Military Review

Factories on wheels. Know-how of the Red Army

44
Factories on wheels. Know-how of the Red Army



Repair tanks during World War II was of great importance. Suffice it to say that over the years of the war, 430 repairs of tanks and self-propelled artillery (SPG) were carried out. On average, every tank and self-propelled guns released by industry went through the hands of repairmen more than four times! In tank armies, for example, each tank (self-propelled guns) failed two or three times and the same number of times the efforts of repairmen returned to battle.

The main role in the repair of tanks played military mobile repair tools. Their share in the total repair of armored vehicles was 82,6%. Restored tanks and self-propelled guns were the main source of compensation for the losses of tank units. The repairmen managed to achieve such high results due to the widespread introduction into practice of the aggregate method of repairing combat vehicles in field conditions.

In the prewar years, the Soviet government launched a great deal of work to strengthen the army, including the further development of armored troops, the creation and production of new tank designs, the improvement of tank engineering, the training of command and engineering personnel. However, by the time the war began, this tremendous job was not completed.

The theoretical foundations of the organization and technology of repairing tanks in the field before the Great Patriotic War were developed insufficiently, repair facilities, especially mobile ones, were poorly developed, and there was an acute shortage of working capital of engines and components and spare parts for their repair. The repair of new T-34 and KV tanks at that time was not yet ready. Evacuation facilities were very poorly developed. All this adversely affected the combat effectiveness of the armored forces. On 15 June 1941, 29% of old type tanks (BT and T-26) needed, for example, a major overhaul and 44% on average. Military repair units with the start of hostilities could not cope even with the current repair of tanks.



As a result of the adoption of urgent measures in the second half of the year 1941, 48 mobile repair bases (PRB) were formed for the average repair of equipment on the battlefield. By January 1 1943, the troops already had 108 prb, 23 separate repair battalion (orvb) and 19 army repair and restore battalions (arvb). To evacuate damaged armored vehicles from the battlefield, an 56 evacuation was formed. The formation of repair tools went on and on. The output of tanks from the repair continuously increased.

However, an increase in prb and rvb-type repair parts did not solve the main task - their technical equipment was such that they could not overhaul tank units and were not intended for this purpose.

Due to the acute shortage of spare tank units, especially engines, repairmen, despite tremendous efforts, could not cope with the repair of tanks on the battlefield. Industrial plants and stationary repair factories located deep in the rear could only supply their own production of tanks and their repair with aggregates. There were very few revolving aggregates. In addition, the delivery of units from the deep rear was accompanied by great difficulties or was eliminated altogether due to the overload of vehicles. In offensive operations, destroyed and worn-out tanks, due to the lack of spare units, stood idle for a long time on the battlefield. When sending them for repair to the deep rear there were many complications with evacuation and transportation. As a result, many months passed before the tanks returned to service.

In 1943, tank repair problems became particularly acute. This was due to the formation of tank armies and the beginning of major offensive operations by the Soviet troops. The army repair facilities that existed at that time, despite their large numbers, could not cope with the tasks in offensive operations, did not provide the necessary survivability of the tank forces in difficult weather conditions. The following facts eloquently speak about it: 2-I tank army of the Central Front, performing 12-19 February 1943, march from the Efremov region to the Fatezh district (200 km), in conditions of strong snow drifts and off-road, left 226 tanks on routes for technical reasons from 408; in the four tank corps of the Southwestern Front, by the beginning of the counter-offensive of the German fascist armies "South" (February 19 1943), only 20 tanks remained in the ranks, and all the non-motorized tanks were buried and turned into fixed firing points.



Many tanks that failed in battle could not be restored due to the lack of a revolving stock of tank units, primarily engines. The situation was such that each engine for the front was equivalent to a tank. Among the few repair units of the Soviet Army, the 1-I stationary armored repair shop (sbtrm) of the North-Western Front had mastered the overhaul of tank diesel engines in Vyshny Volochok by the beginning of 1943. Repairmen used industry best practices, as well as all the best that was in the repair technology at the Moscow Central Military Repair Plant. Repair of tank diesel engines in the 1 sbtrm was established at the time on the instructions of the commander of the armored and mechanized forces of the front, General B.G. Vershinina.

At the end of February 1943, the chief of the 1 Sbtrm major engineer P.P. Ponomarev, being in Moscow, met at the reception of the Main Armored Directorate (GBTU) with the commander of the 4 Guards Kantemirovsky Tank Corps General P.P. Poluboyarov. The general spoke about the difficult situation with the repair of equipment in the army, spoke in favor of a radical improvement in the organization of repair of tanks on the battlefield. The same question has been worrying repairmen for a long time.

