Military Review

"Duck" in Berlin

62
Stalin crossed the line separating reasonable caution from dangerous credulity


During all the 75 years that have passed since the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, we are looking for the answer to the seemingly simple question: how did it happen that the Soviet leadership, having irrefutable evidence of preparing aggression against the USSR, did not believe it to the end. Why Stalin, even after receiving news of the advancement of German units to the original areas for the offensive on the night of 22 June from the headquarters of the Kiev Special Military District, said to the People's Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko and the Chief of the General Staff Zhukov: you shouldn’t rush to conclusions, maybe still to be settled peacefully?

One of the answers - the Soviet leader was the victim of large-scale misinformation, carried out by the German special services. Stalin’s personal miscalculation, in turn, automatically spread to all decision-makers who ex officio were responsible for the state of defense and security of the country, regardless of whether they agreed with the leader’s point of view or not.

Hitler's spells


The Hitler command understood that the suddenness and maximum force of an attack on the Red Army could be ensured only when attacked from a position of direct contact. This required moving directly to the border dozens of divisions that formed the strike force of the invading army. In the German bet, they were aware that with any measures of secrecy this could not be done in secret. And then an incredibly daring decision was made - not to conceal the transfer of troops.

However, it was not enough to concentrate them at the border. Tactical surprise during the first strike was achieved only under the condition that until the last moment the date of the attack would be kept secret. But this is not all: the plan of the German military was also to simultaneously prevent the timely operational deployment of the Red Army and bringing its parts into full combat readiness. Even a sudden invasion would not have been so successful if it had been met by the troops of the Soviet border military districts already prepared to repel an attack.

On May 22, 1941, at the final stage of the operational deployment of the Wehrmacht, the transfer of 47 divisions began to the border with the USSR, including 28 tank and motorized. Public opinion, and through it, the intelligence agencies of all interested countries (not only the USSR) were planted with such an abundance of the most incredible explanations of what was happening, from which, in the literal sense of the word, the head was spinning.

Generally, all versions of the purpose for which such a mass of troops is concentrated at the Soviet border, boiled down to two:

to prepare for the invasion of the British Isles, here, in the distance, to protect them from the blows of the English aviation;
in order to forcefully ensure a favorable course of negotiations with the Soviet Union, which were about to begin, according to hints from Berlin.

As it should be, a special disinformation operation against the USSR began long before the first German military trains moved eastward on 22 in May. In scale, she knew no equal. To implement it, a directive was issued to the OKW, the Supreme Command of the German armed forces. Hitler, Minister of Propaganda Ribbentrop, State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Weizsäcker, imperial Minister Meissner - the head of the presidential office, the highest ranks of the OKW, took personal and far from formal participation in it.

It should be said about a personal letter, which, according to some information, the Führer 14 of May sent to the leader of the Soviet people. The presence of the German divisions near 80 of the German divisions by the time the sender explained the need to keep the troops away from the British eyes. Beginning with 15 – 20 June, Hitler promised to begin a massive withdrawal of troops from the Soviet borders to the west, and before that he had urged Stalin not to succumb to provocative rumors about the possibility of military conflict between countries.

It was one of the peaks of the disinformation operation. And before that, through various channels, including through the press of neutral states, double agents used in the dark by USSR-friendly politicians and journalists, the official diplomatic line to the Kremlin was sent news that would strengthen the hope of preserving peace from the USSR government. Or, as a last resort, the illusion that even if the relations between Berlin and Moscow become conflicting, Germany will by all means attempt to resolve the issue through negotiations. This should have calmed (and, alas, really calmed down somewhat) the Kremlin leadership, instilling in him the assurance that some amount of time was guaranteed to him.

Official diplomatic contacts were also actively used as a channel of misinformation. The imperial minister mentioned above, Otto Meissner, who was considered a man close to Hitler, almost weekly met with the Soviet ambassador to Berlin, Vladimir Dekanozov, and assured him that the Fuhrer was about to finish developing proposals for negotiations and transfer them to the Soviet government. False information of this kind was transmitted directly to the embassy and the Lyceum - the agent-counterpart Berlings, a Latvian journalist who worked in Berlin.

"Duck" in BerlinFor full credibility, the Kremlin was given information about possible German demands. It was not a trifle that, even if in a paradoxical way, it was necessary not to frighten Stalin, but to assure him of the seriousness of the intentions of the German side. These requirements included the long-term lease of grain expanses of Ukraine, then participation in the operation of Baku oil fields. Economic claims were not limited, creating the impression that Hitler was waiting for concessions and a military-political nature - consent to the passage of the Wehrmacht through the southern regions of the USSR to Iran and Iraq for actions against the British Empire. At the same time, German disinformers received an additional argument in explaining why the Wehrmacht units were squeezing to the Soviet borders.

The German secret services played out a mnogohodovka: simultaneously with the introduction of the main enemy, the USSR, the spreading rumors increased distrust between Moscow and London and minimized the possibility of any anti-German political combination behind Berlin.

At the most crucial moment in the course went heavy artillery. In agreement with Hitler, Goebbels published in the evening edition of the newspaper “Felkischer Beobachter” from 12 in June an article “Crete as an example”, in which he made a transparent allusion to the landing of the Wehrmacht in the near future on the British Isles. In order to create the impression that the Reich Minister of Propaganda made a grave mistake and issued a secret plan, the newspaper’s “Hitler’s personal order” was confiscated, and rumors spread around Berlin about the imminent resignation of the minister, who had fallen into disgrace. The newspaper didn’t really miss the newspaper at retail (so as not to misinform its own military and population), but the foreign embassies received a number.

“My article about Crete,” wrote Goebbels in his diary the next day, “is a real sensation in the country and abroad ... Our production was a great success ... From the phone conversations of foreign journalists working in Berlin, we can conclude that they all fell for the bait . In London, the topic of invasion is again in the spotlight ... The OKW is very quite my article. It is a great distraction. ”

And immediately after this, a new tactic was chosen - to keep complete silence. In the words of Goebbels, Moscow attempted to lure Berlin "out of the hole" by publishing a TASS report on June 14, in which rumors circulated in the West about a possible German attack on the USSR. The Kremlin seemed to invite the imperial office to confirm the message. But, wrote Goebbels 16 of June, “we do not polemicize in the press, we shut up in complete silence, and on the day“ X ”we simply strike. I strongly advise the Führer ... it is necessary to continue to spread rumors continuously: peace with Moscow, Stalin comes to Berlin, the invasion of England is coming soon ... I once again impose a ban on the discussion of the topic of Russia by our media in the country and abroad. Until day “X” is taboo. ”

Alas, the Soviet leadership took the explanations of the Germans at face value. In an effort to avoid war at all costs and not give the slightest pretext for attack, Stalin until the last day forbade bringing the troops of the border districts to combat readiness. As if the Hitler leadership still needed a reason ...

Illusion of confidence


On the last day before the war, Goebbels wrote in his diary: “The question about Russia is getting worse every hour. Molotov requested a visit to Berlin, but received a resolute refusal. Naive assumption. This had to be dealt with six months ago ... Now, Moscow must have noticed that it threatens Bolshevism ... ”But the magic of confidence that it would be possible to avoid clashes with Germany was so powerful for Stalin that even after receiving confirmation from Germany of Molotov , the leader in the directive given to 22 June in 7 hours 15 minutes of the Red Army to repel an invading enemy, forbade our troops, with the exception of aviation, to cross the German border line.

