Real sea giants: "Emperor Alexander III" and others like him

96
Real sea giants: "Emperor Alexander III" and others like him


24 in May 1900 in St. Petersburg laid down the first two squadron battleships of the Borodino type, which became legends of the Tsushima battle

The Russian fleet, through the efforts of Emperor Alexander III at the end of the XNUMXth century, turned into one of the largest military fleets in the world, experienced a real shipbuilding boom on the eve of the Russo-Japanese war. The rate of growth in the number of ships taken during the years of Alexander rule, the emergence of new projects and the expansion of the classification of the Russian imperial fleet preserved under the heir of the famous king - Emperor Nicholas II. It was under him that the Russian sailors received serious submarine forces, it was under him that a cardinal change in the structure and capabilities of the fleet ended. Under him, in Russia, the largest series of battleships of the era of the armored fleet was laid down - squadron battleships of the Borodino type. The first two ships of the project - actually Borodino and Emperor Alexander III - were laid down on May 24 (11 in the old style) at two St. Petersburg shipyards: the New Admiralty and the Baltic Shipyard, respectively.

Both at the time of laying and at the time of entry into service in 1903-1904, Borodino-type ships were among the most modern and sophisticated, not only in the Russian fleet, but also in comparison with the fleets of other states. The basis for the creation of the Borodino project was the battleship Tsesarevich, designed and built for Russia in France. From it battleships type "Borodino" inherited location artillery main fire - 305-millimeter - two two-gun turrets on the tank and on the poop, but smaller caliber guns - 152 mm (12 guns), 75 mm (20 guns) and 45 mm (20 guns) placed a little differently, seeking to provide them with the largest sector of fire. Distinguished ships of the type "Borodino" and more powerful armor: they had two solid armor belts, the lower of which had a thickness of 203 mm, and the top - 152 mm. In fact, like the Tsesarevich, the squadron battleships of the Borodino series were the first ships of this class in the world that were protected throughout the waterline by two continuous rows of armor plates.

The actual father of the squadron battleships of the Borodino type was the chief ship engineer of the St. Petersburg seaport Dmitry Skvortsov. It was he who received the Maritime Technical Committee, based on the French project of the battleship Tsesarevich, to create a new project designed for the capabilities of domestic shipyards and the use of almost exclusively Russian materials and mechanisms. Moreover, Skvortsov was instructed to "adhere to the conceptual design of the French shipbuilders and maintain" speed, draft, artillery, booking and fuel on the 5500 miles, although with an acceptable "some increase in displacement."

Dmitry Skvortsov, who had already been working on the construction of such ships as the Admiral Ushakov, a battleship of coastal defense and the General-Admiral Apraksin of the same type with him, had coped with the task in just 20 days! And coped brilliantly, I must say. Given that the booking thickness of the squadron-like battleships of the Borodino type was slightly less than that of the Tsarevich, their internal structure became more original and guaranteed better resilience and survivability. In addition, due to the insignificant - only on 5 mm! - reducing the thickness of the armor "Borodino" and other ships of this project received 75-mm artillery protected by armor: they managed to place it in an armored casemate, which was closed on top of 32-mm armor and divided by 25-mm armor bulkheads. In addition, ships of this type shared transverse watertight bulkheads that provided unsinkability to the 11 of the main compartments: ram, bow cistern compartment, ammunition bow compartment, auxiliary caliber ammunition bow compartment, first and second stoker compartment, machine compartment, auxiliary ammunition feed compartment aft sub-turret compartment with ammunition of the main caliber, a compartment of the steering machine and mechanisms and a tiller compartment.


Model of the squadron battleship "Borodino" 1901. Photo: From the funds of TsVMM

Despite the fact that during the approval of the project of squadron battleships of the Borodino type, and especially during the construction of the series, the current changes were constantly made to the drawings and documentation, as a result, all five battleships - Borodino, Imperator Alexander III, Orel "," Prince Suvorov "and" Glory "- turned out to be very good ships. Although the construction and operational overload, due to which the battleships were not fast enough and maneuverable, unfortunately, became one of the reasons that in real combat these “real sea giants”, as the Russian newspapers of that time called them, were defeated in the Tsushima battle . Four battleships participated in it - all ships of the “Borodino” series, participating in the Russian-Japanese war; the fifth, "Glory," did not have time to go to the Far East.

Of the four battleships that were part of the 2nd Pacific Squadron and took part in the battle of Tsushima, three - Borodino, Emperor Alexander III and Prince Suvorov - were killed. These squadron battleships, which at that time were the newest ships of this type in the Russian fleet, made up the core of the 1st armored squad. On the Suvorov, squadron commander Vice Admiral Zinovy ​​Rozhestvensky held his flag, and it was this battleship who led the convoy. Japanese ships were the first to open fire on it. But in the end, three handsome battleships, who until the last resisted the enemy and answered their own Japanese shells, having fulfilled their duty, went to the bottom, without releasing the Andreevsky flag. All members of their crews died along with them: only one sailor from among those who served on the squadron battleship Borodino managed to escape. As for the “Eagle,” Rear Admiral Nikolai Nebogatov handed it over to the Japanese along with other ships of the 2nd squadron that remained in service. They rebuilt and modernized the ship, and he served under the name "Iwami" until 1924, until he was shot as a target ship of the Japanese aviation.

The Eagle has outlived all of its project partners. After the death of three other battleships of the series in the service in the Russian fleet, only the squadron battleship "Glory" remained in the Tsushima battle. Launched in the 1905 year, he simply did not have time for the Russian-Japanese war and remained in the Baltic. He participated in the defense of the Gulf of Riga in 1915, in 1916, he underwent repairs and upgrades, and in October 1917 took part in the Moonsund battle. It was the last for “Glory”: because of the damage received in battle, the ship almost lost its course and was sunk at the entrance to the Moonsund Channel.

And yet, despite the fact that the service of almost all squadron battleships of the Borodino type was short-lived and did not say happy, this project would forever remain in stories Russian fleet and Russian shipbuilding. After all, the experience gained by domestic shipbuilders in the design and construction of these unique ships, and by Russian sailors during combat service, proved invaluable. Although neither one nor the other had time to use it fully: troubled revolutionary times came too quickly, and after they ended, the era of the battleships actually came to an end. Still, Borodino, Emperor Alexander III, Eagle, Prince Suvorov, and Glory managed to enter their glorious page into it.
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  1. +29
    28 May 2016 06: 55
    If you look only at the tabular data of the second Pacific Ocean, then everything seems to be fine. But they forget that 3 of the 4 main battleships had unworked crews, the Eagle did not give out more than 12 knots due to problems with the vehicles. In fact, there were 6 more or less decent armadillos of the 4 types of Borodino, Sisoy the Great and Oslyabya. All other ships were not suitable for battle.
    Coal overload, low squadron speed, and unexploded shells only strengthened Rozhdestvensky’s passivity.
    There have been cases in the history of the fleets, and repeated when the weaker fleets won. But unfortunately the second squadron was not led by Makarov.
    1. +8
      28 May 2016 07: 29
      We can add that the whole trip was originally an adventure.
      1. +19
        28 May 2016 08: 02
        Quote: Bureaucrat
        We can add that the whole trip was originally an adventure.

        Do not tell me ... This is what we are reasoning now, already knowing the results ... request
        And then there was a war. Nominally, the Russian fleet howled even after the fall of Port Arthur stronger than the Japanese. And when planning this "adventure" with a campaign of Baltic ships in the Far East, MGSH proceeded from the results of the battles of the Arthur squadron. And at that time they showed that the Japanese can be successfully fought. The battle in the Yellow Sea was stopped by one shell successfully hitting the "Tsarevich", which destroyed the leadership of the squadron, and so during the battle in the line, where everyone chooses his own targets, there was a chance of success. Plus, the result of the battle of the Vladivostok cruiser squadron, which showed that the ships can withstand many hours of battle with superior enemy forces. All this gave confidence in the success of the expedition. But the ships of the first line were counted. It turned out 6 (4 "Borodino", "Sisoy" and "Oslyabya") versus 4 ("Mikasa", "Asahi", "Fuji", "Shikishima"). Armored cruisers were formally leveled out by the rest of the squadron ships, albeit with outdated guns, but of a larger caliber. So, according to the mind of that time, it was possible to fight. But only neglect of other factors (speed, tactical thinking) will lead to what we have. But it was also possible to increase at the expense of the Black Sea ships. They just say that the British pressed on the Turks in order not to do this, and so on. Tufta - they would like to, they would strengthen it. There would be a desire. But even two units ("Potemkin" with "Three Saints") could change the result of the battle. But those strategists also attached importance to the capture of the Bosphorus and believed that the Baltic squadron would cope ...
        But who knew that the insidious Japanese would fire at the crews, break in a different tactic of battle, and would use the advantage in speed and the uniformity of their forces to the maximum what So we got Tsushima hi
        1. +5
          28 May 2016 10: 59
          Well, if not a gamble, if the commander of the battleship "Alexander III" Bukhvostov N.M. before sailing said that there would be no victory, adding that we could lose half of the ships during the campaign, that Rozhestvensky himself was skeptical about the campaign itself, saying before sailing, that there are chances if the Japanese ships hit the rocks - there are fogs in the Yellow Sea.
          1. +6
            30 May 2016 11: 15
            Quote: Rastas
            Rozhdestvensky himself was skeptical about the campaign itself


            When the commander is skeptical about the chances of success, the commander needs to be changed. The skepticism of the commander is transmitted to the officers and team.

            If Erwin Rommel complained to his subordinates - twice as many English, we have no chance - he would never have captured Tobruk! The British, according to Rommel, had somewhat greater strength than the Germans - in fact more than twice as much. Which did not stop the Germans from breaking them.
            1. -2
              30 May 2016 11: 51
              Quote: DimerVladimer
              Which did not stop the Germans from breaking them.

              It is a pity that the British do not know about this.
              Where can you read about the "British defeated in North Africa"? Well, of course, without being distracted by the nonsense about the Germans (and Italians) who surrendered there and the "genius commander Rommel" who had previously fled from there.
        2. +2
          28 May 2016 12: 02
          Quote: Rurikovich
          .But those strategists also attached importance to the capture of the Bosphorus and believed that the Baltic squadron could handle it ...


          What is the capture of the Bosphorus in 1904?
          1. +4
            28 May 2016 20: 33
            Quote: Silhouette
            Quote: Rurikovich
            .But those strategists also attached importance to the capture of the Bosphorus and believed that the Baltic squadron could handle it ...


            What is the capture of the Bosphorus in 1904?

            Well, we never refused to capture the Bosphorus, and in any case, we will not refuse to bring it under control.
            As for strengthening the 2nd squadron of the Black Sea Fleet, the Turks really closed the straits there. We could not do ANYTHING. What pressure from our side? The Gull incident showed who the owner of the house is. Political isolation, practically all countries did not take a friendly position, especially England and the USA. And where is the right to download? Rave.
        3. +1
          28 May 2016 12: 12
          Quote: Rurikovich
          And then there was a war.

          Does it somehow harm a sober assessment of one’s forces and means?
          Nominally, the Russian fleet howled even after the fall of Port Arthur stronger than the Japanese.

          Of course. Four Zhiguli (licensed Fiats) with a bunch of Cossacks will always overtake three Mercs with Volks (Fuji type). In total, if the speeds of all participants are added. This is the only way no one competes, unfortunately. But in the Russian General Music School, "the strength was calculated" just like that.
          MGSH proceeded from the results of the battles of the Arthur squadron. And they at that time showed that the Japanese can be successfully fought.