A few days later, P.P. Ponomarev submitted a memorandum to General B. G. Vershinin, Chief of the GBTU, with a proposal on the formation of qualitatively new repair units - mobile tank-aggregate repair plants (PTARPs). The general approved this idea. Soon, 1 sbtrm created a small team to develop the organizational and technological project of such a plant as part of P. Ponomarev, S. Lipatov, V. Kolomiyts and D. Zverko. Later, the entire workshop team joined in the work.

The basic idea was that the mobile plant could freely dispense with stationary production facilities and power plants. PTARZ had to act in any conditions, moving after the troops. When organizing mobile plants in difficult wartime, it was necessary to solve many complex engineering problems.

The authorship of this group of officers 1 sbtrm for the development of PTARZ was legalized by order of the commander of the artillery of the Red Army number 47 from 20 July 1944 of the year. So, for example, to create a coherent system for the overhaul of tank units in field conditions while maintaining a constant technological process, as was the practice in industrial plants, where all operations are strictly regulated, new light, warm, dismantled production facilities with lifting equipment for qualified in-line equipment were needed. repair of tank engines and transmission units. It was necessary to place a large number of various workshops, with machine and other equipment, testing stations, laboratories, power plants on the chassis of highly passable cars and trailers, to provide for the manufacture of quickly assembled and easily transportable communications (water supply, steam lines, electrical cables).

The creation of PTARZs was then a new thing, and not all specialists immediately supported it, fearing that mobile plants would not be able to provide high quality overhauls with such sophisticated equipment as tank diesel engines of type B-2. In addition, some were connected by a draft decision prepared at that time on centralized repair of tank diesel engines at the Central Military Engine-Repair Plant in Moscow. It was proposed to fundamentally reconstruct this enterprise in order to dramatically increase its capacity.

For the final solution of the issue, the head of the GBTU ordered major engineer P.P. Ponomarev to urgently manufacture the basis of the PTARZ by the workshop - a sample of the production room for dismantling and assembly work (a tent with lifting equipment). After numerous creative searches and elaboration of all possible options, a round tent area of ​​260 square was chosen. m with wooden floor, double canvas walls, heating heaters and a set of lifting and transport facilities. The set of equipment and the tent weighed as little as 7 t and were transported by car with a trailer.

Inspection of the production area with a set of equipment for the assembly of tank diesel engines, diagrams of all fundamental decisions on technology and energy supply of the PTARZ took place at the beginning of April 1943 of the year, at the Central Military Engine-Repair Plant in Moscow. Most of the high-ranking persons present endorsed the proposed principal decision, while those opposing the PTARP received an exhaustive explanation. 19 April 1943 of the year was adopted by the resolution of the State Defense Committee on the formation of two PTARPs - №№7 and 8.



First in stories Mobile tank-aggregate repair plant - PTARZ No.7 (chief engineer-major PP Ponomarev) was designed, built and formed in 3,5 of the month, which was a real labor feat of the personnel of I sbtrm, which in the era of “effective managers” hardly can be repeated.

By order of the People’s Commissar of Defense of August 28, 1943, PTARZ No. 7 was placed at the beginning of September at the disposal of the Supreme Command Headquarters to ensure the fighting of the Steppe and Voronezh Fronts. Attaching great importance to the safety of the first mobile plant, the Supreme Commander I.V. Stalin personally instructed to escort the echelons with PTARZ No. 7 along the entire route, under cover of a fighter aviation. In a short time, it was created and sent to the Southern Front of the PTARZ No. 8 (chief engineer-major V.G. Iovenko, hereinafter - colonel engineer N.I. Vasiliev). Great help in the design of the first anti-tank missile defense was provided by the team of the Central military project, led by architect K.A. Fomin, and in the formation of factories - the generals and officers of the Central Departments and industrial plants.

The actions of the first two mobile tank-aggregate repair plants on the fronts proved to be very successful. In a short time, they provided capitally repaired engines, units and instruments for the tank forces of the Steppe, Voronezh and Southern fronts, and also helped the units to quickly master the repair of tanks by the aggregate method. The State Defense Committee immediately appreciated the benefits of PTARPs. And already September 13 of the year 1943 was issued a new decision of the GKO, on the formation of five plants, and in the year 1944 two more. As a result of these activities in 1944, the 9 fronts - 1, 2 and 3-s Ukrainian, all Belarusian and Baltic - had their own PTARS. According to the experience of PTARZ in the 1943-1944, five mobile tank repair plants (PTRZ) were formed, which repaired tanks on the fronts. PTRZ used diesel engines, repaired PTARZami. This gave the overall harmony of the aggregate overhaul system.