It is fundamentally wrong to make some kind of rabbit from Moscow numbing a boa under the gaze. The Soviet leadership made an attempt (active, but, unfortunately, on the whole failed) to oppose the operations of the German special services to a massive transfer to the “other” side of their own disinformation, in order to postpone the moment the Wehrmacht attacked or even eliminate the threat.

Feeling that the danger is increasing every day, and the country is not ready to repel it, the Soviet leader, on the one hand, tried to appease the Führer: he forbade the German aircraft to stop flights over Soviet territory, strictly controlled that supplies to Germany of grain, coal, petroleum products and other strategic materials were carried out strictly on schedule, broke off diplomatic relations with all countries that were subjected to German occupation, and on the other - with some of their actions and statements put pressure on Hitler, restrained his aggressive intentions.

Since one of the best ways to do this is to demonstrate force, since the beginning of 1941, four armies have been advancing from the depths of the country to the western border. 800 thousands of storerooms were called up to the Armed Forces. In offensive tones, Stalin's speech was sustained at the Kremlin reception of graduates of military academies 5 in May 1941.

In a series of measures designed to disorient the Fuhrer, there were also quite impressive disinformation measures carried out by the Soviet special services with the knowledge of the Kremlin. For example, German agents in Moscow were tossed up (and successfully, for reports of this kind were preserved in the funds of the German Foreign Ministry) that the most probable and dangerous direction of a possible strike on the USSR in the Soviet leadership is considered to be north-western - from Eastern Prussia through the Baltic republics to Leningrad. Here and the main forces of the Red Army. But the south-western and southern directions (Ukraine and Moldova), on the contrary, remain relatively poorly protected.

In fact, it was in the south-west direction that the main forces of the Red Army were concentrated: the troops of the Kiev Special Military District, the most powerful in the Red Army, had 58 divisions at the start of the war and there were 957 thousand people. For Hitler, it was as if they were preparing a wolf pit here, or, if resorting to literary associations, imitated a sheepfold, and arranged a kennel.

Even “misinformation” about oppositional sentiments allegedly present in the Soviet leadership was thrown on the “other” side. Thus, the people's commissar of defense Tymoshenko allegedly insisted on an all-out strengthening of the north-western direction, in order, as the German agents informed, to weaken the troops of his native Ukraine and thereby guaranteed to hand it over to the Germans. Even Stalin became a figure of misinformation. In the archives of the Ribbentrop Bureau, reports remained on the presence in the leadership of the CPSU (b) of a certain broad “labor opposition movement” that opposed “the exorbitant concessions of Stalin to Germany”.

The diplomats connected to disinformation events (which they might not have known) worked in the indicated direction. Up to 21 on June 1941, visiting the German Foreign Ministry, the Soviet ambassador in Berlin Dekanozov led only protocol conversations, discussing current private questions about marking individual sections of the common border, building a bomb shelter in the embassy in Berlin, etc.

A kind of misinformation peak, an attempt by Moscow, which was already mentioned above, to “lure out of the hole” Berlin was the publication of the 14 June 1941 of the TASS message. At the same time, Stalin tried to mislead Hitler about his own awareness of the Wehrmacht’s forces, and to make him speak out on this subject. And with special luck I wanted to hope that Hitler would regard the TASS message as an invitation to the negotiations and go for them. This gave delay the war for at least a few more months.

However, in Berlin they began to take final actions on the immediate preparation for the invasion, so the answer, as mentioned above, was complete silence. Keeping the initiative and consistently moving toward the invasion, the Nazi leadership could easily ignore any messages from Moscow.

But the preparation of the Soviet Union for the war, the same TASS statement, not linked and coordinated with other actions of the Kremlin, caused serious harm, disorienting the people and the army. “At us, the staff of the General Staff, as, naturally, among other Soviet people, the TASS report at first caused some surprise,” wrote Marshal Vasilevsky. The fact that it was actually a diplomatic move, calculated on the reaction of Berlin, was known only to a narrow circle of top military. According to the recollections of the same Vasilevsky, the heads of structural units of the General Staff were informed about this by the first deputy chief of the General Staff, General Vatutin. But even the commanders of the border districts were not warned, not to mention the commanders of the lower level. Instead of increasing vigilance and mobilization of all forces, the statement contributed to complacency and carelessness.

Out of fear of giving the Germans even the slightest reason for aggression, Stalin forbade any actions to bring the troops into the necessary degree of combat readiness. All attempts by district commanders to advance at least some additional forces to the border were harshly suppressed. The Soviet leader did not notice how he crossed the line separating reasonable caution from dangerous credulity.

Retroactive counterplay


Response, reflection is always secondary. Forced to answer in most cases plays according to the rules of the attacking side. To seize the initiative, it is necessary to take such actions that would radically change the situation, put the enemy at a standstill.

Did not these considerations drive the leaders of the Soviet General Staff (Chief of the General Staff Zhukov, his first deputy Vatutin and deputy head of the Operational Directorate Vasilevsky) in developing the document reported to Stalin in the middle of May 1941? The document, known as "Note Zhukov", contained a proposal "to preempt the enemy in deployment and attack the German army at a time when it will be at the deployment stage and will not have time to organize the front and the interaction of the armed forces." It was envisaged by the forces of the 152 divisions to defeat the enemy's 100 divisions in the decisive direction of Krakow-Katowice, and then continue the offensive, defeating the German forces in the center and on the north wing of their front, seizing the territory of the former Poland and East Prussia.

The leader of the USSR rejected this option of action, stating that the highest military men want to push him with Hitler, who is waiting for him to use the pretext for the attack. However, regardless of the reasons for the negative decision, Stalin was most likely right: a large-scale attack on the practically deployed Wehrmacht troops could become a gesture of despair at best: without a detailed study of operational documents and the creation of the necessary groupings of troops, he risked turning into an adventure.

There was, however, another course of action, quite real and also allowing it to break out of the coordinate system set by the Hitlerite leadership. Later, analyzing the situation on the eve of the war, the marshals Zhukov and Vasilevsky came to the conclusion that in the middle of June 1941, the time came when it was impossible to further postpone the adoption of urgent measures. It was necessary, without paying attention to the reaction of the German side, to bring the Red Army troops into full combat readiness, to take up defensive positions and get ready to repel the aggressor, without crossing the state border. In this case, it would be possible if not to detain the enemy at the border, then at least to deprive him of the advantages associated with the suddenness of the attack.

In strategic terms, such actions allowed the Soviet side to immediately seize the initiative. It would be extremely clear to Hitler that his aggressive designs had been revealed, they did not believe his peace-loving assurances, and the Red Army was ready to repel the invasion. Of course, at the same time all the bridges were burned, the difficult political and diplomatic game stopped, leading which Stalin hoped at the same time to appease the Fuhrer and scare him.

The leader did not go even to these measures, probably continuing to be in illusions that he was playing a game in the Soviet-German duet. For the need to act in the coordinate system of the enemy until the very moment of the invasion, a very high price was paid. The Red Army met the beginning of the war in peacetime. Their great potential to repel the massive blow of the enemy turned out to be unused. And this is for us a lesson for all time.