          Only here in the composition of the 1st TOE there were 4 EBRs of varying degrees of lousiness. And as part of 2 TOE, not a single one. There is a difference?
          Plus, the result of the battle of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment, which showed that the ships can withstand many hours of battle with superior enemy forces.

          If the Japanese "defenders" were 2 times less, but at the same time, if they were armed with main guns of the correct caliber, nothing would be left of the VOK in an hour. Thunderbolt and Russia returned to Vladik only because Armstrong made his 10 "guns after the Japanese" defenders "entered service. And the 8" guns on even not very heavily armored large DBKs were ineffective.
          It turned out 6 (4 "Borodino", "Sisoy" and "Oslyabya") versus 4 ("Mikasa", "Asahi", "Fuji", "Shikishima").

          If all the disabled people are counted, then where are Navarin and Nikolai? How can you even compare the same Eagle even with the not very successful Asahi?
          Armored cruisers formally leveled by the remaining ships of the squadron

          What are these? Is it Ushakov and Nakhimov? Have you seriously written this phrase, or for fun?
          albeit with obsolete guns, but of a larger caliber.

          Yeah, I get it. Nikolai and Navarin had to "level" 6 Japanese armored defenders and 2 Japanese budget battleships. What, if not a secret? The diameter of the main barrels? Someone else would have protected them. In fact, the guns of Nikolai's GK had the ballistics of field howitzers. And, strictly speaking, they were not cannons. And the guns of the Navarino Group of Companies had the ballistics of field guns. They have nothing to do at sea.
          So according to the mind of that time it was possible to fight.

          After reading you, we can easily understand the train of thought of the "strategists from under the spire".
          Quote: Rurikovich
          But even two units ("Potemkin" from "Three Saints")

          Three Saints were built so ugly that he did not have enough coal for campaigns at the World Cup. The range of its action in a combat-ready state was 215 (!!!) m.m. This is 397 km to make it clearer.
          Potemkin was built a little better, but we must understand that the ships that were built for marine theaters of the database are not very suitable for ocean theaters of the database. Due to the short range in a combat-ready state (of the order of 2 thousand m. M.), It would be overloaded with coal and because of the type of reservation (stronghold) would be unworkable.
        4. The comment was deleted.
        5. 0
          8 August 2016 14: 06
          You can praise or scold those ships, but in the Russian Navy and army, too, the main war was not in the OY. Will to win. At all levels. Everything else is secondary.
          Imagine in the same place with all the same Stalinist Russia. In this case, we could not lose in any way. But...
      2. +4
        28 May 2016 22: 27
        I already wrote on another thread about the Russo-Japanese War AS A HISTORICAL EVENT - the true reasons, goals, true enemies (and these are not JAPANESES (!!!) - but the Anglo-American ruling elite - or rather, a bunch of Jewish-Masonry marginals who wanted to oust Russia with their trade markets of South-East Asia). The archival file "Tsushima tragedy of the Russian fleet" can be closed when the names of these same Kuns, Leeb Rofellers and Rothschilds are named. The same ones as in 1917 tried to destroy Russia once again.
        In the Russo-Japanese War, to which my family personally has a direct relationship (three relatives on my line and my wife's line were veterans of that war - 2 from the infantry, 1 from the fleet) the Russian Empire could win even after losing the Tsushima battle. Why? Because wars are fought on land, the fleet has always been and will be an auxiliary tool to a greater or lesser extent. Tsar Nicholas 2 was a soft-bodied politician, which is why he later condemned the state to death and his people to multimillion-dollar sacrifices. The Russian army was practically not mobilized in the Japanese war. Only a small part of the combat units fought in the Far East. To destroy the Japanese, you just had to:
        1) mobilize 25% of reservists
        2) send there regular, including "guards" units from the European part of Russia
        3) mobilize the Cossacks
        4) organize a letter railway message for the transport of military cargo to the Far East (and not as it was, Mr. Witte did this, exchanging his legal Russian Orthodox wife for a Jewish slut from among the agents of the British intelligence service - the trains began to go to the Far East with a delay of up to 1 month (!!!!).
        5) remove from the army (at least temporarily) all traitors and saboteurs such as the Stoessel, Kuropatkin, Alekseev, etc. to a riffraff (approximately how Stalin handed it in 1941 at a critical moment, removing from the command Budyonny, Voroshilov and Timoshenko). It was possible to replace the commander at Far Votok and most importantly - there was someone.
        Japan fought on credit with money from Anglo-American Zhidomason circles. It was necessary to pay the bills and they were already starting to get nervous - the creditors demanded a result, but it was not. Japan is bogged down in Port Arthur. If Russia had held out for another 3 months in Japan, a real "default" would have begun, moreover, a complete one. 90% of heavy industry was built on credit. 100% of the fleet is on credit. 78% of strategic military raw materials - credit (steel, non-ferrous metals, gunpowder, chemicals), 95% of artillery - bought on credit. Even the FORM (!!!) is a nautical uniform, sewn from English cloth in English and Australian factories. What is there to talk about. And we, under all these conditions, have contrived the war "missed ..." Our one general was right, who in his memoirs called this inglorious war a "war" of something "(this is us) with the" macaques "(these are the Japanese).
      3. 0
        29 May 2016 18: 27
        It is probably appropriate to speak more broadly: the whole policy of organizing an unnecessary conflict with Japan is a decrepit empire that does not realize its inferiority and lives in an illusory self-image - there is a gamble.
        In these conditions, it was possible to add "Slava", "Potemkin" and a couple more "Black Sea" - nothing would have changed.
      4. +1
        30 May 2016 10: 03
        And why did you decide that in the case of combining the two squadrons the situation became completely different, the course of events was strange to say the least, it was standing in Madagascar, what Rozhdestvensky was waiting for that Arthur would fall and be called back with the squadron, or maybe he had no plans to win, because no matter what happened in Manchuria if the Russian fleet dominated, it would be pointless for Japan to continue a land war, so initially I wouldn’t rush to call this expedition in a hurry and wouldn’t rush.
    2. +17
      28 May 2016 07: 48
      With such a squadron, Stepan Osipovich could not have done anything. It would be tantamount to a miracle. The ships are raw and overloaded. The crews are made up largely of reservists, not worked together, not floated. Only the lazy did not write about non-exploding shells with a too tight fuse and wet pyroxylin as explosives. I would not consider the Oslyabya a successful battleship - it was rather a large and well-armed armored cruiser with weak armor on the bow. "Sisoy the Great" - EBR, the construction of which was started in 1891, and then followed a decade of a real revolution in shipbuilding. Therefore, the "Sisoy Veliky" (like "Navarin" - very similar in design, some consider them sisterships), which entered service in 1896, had already become obsolete by the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War - new artillery (four guns 305/40 mm / cal GK - "Sisoy" was the first Russian EBR with such weapons), but at the same time outdated steel-iron armor (albeit thick).
      In short:
      from the point of view of the Sisoy the Great project itself, it was a completely modern ship with powerful artillery and good armor protection. However, its real qualities turned out to be significantly lower due to two troubles of domestic shipbuilding - overload and poor quality of work. Overloading led to a significant recession of the ship, as a result of which a significant part of its armored belt disappeared under the water. But a low-quality building could be fixed only with expensive overhaul and modernization, which was never done. As a result, “Sisoy the Great” turned out to be almost doomed to death due to several not too dangerous hits in the bow unarmored part of the hull.

      Moreover, the low squadron speed of the Russian fleet under Tsushima was also due to the fact that Rozhestvensky was dragging with him the openly outdated and slow-moving ships of the Nebogatov squadron.
      In the entire Russian squadron there were only four more or less decent EBRs - the same "Borodino", but they did not make any difference either.
      I have the honor.
      1. -3
        28 May 2016 12: 22
        Quote: Alexander72
        I would not consider the Oslyabya a successful battleship - it was rather a large and well-armed armored cruiser with weak armor on the bow.

        In fact, it was BrBO. In decent fleets, very obsolete EDBs (and Oslyabya was planned as a class 2 EDB) were usually sent there to Brbo. So his sistership, Peresvet, was sent to the YAIF by the Japanese.
        Quote: Alexander72
        Therefore, "Sisoy the Great" (like "Navarin" - very similar in design, some consider them to be sisterships)

        Nothing in common. And the prototypes are different, Trafalgar and the Silver Piano.
        Quote: Alexander72
        and slow-moving ships of the Nebogatov squadron.

        So Sisoy and Nakhimov are not god knows what walkers were.
        Quote: Alexander72
        In the entire Russian squadron there were only four more or less decent EBRs - the same "Borodino"

        Yes? And what was "decency"?
        1. +1
          28 May 2016 20: 45
          Quote: verboo
          In fact, it was BrBO.

          Not once did he.
          1. 0
            28 May 2016 20: 55
            Quote: Nubia2
            Not once did he.

            But the Japanese took Peresvet (and it was built much better than Oslyabi) and, under the name "Sagami", enlisted in the fleet in the form of a 1st class BrBO. Apparently, they did not understand anything at all in the ships.
            1. +1
              29 May 2016 15: 13
              The way the Japanese classified it does not matter at all.
              Relights were built in accordance with specific tasks. And coastal defense did not enter into them. Rather, the opposite.
              1. 0
                29 May 2016 15: 22
                It’s frankly overshadowing the Peresvet project. These are overfed DBKs, although the British admiral Fisher called them the forerunners of battlecruisers, which is very strange if they had a speed of at least 22 knots they would justify their construction and apart from the main guns there was nothing outstanding
                1. -2
                  29 May 2016 16: 36
                  Quote: Nehist
                  project Peresvet This overfed DBK

                  Well no. This is an attempt to build a class 2 EDB. They were also in the fleets of other states (there weren’t in the NIF). Victory even turned out completely nothing. He would still have normal cars (imported, 2 instead of 3), and then he would be completely hurt. and on domestic cars, of course, he was not very. But Oslyabya and Peresvet did not succeed at all, like an EDB of class 2.
                  Quote: Nehist
                  although the British admiral Fisher called them the forerunners of battlecruisers

                  Correctly named.
                  Quote: Nehist
                  if they had a speed of at least 22 knots then they would justify their construction

                  Yes, well, what are you. Yes, overexposures were slightly slow moving. But normal class 2 EBRs went faster. In addition, 22 knots, you bent it. This is speed with new good DBK defenders. Even "state employees" in those days walked 19,5-20,0 knots. A class 2 EBR of about 19,0 knots. Check out "Swiftsure" and "Triumph" from the British.
                  Quote: Nehist
                  and so apart from the GK guns there was nothing outstanding

                  The guns were different. At Victory, the same level of EDB class 2. And at Relight and Oslyab, countries. Neither 2 nor 1,5.
                  Although, in my opinion, the fact that the Japanese DBK defenders were armed according to the 2x2x8 "scheme is a strange move. It would be much more correct if they were armed according to the 1x2x10" scheme or, at worst, 2x1x8 "+ 1x1x10". That's just something 10 "like the one that stood on Kasuga.
              2. +1
                29 May 2016 16: 17
                Quote: Nubia2
                The way the Japanese classified it does not matter at all

                Of course. They are like a fool ****
                Quote: Nubia2
                Relights were built in accordance with specific tasks.

