmen for a long time.
A few days later, P.P. Ponomarev submitted a memorandum to General B. G. Vershinin, Chief of the GBTU, with a proposal on the formation of qualitatively new repair units - mobile tank-aggregate repair plants (PTARPs). The general approved this idea. Soon, 1 sbtrm created a small team to develop the organizational and technological project of such a plant as part of P. Ponomarev, S. Lipatov, V. Kolomiyts and D. Zverko. Later, the entire workshop team joined in the work.
The basic idea was that the mobile plant could freely dispense with stationary production facilities and power plants. PTARZ had to act in any conditions, moving after the troops. When organizing mobile plants in difficult wartime, it was necessary to solve many complex engineering problems.
The authorship of this group of officers 1 sbtrm for the development of PTARZ was legalized by order of the commander of the artillery of the Red Army number 47 from 20 July 1944 of the year. So, for example, to create a coherent system for the overhaul of tank units in field conditions while maintaining a constant technological process, as was the practice in industrial plants, where all operations are strictly regulated, new light, warm, dismantled production facilities with lifting equipment for qualified in-line equipment were needed. repair of tank engines and transmission units. It was necessary to place a large number of various workshops, with machine and other equipment, testing stations, laboratories, power plants on the chassis of highly passable cars and trailers, to provide for the manufacture of quickly assembled and easily transportable communications (water supply, steam lines, electrical cables).
The creation of PTARZs was then a new thing, and not all specialists immediately supported it, fearing that mobile plants would not be able to provide high quality overhauls with such sophisticated equipment as tank diesel engines of type B-2. In addition, some were connected by a draft decision prepared at that time on centralized repair of tank diesel engines at the Central Military Engine-Repair Plant in Moscow. It was proposed to fundamentally reconstruct this enterprise in order to dramatically increase its capacity.
For the final solution of the issue, the head of the GBTU ordered major engineer P.P. Ponomarev to urgently manufacture the basis of the PTARZ by the workshop - a sample of the production room for dismantling and assembly work (a tent with lifting equipment). After numerous creative searches and elaboration of all possible options, a round tent area of 260 square was chosen. m with wooden floor, double canvas walls, heating heaters and a set of lifting and transport facilities. The set of equipment and the tent weighed as little as 7 t and were transported by car with a trailer.
Inspection of the production area with a set of equipment for the assembly of tank diesel engines, diagrams of all fundamental decisions on technology and energy supply of the PTARZ took place at the beginning of April 1943 of the year, at the Central Military Engine-Repair Plant in Moscow. Most of the high-ranking persons present endorsed the proposed principal decision, while those opposing the PTARP received an exhaustive explanation. 19 April 1943 of the year was adopted by the resolution of the State Defense Committee on the formation of two PTARPs - №№7 and 8.
First in stories Mobile tank-aggregate repair plant - PTARZ No.7 (chief engineer-major PP Ponomarev) was designed, built and formed in 3,5 of the month, which was a real labor feat of the personnel of I sbtrm, which in the era of “effective managers” hardly can be repeated.
By order of the People’s Commissar of Defense of August 28, 1943, PTARZ No. 7 was placed at the beginning of September at the disposal of the Supreme Command Headquarters to ensure the fighting of the Steppe and Voronezh Fronts. Attaching great importance to the safety of the first mobile plant, the Supreme Commander I.V. Stalin personally instructed to escort the echelons with PTARZ No. 7 along the entire route, under cover of a fighter aviation. In a short time, it was created and sent to the Southern Front of the PTARZ No. 8 (chief engineer-major V.G. Iovenko, hereinafter - colonel engineer N.I. Vasiliev). Great help in the design of the first anti-tank missile defense was provided by the team of the Central military project, led by architect K.A. Fomin, and in the formation of factories - the generals and officers of the Central Departments and industrial plants.
The actions of the first two mobile tank-aggregate repair plants on the fronts proved to be very successful. In a short time, they provided capitally repaired engines, units and instruments for the tank forces of the Steppe, Voronezh and Southern fronts, and also helped the units to quickly master the repair of tanks by the aggregate method. The State Defense Committee immediately appreciated the benefits of PTARPs. And already September 13 of the year 1943 was issued a new decision of the GKO, on the formation of five plants, and in the year 1944 two more. As a result of these activities in 1944, the 9 fronts - 1, 2 and 3-s Ukrainian, all Belarusian and Baltic - had their own PTARS. According to the experience of PTARZ in the 1943-1944, five mobile tank repair plants (PTRZ) were formed, which repaired tanks on the fronts. PTRZ used diesel engines, repaired PTARZami. This gave the overall harmony of the aggregate overhaul system.