Do I need to say at the same time how much over the past 75 years have the technologies of deceiving a possible opponent, informational and psychological processing of the ruling elites and the masses advanced? The stratagems used in politics and military art in ancient China have been transformed today into a theory and an effective system of practical actions by troops for a controlled influence on the enemy with the help of a whole set of means and methods of disinformation. There is no need to go far for examples: US and NATO aggression against Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, an attempt to discredit Russia's efforts to fight international terrorism in Syria ...

But with all the sophistication of the strategies and technologies of misinformation, we can say for sure: the least vulnerable is a society in which there is a unity of power and people united by a big goal.
Author:
Originator:
http://vpk-news.ru/articles/30771
62 comments
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  1. Koshak
    Koshak 28 May 2016 05: 04
    +8
    After 75 years, much more visible ...
    And now, probably, not all documents are declassified.
    1. Lebedev Sergey
      Lebedev Sergey 28 May 2016 10: 26
      +2
      And now, probably, not all documents are declassified.

      In order to understand - enough.
    2. gladcu2
      gladcu2 28 May 2016 19: 02
      +16
      Cat

      The basis of the article is an absolutely false statement that I.V. Stalin did not prepare the country for war.

      Cooked, and very much. And at all levels, including schools.

      If you started the article from a false statement, then the continuation and conclusions will be false.

      There is no point in reading.
      1. Aryan
        Aryan 28 May 2016 20: 18
        +3
        I’m a little more patient, I’ve had enough of the phrase Minister of Propoganda Ribentrop
        Author ovnovbroser, slipping softly on the main thesis "Stalin was wrong"
      2. Talgat
        Talgat 28 May 2016 21: 07
        +6
        Quote: gladcu2
        The basis of the article is an absolutely false assertion that JV Stalin did not prepare the country for war.

        Quote: gladcu2
        If you started the article from a false statement, then the continuation and conclusions will be false.

        Totally agree

        Moreover. half truth is the same lie

        the author takes the situation in isolation from the strongest external factors - as it were - one-on-one - Europe and the USSR - the primitivization of the scheme - Stalin did not guess and Europe hit unexpectedly

        In fact, everything is much more complicated - and we all see this over time

        It was impossible not to take into account other centers of power - first of all, the arrogant Saxons from the USA and Japan

        If the USSR was ahead of Europe and hit first. it’s unknown to whom the United States would give help, etc. There was a huge risk that the Motherland would be face to face with the combined power of the whole West - Europe + USA + England + Japan

        And then there would be an end - all Eurasia would not pull such

        I believe that the USSR then went along the razor's edge - putting the situation so that the United States was forced to take its side. as victims of aggression and the losing side

        Remember their words - if the Germans win, then help the Russians - if on the contrary, then the Germans - and let them kill each other as much as possible

        It could have been predetermined to make sacrifices, become a victim of an unexpected attack and not become an object of attack of the whole world

        But then to become one of the winners and survive - moreover - become a superpower and give your people the highest standards of life in the post-war USSR
        1. verboo
          verboo 28 May 2016 21: 30
          +1
          Quote: Talgat
          If the USSR was ahead of Europe and hit first. it’s not known to whom the United States would give assistance, etc.

          Yeah. Germany. And Britain, which waged war on it, would have been bombed by atomic bombs.
          Lord, and why not write.
          Quote: Talgat
          There was a huge risk that the Motherland would be face to face with the combined power of the whole West - Europe + USA + England + Japan

          The next "passions". Especially considering the fact that on May 10, 1941. Britain rejected Germany's proposals for peace on her terms, and even announced it openly on the radio.
          Quote: Talgat
          posing the situation so that the United States was forced to take its side. as victims of aggression and the losing side

          Those. to run to the Anglo-Saxons with shouts of "save-help", this is now called "put the situation like this". We will know.
          Quote: Talgat
          and not become an object of attack of the whole world

          The whole world wanted to sneeze in the USSR. He then did not interest anyone at all. Even the Japanese.
          Quote: Talgat
          and give your people the highest standards of life in the post-war USSR

          Enchanting finale. PPC.
        2. alleksSalut4507
          alleksSalut4507 30 May 2016 22: 05
          +3
          I agree with you. In the current situation, our country cannot be called an aggressor, no matter how hard they try, in that war, but they try to convince us that we are bad, not what we should be. We are a fatty piece that we want to gobble up. ITT and who was on the same side of the barricade, then they won Life for us.
      3. adler
        adler 28 May 2016 23: 46
        +3
        Remember the author. Or an amateur, or a pest. Figo both.
        1. Alena Frolovna
          Alena Frolovna 29 May 2016 02: 57
          +4
          Or an amateur, or a pest.


          Neither one nor the other. Homegrown scribbler - PROVOCATOR.

          Khrushchev's myths are already tired, and someone is buying them.

          Where is STALIN and where is the entot little man who imagines himself an "expert".
  2. Shadowcat
    Shadowcat 28 May 2016 05: 39
    +6
    It was necessary, not paying attention to the reaction of the German side, to bring the Red Army into full combat readiness

    And we completely ignore the fact and example by which the German Empire declared war on the Russian Empire about thirty years ago with respect to that significant date.

    There are also political trends - the Yankees could do the same Lend-Lease for Germany (but already in the open), the British guest flew to the British for a reason the German guest in May ...
  3. lexx2038
    lexx2038 28 May 2016 06: 07
    +11
    Yes, now everything is repeated to one degree or another. Local wars of varying degrees of intensity are going around, countries and regimes that treat us even with a little loyalty are actively being cleaned up, enemy troops are accumulating near our borders, all the couple there are "rehearsing", shouting that we have already attacked them, abundantly flavoring all this lies and propaganda. Films are filmed that Russians are almost animals - not negotiable, and it is not a pity to kill them, and not even sinful. In short, sooner or later, when they convince themselves that Russia can be defeated, they will decide. Again, we will have to teach them wisdom through great sacrifices, shedding our blood. Only this time, it is necessary to teach so that they will remember forever. Forever and ever!
  4. Odysseus
    Odysseus 28 May 2016 06: 46
    +7
    Well ... This topic has been thoroughly studied both from a factual point of view and from a strategic point of view. There was no "surprise", no "Stalin's mistake" either.
    Why for the hundredth time to pour from empty to empty and drag here the sad tales of the Khrushchev-perestroika spill?
    1. demo
      demo 28 May 2016 12: 06
      +6
      Yes. And further.

      Since one of the best ways to do this is to demonstrate force, since the beginning of 1941, four armies have been advancing from the depths of the country to the western border. 800 thousands of storerooms were called up to the Armed Forces. In offensive tones, Stalin's speech was sustained at the Kremlin reception of graduates of military academies 5 in May 1941.

      Isn't it too much for a simple demonstration?
      If all this armada is simply lead-take away, then how much transport is needed?
      And if you place them. provide food?
      And for pilots, airfields are needed. For tankers, military camps with repair areas and fuel depots. Infantry and artillerymen also need normal conditions for living and recreation.
      Plus throw all the equipment.
      And even if not to give live ammunition shells, then here again what to do?
      After all, the enemy is beyond the river.
      Those. the demonstration turned out to be noble.