                This is Russia, my friend. Therefore, what and how was built did not matter much. It is important what was built and how. But everything was built very badly.
                Oslyabya had an effective range of 880 m.m. And so, perhaps, he only pulled on an armored floating battery.
                Relight had a range in combat-ready condition of the order of 2500 m.m. And on BrBO already pulled quite. Actually, in YaIF (Sagami), this is how it happened to him.
                At the same time, although relights were built like an EDB of class 2, the guns of the Peresvet and Oslyaby group of companies did not extend to this level in any way. Even at birth.
                Victory, if you close your eyes to some moments, there was a second-class EBR at birth. Well, almost there. He almost pulled on the old EDB 2 class. At the Nuclear Physics Institute (Suvo), he was already Brbo 2 class, which in general is logical.
                Quote: Nubia2
                And coastal defense did not enter into them.

                This is bad that junk and substandard were put in line for battle with battleships.
                1. 0
                  30 May 2016 10: 36
                  You, my friend, seem to have your own classification.
                  I decided to myself which ship I pulled on)). And basically - to your favorite floating batteries.

                  Quote: verboo
                  This is bad that junk and substandard were put in line for battle with battleships

                  They put that is. Although true - not for the tasks for which it was done.
                  1. 0
                    30 May 2016 11: 24
                    Quote: Nubia2
                    You, my friend, seem to have your own classification.

                    Of course, your own. And the same British copied it from me. Yeshe at the beginning of the 20th century.
                    Quote: Nubia2
                    I decided to myself which ship I pulled on))

                    Indeed, if an animal swims like a duck, quacks like a duck, then it is not a duck, it is an elephant. Because that's what the zoo papers say. This is your logic. Exactly the same logic under Tsushima showed itself in all its "glory".
                    1. 0
                      1 June 2016 10: 18
                      What nonsense? Ducks elephants.
                      There is an official classification. There are tasks in accordance with which these ships were built. And these tasks are never coastal defense, but cruising. Everything else is your fantasies and show-offs.
                      Another thing is that they were not used for their intended purpose. But, this is another question.
                      1. -1
                        1 June 2016 10: 52
                        Quote: Nubia2
                        There are tasks in accordance with which these ships were built.

                        It would be interesting to read which ones?
                        Quote: Nubia2
                        And these tasks are never coastal defense, but cruising.

                        Gee-gee. For cruising, as you put it, they did not have a range. That was not directly under the project. Therefore, they were never suitable for this (moreover, I repeat, even on the project). That is, they were not built.
                        If you are interested in Russian battleships for cruising, then pay attention to Rurik and Russia. Even the Stormbreaker was built for this, but it did not work out (the usual thing for Russia at that time). And I draw your attention, officially all of them were cruisers.
                        And overexposures were officially the EDB. In Russia, the EDB did not have classes and ranks, so there was no clarification. But their approximate counterparts in other countries were called class 2 EDBs. Later, ships of this kind began to be called battlecruisers.
                        Quote: Nubia2
                        Another thing is that they were not used for their intended purpose.

                        They could not fulfill the functions of an EDB of the 2nd class (and even more so armored cruiser-raiders). There was no range in combat-ready condition, Oslyaby had a ridiculous 880 m.m, a modest one at Peresvet 2600 m.m. There were also no guns of the GC level of the EDB.
                        More or less acceptable for this class (approximately at the level of the old and weak class 2 EDB), only Victory was built.
                        Moreover, just the battleship Victory, built entirely on the Russian element base (whatever it was), was the pinnacle of Russian military shipbuilding in the early 20th century. Although this was not a class 1 EDB, an extremely small number of countries in the world reached that level in those years. Japan, for example, could not build ships of this class then.
                      2. 0
                        13 June 2016 20: 15
                        Quote: verboo
                        It would be interesting to read which ones?

                        Clearly, you are not familiar with the materiel.
                        Quote: verboo
                        Gee-gee. For cruising, as you put it, they had no range

                        here it was not straight at all?)))
                        Quote: verboo
                        richem I draw your attention, officially all of them were cruisers.

                        they were cruisers.
                        Quote: verboo
                        And overexposures were officially the EDB. In Russia, the EDB did not have classes and ranks, so there was no clarification.

                        So what? Nothing.

                        Quote: verboo
                        There was no range in combat-ready condition, Oslyaby had a ridiculous 880 m.m, a modest one at Peresvet 2600 m.m.

                        here the trouble is ... as many as 5000 and it really was considered small.
                      3. 0
                        13 June 2016 22: 24
                        Quote: Nubia2
                        Clearly, you are not familiar with the materiel.

                        Oh, I’m not familiar. So I’m looking for someone to explain to me.
                        Quote: Nubia2
                        here it was not straight at all?)))

                        And did someone tell me something a little higher about the materiel? Moreover, in fact everything was just bad at the Victory, very bad at Peresvet and terribly at Oslyaby.
                        Quote: Nubia2
                        they were cruisers.

                        Armadillo cruisers. Those. it was not overexposure that were cruiser armadillos, but Rurik and Russia. Stormbreaker in fact was an unknown ship, because he did not have the range of armadillo cruisers, although it was built precisely for this. It did not work out, in Russia it was normal. Moreover, the advantage was small. But crappy cars (like Victory) and stupid engine diagrams (like overexposures) did their job. Exactly the same as they did with overexposure. Those. they stepped on the mop not 3 times, but 4.
                        Actually, the maximum that Stormbreaker was capable of was being a scout with the armored detachment of Tsarevich + Pobeda. Maybe, if the raid was close, Peresvet could join them. With such a layout, Thunderbolt would be a real use. And the "Vladikskaya flock of galosh" (WOK), it was nonsense.
                        Quote: Nubia2
                        So what? Nothing.

                        Never mind. Only runet in shock, because did not receive valuable clarification. And without him it is impossible in any way.
                        Quote: Nubia2
                        here the trouble is ... as many as 5000 and it really was considered small.

                        You will tell the boys of primary school age. And the real range in the operational state of Oslyaby was ridiculous 880 m.m, at Peresvet modest 2600 m.m. at Pobeda insufficient 4300 m.m, at Gromoboy insufficient nearly 6000 m.m.
                        And with the planned indicators, you also did not guess. Relights were supposed to walk on 6200 m.m, Gromoboy 8100 m.m. Those. everything was fine on the project. But in fact ... I hope you noticed some difference between the planned and actual indicators.
                        By the way, less than 5000 m.m, this is at the beginning of the 20th century and for the first class EDB it was already considered a little. And for other armadillos and even more so.
      2. 0
        28 May 2016 18: 10
        “The crews are largely made up of reservists, not worked together, not floated.” - and how much have they sailed? There have been live fires? So there is no need for fusion and inexperience.
        And by the way, there were no deserters with a sufficiently large number of parking lots ....
        1. +2
          28 May 2016 21: 42
          One.
          Near Madagascar.
          Showing depressing results.
          Alas.
      3. -1
        28 May 2016 21: 45
        I would not consider "Oslyabya" a successful battleship - it was rather a large and well-armed armored cruiser with weak bow armor. Excuse me, why write this? This point of view has been wandering for 40 years, starting from the Murzilka magazine, and ending with the scientific works of the luminaries of naval art.
    3. -2
      28 May 2016 11: 25
      Quote: demiurg
      If you look only at the tabular data of the second Pacific Ocean, then everything seems to be fine.

      If you look at the tabular data of all the RIF ships, then everything was fine with them.
      Quote: demiurg
      In fact, there were 6 more or less decent armadillos of the 4 types of Borodino, Sisoy the Great and Oslyabya.

      Borodino (Borodino built the best of all), the minimum overload above the maximum level of combat capability on the day of Tsushima is 455 tons. Conclusion - unfit, like the EDB. Could fulfill the functions of an armored floating battery.
      Eagle, the minimum overload in excess of the maximum level of combat capability on Tsushima day is 495 tons. Conclusion - unfit, like the EDB. Could fulfill the functions of an armored floating battery.
      Alexander III, the minimum overload over the maximum level of combat capability on Tsushima day is 635 tons. Conclusion - unfit, like the EDB. Could fulfill the functions of an armored floating battery.
      Suvorov, there is no exact data on this ship. But we can safely assume that there was something like the rest. Well, at least they did not drag Glory to Tsushima. That's where the floating horror was.
      Sisoy, the minimum overload beyond the ultimate level of combat capability on Tsushima's day is 793 tons. Conclusion - not operational. At the same time, Sisoy was built with such a huge overload that even without coal at all, he was incapable. Those. never in principle. In peacetime, he could serve as a training ship.
      Oslyabya, another "masterpiece of domestic shipbuilding". Not Sisoy, of course, but in terms of the clumsy construction it could well compete with Sevastopl and the Three Saints. The minimum overload in excess of the maximum level of combat capability per day of Tsushima is 1091 tons. Conclusion - incapable of combat.
      I don’t know where you counted 6 "more or less decent battleships", I didn’t find a single one.
      Quote: demiurg
      There have been cases in the history of the fleets, and repeated when the weaker fleets won.

      To do this, they should have had at least a few decent ships. Rozhdestvensky did not have them. Even if the Borodinians were not overloaded, the peculiarities of booking their GPs did not allow them to be classified as full-fledged EDB. Sisoy as an EDB was just ridiculous. In addition to the guns of the main gun from the EDB there was nothing there. Exactly the same applies to Oslyaba, only he didn’t even have these same GK guns. Those. Oslyabya in fact the EDB (even 2 classes) was not. Just like Navarin and Nicholas I.
      Quote: demiurg
      But unfortunately the second squadron was not led by Makarov.

      Oh yeah. This "genius naval commander" fleets and squadrons across the seas and oceans led many times. And he beat the foe, do not count. Only I have forgotten the examples. Can you remind me? And then offhand only the catch of the Japanese Makarov on replication with the destruction of the flagship Petropavlovsk (with the entire crew, headquarters, Makarov and the artist Vereshchagin) climbs into the head.
      1. +3
        30 May 2016 14: 34
        About the overload of Japanese battleships:

        "It was a dull day with fog over the sea. The Adzuma took in 200 tons of coal, which heavily filled up the upper deck. Several other ships also accepted coal, some for the second time in three days. At 17:00, Mikasa entered the harbor. He had a large amount of coal on the upper deck and sat very deep in the water, so that the heels of the poles of mine nets were completely submerged in the water. All fighters and destroyers had a load of coal on the decks. "

        ... "the construction overload of" Mikasa "was 784 tons. For comparison, the analogous figure of the" Eagle ", according to the ship engineer V. P. Kostenko, was 635 tons" ...