The basis of PTARZ were four production departments. The first was intended for the repair of tank engines, the second - for the repair of transmission units, electrical equipment, various components and instruments, the third - for the manufacture and restoration of worn parts. The fourth division was a branch of the plant, was based on industrial enterprises in the liberated cities and periodically redeployed for PTARZ by rail. He restored the most complex parts, produced castings and complex forgings. By the end of 7, at the Fourth Division, a powerful repair train was built for the fourth division, in which the 1944 specially converted 50-axle wagons were used to accommodate production workshops, laboratories and power plants. In addition to the production departments, in the state of PTARZ there were supporting departments - planning and production, technical, technical control, chief mechanic, logistics, and other departments and services.

At PTARZ, in addition to the 4 department, there were also 600-700 units of machinery and other equipment located in special tents and various workshops, in bodies on motor vehicles and caravans. Their total production area was equal to 3000-3500 square. The power of mobile power stations was 350-450 kW.



The number of personnel of PTARZ on the initial staff was 656 people (officers - 76, soldiers and sergeants - 399, civilian workers - 181). The organizational structure of the plants was continuously improved. By the end of the war, their personnel had increased to 1920 people (officers to 120, soldiers and sergeants to 1300, free-lancers to 500 people).

The technological process of repairing tank units at PTARZ was in-line and organized using the experience of industrial tank plants and stationary military repair plants. In essence, PTARZs were full-fledged industrial enterprises, but only on wheels.

Their interaction with the military repair facilities that produced current and medium repair of tanks was carried out as follows. Wrecked and worn-out tanks concentrated on the emergency vehicle assembly points (SPAMs), where the repair and restoration battalions and mobile tank repair bases were deployed. The repair fund of tank engines, transmission units, assemblies and devices was depersonalized and sent to PTARZ for overhaul, and instead of them, the plants were issued in exchange for overhauled repairs. Thanks to this, the RVB and Ptrb were able to repair tanks using the aggregate method. The transfer of units to a small distance within the military and frontline rear was carried out both by the transport of military repair units and by PTARZ themselves.

PTARZs not only provided for the repair of tanks by the aggregate method, but also contributed to the fundamental technical re-equipment of all military repair facilities - tankers, rvb and even mobile tank repair factories, being for them the basic organization. They essentially headed the field tank repair industry. Skillfully maneuvering and echeloning technical equipment, PTARPs, even during relocations, did not interrupt their production activities. When necessary, they sent operational production groups as close as possible to the front line. The high mobility of PTARZs and their ability to immediately follow the troops are vividly indicated by the release of the forward part of the PTARZ No. XXUMX to the Dnieper bridgehead (in the area of ​​Onufrievka in the autumn of 1943).



In the liberated territory, the PTARPs assisted the Soviet and economic organizations in organizing the work of the factories, in organizing the production of products for the front and the national economy.
Together with the troops of the Steppe and the 2 of the Ukrainian Front, the PTARZ No.7 passed along the roads of the war about 5000 km. During the war years, they repaired 3000 tank engines, more than 7000 tank transmission units, a significant number of different assemblies and devices, about 1000 units for armored cars and tractors, and new parts were repaired on 3,5 million rubles.

For the selfless labor of PTARZ No. 7 in 1944, he was awarded the Order of the Red Star. 70% of plant personnel awarded orders and medals. At the direction of the Supreme High Command, the work of PTARZ No. 7 at the front was captured in the full-length sound film “Plant at the Front”.

Other PTARZs also operated successfully.

For actions PTARZov characterized by greater mobility and mobility. They did not break away from advanced connections more than 100-150 km, and in many cases worked 10-12 km from them. Quickly (for 18-20 hours) they could curl up and just as quickly (after 24-28 hours) turn around and start working in a new place.

The experience of the war showed that the technical support, and first of all the organization of the repair of military equipment during operations, is one of the main factors of the high combat readiness of the tank forces. With the formation of mobile plants, the beginning was the creation of a scientific system for the repair of tanks. Restoration of combat vehicles was complex, covering all types of tank repair. A sharp reduction in the repair period was achieved due to the maximum approximation of military repair units to combat areas, good technical equipment and sufficient power of their repair facilities.