      I remember not so long ago that we had exercises with the transfer of 100000 people.
      So the mass media buzzed with delight.
      And they had ammunition for a day or two of training.
      And here 800000 people with full ammunition.
      This is how the Leader knew how to organize a business.
    2. Predator
      Predator 18 October 2016 08: 54
      0
      Quote: Odyssey
      Well ... This topic has been thoroughly studied both from a factual point of view and from a strategic point of view. There was no "surprise", no "Stalin's mistake" either.
      Why for the hundredth time to pour from empty to empty and drag here the sad tales of the Khrushchev-perestroika spill?

      Well, how then can one explain such a tragic start of the war ?! In fact, none of the western districts was ready for war, and after all, everyone not only had to, but had to meet the Wehrmacht in the established groupings (and not scattered over a huge territory and with breaks between echelons of 100-200 km), in organized field defense, in occupied (albeit unfinished) SDs by rifle divisions on the border, and not at the places of deployment from which there were from 3 to 12 km to the intended lines. With a width of defense not in 30-40 km, and according to the standards, 12 km per division, and even without standard art. Why did the MK have 1-1.5 refueling (the rest of the fuel was in warehouses far away from the land, so in the West-Maikop, SZOVO-Leningrad region ?!) and there were a lot of such "blunders" and this was when the war was expected soon ?! One involuntarily comes to mind the betrayal of the leadership of the districts, NGOs and the General Staff, and or the thought that they are stupid people with a hatred disease. But the time was over a year. Back in June 1940. it became clear that there will be war. Germany, having resolved all the issues in the west, not only did not demobilize the Armed Forces, but additionally began to create new divisions, and it is very costly to maintain 5.5 million army, therefore it will be used in the near future. only the USSR (for the invasion of England and 500 thousand is enough) So, what else did the military need to organize a rebuff ?! The country was preparing, and what were the NGOs and the General Staff busy with, that they allowed the tragedy of 1941 ?!
  5. Alexy
    Alexy 28 May 2016 07: 21
    +4
    As they did not go out of steam, they still got the teeth.
  6. Basil50
    Basil50 28 May 2016 07: 45
    +25
    The author of the article is disingenuous, this * theory * was born under Khrushchev. The military, who made the coup, * put * Khrushchev and he, in * gratitude *, transferred the blame to AND IN STALIN. The fact that the SOVIET UNION was preparing for war with the Nazis was not hidden: new weapons were being developed, the army was growing. In 1941, much was prepared for the resistance and destruction of the aggressors. And there were several orders to * bring troops on alert * in 1941, but were ignored in the Western districts. Hitler explained the strangeness of the transfer of the attack on the SOVIET UNION on June 22 by the fact that assistance would be provided to the Germans * from the inside *. Such a development of events explains the whole * inconsistency * and * inaction * of the RED ARMY generals on the eve of the war and in the first month of the war. I don’t know why even historians still lie in favor of the Khrushchev * theories *. Orders are known to be put on combat alert and still claim that AND IN STALIN * did not allow *, and then just like Khrushchev and those who brought him to power.
    1. Igor39
      Igor39 28 May 2016 08: 58
      +1
      The author of the article, Yuri Rubtsov, doctor of historical sciences and professor, I think that he wrote the article based not on speculation and speculation, but on historical arguments and facts.
      Do you have any facts to suspect him of cunning?
      1. Basil50
        Basil50 28 May 2016 09: 15
        +6
        Igor. To obtain a * degree * requires approval * of the scientific community * and that’s it. Scientific works are just an excuse for considering a candidate for official * scientists *. The author, even though the whole body is weighted by degrees, will not tell the truth, otherwise * they will not understand * * co-historians *.
        And yet, you think, i.e. you believe in his honesty, only on the basis of his academic degree.
        1. Igor39
          Igor39 28 May 2016 10: 15
          +1
          Well, your community, based on your post, knows anyway more than the author.
        2. Igor39
          Igor39 28 May 2016 10: 47
          +3
          Yuri Viktorovich Rubtsov (born June 20, 1955, the village of Migulinskaya, Rostov Region) is a Russian historian. Colonel Reserve, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor of the Military University of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Academician of the Academy of Military Sciences, member of the International Association of Historians of the Second World War. The author of more than 100 scientific publications.
      2. The comment was deleted.
      3. The comment was deleted.
      4. RUSS
        RUSS 28 May 2016 09: 50
        +3
        Quote: Igor39
        The author of the article is Yuri Rubtsov, Doctor of Historical Sciences and Professor

        It doesn't matter, he touched on the "sacred" laughing therefore, he will not be right here for anyone, the author will be recorded as a liberalist and anti-adviser. In general, such articles do not channel on this forum, they are clamored and challenged hoarsely.
        1. Profan
          Profan 28 May 2016 14: 29
          +3
          I agree that if articles of a technical nature gain 100% approval, then the recent history, or rather a critical look at it, is not welcomed by this audience.
      5. demo
        demo 28 May 2016 12: 13
        +1
        This is not a simple guy.

        Deputy head of the research center of the Ministry of Defense for the creation of the 12-volume edition of the Great Patriotic War, the author of the publication, doctor of historical sciences, professor Yuri Rubtsov.

        However, do not be naive and look at the regalia.
        History can both help its citizens, as in our case, and harm, as in the case of the Germans.
        Think at your leisure.
        1. Samy
          Samy 29 May 2016 03: 35
          +1
          Does any of the commentators have such a level of training and analysis ability as Rubtsov's? Again, we begin to argue about the taste of oysters according to the pictures of the Murzilka magazine. Rubtsov's conclusions were fully confirmed by history.
          1. Monarchist
            Monarchist 31 May 2016 21: 44
            0
            Samu, Read: Martirosyan, Yu. Zhukov. It cites "strange" facts, to put it mildly. Baltic Military District: 18 units occupy combat positions. Aviation is dispersed. Bel. Military. District: aviation is in line, in Brest the division that should cover the fortress is in the winter barracks (the commander "forgot ") that every summer the units are taken to summer camps. Beria on 17.06. raised the border guards" in the gun "canceled the vacations of the command personnel, and in Belarus, so as not to provoke: planes in line, command personnel on vacation vacation met war) What is it? In my opinion: treason! NS said that "Stalin is to blame", Pavlov, Klimovskikh and others "white and fluffy"
      6. vanya
        vanya 28 May 2016 13: 55
        +4
        Directive to the Military Councils of the Northern Fleet, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, the Black Sea Fleet, the Commander of the Pinsk and Danube Flotillas on the transition to increased combat readiness

        No. Mark / 87 June 21, 1941 23.50 Immediately switch to operational readiness No. 1