        "The operational overload, which on May 25, 1905, amounted to at least 2 tons (191 tons - 2 tons), aggravated the situation. The main armor belt went into the water by another 975 cm, and its upper edge was lower waterline by 784 cm. (87,64 cm. - 43 cm.). As we remember, the Eagle's main armor belt towered over the waterline by more than ten centimeters. "

        “One of the components of the operational overload of the Japanese flagship was the increased ammunition of the main and medium caliber during the repair, from 90 to 110 and from 130 to 175 per barrel, respectively.
        Total, the additional weight due to the increase in ammunition was 63 120 + 34 146 = 97 266 kg "
        http://alternathistory.com/k-voprosu-o-peregruzke-bronenostsev-v-russko-yaponsku
        yu-mikasa
        1. 0
          30 May 2016 15: 21
          Quote: Trapper7
          http://alternathistory.com/k-voprosu-o-peregruzke-bronenostsev-v-russko-yaponsku
          yu-mikasa

          I would recommend that you continue to use reputable sources of information, rather than an online press of dubious nature. The inscription on the fence has approximately the same degree of certainty.
          And this applies primarily to the so-called. "Packinham Reports" (referenced in the article at the link). This source is more than dubious. If only because in the battle in the Korea Strait the Japanese DBK-defenders, who, according to these "reports," could barely move, quite cheerfully not only caught up with, but also surpassed the VOK, embracing its head. But according to the "reports" this could not have happened in principle.
          Therefore, the selection of information must be approached carefully.
          Quote: Trapper7
          "the construction overload of" Mikasa "was 784 tons. For comparison, the analogous figure of" Eagle ", according to the ship's engineer V. P. Kostenko, was 635 tons"

          Mikasa's construction overload, according to Japanese data, was 806 tons. This is 34,6% of the total capacity of its coal pits. So, in the remainder there was another 1521 tons of coal.
          Actually not Kostenko, but GMS. But still 635 tons. This is 51,4% of the total capacity of its coal pits. So, in the remainder on Oryol there was only 600 tons of coal.
          Feel the difference.
          Quote: Trapper7
          One of the components of the operational overload of the Japanese flagship was increased ammunition during repair

          There is no point in even commenting on the pearls of the "inscriptions on the fence." Its author (if you look at the link), apparently, does not even think of the "brilliant idea" that construction and other overloading was usually regulated before a battle by underloading a full supply of coal. And the underload was regulated by the intake of water in the double bottoms.
          By the way, excluding construction overload, the RIF ships under Tsushima were not overloaded. Maybe slightly Alexander III. And with her, there were. And significantly.
      2. The comment was deleted.
    4. The comment was deleted.
    5. +6
      28 May 2016 11: 46
      Quote: demiurg
      passivity Christmas.

      I'll correct you a little - he is Rozhdestvensky, without the "d".
      1. +3
        28 May 2016 12: 06
        Quote: verboo
        Sisoy, the minimum overload beyond the ultimate level of combat capability on Tsushima's day is 793 tons. Conclusion - not operational. At the same time, Sisoy was built with such a huge overload that even without coal at all, he was incapable.

        I would like to add that Sisoy the Great was part of the 1st Pacific Squadron and was sent to the Baltic for repairs. Without repair, in an even worse technical condition, he was included in the 2nd Pacific Squadron.
    6. 0
      28 May 2016 21: 35
      They had little hike through the backlight to work together.
      1. +2
        29 May 2016 18: 14
        You have touched on a very true aspect!
        To this day, there are continuous attempts to cover up the Tsushima defeat with fig leaves of chatter about bad ships, stupid Rozhdestvensky and sailor reservists.
        Needless to say, there were a lot of stocks in TOE-2. Particularly critical, apparently, should be considered non-explosive shells with "wet" pyroxylin, the tactically illiterate formation of the squadron with the burden of its transports with brainless - "heroic" use of it in a frontal attack on a stronger enemy. The latter is generally typical for Russia, where a soldier (and anyone else) is always a cheap consumable for unpunished waste.
        One of the myths is that "the Japanese shot 5-6 ammunition during the exercise," thus learning how to shoot accurately. It's a bullshit! They would have to change the main battery guns 5-6 times.
        The ships of that era did not have complex fire control systems, and the development of simple optical sights did not require gigantic experience: shooting was determined by shooting.
        The arguments of those who are not looking for fig leaves, but analyze soberly have already been published: while the Russians still had guns capable of firing, they achieved 3% of hits ... as in exercises.
        Which is not bad for "untrained reservists", who for the first time in the world passed a half-world squadron and did not "lose" the squadron on the way.
        1. 0
          4 November 2016 18: 16
          I support. 1) Main battery shells. 2) Lack of a battle plan, plans for rebuilding in battle. 4 EBR in the head, and prem in Vladik. I still don’t understand what prevented Rozhestvensky from starting with a deviation to NW the divergence on the countercourses with the Togovskaya "stick over T". Was afraid to substitute his slow-moving "tail" -? - I could rebuild into 2 columns (letting the troughs go even further to the west), I still trudged like a turtle and took luli for 4 ships. There is a lack of battle planning, which should have provided for at least 2 scenarios "Togo to the right", "Togo to the left". If Togo had taken up slugs, then it would have already been possible to attack him with the main forces. No. They canceled 2 columns, walked stupidly forward, in single file, like rats on a pipe.
    7. 0
      30 May 2016 11: 22
      Among foreign contemporaries-analogs, this series was just the smallest. The ships also sinned by the presence of a large number of 37 and 47-mm artillery, the uselessness of which was already fully understood. In fact, the ship was a compromise with the capabilities of the Russian industry. If the author of the project had the opportunity to build in the displacement of the British, use more reliable boilers and put 75-mm guns instead of all the "small ones", the ship would be a worthy rival to the Japanese.
    8. 0
      15 November 2016 18: 04
      Rozhdestvensky, not Rozhdestvensky !!!
  2. +3
    28 May 2016 07: 50
    Quote: Bureaucrat
    We can add that the whole trip was originally an adventure.

    Well why a gamble? Could transfer 6 armadillos and modern cruisers quickly enough, for 3-4-5 months to Vladivostok.
    1. +4
      28 May 2016 10: 30
      Oh .. there was a trouble. Despite the plans for enhancing the TE by ships with the Baltic Fleet and the Black Sea Fleet - well, the bureaucratic machine could not quickly implement its plan.
      In general, the song there was with the sending of help ... if you read this, then in many ways the help plan was frustrated in time (Could have done it before the fall of Port Arthur and even before the battle in the Yellow Sea)
      And the "exploits" of Skrydlov, and the expectation of Nebogatov, and the illnesses of the commanders, and so on ... complete outrage ... as Boreiko (Port Artur Stepanov) said - "The pace is Arthurian" but the war did not download anything ...
  3. +9
    28 May 2016 07: 50
    Nevertheless, Borodino, Emperor Alexander III, Oryol, and Prince Suvorov managed to enter their glorious page into it.


    Well said. Sounds nice.
    I would like to support, but ...

    ... but let me ask - what's the glory?

    :(; (; (

    All of them are direct participants in the largest and most painful defeat of our fleet, which until now is like a bleeding wound in our hearts: (((


    And I'm not at all sure that these battleships "wrote their glorious page" (c)

    It hurts my brothers, it still hurts ...
  4. UVB
    +1
    28 May 2016 08: 04
    they had two continuous armor belts, the lower of which had a thickness of 203 mm, and the upper - 152 mm
    A small clarification is not 203 but 194 mm.
  5. +9
    28 May 2016 08: 16
    Quote: Miner
    It hurts my brothers, it still hurts ...

    Nothing bro! The Yapers still hurt for Khalkhin-Gol, in 1945. And imagine how they look at Shikotan in good weather? I am silent about Sakhalin - still there is a Japanese lighthouse, and nicks with hallmarks on tree trunks are visible.
    1. +7
      28 May 2016 10: 39
      in history, each state has its own "Waterloo" or even several ..
      So Tsushima is even worse than Waterloo (as we see these are two common nouns)
      And you yourself understand after Sinop — excluding small local victories at sea — major failures went ... After the victory at the sea, the Japanese at RI became a real ocean power. So far, in turn, have not ceded to the United States.
      And in 1905, everything was just decided who would dominate the TO.
      Yes, of course, we can partially wash away the shame of that time by defeating Japan in 1945, taking the same Arthur and raising the Soviet flag there. But the phantom pain of Tsushima, the heroic and turned out to be useless defense of Arthur (help was delayed, the army did not release, the fleet was flooded - the heroism of the defenders was wasted) has been haunting us for more than a century
  6. 0
    28 May 2016 08: 44
    Quote: Alexander72
    With such a squadron, Stepan Osipovich could not have done anything. It would be tantamount to a miracle. The ships are raw and overloaded. The crews are made up largely of reservists, not worked together, not floated. Only the lazy did not write about non-exploding shells with a too tight fuse and wet pyroxylin as explosives. I would not consider the Oslyabya a successful battleship - it was rather a large and well-armed armored cruiser with weak armor on the bow. "Sisoy the Great" - EBR, the construction of which was started in 1891, and then followed a decade of a real revolution in shipbuilding. Therefore, the "Sisoy Veliky" (like "Navarin" - very similar in design, some consider them sisterships), which entered service in 1896, had already become obsolete by the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War - new artillery (four guns 305/40 mm / cal GK - "Sisoy" was the first Russian EBR with such weapons), but at the same time outdated steel-iron armor (albeit thick).
    In short:
    from the point of view of the Sisoy the Great project itself, it was a completely modern ship with powerful artillery and good armor protection. However, its real qualities turned out to be significantly lower due to two troubles of domestic shipbuilding - overload and poor quality of work. Overloading led to a significant recession of the ship, as a result of which a significant part of its armored belt disappeared under the water. But a low-quality building could be fixed only with expensive overhaul and modernization, which was never done. As a result, “Sisoy the Great” turned out to be almost doomed to death due to several not too dangerous hits in the bow unarmored part of the hull.

    Moreover, the low squadron speed of the Russian fleet under Tsushima was also due to the fact that Rozhestvensky was dragging with him the openly outdated and slow-moving ships of the Nebogatov squadron.
    In the entire Russian squadron there were only four more or less decent EBRs - the same "Borodino", but they did not make any difference either.
    I have the honor.

    It was possible to divide the squads of ships by speed. And each detachment would act independently. And yet, yes, the whole convoy could be sent away from sin.
    1. 0
      4 November 2016 18: 22
      Bravo! Here is the obvious thing! But not for Super Admiral Rozhdestvensky. The way he rushed by the main forces into a fire trap - it can be somehow justified only if our admiral KNEW that he could not inflict practically NO DAMAGE on the Japanese. And this is unlikely.
  7. +5
    28 May 2016 08: 48
    The Russian sailors demonstrated courage and the Japanese themselves acknowledged this. Yes, unfortunately Tsushima, we lost.
    1. +3
      28 May 2016 12: 32
      Sailors, yes. But not the officers.
      The Japanese were amazed that the Russian officers were transplanted into Japanese longboats, surrendering,
      without bothering to check whether the wounded remained on the damaged ships.
      And they were, many dozens of people bleeding.
      Why be surprised that in the 1905 revolution, sailors brutally cracked down on their own officers.
      1. +1
        28 May 2016 14: 10
        Quote: voyaka uh
        Why be surprised that in the 1905 revolution, sailors brutally cracked down on their own officers.


        There is something to be surprised at: on the Potemkin Black Sea Fleet did not know about the details of Tsushima that happened just a month ago. Cases of reprisals were sporadic, traitor killers were destroyed. And this rabble revolted because they were afraid to go to war, out of fear for their own skin. Like their leader, coward Schmidt, who escaped in Suez from a ship going to Tsushima.
        1. -1
          29 May 2016 10: 44
          "The cases of massacres were isolated, the traitor killers were destroyed" ////

          Both in 1905 and in 1917, the reprisals of sailors over officers were massive.
          I do not justify the lynch, but the fact: the system of relations in the Navy was
          outdated and rotten.
          Moreover, in the ground units of the Russian army such cases during the revolution
          were much less common.
          1. +4
            29 May 2016 13: 34
            Quote: voyaka uh
            In both 1905 and 1917, the killings of sailors over officers were massive. I do not justify the lynch, but the fact: the system of relations in the fleet was outdated and rotten.


            It was about 1905, what does the 1917 have to do with it? And in 1905 no massacres did not have (less than 10 people). Name "mass" reprisals (you can't)
            The "rotten" system did not prevent the Russian fleets from fighting perfectly in the Black and Baltic Seas in WWI.
            Mass killings began after the October Revolution.
            Quote: voyaka uh
            Moreover, in the ground units of the Russian army, such cases during the revolution were much less common.

