1941 year: Silent horror in tank forces
In the first article of the cycle, I tried to quantify the tank fleet of the Soviet Union at the time of the German attack. Now let's talk about the quality characteristic tanks and tank units of the Red Army. How significant was it, and how different was the reality from what was written on paper ...
In the first article of the cycle, I tried to quantify the tank fleet of the Soviet Union at the time of the German attack. Now let's talk about the qualitative characteristics of tanks and tank units of the Red Army. How significant was it, and how much did reality differ from what was written on paper?
The Soviet tank division under the draft resolution 1940 of the year was to consist of two tank regiments, each of which was to consist of a battalion of heavy tanks, two battalions of medium tanks, a battalion of "chemical" (ie, flame-throwing) tanks. In addition, the division was supposed to have a motorized regiment, a howitzer artillery regiment, an anti-aircraft artillery division, reconnaissance, pontoon-bridge, medical and sanitary, road transport, repair and restoration battalions, a communications battalion, a company of regulation, a field bakery. The division was armed with 386 tanks (105 KV, 227 T-34, 54 "chemical"), 108 armored vehicles, 42 artillery guns, 72 mortars.
However, as a result, staff number 010 / 10 was approved with some changes [1]:
Command staff - 746 people.
Commanding composition - 603 people.
Junior commanding staff - 2438 people.
Ordinary composition - 6777 people.
Total personnel - 10564 people.
972 self-loading rifles SVT
Mosin 3651 rifles
1270 carbine
45 sniper rifles.
Cars - 46 pcs.
Trucks - 1243 pcs.
Special vehicles - 315 pcs.
Tractor - 73 pcs.
Autokitchens - 85 pcs.
Heavy tanks - 105 pcs.
Medium tanks - 210 pcs.
Flame-throwing tanks - 54 pcs.
Light tanks - 44 pcs.
Average BA - 56 pcs.
Light BA - 35 pcs.
Motorcycles with a machine gun - 212 pcs.
Motorcycles without a machine gun - 113 pcs.
Artillery guns:
152-mm - 12 pcs.
122-mm - 12 pcs.
76 mm zen. - 4 pcs.
37 mm zen. - 12 pcs.
Mortars:
50-mm - 27 pcs.
82-mm - 18 pcs.
Machine guns - 45 pcs.
Light machine guns - 169 pcs.
Heavy machine guns - 6 pcs.
As we can see, on paper, the Soviet tank division of the 1941 model of the year looked quite impressive: tanks alone were under five hundred! But, as they say "it was smooth on paper, but they forgot about the ravines" ...
To begin with, none of the Soviet tank divisions were equipped to full strength. This is known to all. In addition, there was a certain qualitative assessment of the mat.parts of armored troops. According to the orders of the NKO USSR №12-16 10 January 1940 of the year and the "Instructions for Accounting and Reporting in the Red Army" from 10 April 1940, it was stipulated that all the property of the Red Army in its qualitative state is divided into five categories:
1. The new, not being in operation, meeting the requirements of technical conditions and quite suitable for use for its intended purpose.
2. Former (in use), fully serviceable and usable for its intended purpose. This category also includes property that requires troop repair (maintenance).
3. Demanding repair in district workshops (medium repair).
4. Demanding repair in the central workshops and at factories of the industry (capital repairs).
5. Not good.
Of particular interest is the 2 category, or more precisely, the phrase that "this includes property that requires troop repair." Such a streamlined formulation leads to sad thoughts that some tanks belonging to the 2 category and were considered in almost all the works devoted to stories Soviet armored troops, battle-worthy, were not capable of not only entering into battle, but, at times, simply moving on their own.
Quite a lot of engine malfunctions can (and should) be fixed by repair shops of tank units. That is, the tank is in the 2 category, but in fact it is not able to move independently. But I mentioned the tank engine only as an example, in fact, the options for various malfunctions that should be fixed in the army by the current repair, but do not allow the tank to be used effectively (and sometimes completely) in combat. Engine (partly), gearbox (partly), friction, on-board transmissions, ventilation, control devices, and surveillance, tank gun and its components ... leaks, misalignments, jamming - this is not a complete list of faults that may be present and which are necessary eliminate, but in the presence of which the tank on paper continues to be listed as “fully operational and usable for its intended purpose." Such a paper balancing act, on the bait of which quite a lot of researchers fell.