        Kuznetsov
        CVMA, f. 216, d. 12487, l. 443. The original.
        1. Basil50
          Basil50 28 May 2016 15: 28
          +2
          Yes, it turns out that I know more than the author, although without a degree in history.
          Democrats in their repertoire of discussion: first they spit in HUMAN, then they will discuss mental abilities. It’s weak with its own arguments, more and more are * referred to * authorities *, just like churchmen who, instead of facts, make statements by different monks
      7. Petr petrov
        Petr petrov 31 May 2016 07: 51
        +1
        Such doctors now, like mad dogs .... !!!!!!
        1. Monarchist
          Monarchist 31 May 2016 21: 47
          0
          It is necessary to shoot such "historians" from a slingshot!
    2. Aryan
      Aryan 28 May 2016 20: 27
      0
      And Führer didn’t know such a missile defense word, and unfortunately everything is repeated ... well, well, Europeans have to remind every century of a campaign ...
      What do they have there with memory? fool
  7. washi
    washi 28 May 2016 07: 53
    +17
    June 18th Directive
    about bringing into the BG went into the army apparently without the knowledge of the IVS?
    1. Petr petrov
      Petr petrov 31 May 2016 07: 54
      +2
      The doctor did not know about this ..... smile
  8. iury.vorgul
    iury.vorgul 28 May 2016 07: 54
    +15
    The works of many modern historians have proved that J.V. Stalin knew and prepared for the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR, prepared the country and the people for this. The defeats that the Red Army suffered in the summer of 1941 had many both objective and subjective reasons. ... And now Khrushchev's tales that "Stalin did not believe in an attack" can only be cited by shitcrats and liberals.
  9. apro
    apro 28 May 2016 07: 57
    +6
    Accusing IVStalin of trustfulness is first-rate stupidity, it is difficult to find a more perspicacious ruler, Stalin himself could not be the first to strike for any reason or prerequisite for this, and it is difficult to approach the adventurer Hitler logically and expediently, his strike on the USSR is an agreement with the Anglo-Saxons that Germany’s national interests are not It’s not reasonable and criminal to blame the 41-year catastrophe on Stalin alone, just as the betrayal isn’t cool;
  10. Mikhail Matyugin
    Mikhail Matyugin 28 May 2016 08: 08
    +3
    There are so many problem places in the article that I just don’t even want to disassemble everything.

    One answer is that the Soviet leader was the victim of widespread misinformation carried out by German intelligence services.
    The recently created special services of the Third Reich - and supposedly able to overcome the incredibly powerful (probably the strongest in the world!) Special services of the USSR? don’t tell my boots!
    1. Profan
      Profan 28 May 2016 14: 34
      +1
      But the special services of the USSR were founded in the 12th century? The NKVD leads a story with Ivan the Terrible? By the way, both Canaris and Shelenberg and others were not born in 1933 !!
  11. Idiot
    Idiot 28 May 2016 09: 43
    +6
    A. B. Martirosyan "June 22. The detailed anatomy of betrayal." If you are interested in the opinion of a professional, not a historical figure, I advise you to read it.
  12. dzvero
    dzvero 28 May 2016 09: 46
    +9
    Stalin could not attack first and act as an aggressor. After all, the USSR did not have any allies, on the contrary. To start first would be uniform suicide: a war on two fronts (Germany and Japan), a separate peace between Germany and England, and the US’s allies on their side. How long could the USSR resist in such conditions? It’s not very far to go for examples - the British and French planned a strike on the oil fields of the USSR on May 15, 1940, and only the German office of the 10th thwarted their plan.
    The catastrophe of the Western District is largely the result of Pavlov’s betrayal and the lack of initiative or stiffness of some senior officers.
    In hindsight, all strategists, so I will allow myself one judgment. May 9, 1945 was made possible thanks to the victory of Commander Zhukov, G.K. on Khalkhin Gol in the summer of 1939, as a result of which Japan was afraid to open a second front against the USSR in the difficult 41st year, and turned its gaze south against the United States.
    1. verboo
      verboo 28 May 2016 10: 51
      -5
      Quote: dzvero
      Stalin could not attack first and act as an aggressor.

      Yes? And what happened to him in 1941. what happened? Before that, he somehow attacked and acted.
      Quote: dzvero
      After all, the USSR did not have any allies, on the contrary.

      But Germany had a bunch of enemies. She was even at war with some of them, if you forgot. And the enemy of my enemy, my friend. Actually, with the allies the USSR did just that.
      Quote: dzvero
      Beginning first would be uniform suicide: a war on two fronts (Germany and Japan)

      And what, Japan fought with the USSR in the early 40s? Remind me when and where the DB took place. Passion-muzzle write.
      Quote: dzvero
      the separate world of Germany and England and the U.S. nets on their side.

      Wow. Passions flare up. I’ll remind you just in case, May 10, 1941. Britain rejected the offer of peace on German terms with Germany. As reported on the radio. Then, allegorically, it was clear to everyone, even an illiterate janitor 100 km from the Kremlin. It was also clear to everyone (and this was already excluding the janitor) that a German-Soviet war was inevitable. And the only question is the timing of its beginning.
      Quote: dzvero
      the British and French planned a strike on the oil fields of the USSR on May 15, 1940, and only the German office of the 10th thwarted their plan.

      Why May 15? Write on May 11th. Or, better, May 10, for dinner. So it will be quite exciting.
      Quote: dzvero
      The disaster of the Western District is largely the result of Pavlov’s betrayal

      I would be the commander of Zhukov, would now blame him. Last name would not change the result. And what resulted in the disaster of the Baltic region? Red Army in 1941 was not combat ready. This was the usual state of the USSR army in peacetime. The fact is that the army in the USSR served many goals and objectives. And the country's defense in fact was not a priority. From this and such a result.
      Quote: dzvero
      May 9, 1945 was made possible thanks to the victory of Commander Zhukov, G.K. on Khalkhin Gol in the summer of 1939, as a result of which Japan was afraid to open a second front against the USSR in the difficult 41st year, and turned its gaze south against the United States.

      What nonsense. Japan had its own problems and it solved them to the best of its ability. The USSR was not at all in the circle of priority problems. Therefore, Japan concluded a peace treaty and dealt with more important issues for it.
      1. dzvero
        dzvero 28 May 2016 13: 51
        +4
        Why Stalin did not hit first in the 41st. At the beginning of WW2, there was one leading industrial center in the world - the Anglo-Saxon and its main industrial competitor - Germany. At that time, neither Japan nor the USSR can be called truly industrial giants. For example, before the war in the USA, Japanese products had the same resolve as Chinese crafts of the late 80s :). About the percentage of marriage in Soviet factories in the 30s, I think no need to say. The USSR for the West was like a thorn in the eye and to crush it was their blue dream. The USSR was isolated and for me there is no doubt that if Stalin had been hit first, then Russia would have had to fight alone with a bloc of all world forces. Do not flatter yourself about the British declaration. It is no accident that the Hess case remains classified to this day. After all, even after the massive German bombing in England, there was a very strong pro-German lobby. So before Stalin at that time, the most important thing was to prevent the destruction of the USSR by the West even by paying such a high price.
        In addition, the USSR had no diplomatic arguments justifying such a preventive strike. The Germans at least with a creak, but still sewn with white thread something similar to the claim. They were also formally let down by the fact that they handed the notes not BEFORE, but AFTER the outbreak of hostilities. Incidentally, a similar incident occurred in December 41, when the Japanese handed their ultimatum to Roosevelt AFTER the attack on Pearl Harbor.
        An English-French plan of attack on Soviet oil fields was an article on the military.
        As for Japan and the role of victory at Khalkhin Gol. It is no secret that Japan at that time hesitated where to go - north or south. In the late 30s, she probed the Soviet defense in the Far East, and only after the Khalkhin Goal did she finally turn south. There, of course, there are other reasons, the USA actively pushed the samurai to war.
        Khalkhin-gol had one more consequence - in the 41st, the Japanese still did not dare to attack the USSR as Hitler demanded of them and the USSR was able to transfer troops from the Far East for an offensive near Moscow. By the way, the fact that Germany acted as an aggressor on June 22 also allowed the Japanese not to formally begin military operations in June according to the tripartite pact.
        About the possible role of Zhukov on the western front. The network has enough information about the composition and deployment of troops of the Western Military District as well as the German group. Even a cursory glance shows me to a layman that it is almost impossible to repulse such a blow. If Zhukov had been in place of Pavlov, then most likely there would have been a retreat, but there would have been no such catastrophe.
        So the wait for the Soviet leadership was justified. The West remained divided and could not come up with a united front against the USSR. As a result of the war, the Soviet Union became a superpower with power that no one in the Russian Empire dreamed of. Russia defended its independence, but the price that had to be paid was terribly bloody.
        PS I didn’t give you a plus sign, but I don’t minus it either. I respect your opinion, even if it does not coincide with mine.
        1. verboo
          verboo 28 May 2016 15: 09
          0
          Quote: dzvero
          The USSR for the West was like a thorn in the eye and to crush it was their blue dream.