            Nonsense. (read the historian Volkov)
            1. -1
              30 May 2016 11: 43
              Quote: Aleksander
              The rotten "system did not prevent the navies of Russia from fighting perfectly in the Black and Baltic Seas in WWI.

              Is it wonderful to fight by fencing off mines from a much less powerful opponent, having decent reconnaissance from airplanes, and many bases in the Baltic?
              The system really rotted in the fleet, and only began to emerge from the crisis in the period from 1907 to 1912. In WWI, she was still rotten with the hope that she would recover.
              Although all this does not negate the heroism and talent of individuals, like Makarov, Bubnov, etc., for example.
      2. The comment was deleted.
      3. +8
        28 May 2016 17: 20
        voyaka uh Today, 12:32 ↑
        My great-great-grandfather served as a sailor on the coastal defense battleship "Admiral Ushakov". The last battle of the ship can be found on the Internet. The ship was commanded by Miklouho Maclay's elder brother. This is a real Russian officer. I do not know what the Japanese were amazed at. I know that they hammered with guns for another two hours to save where the ship sank. Only then did they start saving people. Read what the Japanese commander Miklouho Maclay said then. And you for indiscriminate "-" from me.
        1. -3
          29 May 2016 11: 10
          Quote: shura7782
          The elder brother Miklouho Maclay commanded the ship. This is a real Russian officer.

          I would ask the officers of that war not to go so indiscriminately. Not everyone was as incompetent as this Mikluha.
      4. -4
        29 May 2016 11: 07
        Quote: voyaka uh
        Why be surprised that in the 1905 revolution, sailors brutally cracked down on their own officers.

        These are features of slave psychology. A slave is always ready tomorrow to tear apart the one whom he is afraid to hiccups today. Because habitually resides in extreme conditions.
    2. +3
      28 May 2016 13: 00
      Courage is always good and our people can’t take it, but accuracy wasn’t enough because they didn’t master the new technique.
    3. 0
      4 November 2016 18: 24
      Yes, this is courage in the slaughter. Unfortunately.
  8. +2
    28 May 2016 09: 22
    The Japanese still had all the conditions for accurate shooting. Could shoot rarely but accurately. Perhaps that is why the paint on the trunks did not burn out. IMHO
  9. +2
    28 May 2016 09: 36
    Beautiful ships, a worthy milestone in the history of our country, although defeat, but without defeat, there are no victories.
  10. +6
    28 May 2016 10: 49
    That war was generally "divorced from the RI reality." The winner was the one "who needed more."
    And RI fell to everything that accompanies such wars - heroism and cowardice, surrender and death along with ships, the courage of some and the mediocrity of others, etc.
    Well, edification for posterity - how not to do it.
    I don’t see anything heroic in the ships - courage is yes, but they came then, when it was all over. And apart from dying, they had no choice (well, except to intern)
    The idea was different - to turn the tide of that war. And if you arrived at the code, it was already clear to your mustache (at sea and on land - although it was just there you could tighten until victory) - what were your plans? To win? To give a victory? Who would use it after the fall of Arthur? There was no base, and Vladivostok is not the right place for a maneuver war.
    My opinion of Tsushima is an unnecessary chord in that unlucky war. If it had happened before the fall of Arthur - yes, a necessary attempt to unlock, in the event of at least a draw would have already given a lot.
    And so - they walked - long long time .. Everything was decided during this time. They didn’t come to win, but to die! Heroically courageously ... here that worries so far ...
    1. +2
      28 May 2016 11: 40
      Quote: Retvizan
      in that unlucky war.

      Yeah. Island of bad luck. They would take and cancel Mondays. So they were canceled in 1917. The legendary mediocre rulers of RI. Retrofitted - their, not the Bolsheviks, class brothers asked for a way out.
    2. 0
      4 November 2016 18: 28
      The meaning is always there. In the event of the defeat of the Japanese squadron, it will cut off the supply of the Japanese ground army for a couple of months. This is not about Port Arthur, but about Manchuria. We just needed a landfill, and Rozhdestvensky was stupidly walking. Here he went to Vladik really senseless.
  11. +9
    28 May 2016 11: 00
    That's how they became legends ??? Quickly drowned, almost without causing any loss to the Japanese fleet? Descent flag and surrender the ship-too glorious page?
    1. +3
      28 May 2016 11: 41
      Quote: Dimon19661
      surrender of the ship is also a glorious page?

      It’s not possible here. Russians do not give up - this is not discussed. Any cleverness is punished mercilessly. Cast iron loading.
  12. +3
    28 May 2016 11: 33
    To me, as a techie who had an idea of ​​the design of warships, the following text struck my eye:
    The ships of the Borodino type were also distinguished by more powerful armor: they had two continuous armor belts, the lower of which had a thickness of 203 mm, and the upper - 152 mm. In fact, like the Tsesarevich, the squadron battleships of the Borodino series were the first ships of this class in the world to be protected along the entire waterline by two continuous rows of armored plates.
    I would like to inform the author that only the main armor belt passes along the waterline, and the upper one is usually a couple of meters higher. By the time the Borodino battleships were built, there were many ships with this type of booking. At the same time, it was the irrational placement of the reservation, its excess, that was one of the reasons for the overload of the Russian battleships. At the same time, the design perfection is achieved not by the outstanding characteristics of the paper project, but by its logical result - a high-quality construction of a balanced ship, where all systems work reliably and correctly.
    1. +1
      28 May 2016 13: 05
      Like the main reason for overloading is called unmeasured coal reserves? And on "Orel" they were able to remake the flooding system, so that it did not roll over in a situation when the others did it.
      1. +4
        28 May 2016 13: 33
        Quote: Crimea26
        It seems that the main reason for overloading is called unmeasured coal reserves?

        There were no unmeasured reserves there.
        Quote: Crimea26
        And on "Orel" they were able to remake the flooding system, so that it did not roll over in a situation when the others did it.

        "Suvorov" was shot by the entire Japanese fleet and finished off with torpedoes. Why "Eagle"? "Borodino" died after the explosion of the artillery cellar. What does the "Eagle" have to do with it? And can you explain how the Eagle, with its never-pierced armor belt, could have been helped by the counter-flooding system? If possible, then in all the chilling details - which compartments of the "Eagle" were flooded as a result of Japanese influences and which compartments were counter-flooded?
        Of course, I understand that Kostenko needs to come up with some merit for the heroically seated all battle in the infirmary. But it would be possible to compose something more prudent.
  13. +8
    28 May 2016 11: 56
    I’ll complete the Falkland cycle, it will be necessary to write an article about Russian EDB from the time of the REV. And then this nonsense
    Quote: verboo
    Borodino (the best built Borodino is the best), the minimum overload above the maximum level of combat capability on Tsushima 455 tons day. Conclusion - Inoperative

    already tired. But someone can take it at face value.
    1. -5
      28 May 2016 12: 40
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      I’ll complete the Falkland cycle, it will be necessary to write an article about Russian EDB from the time of the REV.

      Write-write. Read, laugh. It even became curious how you were going to wash the black cable until white.
    2. The comment was deleted.
    3. +2
      28 May 2016 14: 01
      About Harrieres, etc. will be further? Come on (TE), Come on (TE), Come on (TE) !!!!!!!!!
  14. +2
    28 May 2016 13: 03
    yeah .... a shame in the history of the country they are trying to pass off as a victory ... "Sea giants" and so on ... well, isn't it funny? Let us, Russians, not be like THIS and not rewrite history, eh? the Japanese under Tsushima are really winners, why is it black and white ...
  15. -3
    28 May 2016 13: 07
    Only "Alexander" (Novikov-Priboy "Tsushima") died with the entire crew, not 3 battleships.
    1. +6
      28 May 2016 13: 36
      Quote: Crimea26
      Only "Alexander" (Novikov-Priboy "Tsushima") died with the entire crew, not 3 battleships.

      You would be ashamed. Yes, the fact that a whole sailor escaped from the Borodino, and the headquarters was removed from the Suvorov, does not formally give grounds to state that these ships perished with their entire crew. Because they died with 99,9% of the crew and not 100%.
  16. +4
    28 May 2016 13: 10
    When the rulers of Russia are negotiating with Japan about the Kuril Islands, it would be nice to remember about Tsushima, how many thousands of Russian sailors died in the depths of the sea along with the ships. As a child, I read the novel "Tsushima" by Novikov-Surf. Yes, the Russian memory of their descendants, who went to certain death, but did not lower the Russian flag, is short. There should be no negotiations at all with Japan on this matter! We have lived without a peace treaty since 1945, and that's okay. And there was a peace treaty with Germany, but at the same time they surrendered all of Eastern Europe with the Baltic states, and without a war.
    1. +2
      28 May 2016 13: 54
      Yeah, especially Nebogatov did not lower the flag. I’m not joking, I’m offended myself. They would drown themselves and save themselves "according to their ability" - even though there would be no shame. He would be shot, for the edification of others, but no, the king-dunce replaced the execution.
      1. 0
        28 May 2016 14: 33
        Traitor, like Nebogatov, on the forum. Minus set, for a colleague it became a shame.
  17. +1
    28 May 2016 13: 11
    Sorry I don’t know Japanese. I would very much like to read, and in what condition did the Japanese reach Tsushima, incl. and after repairing damage after the battle in the Yellow Sea. Belov - silence, searched, in our internet - I did not find anything. Technical English Internet is complicated for me, but there is nothing there.

    And that’s all - overload, Rozhdestvensky pathological deb ..., one might think the loop of Togo is the top of naval art. I repeat once again - just total bad luck.
    1. +1
      28 May 2016 13: 47
      In normal condition, they had 9 months in reserve, so we went through everything that we could and managed to replace the shot trunks
      1. 0
        28 May 2016 13: 58
        Where did this come from, especially about the English trunks?
        1. +1
          28 May 2016 14: 04
          So the stock was! And the Japanese went all war in Cardiff English
          1. 0
            28 May 2016 14: 06
            I believe that I was. Infa from where?
            Where were repaired. Revision of bonepoyas, replacement of plates. Revision of artifacts, change of trunks. Replacing crew loss. And so forth and so forth and so forth
            1. 0
              28 May 2016 14: 14
              The story of the Meiji Sea War! Navy Sasebo, Kure, Yokosuka were repaired. Shipyard in Nagasaki
              1. 0
                28 May 2016 14: 29
                Yes, there is nothing interesting in Volume 3.
    2. +1
      28 May 2016 14: 07
      The squadron immediately entered the battle while being squeezed in the strait, lacking both speed and room for maneuver. The Japanese completely controlling the time and place of the battle had a serious advantage in speed, which immediately allowed them to take a tactically more advantageous position, and not to miss this advantage to the end A part of the Russian ships was also forced to remain guarded by transporters, and accordingly they almost did not take part in the battle. You can add here the best training of Japanese sailors, the experience of the battle with the first Pacific squadron. it’s not worth talking about bad luck; the 2nd squadron had practically no chance.
    3. +1
      28 May 2016 15: 50
      Quote: King, just king

      And that’s all - overload, Rozhdestvensky pathological deb ..., one might think the loop of Togo is the top of naval art. I repeat once again - just total bad luck.

      The book of I.F. Tsvetkov has answers to many questions. For some reason, the whole complex of problems is not considered. The quality of shells, the inability and lack of practice in the use of modern, by that time, optical devices. There are damages to Japanese ships, but too little C .Suliga. "Ships of the Russo-Japanese War."
      1. 0
        28 May 2016 17: 28
        Ahhh, these shells are nonsense and so on. The CBD was not put on the line from a good life. If any of our KBRs were blocked, we’ll be the first to look, and Togo would take the cruiser off the line.