For example, the 125-th tank regiment of the 202-th MD 12-th MK PribOVO 22 June 1941 of the year alarmed 49 T-26, and 16 combat vehicles (about 30 percent!) Threw out of order in the parks, although they seemed to be to the very, 2-th category and on paper were "quite serviceable and fit" [2].
Or, for example, the 28-th TD of the same 12-th MK alarmed 210 BT-7 out of its parks, leaving it out of order in the 26 vehicle parks, managed to get 56 T-26 tanks, leaving 13 [3].
The 3-th TD of the 1-th “exemplary” MK LVO pulled out of the 32 parks from the T-40 tanks from the 28, and a little later another 17 tanks lagged behind on the march due to damage to the brakes [4].
21-th TD 10-th MK LVO performed 160 from 177 T-26, 24-I TD of the same building brought out 232 BT-2 and BT-5 and left 49 machines of these types in parks, there were also thrown T -26 divisions [5].
10 th TD 15 th MK KOVO alarmed X-NUMX T-37 tanks, left a tank of this type in 34, fired 1 and left 44 T-17, fired 28 and left 147 BT-34, you left X-NNXX, left X-NNXX, left 7 and left 19 BT-3, you installed X-NNXX, left X-NNXX and left 26 BT-5, you left X-NNXX, left XNUMX and left XNUMX BT-XNUMX, you left X-NNXX, you left XNUMX and left XNUMX BT-XNUMX, you installed X-NNXX, you left XNUMX and left XNUMX BT-XNUMX, you left X-ZNXX, you left XNUMX and left XNUMX BT-XNUMX; -XNUMX [XNUMX].
This mournful list can be continued for a very long time, in almost every tank division of every mechanized corps the same thing happened. And note, these are only cars that could move themselves. That is, some of the withdrawn from the park probably had some other faults that influenced their combat effectiveness.
As for abandoned cars, it turns out that in fact in parks left from 10 to 25% of tanks (in the overwhelming number of cases - the old types). Although according to the reporting of parts and compounds, they belonged to the 2 category and were considered quite combat-ready.
Why in fact it turned out so many abandoned cars that were listed as "fully serviceable"? First of all, this was due to the lack of repair facilities, and most importantly, the almost complete lack of spare parts for both new tanks and old type combat vehicles. Soviet industry plan for the production of spare parts for tanks in the 1940 year completed only 30%. For example, plant number 183 had to release spare parts for BT tanks in the amount of 20 300 000 rubles, and only released 3 808 000 rubles. For the T-34 tanks, the same plant, having a plan for the production of spare parts for 6 million rubles, was able to produce the most scarce spare parts for B-2 engines and for CAT only for 1,65 million rubles. STZ having a spare parts plan for T-34 for 10 million rubles was able to fulfill the entire 5% of the plan. And for spare parts for tanks KV LKZ fulfilled the plan for ... 0%!
Year after year, the industry of the USSR has been unable to cope with the plan for the production of spare parts for tanks and automobiles, which is reflected in the report of Lieutenant-General Fedorenko, head of the GABTU:
“To ensure the availability of a fleet of vehicles in 1941, as well as to spare emergency supplies for spare parts in the Red Army, spare parts and units are required: for 1941 a year, supplying NPOs with spare parts for tanks, tractors and automobiles is not enough, namely:
a) tank spare parts allocated for 219 million rubles. instead of the required 476 million rubles upon request;
b) automobile and tractor - funds allocated for 112,5 million rubles versus 207 million rubles for the annual application.
The supply of auto parts from the industry (based on one car) is decreasing from year to year: for tank vehicles it remains almost without an increase, despite the fact that cars are aging and wear out ...