The tank repair system adopted by our army during the Second World War had a decisive advantage over the German one, and mainly because with the help of PTARZ the aggregate method of repairing combat vehicles directly on the battlefield was widely introduced. In the German army there were no mobile repair plants. Until the end of the war, the German command did not understand why, despite the loss of equipment, the Russian armored and mechanized units soon returned to battle.

Sources:
Lipatov S. Plant at the front. M .: Military Publishing. 1988. C.12-121.
Radzievsky A.I. Tank strike: a tank army in an offensive operation of the front according to the experience of the Great Patriotic War. M .: Voenizdat, 1977. C.217-240.
Injections V. The second tank industry. On the Earth, in the Sky and the Sea: A Collection of Memories. Release of the eleventh. M .: Voenizdat, 1989. C.306-358.
Lipatov S., Kolomiets V. Front-line Tank Repair Industry // VIZH. 1982. No.7. C. 31-34.
Babadzhanyan A. Tanks and tank troops. M .: Voenizdat, 1980 S. 187-189.
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  1. qwert
    qwert 8 June 2016 07: 07
    +30
    The Red Army and the USSR in general had a lot of know-how. And while there was no Skolkovo. Although perhaps this was the main secret of the success of the USSR.
    1. Penzuck
      Penzuck 8 June 2016 07: 53
      +2
      Quote: qwert
      The Red Army and the USSR in general had a lot of know-how. And while there was no Skolkovo. Although perhaps this was the main secret of the success of the USSR.

      Too lazy to look in more detail, but on VO (EMNIP) there was an article about Lend-Lease, which indicated a figure about the American repair and recovery vehicles supplied at the beginning of the war. "127 repair tanks M31". and so on (you can’t make a major overhaul on them). Deliveries began in 1942, therefore, the connection between these two events is obvious and clear ...
      http://topwar.ru/26279-tanki-lend-liza-obemy-i-modifikacii.html
      The USSR relied on "its" and "foreign" experience, and it is not surprising that our engineers were able to design and implement this KNOW-HOW.
      As a PART of a general system for repairing equipment. Those. We took care of both the means of evacuation and the mobile means of repair ... We used a systematic approach.
      And on this basis to scold "Skolkovo"?
    2. Xpyct89
      Xpyct89 8 June 2016 08: 06
      +4
      Well, why wasn’t it? It was somewhat under the direction of Lavrenty Pavlovich.
    3. Sars
      Sars 8 June 2016 10: 51
      +7
      Quote: qwert
      And while there was no Skolkovo.

      Comrade Stalin, at the time, called on all Skolkovo men to order.
    4. The comment was deleted.
  2. Aleksander
    Aleksander 8 June 2016 07: 49
    +5
    The theoretical foundations of the organization and technology of repairing tanks in the field before the Great Patriotic War were insufficiently developed, repair tools, especially mobile ones, poorly developed,


    And this is absolutely incomprehensible: how could it be possible to produce a huge amount of rather complicated equipment, with obviously weak units (transmissions), without providing it with an appropriate repair base ?! Abandoned or blown up expensive tanks left due to lack of trifling penny parts, breakdowns, impossibility of evacuation is one of the main reasons for the terrible loss of equipment in the first months of the war. The country’s enormous efforts to build machinery were destroyed. Criminal headache.
    It would be better to do less, but with a good repair base and radio communications.
    1. kuzma2
      kuzma2 8 June 2016 08: 00
      +3
      He served in such a unit in Ulan-Ude 1981-1983, military unit 26380. Unfortunately, little is written about such units.
      Are there any employees at the Forum at the Forum?
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 8 June 2016 10: 24
      +4
      Quote: Aleksander
      And this is absolutely incomprehensible: how could it be possible to produce a huge amount of rather complicated equipment, with obviously weak units (transmissions), without providing it with an appropriate repair base ?!