        By and large (knowing the truth in advance of what ended), it was necessary to leave everything old and the transports with Magnolia 2-3 transitions back in the guards of cruisers and EM, and break through the armored fist of Borodino + Oslyabya + maybe Sisoy, if they broke through, then and the old ones would have passed, and if not, then at least they would have been saved.
        1. -1
          29 May 2016 05: 13
          Quote: King, just king
          Ahhh, these shells are nonsense and so on. The CBD was not put on the line from a good life. If any of our KBRs were blocked, we’ll be the first to look, and Togo would take the cruiser off the line.

          Good! Here is the answer about the shells. When the Sveaborg Uprising in 1906 was suppressed, the shells of the 12 "guns of the battleship Slava, for the most part, did not explode, due to the high humidity of pyroxylin and unreliable fuses. And in different publications there are mentions that the Japanese simply killed wooden plugs in the places where Russian shells hit.
          1. 0
            29 May 2016 10: 42
            Quote: Amurets
            When the Sveaborg Uprising was suppressed in 1906, the shells of the 12 "guns of the battleship Slava, for the most part, did not explode, due to the high humidity of pyroxylin and unreliable fuses.

            Parts, especially primitive ones, as well as chemicals from storage deteriorate. So the example is 1906. not quite correct. It is possible that under Tsushima everything exploded well. Just didn’t hit.
          2. +5
            29 May 2016 11: 42
            Quote: Amurets
            When the Sveaborg Uprising was suppressed in 1906, the shells of the 12 "guns of the battleship Slava, for the most part, did not explode, due to the high humidity of pyroxylin and unreliable fuses.

            I'll correct it a little. Not a single "Glory" shell exploded in the Sveaborg fortress. None :))) For one simple reason - the battleship "Slava" did not take part in the suppression of the Sveaborg uprising :)) Ie. he was included in the squadron of ships, which was supposed to suppress, but on common reason (the team was considered unreliable) was not sent for shelling.
            Greetings to Novikov-Priboy, with whose light hand this maxim went for a walk in Glory. He did not hesitate to attribute Krylov.
            1. +1
              29 May 2016 16: 05
              Thank you "Andrey from Chelyabinsk"!
              Pancake. I was busy. This bike about Sveaborg, everyone who is interested in RIF should be known from the nursery group of kindergarten.
              Citizen "Amurets", well, what are you really ...
          3. The comment was deleted.
    4. 0
      4 November 2016 18: 32
      That's right. I don’t even know, in comparison with “I am not a naval commander” Vitgeft, what should I call Rozhdestvensky?
  18. The comment was deleted.
  19. -1
    28 May 2016 13: 38
    Three pillars of our defeat in that war - Kuropatkin, Stessel, Christmas!
    1. +4
      28 May 2016 14: 10
      No, you're wrong!!! The three pillars are sloppiness, not literacy and theft
  20. 0
    28 May 2016 13: 39
    the largest series of battleships of the era of the armored fleet was laid - squadron battleships of the Borodino type.

    It is very important to note here that the ships were laid as an EDB, but they failed to build full-fledged EDBs. The designer and engineer with the project screwed up. Yes, and then the builders also contributed.
    at the time of commissioning in 1903-1904, ships of the Borodino type were one of the most modern and advanced not only in the Russian fleet, but also in comparison with the fleets of other powers

    Gee-gee. I love this kind of article for such sparkling humor.
    The basis for the creation of the "Borodino" project was the battleship "Tsesarevich"

    This is the trouble. Although the Tsarevich himself, when he entered service, in terms of total power, successfully dangled on the border of the weak modern EBR1 and the strong old EBR1. Of course, on the basis of this pelvis, the Russian designers, as was the case above ?, created "the most perfect and modern project of the Borodino EDR."
    the lower of which had a thickness of 203 mm

    This was already the second option. And there was a third and a fourth. Due to the defectiveness of the project (overload was revealed), the thickness of the GP was reduced to 194 mm, and then some, quite important, sections, to 145 mm. Zashibichnyy turned EBR, with a cardboard (in places) on the GP. For those who are not up to date, less than 178 mm of the reduced krupp in those days did not make the armor of normal EBs at the GP. Even 2 classes.
    were the first ships in the world

    This is a very dangerous fact. We must carefully look who is the woodpecker, "the whole world" or "the first in the world." It happens in different ways.
    coped with the task in just 20 days!

    It can be seen.
    And he did it brilliantly, I must say.

    Of course.
    guaranteed better resistance and survivability

    Of course. Of course, 145 mm kruppa in places on the GP guarantee much greater security than 250 mm kruppa in the same places at Tsesarevich.
    In addition, due to the insignificant - only 5 mm! - reducing the thickness of the armor "Borodino"

    Today I am somehow particularly weak in mathematics. How much will 250-145 =? Do not want to take these sites? Okay, take the rest. How much will 250-194 =? I can be wrong, but it seems to me that more than 5 mm.
    1. -1
      28 May 2016 13: 43
      turned out to be very good ships

      Why? Didn’t drown yourself right away?
      construction and operational overload, due to which the battleships were not fast enough and maneuverable

      This is nonsense. The battleship differs from the tank in that it has a different surface under them. If the tank breaks during overload, the battleship sinks deeper into the water. At the same time, its GP is immersed, the location of which is designed for a strictly defined load. Up to a certain level of GP immersion (full displacement), the combat efficiency of the ship is maintained. More than this level, is rapidly losing, because GP ceases to play its protective function. In the presence of VP, it is he who begins to play the role of GP. In its absence, nothing plays this role and the battleship in fact turns into an armless ship. Well, that’s roughly so, schematically and in three words.
      the fifth, “Glory”, did not manage to go to the Far East.

      It's good. Worst of all was built.
      They rebuilt and modernized the ship, and he served under the name "Iwami"

      And yet, interestingly, it served, as befits a product of this kind, Brbo 1 class. And the Glory, which was built worse than the Eagle and did not undergo any modernization, served the EDB. Here it is, the difference of approaches. On postscript and fraud you will not go far.
      the experience gained by ... Russian sailors during military service was invaluable.

      Apparently, the author had in mind the crews of Suvorov, Alexander and Borodino, who almost completely died.
      Nevertheless, Borodino, Emperor Alexander III, Eagle, Prince Suvorov and Glory managed to enter their glorious page in it.

      They only wrote one page, Tsushima. But to call her "glorious" is too much.
    2. 0
      28 May 2016 13: 43
      turned out to be very good ships

      Why? Didn’t drown yourself right away?
      construction and operational overload, due to which the battleships were not fast enough and maneuverable

      This is nonsense. The battleship differs from the tank in that it has a different surface under them. If the tank breaks during overload, the battleship sinks deeper into the water. At the same time, its GP is immersed, the location of which is designed for a strictly defined load. Up to a certain level of GP immersion (full displacement), the combat efficiency of the ship is maintained. More than this level, is rapidly losing, because GP ceases to play its protective function. In the presence of VP, it is he who begins to play the role of GP. In its absence, nothing plays this role and the battleship in fact turns into an armless ship. Well, that’s roughly so, schematically and in three words.
      the fifth, “Glory”, did not manage to go to the Far East.

      It's good. Worst of all was built.
      They rebuilt and modernized the ship, and he served under the name "Iwami"

      And yet, interestingly, it served, as befits a product of this kind, Brbo 1 class. And the Glory, which was built worse than the Eagle and did not undergo any modernization, served the EDB. Here it is, the difference of approaches. On postscript and fraud you will not go far.
      the experience gained by ... Russian sailors during military service was invaluable.

      Apparently, the author had in mind the crews of Suvorov, Alexander and Borodino, who almost completely died.
      Nevertheless, Borodino, Emperor Alexander III, Eagle, Prince Suvorov and Glory managed to enter their glorious page in it.

      They only wrote one page, Tsushima. But to call her "glorious" is too much.
      1. 0
        28 May 2016 15: 26
        It is strange, in fact, that Iwami 06.06.1905 was included in the imperial fleet as a battleship of the 1st class.
        1. +1
          28 May 2016 15: 55
          Quote: Nehist
          It’s strange, actually, Iwami 06.06.1905 - is included in the imperial fleet as a battleship of the 1st class

          Nothing strange. At that time, he was only listed as until October 1909 (first Kure until 1907, then Uraga) underwent repair and modernization. And on August 28, 1912, he was retrained as battleships of coastal defense of the 1st class.
  21. The comment was deleted.
  22. +4
    28 May 2016 18: 12
    It's funny About a sober assessment.

    1. Does the construction overload of domestic battleships indicate that they are not capable of fighting? And the Japanese? "Mikasa" was overloaded by construction by about 900 tons. More than any of the "Borodintsy".
    2. Of the Japanese battleships, only the flagship was protected by Krupp armor. So the rest are not capable of fighting? "Fuji" had unprotected extremities and outdated GC installations, the speed of 15 knots - exactly a floating battery?
    3. Japanese "defenders" had a long speed of 17 to 15 knots. What cruiser could they catch up with? Whom could they protect so quickly? And they were not any "defenders". And they were ships for squadron combat. For fighting squadron battleships.
    The shells of the main shells of the Russian battleships -331 kg, shells of the main shells of the Japanese "non-defenders" -95 kg (there were shells and 118 kg, but the lifts were not adapted for them.) Russian shell of caliber 10 "-254 kg.
    It was the BBO that disabled Asama. In terms of fire performance, the "non-defenders" were inferior to the Russian cruisers with a displacement of 6000 tons. That is, "non-defenders" are not capable of fighting? An extremely unsuccessful project that just got lucky. Two or three full-fledged battleships, even the likes of Fuji, would be more useful.
    1. 0
      28 May 2016 19: 30
      Quote: ignoto
      And the Japanese? "Mikasa" was overloaded by construction by about 900 tons. More than any of the "Borodintsy".

      806 tons, to be exact. Why so? Glory was overloaded at 899 tons.
      But there are a couple of important details:
      1. In Mikas, the advantage was 34,6% of the total coal reserves. And in Glory, 72,8%. Feel the difference.
      2. New Japanese EDBs were designed for increased range in combat-ready condition. If for European EDB 20c the range was 5-6 thousand m.m. then for the Japanese 6-7 thousand m.m. Therefore, Mikasa, although it was built with a ball-mounting by the Vickers office, was built according to a good project (unlike Asahi). As a result of superimposing on each other all the circumstances, Mikasa confidently showed good indicators for the European EDB of the 20th century, the range in combat-ready condition was 5880 m.m
      The Borodino project was not good, it was "brilliant". Which does not mean his goodness at all. The range in combat condition was projected at the limit, 5 thousand m. As a result of all the circumstances overlapping each other, Slava had an operational range of 1370 m. Those. by this indicator, he did not even pull a normal BrBO, except perhaps an armored floating battery.
      These are the things with overload. And the Asahi was built the worst among the Japanese (599 tons of overload). Together with a not very successful project, this gave a range of 3330 m.m. The figure is at the level of normal 19th century EDBs, such as Fuji and Yashima.
      Quote: ignoto
      Of the Japanese battleships, only the flagship was protected by Krupp armor. So the rest are not combat ready?

      But for the rest, the percentage of armor was noticeably higher. For example, in Mikasa it was 27,0% (in Retvisan 25,6%), and in Sikishima 32,3%. And this despite the fact that Harvey-nickel armor in resistance was inferior to armor of Krupp type 1 of the order of 11-12%.
      Quote: ignoto
      "Fuji" had unprotected extremities and outdated GC installations, the speed of 15 knots - exactly a floating battery?