At 1941 year, the factories No. 26, 48 and Kirovsky, due to the transition to the release of new products, stopped the production of spare parts for T-28 tanks and M-5 and M-17 engines.
Plants Nos. 37, 174 and 183 reduce the production of spare parts for BT, T-26 T-37 - 38 tanks and the Comintern tractor.
Especially bad is the situation with the supply of non-profit organizations of deficient tank and autotractor parts. Details of the motor group (pistons, connecting rods, piston rings, etc.) and a number of others are under-supplied by industry year after year. ”
18 June 1941 of the year (4 day before the start of the war!) Fedorenko sends an angry letter to the People's Commissar of Medium Machine Building to Malyshev in which he paints a deplorable picture with the release of spare parts by industrial plants. And you can understand General Fedorenko - from the 183 ordered at the plant No. (spare parts for BT tanks) 285 M-17 engines to 1 June 1941 is released 0! Zero! Of the 100 M-5 engines - 57 (half), of the 75 diesel engines B-2 - 43 (slightly more than half), of the 300 gearbox - only 6 (in words - six!). In addition, there are almost no gearboxes, gearbox gears, axle shafts, complete wheels and engine equipment.
The factories of GlavAvtoTractorDetal were to produce spare parts for BT tanks for 9 million rubles. June 1 released parts on 25 thousand rubles, or 0,3%! But the factories of this union produced spare parts badly needed in the troops: wheels, half-shafts, balancers, cranks, gear covers, guitars, trucks, etc.
For spare parts for T-34 tanks at the factory No. 183, the picture is the same: of the B-150 engines ordered by 2, 0 was commissioned, and 200 from 50 gearbox. Plant No.75 tore off the plan for the production of B-2 diesel engines: out of the ordered 735 units, only 141 units were accepted for state half a year.
Directly in the tank units and formations, the situation with the presence / absence of spare parts looked like this [9]:
6 Mechanic Corps.
“For combat vehicles - for the T-28 tank there are no spare parts for the undercarriage of the final drive. There are no crawler and axle drive wheels for the BT tank. For other brands of military vehicles, the supply of spare parts for 60-70%.
For auxiliary machines provision of spare parts is extremely insufficient. For 4-th quarter of 1940, 10% of demand was received; for the 1-th quarter of 1941, the situation has not improved.
Completely lacking revolving units, such as: motors, gearboxes, rear axles for all brands of cars.
The provision of rubber on M-1 machines is completely absent, with the result that 30-40% of M-1 machines in parts are without rubber. Gusmatik BA-20 armored cars are not fully supplied with gusmatik.
Due to the lack of spare parts, there is no possibility of timely recovery of machines with medium and current repairs ”[7].
8 Mechanic Corps
“7-i motorized rifle division. Repair facilities equipped with 22%. There are no fixed workshops and machine tools in the RVB (repair and restoration battalion - author's note).
Spare parts for the repair of combat and wheeled vehicles division provided for 1%. Spare parts in the "NZ" for combat and wheeled vehicles - no.
Rubber trucks and wheeled vehicles are provided on 60%, armored vehicles on 100%. From the availability of trucks 200 due to lack of rubber are on the pads. Average rubber wear on 70% ”[8].
9 Mechanic Corps
“The availability of spare parts is unsatisfactory, there are no spare parts in the NZ at all. There are also no spare parts at the current content, with the exception of a number of random non-running parts. ”
And so on and so forth...
As a result of this provision of spare parts, after 22 June 1941, hundreds, if not thousands of tanks, often with minimal damage, were abandoned at the locations of our tank units and formations. A repair of wrecked vehicles, which nevertheless managed to get out of the battlefield, was carried out mainly in the most barbaric way - using the “cannibalization” method, that is, out of two or three failed tanks, one serviceable was assembled. Until the war began, no one, of course, did not allow for the dismantling of almost combat-ready tanks, awaiting the receipt of spare parts or repair orders.