          You are trying too hard to give importance to the pre-war USSR. In fact, this was not so. He at that time did not interest anyone at all. So, some obscurantists on the edge of the world.
          Quote: dzvero
          USSR was isolated

          Generally, for the attack on Finland, as far as I remember. Those. "the intrigues of enemies" has nothing to do with it.
          Quote: dzvero
          there is no doubt that if Stalin had been hit first, then Russia would have had to fight alone with a bloc of all world forces.

          Really? So what? Wasn't Britain at war with Germany? In addition, it was Britain that pushed the Germans east, pushing them away from their doorstep. So, the war between the USSR and Germany corresponded to British interests. And would be supported by her. On the Soviet side, of course, as it was. No matter who attacked whom.
          And then to listen to you, it remains only to be surprised how the Anglo-Saxons did not start the war against the USSR directly on May 9, 1945.
          Quote: dzvero
          So before Stalin at that time, the most important thing was to prevent the destruction of the USSR by the West

          West wanted to sneeze on the USSR. And even Germany wanted to sneeze at him. In addition, she did not plan to destroy him, she planned to push Arkhangelsk-Kotlas-Kazan-Astrakhan over the North line. Dvina and the Volga, depriving the mob. and prom. potentials (see Barbarossa plan).
          Quote: dzvero
          An English-French plan of attack on Soviet oil fields was an article on the military.

          A very reliable source of information.
          Quote: dzvero
          It is no secret that Japan at that time hesitated where to go - north or south.

          Of course, no secret. What was she to do in the hungry and cold north? To drive bears on ice?
          Quote: dzvero
          In the late 30s, she probed the Soviet defense in the Far East.

          Actually, on Hassan, it was the Soviet troops that squeezed 2 hills from Manchuria. On their own initiative. And Khalkhin-Gol, this is Mongolia, which the USSR was roofing. So your fabrications, they do not pull on the facts.
          1. verboo
            verboo 28 May 2016 15: 10
            -4
            Quote: dzvero
            after Khalkhin Goal, she finally turned south.

            So that's all, there are no territories left in the north. Only the USSR with taiga and bears.
            Quote: dzvero
            in the 41st, the Japanese still did not dare to attack the USSR as Hitler demanded of them

            Hitler did not demand, Hitler requested. But the Japanese had completely different plans. Therefore, nothing happened. But the USSR could not, was busy. And as soon as he could, he immediately attacked Japan.
            Quote: dzvero
            most likely there would be a retreat, but there would not be such a catastrophe.

            Why not? Just Zhukov, the chief of the General Staff, and Tymoshenko bear the main responsibility for the failure of 1941. But Pavlov and others are small switchmen. Nothing would have changed from replacing Pavlov with Zhukov.
            Quote: dzvero
            The West remained divided and could not come up with a united front against the USSR.

            And again, I repeat, I wanted to sneeze the West until the 60s of the last century in the USSR. Although the USSR, for example, was very useful to Americans:
            1. Contained people from all over the world. Now the United States is forced to do this.
            2. Helped more actively sell American weapons to US allies, acting as a full-time scarecrow.
            Quote: dzvero
            Following the war, the Soviet Union became a superpower with power

            Do not make me funny. From 2MV the USSR came out completely ruined and destroyed by the state. With almost completely destroyed the male population of the most productive age. A state that could not feed itself (famine 1947).
            Quote: dzvero
            Russia defended its independence

            Do not confuse Russia with the Bolsheviks. Russia still remained dependent on them for a very long time.
            By the way, the Bolsheviks also painted the internal borders of the USSR. They always found some kind of "friends" and always gave them something. Not at your own expense, of course.
            1. Tektor
              Tektor 28 May 2016 17: 21
              -9
              Stalin knew everything even before the start of the war: he had Messing ... And he knew when and how the war would end ... Based on this, one should consider Stalin's actions at the beginning of the war and during its course.
            2. Monarchist
              Monarchist 31 May 2016 22: 13
              0
              That's right, Stalin is an aggressor and Suvorov (Rezun) has long been proving this, and the current claims of the Japanese to the "northern territories" are fair. To return the Crimea, the Kuriles and Sakhalin too (Stalin took the aggressor away from the poor Japs, the Kwantung army stood in the south, Japan always wanted peace, and Bolsheviks and Stalin war. Remember the delirium of Pedro and Yayzenet "Stalin invaded Ukraine" Stalin used homosexuals - Glory to the homosexuals!
          2. cast iron
            cast iron 28 May 2016 22: 03
            +4
            Yes, yes, yes, the USSR was so uninteresting to the West that the West was actively cultivating the Nazi regime of Hitler and skillfully at the level of diplomacy brought the Nazi army to the borders of the USSR.
            1. verboo
              verboo 28 May 2016 22: 20
              -5
              Quote: cast iron
              West actively cultivated Hitler's Nazi regime

              Remained the old manuals from the old place of work? Reread them sometimes, refresh your memory?
              Quote: cast iron
              skillfully at the level of diplomacy brought the Nazi army to the borders of the USSR.

              And what is so strange here? Better let the neighbors fight among themselves. From this, in any third party, the sheer benefit. Before the fall of France, Jugha preached exactly the same thing. Just did not expect that the French would not want to fight the Germans.
        2. Prometey
          Prometey 28 May 2016 21: 02
          -2
          Quote: dzvero
          The USSR for the West was like a thorn in the eye and to crush it was their blue dream.

          What for? Write yourself that the USSR did not represent any competition for the West. What is whose dream?
          Quote: dzvero
          If Stalin had been the first to strike, then Russia would have to fight alone with a bloc of all world forces.

          At that time there was only one block - the axis of Germany, Italy, Japan - is the whole world?
          Quote: dzvero
          in the 41st, the Japanese still did not dare to attack the USSR

          Japan needed resources - oil that could be taken in Southeast Asia. The Soviet Far East did not even have a normal industry. He was not interested in the Japanese.
    2. The comment was deleted.
    3. Petr petrov
      Petr petrov 31 May 2016 07: 56
      +1
      Yes, and there was a peace treaty.
    4. Monarchist
      Monarchist 31 May 2016 21: 18
      0
      That the British on May 15 were preparing to bomb our oil fields, I did not know.
      1. verboo
        verboo 31 May 2016 21: 39
        0
        Quote: Monarchist
        That the British on May 15 were preparing to bomb our oil fields, I did not know.