      Had so what? Fuji was a citadel armadillo and, in theory, could have no surface extremities. That would have destroyed them with shells, and he would have at least something. The main thing for him was, as for all citadel armadillos, to avoid overloading. And for the rest, you could not really worry.
      Maybe the installations were outdated. But the trunks were modern.
      Fuji's residual speed is estimated at 15,8 knots. It is at the level of the same Petropavlovsk. And noticeably more Sisoy and Navarin.
      1. 0
        28 May 2016 19: 32
        Quote: ignoto
        The Japanese "defenders" had a long stroke speed of 17 to 15 knots.

        Did you invent this yourself? Or was they deducted from Pekingham? I do not recommend using the data of this figure. The battle in the Korea Strait completely denied them.
        The residual speed of the Japanese defenders and state employees ranged from 19,5 (Asama) to 20,5 (Azuma) knots.
        Quote: ignoto
        And there were ships for squadron combat. For combat with squadron battleships.

        Yes? Apparently, therefore, they were armed with 8 "main battery guns, which could not affect even not very well protected armored ships (Thunderstorm and Russia). Do not invent" news ".
        By the way, they were different. There were 6 defenders, + there were still Garibaldians (2 pieces) for this, but from birth they were budget armadillos (battleships for the poor).
        Quote: ignoto
        shells of the main shell of the Japanese "non-defenders" -95 kg (there were shells and 118 kg, but the lifts were not adapted for them.

        In fact, the shells of the Japanese DBKs weighed 113,4 kg. But shells for lightweight 8 "/ 40 guns (they were on the Japanese BRPK) weighed 95,26 kg.
        Quote: ignoto
        Russian projectile of caliber 10 "-254 kg.

        254 mm. And 225,2 kg.
        Quote: ignoto
        It was the BBO that disabled Asama

        News after news from you.
        Quote: ignoto
        In terms of fire performance, the "non-defenders" were inferior to the Russian cruisers with a displacement of 6000 tons. That is, "non-defenders" are not capable of fighting?

        Those. hares in the length of their fangs and claws were inferior to wolves? It's funny. Is it okay that the 6 "shell of the DBK-defender was like an elephant's grain? But the 8" shell of the main battery of such a DBK-defender was mortally dangerous for the BRPK cruiser?
      2. The comment was deleted.
      3. +1
        28 May 2016 22: 11
        The strange assertion is that Japanese EDBs were designed with extended range! On the contrary, for the reduction of coal reserves, they were better armored and heavily armed. Yes, and they did not require range due to the specifics of the theater
        1. +1
          28 May 2016 22: 58
          Quote: Nehist
          The strange assertion is that Japanese EDBs were designed with extended range!

          However, this is the case for the new EDB 20c. Except Asahi.
          Sikishima on the project and in fact had a range of 6800 m.m. Hatsuse - 6500 m.m. Both ships are from Arstrong, so they were built perfectly. Even with a small saving in displacement.
          Mikasa on the project was supposed to have a range in the operational state of the order of 6700 m.m. But it was not built well, so in fact this range was approximately 5900 m.m. In principle, for the European EDB an excellent indicator.
          Asahi was a European (not heavily revised) project, and its range in combat-ready condition under the project was 5650 m.m. But it was also built not very high quality, so in fact this figure was about 3350 m.m. This is not enough even by European standards. Suffice it to say that the EDB 19 in Fuji and Yashima had a range of 3500 and 3000 m. respectively. According to the project and in fact (Armstrong).
          Quote: Nehist
          On the contrary, for the reduction of coal reserves, they were better armored and heavily armed.

          Well, what is the decline in coal reserves? The figures do not confirm this. The stock was noticeably larger than the Russian EDB.
          If you are interested in what the Japanese saved on, then I will tell you. And exclusively, they don't write about it anywhere. They saved on the GP booking level. All of their class 1 EDBs, except for Fuji and Yashima, were booked at the class 2 EDR level by GP. And already on this basis, formally, these ships of the EBR class 1 were not. Moreover, despite the fact that these ships were built in different places and according to different projects, this level of booking is the same for all 4s. Is that Mikasa, due to more modern armor, is protected "by a couple of kopecks" better. And the level of protection in terms of GP for the remaining 3 is exactly the same as that of the 2nd class Pobeda EDB. And, which is extremely surprising, for the DBK defenders Iwate and Izdumo.
          In addition, they saved on the length of the perimeter of the citadel. They cut it from all sides, wherever possible.
          At the same time, all the saved armor was spent on booking the top, here they had no equal.
          Quote: Nehist
          Yes, and they did not require range due to the specifics of the theater

          Actually, it was required. They were not only going to act around Japan.
          1. 0
            29 May 2016 01: 10
            Explain then how they, with a coal reserve of 200 tons less than their English counterparts, went more? All the Japanese EDBs were defended at a distance of 4500-5000 miles precisely on the project. And by definition, everyone could not go further in the banal amount of coal that determines the range.
            1. 0
              29 May 2016 01: 39
              Quote: Nehist
              Explain then how they, with a coal reserve of 200 tons less than their English counterparts, went more? All the Japanese EDBs were defended at a distance of 4500-5000 miles precisely on the project. And by definition, everyone could not go further in the banal amount of coal that determines the range.

              I don't know what the "English counterparts" are. Besides, I don't know what numbers you use. Therefore, I can not comment on anything additionally.
              According to the project, the total coal reserve at Mikas was 2327 tons. How can there be a range of 4500-5000 miles with such a supply of coal?
              1. 0
                29 May 2016 01: 48
                where did you get? According to the project, the total reserve of 1520 tons where did you get over 2000? Sikshima only had over 1700 tons
                1. +2
                  29 May 2016 02: 57
                  Quote: Nehist
                  According to the project, the total reserve of 1520 tons where did you get over 2000?

                  Book "Nihon no senkan" v.1, there is a detailed weight summary. Project figures and actual figures.
                  If you take a fact. Mikasa’s full offset, subtract the design normal offset from it and add the normal coal supply, and then subtract the overweight, then we get the same 1521 tons of coal. But this is actually, taking into account the advantage, and the project was 2327 tons.
                  By the way, the English-speaking Vika supports this particular version. Unlike Russian.
                  Quote: Nehist
                  Sikshima only had over 1700 tons

                  1722 tons, according to the same sources. And Hatsus 1643 tons.
            2. The comment was deleted.
        2. The comment was deleted.
  23. +2
    28 May 2016 20: 20
    Author! The Slava was not sunk, but flooded. There is a difference?
    1. 0
      28 May 2016 21: 40
      The fame was gouged so that she got water and was not much different from the sunken one. The question is what they managed to drag to a place where her carcass could benefit even at the bottom.
    2. -1
      28 May 2016 22: 46
      If you get clever, it is still sunk by the torpedo of the guarding destroyers (there was a salvo), after the crew was removed.
  24. 0
    28 May 2016 20: 27
    On the only surviving battleship "Eagle" Kostenko served as a ship engineer, who in Soviet times became a prominent shipbuilder of the USSR. After the battle, he wrote the book "On the Eagle" in Tsushima ", which describes in detail the construction of the" Eagle ", in which he took part, the preparation of the ship, the transition to Tsushima, the battle itself and the subsequent Japanese captivity. In this book there are answers to many questions that are procrastinated on the site by home-grown "experts" of maritime affairs.
    1. +2
      28 May 2016 21: 30
      Quote: valerei
      This book contains answers to many questions that are procrastinated on the site by home-grown "experts" of maritime affairs.

      This book has a bunch of inconsistencies and contradictions, especially if you compare what Kostenko wrote with what he said to the Commission of Inquiry. Of course, it is necessary to read his book, but it has more value in terms of describing the campaign and the battle, but Kostenko’s conclusions, alas, are not worth a penny
      1. 0
        28 May 2016 22: 32
        Of course not! However, who is Kostenko! - a highly qualified shipbuilding engineer and who is "Andrey from Chelyabinsk" ?, as the saying goes: "Who are the judges?" In competence on this issue, you have incomparably different weight categories with him.
        1. +2
          28 May 2016 22: 41
          Quote: valerei
          However, who is Kostenko! - a highly qualified shipbuilding engineer

          At the time of the Tsushima battle, this is a graduate, yesterday’s student. What kind of higher qualifications are there ...
          Quote: valerei
          and who is "Andrey from Chelyabinsk" ?, as they say: "Who are the judges?" In competence on this issue, you have incomparably different weight categories with him.

          First, you have a logical contradiction. If I cannot judge Kostenko’s conclusions due to the lack of specialized education, then Kostenko has absolutely no right to judge the tactics of the Russian fleet in Tsushima, since he is not a naval education officer. He is a shipbuilder, and that’s it. I didn’t see the fight myself - I was in the infirmary :)) But after it I gave out a wonderful theory-analysis about how the squadron fought and how it should have done it.
          Therefore, be logical, and this is your pathetic "who are the judges ?!" pay attention first of all to Kostenko :)))
          And secondly, I do not offer a PERSONAL look at Kostenko’s work. I repeat, he says this one, then the second, then the third, it is enough to read his book ATTENTIVELY and compare it with his testimony. And his words do not correspond to the testimonies of naval officers, such as Semenov, Swede, etc.
          1. 0
            29 May 2016 01: 36
            Particularly impressive is the number of hits in Oryol that Kostenko leads))))
      2. 0
        29 May 2016 18: 52
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        This book has a bunch of inconsistencies and contradictions, especially if you compare what Kostenko wrote with what he said to the Commission of Inquiry.

        But you are missing, what the author said to the commission and when he wrote the book are separated by many decades. In addition, emnip, Kostenko went through a lot that not everyone is given - even in civil war, when he was arrested by the interventionists and "sat down" with the advice. In general, the details could get blurry ..... so the circumnavigation to Tsushima may not be entirely accurate ....... unfortunately.
  25. 0
    28 May 2016 21: 18
    The reasons for the death of "Alexander III" are still not known. By the way, it may not be accurate - but in the Russo-Japanese war, not a single ship was killed due to detonation of ammunition (mines do not count). Maybe the reason for the death of several new Russian battleships in the battle is very commonplace - a mistake in design or construction. Not all, but such as "Oslyabya", "Borodino", "Alexander III". How else to explain that the riddled Oryol and Suvorov remained afloat, and Suvorov was finished off only with torpedoes?
    1. +1
      28 May 2016 21: 36
      Quote: Prometey
      during the Russo-Japanese War, not a single ship was lost due to detonation of the ammunition (mines do not count).

      What about Borodino?
      How else to explain that the riddled "Eagle" and "Suvorov" remained afloat

      The top (slightly above the overhead line), cut by fragments (usually the stronger term "ridged" is used), has no effect on buoyancy.
    2. +1
      28 May 2016 21: 54
      Quote: Prometey
      By the way, it may not be accurate - but in the Russo-Japanese War, not a single ship was lost due to detonation of the ammunition (mines do not count).