      So ... a paradox, but for the USSR the tank was easier to make than the same tractor. Since ChTZ since the mid-30s they demanded to make a normal high-speed tractor for BTV. As a result, after 5 years, the army received raw crafts, and even in insufficient quantities:
      Decree of the Defense Committee under the SNK of the USSR No. 443ss dated 19.12.39/2/1500 obliged the NKSM to supply 1738 tractors “ST-18” NPOs. and Decree of the Economic Council under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 26 dated October 1940-1, 1940 for the 2st quarter of 585, XNUMX NPOs of ST-XNUMX tractors were allocated.
      However, in 1940 ChTZ did not present a single ST-2 tractor for delivery to the Bolshoi State Technical University of the Army.
      Released the first batch of tractors "ST-2" in 1940 and 41. have a large number of structural and technological defects.
      At the end of 1940, protocol agreements were concluded between Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant and the State Aviation Technical University of the Red Army to finalize the defective ST-2 mechanisms in order to eliminate these defects.
      Despite the sufficient time, ChTZ did not fulfill its obligations and put the ST-2 machine into mass production with serious defects in the basic mechanisms.

      Plus the notorious "shaft plan". Because of him, at the same ChTZ, KB and pilot production at the end of the 30s were actually engaged in serial production. And at STZ, already in wartime, menacing telegrams had to be sent so that the plant director did not dare to close the plan for tractors at the expense of the T-34, bringing them together in the reports in one column.
    3. cast iron
      cast iron 9 June 2016 00: 22
      -5
      It is bad that in the USSR in 1941 there was no such ingenious specialist as you. With you there would be no mistakes and miscalculations. This is 100%!
    4. 73bor
      73bor 9 June 2016 00: 53
      0
      The main reason for the loss of equipment at the beginning of the war is the abandonment of the battlefield by our army in the process of retreat, although these reasons can be counted many more, but nothing went wrong, as we won and our BTT repair system was one of the best in the world, radio communication of course is also bad - Would, but "what is that is!" - But our messengers ran fast!
      1. Aleksander
        Aleksander 9 June 2016 06: 10
        0
        Quote: 73bor
        The main reason for the loss of equipment at the beginning of the war is the abandonment battlefield our army in the process of retreat

        All T-35 (48 pieces), which were available to the 34-th, by the beginning of the war were in the area of ​​Rava-Russkaya and were lost in the early days of the fighting. Moreover, only 7 vehicles were lost directly in battleThe 6 was under repair at the time the war began, and the other 35 were out of service due to malfunctions, broke on the march and were abandoned or destroyed by crews.
        Those. only 14% died on the battlefield.
  3. denvar555
    denvar555 8 June 2016 07: 58
    +12
    Great article! I never would have thought that it would be so creative to approach such a serious matter as the restoration of tanks and armored vehicles. Is it interesting now that the analogs of the PTARZs remained in the army? I heard that under Mr. Taburetkin they wanted to switch to outsourcing for the repair of armored vehicles and automobiles in the army by reducing repair companies. Like why should a soldier poke around in the engine if qualified specialists at the manufacturing plant can do this. True, the logistics for delivery to the plant and the final cost of such repairs were not disclosed for some reason.
    1. kuzma2
      kuzma2 8 June 2016 08: 07
      +4
      For denvar555, my part, judging by Google, is valid. Up to 30 engines plus units with incomplete staff and carrying internal and garrison outfits were given out per month. When we still had a second such factory, but minimized (10-15 soldiers and officers). Besides this overhaul of motorcycles.
    2. blizart
      blizart 8 June 2016 17: 49
      +6
      Strength, strength. The oiled quilted jackets and skating rinks of "Panther", which continue to fight against the manufacturers, took for the soul. Shoe a flea ?! No problem!
      1. Black Colonel
        Black Colonel 10 June 2016 14: 16
        0
        Yes, I was surprised about the "Pater" skating rinks on the T-34
  4. Aleksandr72
    Aleksandr72 8 June 2016 08: 01
    +16
    Thanks to the author for the article. For the first time I read about the PARM field auto repair shops on the chassis of GAZ-A and ZiS-5 trucks when I was a child in the magazine "Za Rulem". Thanks to the work of our repairmen, many tanks, self-propelled guns and cars returned to service several times without sending them to repair plants in the rear. However, the author did not mention that towards the end of 1943 (when the large-scale offensive operations of the Red Army were launched and the rapid repair of the failed armored vehicle was necessary and vital for the front), the activities of our ATARZ were largely supported by the supply of mobile repair shops made in the USA and Canada on a car chassis. The full park of the American workshop was a field tank repair plant and consisted of up to 10 units: these are mechanical workshops М16А and М16В, metalwork and mechanical workshop М8А, forging and welding workshop М12, electrical repair workshop М18, workshop for repairing weapons М7, tool workshop and storage vehicles M14. All this was based on the chassis of the Studebaker US6 all-wheel drive (6x6) vehicles. The fleet of tank repair workshops also included 10-ton truck cranes M1 Ward LaFrance 1000 or Kenworth-570, as well as the Baldwin Locomotive Works M31 ARV (this technique was not produced in the USSR, old T-34 without a turret were used as ARVs). Canadian fleets consisted of A3 and D3 mechanical workshops, an electromechanical workshop, an OFP-3 mobile charging station and a KL-3 electric welding workshop: all this was mixed on the chassis of GMC CCKW-6 all-wheel drive (6x352) trucks (made in the USA) and Canadian (4x4 ) Ford F60L and Ford F15A. In total, in 1944-1945, 1590 workshops of all types were delivered to the USSR, and this is only from Canada.
    In the photo, the M1 truck crane Ward LaFrance 1000 (Kenworth-570 was, in principle, exactly the same - it did not differ significantly):
  5. Riv
    Riv 8 June 2016 08: 29
    +7
    Grandfather (driver) told how they changed the damaged gun on the T-34. They drove the tank into some workshop, hung a hoist from the beam, tilted the tower forward and pulled out the gun. Then they pushed a new one in its place. The regimental gunsmith with the commander shot a gun. Everything, the tank is ready for battle. And the hole in the armor of the engine compartment, pierced by an armor-piercing projectile, was simply hammered with a wooden cork cut from logs.