        In the internet, you still can not "know". The British did not bomb the Romanian oil fields (Romania was part of the Triple Pact). And the Soviets (the USSR did not enter the Triple Pact) were going.
        Moreover, it is not clear on which aeroplanes and where they planned to fly to Baku from. But these are trifles, of course. Of course, the evil Britons were planning. Because, this is understandable. Evidence and logic are not needed here.
    5. Mikhail Matyugin
      Mikhail Matyugin 31 May 2016 22: 20
      0
      Quote: dzvero
      on Khalkhin Gol in the summer of the 1939 year, as a result of which Japan was afraid to open a second front against the USSR in the difficult 41 year,

      How would you be more careful to say that. I will say simply: Japan needed oil resources. And in Siberia and the Far East, especially them are dumb.

      There is another factor - the Japanese army had a strong war in China, which already dragged all the forces. But the imperial fleet was idle. And they decided to take it urgently. Especially after the closure of oil and other supplies to Japan by the Anglo-Saxons.
  13. Lebedev Sergey
    Lebedev Sergey 28 May 2016 09: 57
    +4
    During all the 75 years that have passed since the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, we are looking for the answer to the seemingly simple question: how did it happen that the Soviet leadership, having irrefutable evidence of preparing aggression against the USSR, did not believe it to the end. Why Stalin, even after receiving news of the advancement of German units to the original areas for the offensive on the night of 22 June from the headquarters of the Kiev Special Military District, said to the People's Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko and the Chief of the General Staff Zhukov: you shouldn’t rush to conclusions, maybe still to be settled peacefully?


    how many times have they told the world ... and things are still there ...
  14. verboo
    verboo 28 May 2016 10: 24
    +2
    how it happened that the Soviet leadership, having irrefutable evidence of preparing aggression against the USSR, did not fully believe in its possibility.

    Who said that? Propaganda and propaganda department of the Central Committee of the CPSU? A very reliable source of information.
    Quote: Sergey Lebedev
    Why did Stalin, even having received news from the headquarters of the Kiev Special Military District on the night of the advance of German units to their starting areas for the offensive, told Tymoshenko and the chief of the General Staff Zhukov, defense narcotist: do not rush to conclusions, maybe it will still be settled peacefully?

    Yeah. And so the Red Army in 1941, long before the start of the Second World War, began to conduct covert mobilization. It is enough to see the strength of the Red Army in different periods of time to refute this nonsense.
    Having a multiple advantage over the Wehrmacht, the Bolsheviks pro *** l about 1941 (and 1942, but no longer having an advantage), and then invented "reliable facts" why this happened.
    1. cast iron
      cast iron 28 May 2016 22: 01
      +4
      The Bolsheviks tried to stop the BEST ARMY OF THE WORLD in June 1941. And they stopped her in November near Moscow. And already in December 1941, the Bolsheviks REFUSED THE BEST ARMY OF THE WORLD 250-300km across the many thousand-strong front back. I doubt that you personally would have done better.
      1. Kenneth
        Kenneth 28 May 2016 22: 12
        +1
        The Red Army retreated to such a distance that no other European army could retreat. Their camps ended before, and the Germans did not have such wild problems with logistics.
        1. cast iron
          cast iron 29 May 2016 01: 26
          0
          The third most powerful army in Europe - the army of France, lay down as the last mess under Hitler in SIX WEEKS. Not the worst army in Poland fell under Hitler in TWO WEEKS. Yugoslavia and Greece with their difficult mountainous terrain fell under Hitler for ONE MONTH.
          Come on, don't be shy, you can tell us a fairy tale about "General Frost", "Russian roads" in addition to tales about distances. The scale of troops and operations such as you, in principle, cannot be compared as well as the ratio of military forces in 1939 and in June 1941.
          1. Mikhail Matyugin
            Mikhail Matyugin 31 May 2016 22: 22
            0
            Quote: cast iron
            The third most powerful army in Europe - the army of France, lay down as the last mess under Hitler in SIX WEEKS. Not the worst army in Poland fell under Hitler in TWO WEEKS

            You would simply count and see - that the pace of the "Blitzkrieg" in the USSR at the initial stage exceeded or were comparable to the speed of the Wehrmacht passing through the territory of France.
            1. cast iron
              cast iron 2 June 2016 15: 44
              0
              You would simply calculate the number of troops and experience of the German army in 1941 and the model of the beginning of 1939. And all at once the anti-Soviet will fall into place, if the brains of course are able to think.
      2. verboo
        verboo 28 May 2016 22: 16
        -3
        Quote: cast iron
        The Bolsheviks tried to stop the BEST ARMY OF THE WORLD in June 1941.

        How is this known? What about the best army in the world? Did you come up with this yourself or who suggested?
        Quote: cast iron
        And already in December 1941, the Bolsheviks REFUSED THE BEST ARMY OF THE WORLD 250-300km across the many thousand-strong front back.

        Do not fantasize. There are people who still know the story.
        Quote: cast iron
        I doubt that you personally would have done better.

        You, boy, make a hole in the couch and poke there, okay?
        1. Monarchist
          Monarchist 31 May 2016 22: 32
          0
          Of course, in 1941 we had only invalids in Wehrmacht and half of Europe Hitler didn’t capture this invention of the Central Committee of the CPSU, perhaps Stalin (he is a tyrant). In December 1941 the Germans were tired of looking at Moscow and they went back, but Stalin did not know the Red Army either. Did you play snowballs? Stalin attacked Japan, and what the Allies asked Stalin at the Potsdam conference: do not offend the Japs, otherwise verboo will swear!
          1. verboo
            verboo 31 May 2016 22: 45
            0
            Quote: Monarchist
            and what the Allies asked Stalin at the Potsdam Conference: do not offend the Japs, otherwise verboo will swear!

            Fully in the internet inadequate.
          2. The comment was deleted.
      3. The comment was deleted.
    2. Mikhail Matyugin
      Mikhail Matyugin 31 May 2016 22: 25
      0
      Quote: verboo
      And so the Red Army in 1941, long before the start of the Second World War, began to conduct covert mobilization. It is enough to see the strength of the Red Army in different periods of time to refute this nonsense.
      Having a multiple advantage over the Wehrmacht, the Bolsheviks pro *** l about 1941 (and 1942, but no longer having an advantage), and then invented "reliable facts" why this happened.

      This is unfortunately a fact. And in spite of everything - they still lost outright. And in conditions of war, it was already necessary to create a new army and new concepts of warfare in various environments. And all this unfortunately resulted in rivers of blood of the peoples of the USSR.
      1. verboo
        verboo 31 May 2016 23: 29
        0
        Quote: Mikhail Matyugin
        And in the conditions of war, it was already necessary to create a new army and new concepts of warfare in various environments.

        It would be nice to create a new technique. But with this in the USSR it was very bad. Therefore, the weapon was basically not good, but legendary. And what could be the claim to the legend?
        Quote: Mikhail Matyugin
        And all this unfortunately poured into the rivers of blood of the peoples of the USSR.