      "Korean":))))
      But seriously, Borodino. After the 305-mm hit in the area of ​​the 152-mm turret, a strong explosion was observed and after that the battleship turned over. Most likely it was like this - the artillery cellar of 152-mm charges and shells detonated, from which a large hole was formed in the underwater part, well ...
      "Alexander III" - the only "Borodino" who really lost stability, but it most likely happened like this - the ship received extensive flooding (probably, several shells fell under the armor belt), which is why it had a roll, coped with the roll, most likely counter-flooding (according to eyewitnesses, the battleship straightened up, but sat very low in the water, which would not have happened if the water had just been pumped out) Before the death, the ship tilted again (probably - again underwater holes) and, since it sat deeply, the water poured into the ports of 75-mm guns, which on battleships of this type were indeed placed very low.
      And "Oslyabya" - everything is clear with it, had unarmored extremities and after an extremely unsuccessful, possibly - double hit in the bow of the 305-mm "suitcases", the water gushed like Niagara falls. The ship could have been saved if this hole was the only one, it would have got a trim on the bow and that's it, but from this trim more and more holes ended up under water ("Oslyaba threw six-inch wells well), in general, the rescue teams did not cope.
  26. +1
    28 May 2016 21: 37
    Judging by the results of the battle, all of Sorokin’s products were a little d. But they gained experience. Spend more than 20 days on a project
    1. 0
      28 May 2016 22: 04
      Quote: Kenneth
      Judging by the results of the battle, all of Sorokin’s products were a little g.

      Skvortsova.
      Quote: Kenneth
      But experience gained. Spend more than 20 days on a project

      In fact, Skvortsov's ships were not built according to this project. Because rejected. Built according to the "revised and improved" Lagan's project. "Revised and improved" Lagan Skvortsov's project a little more than 2 months, from January 12 to March 27, 1899. And then, in the course of construction, too, "improved and reworked."
      In fact, the junior shipbuilder Skvortsov acted as Captain Mosin. Only the latter "improved and reworked" the Nagant rifle into the "legendary three-line". And Skvortsov, the battleship Lagan, became the "legendary Borodino".
      Unfortunately, history is silent about who exactly "improved and reworked" the French Canon de 75 mle 1897 cannon into the "legendary three-inch gun". It would be interesting to know. One replacement of an advanced shutter with a sloppy (but very simple) was worth what.
  27. +3
    29 May 2016 11: 09
    Quote: verboo
    Oh yeah. This "genius naval commander" fleets and squadrons across the seas and oceans led many times. And he beat the foe, do not count. Only I have forgotten the examples. Can you remind me? And then offhand only the catch of the Japanese Makarov on replication with the destruction of the flagship Petropavlovsk (with the entire crew, headquarters, Makarov and the artist Vereshchagin) climbs into the head.

    At least Makarov did not run from the Japanese, but was looking for battles with them. And the tragedy of Petropavlovsk ... anyone could get puncture ... By the way, a little later, the Russians paid Togo the same coin. As a result, the Japanese fleet lost 2 EBR on mine banks.
    1. -2
      29 May 2016 11: 19
      Quote: mamont5
      At least Makarov did not run from the Japanese, but was looking for battles with them.

      What did not find? Here they are, in front of the PA every day loomed. And he did not find.
      Quote: mamont5
      And the tragedy of Petropavlovsk ... anyone could get punctured here

      What do you mean, anyone? Why, besides Makarov, did no one leave the PA almost every day and did "maneuvers" on the same patch?
      Quote: mamont5
      By the way, a little later, the Russians paid back Togo with the same coin.

      Makarov ordered? Or Vitgeft? So who is the "great naval commander" after that?
      By the way, the mine can is a mine can. The Russian mine can had a lot of such features that really make it possible to talk about Vitgeft's fleet-growing talent.
      1. 0
        29 May 2016 14: 03
        I don’t know who you minus for this koment slapped, but the death of Petropavlovsk as well as the destroyer Stereuschiy entirely on the conscience of Makarov! This is how it was possible to go out without minesweepers knowing that the Japanese constantly mine water. Is it like knowing that destroyers are at sea and should come up and not provide them with cover knowing that Japanese cruisers constantly graze under arthur? In general, Makarov, the torpedo boat, and battleships never led to battle ... Many of his thoughts provoke conflicting thoughts and, to put it mildly, arouse suspicions that the admiral was not quite inside
        1. 0
          29 May 2016 15: 41
          Quote: Nehist
          I don’t know who you minus for this koment slapped

          Apparently, comments should not be written historically correct, but ideologically correct.
          Quote: Nehist
          and battleships never led into battle ...

          This "glorified naval commander" had never commanded squadrons before RYA, let alone fleets. Only once in peacetime he was a "ferry admiral" of a detachment of ships (from the Baltic to the Far East). Well at least there were no consequences. But the command of the squadron was already with consequences.
          The Bolsheviks, of course, fanned the elephant out of a fly. They very much liked the origin of Makarov.
          Quote: Nehist
          Many of his thoughts provoke conflicting thoughts and, to put it mildly, raise suspicions that the admiral was not quite inside

          I was somehow impressed by his project of converting "pebbles" from small BRPK reconnaissance aircraft into small BRPK fighters. The mash is wild. First, there are definitely positive points:
          1. Remove one of the three cars.
          2. Add another normal supply of coal.
          Get lost for the task? Definitely hurt yourself, who is arguing? But at the same time there was a controversial point:
          1. Supply two auxiliary (100hp each) economical running machines. Rurik's type scheme called "hemorrhoids". Very controversial proposals.
          And further on, something that can only cause bewilderment:
          1. How can a BrPK reconnaissance be turned into a BrPK fighter without changing the dimensions of the hull? After all, the dimensions of these ships are completely different (even with the same displacement), because they have different tasks, these are antipode ships. No, theoretically this can be done, but why? A good BrPC fighter will not work out unambiguously. Therefore, this can only be done when it is desperately needed. In force majeure situations.
          2. It was proposed to leave the 2 main cars the same, which is insanity. The course of such a "fighter" could not be more than 22 knots, which in 20c was already very small. Even Boyarin, a real small BRPK fighter, walked more. Although just speed was called his Achilles heel.
          Of the machines available in Russia at that time, it was possible to supply 2 machines that were on the Borodino, Tsarevich and Bayan. In this case, the move of the "pebbles" would be already acceptable, something around 24 knots. And in two cars of the Bogatyr, he would go well at all, no less than 25 knots.
          In general, the meaning of acquiring a license for Novik's cars is not entirely clear. It would be much more logical to put them on every little thing. But no, they stood on real "pebbles" (3 pieces). As a result, the latter had a very small travel range. Although the cars themselves, in principle, were not bad. Their use was lame on both legs.
          3. Remove the old artillery, replacing it with 1x203mm + 5x152mm + 10x75mm. This is not a gate at all. Why would a small BRPK-fighter, whose "clients" are basically "merchants" and military transports of such art? What will he do with it, against whom to apply?
          And indeed, in principle, the BrKK fighter (as well as the armored raider) should not engage in battle with the enemy’s warship, its business will be washed off in time. Other service specifics. For this, speed is needed, for this they didn’t put towers (and even gun shields) on such ships, facilitating them in every possible way.
          This project was, of course, rejected. And Kuteinikov called it a floating BRPK-battery. But this project was put forward by the "outstanding naval commander" in all seriousness. And this already says something.
          1. +1
            29 May 2016 16: 04
            That's what I mean by the govar that there are suspicions of sanity !!! The same armless cruisers with the maximum number of large-shell guns !!! For what and why? According to the admiral, they had to destroy linear forces! The question is HOW ??? !!!! Lack of full combat stability! And for the trade fighters, we had three goddesses, which were too bulky. Pebbles are typical scouts, well, like Destroyers, that is, destroyers to use, well, or leaders according to a later classification, they were no good for more! tasks for either insufficient speed or insufficient range.
            1. 0
              29 May 2016 16: 14
              Contemporary of the "young school" of the uncontested French

              And as for cruisers in RIF, in my personal opinion, there was quite a sane policy, and for battleships too. Questions about the EBR, in general, these are SCs in the towers (especially for the "Petropavlovtsy"), and the construction speed is not very good.
            2. 0
              29 May 2016 17: 03
              Quote: Nehist
              And for the trade fighters, we had three goddesses, which were too bulky.

              Yes, I also thought so at one time (I read it from "authoritative authors"). Until I began to look more closely at their dimensions and so on. In fact, goddesses are "colonial cruisers" (another name for BRPK-stationers). Scaled Svetlana. Why RIF needed them, I did not understand this, and apparently I cannot understand. Russia had no overseas colonies. During the war, such ships mainly carry out convoy and guard duty. Well, and so, joke around the base. For other purposes and tasks, they are not adapted, some key components are missing in their performance characteristics.
              In the RIF there were only 2 BrPK fighters, this is a big one, Varyag. And small, Boyarin.
              Quote: Nehist
              Pebbles are typical scouts, well, like Destroyers, that is, counter destroyers to use, or, according to a later classification, leaders, for better they were not suitable!

              And also Novik. Small (and close) BRPK scouts. Do not be confused by the term "scout". This is such a not entirely successful translation from English. The reconnaissance ships were not engaged in reconnaissance, in the Russian sense of the word. One of the tasks of the small BRPK reconnaissance officers was just counter-mine-carrying warfare.
              Quote: Nehist
              In general, from a larger number of cruisers in the RIF normal, you can re-finger on the fingers

              All foreign built. Varangian, Askold, Bogatyr, Novik, Boyarin and Bayan. Varangian and Boyarin, these are BrPK fighters, the rest are scouts. At the same time, Bayan is not BrKK, but a DBK reconnaissance (not a DBK defender, like the Japanese have). The Varangian and Bogatyr were long-range ships, the rest were close. Novik and Boyarin, these are small cruisers, the rest are large.
              There were also BrpK inpatients. This is, first of all, Svetlana and the goddess. What for they were, I do not know. After all, they were built on purpose, and pensioner cruisers of other categories usually fall into the category of hospital cruisers. Type Monomakh and Don. Apparently, for some reason this was necessary for someone.
            3. The comment was deleted.
  28. -1
    29 May 2016 21: 42
    The great USSR avenged Tsushima in full!
  29. +1
    30 May 2016 11: 37
    Do not forget that Rozhdestvensky’s squadron, in fact, was a convoy — it was connected by maneuver, low-speed transport, which they were forced to cover. The cruiser detachment repulsed the attacks of Japanese cruisers on transports and on armadillos.

    No matter how modern Russian battleships are, it is not possible to withstand massive fire from several ships. The faster squadron can dictate the conditions of the attack, which the Japanese did - repeatedly "putting their wand over the T" - that is, massaging fire on the lead ship of the Russian squadron.
    It is useless to discuss performance characteristics - losing in speed, losing in tactical maneuvering, losing in controlling the squadron.
    1. 0
      4 November 2016 18: 49
      It's like that. Yes, only Rozhdestvensky himself climbed into this T meekly. Even from 2 columns into one rebuilt. As a specialist: quickly drown the main forces in a fire trap, so that it would be more convenient for the Yap to shoot the "convoy". Everything for the client, I understand! He took care of the convoy, there is nothing to say, well done. I wonder how he intended to "defend the convoy" by slipping 4 head EBR ahead of all the others? The 3-ranker in chess knows how important it is to tie up the main forces of the opponent with his weak pieces. And a maneuver with what is "our everything." Evil is not enough. He led the squadron like rams to the slaughter.
  30. 0
    18 June 2016 09: 37
    Comments pleased
  31. 0
    9 October 2016 09: 01
    "Legends of the Tsushima battle" - delivers))))
  32. 0
    4 November 2016 18: 41
    I believe that the Japanese themselves are still freaking out from the "buy-in" of Tsushima. This is a jackpot of some kind. Synergy, on the contrary, for us, of course. 1) Found and met Russians where and when needed. 2) The Russians with the GK shells are "not TO". Did the Yapas know that? 3) Motley squadron, low speed. - An objective plus, but with the passivity of the enemy. 4) "The genius of maneuver" Rozhdestvensky. Finally a gift! Correctly someone put it "esoterically": "Mass sacrifice to the demon of the statehood of Japan." As the meaning of the result.