Well, well, the reader will say, even so. Let the N-th number of tanks in the Soviet troops was not capable. But after all, the very fact of double superiority even these very solid numbers do not cancel? Of course it is. However, the tank itself is just a pile of iron, and to turn it into a full-fledged combat unit requires hard work of many people. The tank requires ammunition, competent maintenance, fuel and lubricants, a trained crew, etc. etc.
Let's start with ammunition. Again, we all know that the F-34 cannon, which was mounted on the T-34 tank, was the most powerful tank weapon placed on production tanks in the 1941 year (the ZiS-5 cannon for the KV-1 tanks had identical characteristics and identical ammunition) and hit virtually any German tank from any distance of actual fire. Once again, everyone knows that. But the enemy's tanks do not run up in panic, barely seeing the silhouette of the T-34! In German tanks - who would have thought - it is necessary to shoot! And here begins a new series of problems.
So, in the 9090 w / h statement from 30 on April 1941, in the column “76-mm armor-piercing tracer” is a bold zero. It is supposed to have a 33 084 shot, the 33 084 shot is missing, the percentage of security is zero! Do you know what this 9090 is in? This, no less than nothing, is the 6 th mechanized corps of the Zapovo under the command of Major General MG G. Khatskilevich - the most powerful mechanized corps in the Western Military District and one of the most equipped in the Red Army. So, the most powerful and equipped mechkorpus ZAPOVO on 22 June 1941 of the year had 238 T-34 tanks, 113 KV tanks and ... not a single armor-piercing projectile to them!
The same situation can be seen not only in the 6 of the MK, but also, for example, in the 3 of the MK PribOVO: on 25, April KV - 51 tanks, T-34 - 50 tanks, it is assumed by 17 948 armor-piercing 76-mm shells available - 0. I repeat once again - zero, zero, nothing, dummy.
And what about the security of 76-mm projectiles in the most equipped with new types of tanks mechanized corps of the Red Army: in the 4-m mechanized corps KOVO? probably there they are!
No, they are not there either: available (on 1 in May 1941): tanks KV - 72, tanks T-34 - 242. It is supposed to have 76 66 tank guns for 964-mm tank guns, one of them is available ... you guessed it ... zero! Or maybe there are other shells? Say, armor-piercing tracer, or at least high-explosive fragmentation? Not. They are also zero.
At the beginning of June, the 76 th mechanized corps under the command of D.I. turned out to be the richest projectiles for 34-mm guns for tanks KV and T-8. Ryabyshev: from the state-supplied 8 163 armor-piercing shells in the case there were as many 2 350 pieces, that is, almost a third of the need.
Aha, he will say, a shrewd reader, since all these shells were in the warehouses, they simply did not have time to give them to the unit! Forced to disappoint such a reader: and in the warehouses of armor-piercing shells of caliber 76-mm was not. According to the certificate of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, drawn up 20 days before the start of World War II, the situation with 76-mm armor-piercing shells was deplorable:
1 table. Help on the implementation of orders for the production of 76-mm armor-piercing shells for 1936-1940. (compiled 3 June 1941 g.) [9]
Moreover, about 100 thousands of shells of the caliber 76-mm produced by the industry were not equipped by March 1941.
The situation with 76-mm armor-piercing shells was a real disaster. In it, as in a mirror, the general problems of the military-industrial complex of the USSR were reflected. Prior to the beginning of the 30 of the 20th century, special armor-piercing ammunition for 76-mm caliber guns was not made at all, for almost all tanks of that period had anti-bullet booking with which, for example, 76-mm shrapnel shell delivered “ to blow. The Soviet military industry failed to react in time to the next round of the technological race - the emergence of the first generation of tanks with anti-missile booking. The situation was aggravated by the worse quality of Soviet ammunition, compared to German ammunition of comparable caliber (75 mm).