    So they did it themselves, by the crew. And the repair base is probably an engine to change, or something else major. Grandfather always said that if you look after any car (or even a bicycle pump), then there will be no need for complex repairs.
    1. Igor V
      Igor V 8 June 2016 16: 14
      0
      And my grandfather was engaged in the repair of automotive equipment in the field.
  6. kuzma2
    kuzma2 8 June 2016 08: 36
    +3
    For Riv, a tank diesel engine has a very small material resource, I don’t know how it is with the new one, the B-2 type of ammunition has only about 100 operating hours. Engines constantly came from the troops in a terrible state from training vehicles. In addition, another V-6 with PT-76 and D-12 with a tractor.
    1. Aviator_
      Aviator_ 8 June 2016 21: 34
      0
      Well, what PT-76 from 1941 to 1945 of the year?
      1. kuzma2
        kuzma2 9 June 2016 05: 17
        0
        for Aviator_ I wrote above that I served in such a part of 1981-1983
  7. nivander
    nivander 8 June 2016 09: 15
    +14
    it is a pity that the author did not dwell on the experience of the tankers of the Kalinin and Western fronts who, in the period 1941-42, managed to restore the same tank 3-4 times, and even make their own designs such as the T-26 tank with a turret from BT-2 and And in the 28th Tank Brigade of Colonel Malygin (the future GSS and the commander of the 9th Mechanized Corps), Pompotech Schwebig (the future commander of one of the ATARZs) generally restored any tanks except the exploded ones and had a stash (collected in an open field) in the form of spare engines tanks of all kinds. And during Operation Mars, an improvised tank repair plant kept the unfortunate 6th Tank Corps of G. Arman in combat-ready condition, so that the puzzled Germans even organized an investigation to establish the authenticity of the reports (according to the Wehrmacht reports, they finished off the 6-tank case at least 5 times)
  8. Skalpel
    Skalpel 8 June 2016 09: 45
    +5
    Thanks for the article, Author! Informatively! Interesting! Informative!
    And for:
    "The first ever mobile tank-aggregate repair plant - PTARZ No. 7 (chief engineer-major P.P. Ponomarev) was designed, built and formed in 3,5 months, which was a real labor feat of the personnel of the XNUMXst brigade, which in the era "Effective managers" can hardly be duplicated. "
    - A separate respect to the author and sincere RESPECT and ADMINISTRATION to those heroes who created this whole system in such terms. Heroes!
    Eh, it's a pity that such a criterion for effective work will not be legally introduced and implemented, for the current "ineffective managers", whose effectiveness is only on paper, but in reality - heaps of der.ma, instead of results ...
  9. The comment was deleted.
  10. iouris
    iouris 8 June 2016 10: 11
    +2
    An article on a very relevant topic.
    Management is a specific process management model that is unique to a market economy. Soviet managers during the war (and it was always carried on while the USSR existed) used other - communist - management methods.
    "Serdyukov's Reforms" is a vivid example of "systemic scientific management". As a result of these reforms, on the eve of events that could lead to war, the system of front-line repairs of military equipment was destroyed.
    And even car maintenance has been handed over to manufacturers.
    When designing armatures and PAKs, it should be borne in mind that combat survivability and adaptability to maintenance and repair are the most important properties of the reliability of military equipment.
    Repair should be understood as the production (overproduction) of military equipment from components that have significant operating time (service life).
    Equipment for civil (commercial) use, as a rule, is (and should be) non-repairable.
    1. Amurets
      Amurets 8 June 2016 12: 48
      +2
      Quote: iouris
      An article on a very relevant topic.