        That's it. And that is precisely why, in my opinion, any adequate person cannot be delighted with the Stalinists, who turned the whole thing in this way.
  15. Stas57
    Stas57 28 May 2016 10: 25
    +4
    Minister of Propaganda Ribbentrop,


    ??
    Well, in general, the level of the article is appropriate quotation
  16. 97110
    97110 28 May 2016 12: 34
    +1
    the least vulnerable is a society in which there is a unity of power and people united by a big goal.
    What did the Author want to say? Stopped "to avoid"? Not finding a "common goal" between the authorities and the people? And it is - making a profit - in which the people participate, for the most part, selling labor. The minority, having bought it, receives a surplus product and the opportunity to buy power with giblets. More sophisticated is to hire managers to run the state. Which is not capable of withstanding the strongest aggressor by definition - hired managers will move to another job where profitability is higher. That is, they will be overbought.
    1. dzvero
      dzvero 28 May 2016 15: 15
      +2

      Good illustration ...
  17. Nross
    Nross 28 May 2016 13: 36
    +1
    Personally, I think that we all just don’t know everything about those unfortunate days on June 22nd.

    I think that in addition to the misinformation brought not so much to Stalin as to the regimental commanders on the western borders, a non-trivial event took place, which is called the "demoralization of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief."

    Personally, I doubt very much that a person who has gone through fire and water can be demoralized. Most likely there was an ATTEMPT to kill the Leader of the Peoples. It happened very timely and was almost successful, because For 3 days, Stalin's comrades tried to put him on his feet.

    I don’t see another reason why Joseph Illarionovich was unable to take command into his own hands as soon as possible.

    On the other hand, it is not clear why Stalin did not appoint a deputy for such a case. Option 2: either he did it, or the Nazis removed him.
    1. Igor39
      Igor39 28 May 2016 14: 09
      +2
      Joseph Illarionovich, who was that?
      1. Dimon19661
        Dimon19661 28 May 2016 14: 36
        +4
        Best friend and associate of Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin lol
      2. The comment was deleted.
      3. RUSS
        RUSS 28 May 2016 15: 33
        +2
        Quote: Igor39
        Joseph Illarionovich, who was that?

        Iosif Illarionovich Nikitsky (1905-1974) - Soviet leader of the state security organs, head of the Main Archival Directorate of the NKVD - USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, major general. laughing
    2. Nikolay K
      Nikolay K 28 May 2016 23: 14
      -6
      I don’t see another reason why Joseph Illarionovich was unable to take command into his own hands as soon as possible.

      You quite rightly raised the question of the demoralization of Stalin in the early days of the war. Just do not need to fantasize about non-existent attempts. There are no facts on this score.
      But the very fact of demoralization is indirect evidence that the sudden attack of Germany on the USSR, Stalin perceived as a huge PERSONAL mistake. I think he quite reasonably believed that such a mistake in their own approved order should qualify, at least, as wrecking, and as a maximum. . . Perhaps these three days he was waiting for him to come. . .
      The complete prostration of Stalin in the early days of the war proves that he was not what WAS NOT ready for her, she became a SHOCK for him.
      Stalin really made a huge mistake in assessing the political situation. He DIRECTLY believed that in the summer of that year Germany would not dare to attack the USSR. This mistake cost the country the defeat of our superior forces, in millions of human lives. And only at the cost of incredible efforts and sacrifices, our people could withstand the blow of the German military machine and break the ridge of fascism.
  18. EvgNik
    EvgNik 28 May 2016 16: 19
    +1
    I read the comments. Some have a complete misunderstanding of the situation of that moment.
    Illusion of confidence

    Subtitle of the article. Does it remind you of anything? Today's reality. Articles like "we will throw our hats" and the concentration of NATO troops, now almost at all borders. Think about it before placing a minus article. Thinking is generally useful.
  19. Caduc
    Caduc 28 May 2016 17: 57
    +1
    I did not rate the author.
    But in my opinion, complete nonsense.
    The author simply forgot what environment the USSR was in.
    The Soviet people's state surrounded by capitalists. Only couch strategists armed with afterglow can talk about some missed opportunities and miscalculations. The USSR needed to look like an unconditional and undeniable victim of aggression and nothing else.
    Any relocation and concentration of troops on the border is a preparation for aggression by the USSR and nothing else.
    I ask the author for the future: before you start writing such nonsense, try to think through and analyze all the possibilities and consequences.
    Stalin apparently knew how to do it.
    Therefore, under his leadership, the Soviet people won the war and preserved and multiplied the country along with the socialist system.
    That is, despite the huge losses, he won outright.
    1. Mikhail Matyugin
      Mikhail Matyugin 31 May 2016 22: 27
      0
      Quote: Kaduk
      The Soviet people's state surrounded by capitalists. Only couch strategists armed with afterglow can talk about some missed opportunities and miscalculations.

      Oh well. Actually, there was benevolent neutrality and good trade relations with the countries. And with National Socialist Germany and feudal imperialist Japan (you see, not all were capitalists!) There were peace treaties and trade was on such a scale that the capitalists could not even dream of.

      But Adik outplayed Joseph strongly in 1941. For this he paid in 1945. Let's put it in thieves' terms like this - a "fraerok" ran into a "thief in law" and even "got lucky". laughing But in the end, anyway, the thief and his companions fucked him and threw him into the rot. request
  20. Prometey
    Prometey 28 May 2016 20: 53
    +1
    Quote: Kaduk
    That is, despite the huge losses, he won outright.

    Contradict yourself. Having huge losses, you won’t win in the net. 20 years had to restore the population.
    1. Odysseus
      Odysseus 29 May 2016 02: 05
      -1
      Quote: Prometey
      Contradict yourself. Having huge losses, you won’t win in the net.

      What is the contradiction here? To win in the net-completely defeat the army and state of the enemy. Fascist Germany surrendered, the Red Army ended the war in Germany, entered Berlin, this is to win outright.
      Huge losses are already another semantic category, the category of the price of victory.
      Quote: Prometey
      20 years had to restore the population.

      The population of the USSR: June 1941-196,700 million, in 1956-197,9 million, so not 20, but 15.
      And by the way, for reference, the population of the RSFSR in late 1991-148,5 million people. The population of the Russian Federation in 2016-146,5 million people. And this is taking into account the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol.
      Notice 25 years have passed. And without any war. More precisely, the war is just going on. Only with its own people.
  21. Kenneth
    Kenneth 28 May 2016 22: 08
    -3
    The problem of a poorly educated dictator is that he, lacking sufficient competence, is forced to bear full responsibility for decisions.
  22. haenx
    haenx 29 May 2016 10: 24
    +1
    A. Martirosyan - Conspiracy of the general against Stalin (1,2,3,4 parts) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BqL1I5Ikd1c
  23. Ustinov 055 055
    Ustinov 055 055 30 May 2016 16: 20
    +1
    Quote: vanya
    Directive to the Military Councils of the Northern Fleet, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, the Black Sea Fleet, the Commander of the Pinsk and Danube Flotillas on the transition to increased combat readiness

    No. Mark / 87 June 21, 1941 23.50 Immediately switch to operational readiness No. 1

    Kuznetsov
    CVMA, f. 216, d. 12487, l. 443. The original.

    YES THIS IS THE ONLY HEALTHY HIGH OFFICER OF HONOR AND GLORY