The basis of PTARZ were four production departments. The first was intended for the repair of tank engines, the second - for the repair of transmission units, electrical equipment, various components and instruments, the third - for the manufacture and restoration of worn parts. The fourth division was a branch of the plant, was based on industrial enterprises in the liberated cities and periodically redeployed for PTARZ by rail. He restored the most complex parts, produced castings and complex forgings. By the end of 7, at the Fourth Division, a powerful repair train was built for the fourth division, in which the 1944 specially converted 50-axle wagons were used to accommodate production workshops, laboratories and power plants. In addition to the production departments, in the state of PTARZ there were supporting departments - planning and production, technical, technical control, chief mechanic, logistics, and other departments and services.
At PTARZ, in addition to the 4 department, there were also 600-700 units of machinery and other equipment located in special tents and various workshops, in bodies on motor vehicles and caravans. Their total production area was equal to 3000-3500 square. The power of mobile power stations was 350-450 kW.
The number of personnel of PTARZ on the initial staff was 656 people (officers - 76, soldiers and sergeants - 399, civilian workers - 181). The organizational structure of the plants was continuously improved. By the end of the war, their personnel had increased to 1920 people (officers to 120, soldiers and sergeants to 1300, free-lancers to 500 people).
The technological process of repairing tank units at PTARZ was in-line and organized using the experience of industrial tank plants and stationary military repair plants. In essence, PTARZs were full-fledged industrial enterprises, but only on wheels.
Their interaction with the military repair facilities that produced current and medium repair of tanks was carried out as follows. Wrecked and worn-out tanks concentrated on the emergency vehicle assembly points (SPAMs), where the repair and restoration battalions and mobile tank repair bases were deployed. The repair fund of tank engines, transmission units, assemblies and devices was depersonalized and sent to PTARZ for overhaul, and instead of them, the plants were issued in exchange for overhauled repairs. Thanks to this, the RVB and Ptrb were able to repair tanks using the aggregate method. The transfer of units to a small distance within the military and frontline rear was carried out both by the transport of military repair units and by PTARZ themselves.
PTARZs not only provided for the repair of tanks by the aggregate method, but also contributed to the fundamental technical re-equipment of all military repair facilities - tankers, rvb and even mobile tank repair factories, being for them the basic organization. They essentially headed the field tank repair industry. Skillfully maneuvering and echeloning technical equipment, PTARPs, even during relocations, did not interrupt their production activities. When necessary, they sent operational production groups as close as possible to the front line. The high mobility of PTARZs and their ability to immediately follow the troops are vividly indicated by the release of the forward part of the PTARZ No. XXUMX to the Dnieper bridgehead (in the area of Onufrievka in the autumn of 1943).
In the liberated territory, the PTARPs assisted the Soviet and economic organizations in organizing the work of the factories, in organizing the production of products for the front and the national economy.
Together with the troops of the Steppe and the 2 of the Ukrainian Front, the PTARZ No.7 passed along the roads of the war about 5000 km. During the war years, they repaired 3000 tank engines, more than 7000 tank transmission units, a significant number of different assemblies and devices, about 1000 units for armored cars and tractors, and new parts were repaired on 3,5 million rubles.
For the selfless labor of PTARZ No. 7 in 1944, he was awarded the Order of the Red Star. 70% of plant personnel awarded orders and medals. At the direction of the Supreme High Command, the work of PTARZ No. 7 at the front was captured in the full-length sound film “Plant at the Front”.
Other PTARZs also operated successfully.
For actions PTARZov characterized by greater mobility and mobility. They did not break away from advanced connections more than 100-150 km, and in many cases worked 10-12 km from them. Quickly (for 18-20 hours) they could curl up and just as quickly (after 24-28 hours) turn around and start working in a new place.
The experience of the war showed that the technical support, and first of all the organization of the repair of military equipment during operations, is one of the main factors of the high combat readiness of the tank forces. With the formation of mobile plants, the beginning was the creation of a scientific system for the repair of tanks. Restoration of combat vehicles was complex, covering all types of tank repair. A sharp reduction in the repair period was achieved due to the maximum approximation of military repair units to combat areas, good technical equipment and sufficient power of their repair facilities.
The tank repair system adopted by our army during the Second World War had a decisive advantage over the German one, and mainly because with the help of PTARZ the aggregate method of repairing combat vehicles directly on the battlefield was widely introduced. In the German army there were no mobile repair plants. Until the end of the war, the German command did not understand why, despite the loss of equipment, the Russian armored and mechanized units soon returned to battle.
Lipatov S. Plant at the front. M .: Military Publishing. 1988. C.12-121.
Radzievsky A.I. Tank strike: a tank army in an offensive operation of the front according to the experience of the Great Patriotic War. M .: Voenizdat, 1977. C.217-240.
Injections V. The second tank industry. On the Earth, in the Sky and the Sea: A Collection of Memories. Release of the eleventh. M .: Voenizdat, 1989. C.306-358.
Lipatov S., Kolomiets V. Front-line Tank Repair Industry // VIZH. 1982. No.7. C. 31-34.
Babadzhanyan A. Tanks and tank troops. M .: Voenizdat, 1980 S. 187-189.