      Yes, I agree. In the late 1980s, in our region, according to the mobilization plan, on the basis of four enterprises, a mobile auto repair plant was formed. The plant was equipped with the equipment of those enterprises on the basis of which it was formed. Collections were carried out, but the truth was without dismantling the equipment that we had to "put on wheels" Interesting moment. One of the factories was during the war years was a mobile army repair base for car repairs. Then it was transferred to the national economy and converted into an auto repair plant. I have already expressed my opinion, I will express it now. in the army are needed. To carry out maintenance and current repairs should be in units, these units. Complex and major repairs should be carried out by factory enterprises: manufacturers or specialized enterprises for the repair of army equipment. Naturally, as before, for repair units there should be the necessary set of tools and materials.
  11. Stas57
    Stas57 8 June 2016 10: 51
    0
    it's all good, but the lack of normal means of evacuation, in the initial period, was expensive
  12. Sars
    Sars 8 June 2016 10: 54
    +1
    After the fighting on the Kursk Bulge, the Germans sent all the wrecked tanks to Germany, and ours of the two wrecked ones collected one ready for battle.
  13. Samy
    Samy 8 June 2016 12: 38
    -2
    Strange, what is this know-how? The Wehrmacht used it for a long time ...
    "Each tank regiment of the Wehrmacht has a repair company equipped with machine tools, a welding machine, a crane, the necessary mechanical and painting tools. The repair company includes another evacuation platoon, whose task is to tow damaged tanks to a place convenient for organizing repairs."
    http://pro-tank.ru/blog/660-tanks-in-fight-first-campaigns
    1. kuzma2
      kuzma2 9 June 2016 05: 21
      0
      Ptars is a plant engaged in the overhaul of engines, assemblies and motorcycles, is subordinate to the tank army, has no means of evacuation. Personnel 1500.
    2. iouris
      iouris 10 June 2016 23: 42
      0
      About 19 years ago, on a Riga-Peter train, he was traveling with one doctor of chemical sciences from Riga. Russian. At the age of 15-16, he, a resident of the Pskov region, was mobilized by the Germans and repaired German tanks. When the Germans retreated in 1944, together with the German repair unit, he ended up in Courland. The German boss treated him well. Apparently the kid was very smart.
  14. Samy
    Samy 8 June 2016 12: 43
    +1
    And one more thing ....

    In other parameters, the Wehrmacht was ahead of the Red Army, especially in terms of the organization of evacuation, repair and maintenance of equipment. The organizational and staffing structure of the German tank divisions more closely met the requirements of the time and, by the way, during the war years remained practically unchanged.

    Red Army in June 1941 (Statistical Digest)

    http://istmat.info/node/26037
  15. pimen
    pimen 8 June 2016 13: 03
    +3
    in terms of equipment restoration, it’s more important, after all, not the organization of the matter, but the maintainability of the equipment itself
    1. Stas57
      Stas57 8 June 2016 14: 21
      +2
      Quote: pimen
      in terms of equipment restoration, it’s more important, after all, not the organization of the matter, but the maintainability of the equipment itself

      this is nonsense, any technique, even the most complex, can be provided with the necessary number of technicians and equipment and will not be better than the simplest nonsense.
      our evacuation of Kv was carried out by 3 by the Stalinists in large numbers - and they couldn’t always take it away, but the Germans had Sd.Kfz.9 Famo and repair it as SPAM as needed and how many reports wrote — it is impossible to evacuate — the tank was blown up.
      that's all statistics
    2. Amurets
      Amurets 8 June 2016 15: 42
      +3
      Quote: pimen
      in terms of equipment restoration, it’s more important, after all, not the organization of the matter, but the maintainability of the equipment itself

      This and that is important. The organization is important in any business, it is taking into account motor resources, and the equipment of consumables (filters, oil, repair kits, generally trifles) and a revolving repair fund. Repairability is the ability to easily change problem nodes and assemblies to pre-repaired ones. Unfortunately, equal-strength, equally-resource units and assemblies have not yet been created. That is why there should be reasonably convenient access to aggregates with less resource.
      1. pimen
        pimen 8 June 2016 19: 05
        0
        hmm ... I guess I still wanted to say that maintainability is a "constant" recovery formula, about the organization of the process - a variable
  16. Samy
    Samy 8 June 2016 13: 35
    +4
    I disagree. Always and everywhere, the organization beats "disorganization". Let me remind you that quantitatively, in terms of saturation with equipment, the Red Army was not inferior to the Wehrmacht, and in some part (heavy tanks, for example) it was superior to the Germans. But they beat us with the organization. Too lazy now to look, but rem units of the Wehrmacht worked more efficiently at the beginning of the war. Please note that they began to engage in PARZs from 42-43 years. Only when we learned how to fight (organization of staff, combat and training work), repair (organize repairs), the Germans began to yield. The downside to maintainability is poor quality, which still haunts us. A striking example is the current auto industry. For some reason, we cannot do it with high quality and simply.
    1. tasha
      tasha 8 June 2016 14: 42
      +8
      I support. It is from different "little things" (the presence of tractors for evacuation, spare parts for field repairs, mobile workshops, funnels for filling fuel) that the readiness / unpreparedness of the army for war is formed. Most often, they are judged by the list of tanks, aircraft, bayonets ...

      There was no nail - the Horseshoe was gone.
      There was no horseshoe - The horse limped.
      The horse limped - the commander was killed.
      The cavalry is defeated - the army is running.
      The enemy enters the city, sparing no prisoners,
      Because there was no nail in the smithy.
      S. Marshak
      1. iouris
        iouris 11 June 2016 00: 04
        0
        Quote: tasha
        The downside of maintainability is poor quality

        You are very mistaken. Starting in the 1950s, the United States Air Force adopted guidelines for reliability. Adaptability to maintenance and repair of combat damage - in the first place (!)
        It is easy to see that American tactical fighters are very small, suspension units, hatches, accessible even to people of small stature. This means that fewer planes can provide a greater number of sorties per operation. Quality is an a priori (preliminary) assessment of effectiveness. Efficiency is a useful effect related to resource costs and combat losses (combat and non-combat).
    2. cast iron
      cast iron 9 June 2016 00: 34
      +1
      "The downside to maintainability is poor quality, which still haunts us."

      This is in what kind of a tank "low" quality pursues? Name. And a Western analogue, which is less maintainable but more "quality"?

      "A striking example is the current auto industry. For some reason, we cannot do it with high quality and simply."

      And where does the auto industry and the military industry? At the time of the release of new models, the USSR was quite at the level with foreign counterparts in terms of parameters. And the fact that technologies and models have not been updated is another question. By the way, with regards to the automotive industry, they have forgotten how to do the West and Japan qualitatively and simply.
    3. akims
      akims 9 June 2016 07: 31
      0
      The Germans seriously damaged tanks were withdrawn to the rear. But not at the factory. In 1943, Manstein so lost about 50 tigers, which were being repaired in Kharkov at the plant named after him. Malysheva. In his memoirs, he described this as a critical irreparable loss - and this seems to be true.
    4. iouris
      iouris 10 June 2016 23: 55
      0
      Our organization is traditionally bad, but the shortcomings of the organization have always been compensated by the number and specific "motivation" of personnel.
      In one recent publication, examining in detail the course of the Battle of Kursk, the author claims that during the 2..3 days of the offensive the number of tanks among the Germans grew. This paradoxical conclusion is explained by the low efficiency of our anti-tank artillery against the new heavy tanks of the Wehrmacht and the contribution of the repair and restoration units, which worked a couple of kilometers from the front line, commissioning faulty and damaged vehicles.
  17. Aviator_
    Aviator_ 8 June 2016 21: 31
    +3
    Very informative. Respect to the author!
  18. Reptiloid
    Reptiloid 9 June 2016 01: 27
    +2
    Thank you for the article. A new topic for me. Stories about how the Donchans repaired abandoned dill technique and used the technique of past times are recalled !!!! Well done !!!!
  19. BAI
    BAI 28 September 2016 15: 32
    0
    I saw a photo where there were 34 types of rollers on the T-4 (from different models), but attaching the "Panther" rollers is cool!
  20. Elena G.
    Elena G. 9 May 2020 16: 05
    0
    Many thanks to the author for this article. For a long time, there was no information on the Web about the developments and activities of my grandfather Viktor Mikhailovich Kolomiets and his best friend and head of PalPalych Ponomarev.