In the USSR, there was a terrible personnel shortage. Our country simply did not have enough qualified specialists. As a result, the USSR could not provide the production line of armor-piercing shells with three (turner, welder, puncher) highly qualified specialists, as the Germans did. In the USSR, such people were in disguise, they were distributed among the factories "by the piece". Yes, the Soviet armor-piercing projectile was simpler, more technological, cheaper, and it was done only by a turner. But in terms of quality, it was inferior to the similar 75-mm German projectile. What is it poured? On the one hand, the additional sacrifices of our soldiers, tankers. On the other hand, no one would argue that it is better to have 15-20 shells of degraded quality than to have one "golden" one - every gunner will tell you.
With the beginning of the war and the evacuation of many core enterprises, the situation has deteriorated further. From the report of the Central Research Institute-48 of 22 in July 1942 “The defeat of the armor of German tanks” it is clear that a year after the start of the Second World War the situation with 76-mm projectile piercing shells improved only slightly. The very first line of the report states that “due to the lack of the required number of stone armor-piercing projectiles at present ...” and further on. In the list used by Soviet artillery and 76-mm ammunition with anti-enemy tanks, the high-explosive steel grenade ranks second, the shrapnel is on the third, the incendiary projectile is on the fourth, the high-explosive steel grenade is on the third, the fragmentation grenade is on the fourth steel cast iron. Even the appearance of the BR-350BSP simplified armor-piercing projectile (“solid” - that is, just a steel bar) only partially alleviated the problem, but did not solve it completely.
So Soviet tankers went to attack German tanks and infantry without shells. I do not claim that this was a universal phenomenon, but that it took place - I hope, now it is clear to the reader. Knowing the situation with ammunition in tank units, now you are not particularly surprised by the memoirs of former soldiers and officers of the enemy, in which they repeatedly describe the attacks of our tanks without opening fire on them. We are also not surprised by the numerous photographs of our tanks, which rammed German tanks, guns, and cars. No shells - you have to go to the ram, trying to at least cause damage to the enemy.
Now about the people who fought on the formidable KV and T-34, and not so terrible BT, T-26, T-28, etc.
Let's start with a very painful topic - the general educational level of soldiers and commanders of the Red Army in the pre-war tank forces. Immediately make a reservation: for more than 20 years of Soviet power, the situation with education in Russia / USSR has changed dramatically. So, in 1914, 61% of the rank and file of the Russian army was illiterate, on the eve of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, this figure fluctuated in different parts from 0,3 to 3 percent. However, in the enemy and in 1914, the illiterate percentage was 0,4%, and by 1941, this value in the Wehrmacht was tending to zero — 98% percent of the soldiers of the German army had a completed secondary education.
Despite the titanic efforts of the USSR to raise the educational level of the population, we were unable to catch up with Germany on this indicator by the 1941 year. Of the surviving Soviet documents of the time, a rather bleak picture will appear before us. Take for example the already mentioned 6-th MK. Let me remind you, this is one of the strongest and most staffed in the Red Army. In the 7 th TD of this corpus of 1, 180 people from the 1 classes to the 6 classes had 484 people, from 6 to 9 classes - 528 people, secondary - 148 and higher - only 20 people. From 19 809 junior commanders and ordinary 6s from 1 to 6 classes, 11 942 people graduated from 7 to 9 - 5 652, 1 979 people had secondary education, and 236 had higher education.
In the mechanized corps of the second wave, the formation was even worse. For example, in the 31-th tank division of the 13-th MK with the rank and file, the situation was as follows:
"Illiterate - 30,
1 class - 143,
2 class - 425,
3 class - 529,
4 class - 1528,
5 classes - 682,
6 classes - 464,
7 classes - 777,
8 classes - 167,
9 classes - 116,
average - 320,
Higher - 20. [11]
In the 203 Motorized Division:
“Illiterate - 26, 1 class - 264, 2 class - 444, 3 class - 654, 4 class - 1815, 5 classes - 749, 6 classes - 437, 7 classes - 684, 8 classes —NGXX, 199 classes, 9 classes, 122 classes, 374, 33 classes, 11 classes, XNUMX classes, XNUMX classes, XNUMX classes, XNUMX classes secondary - XNUMX, higher - XNUMX. [XNUMX]
I remind you that in the pre-war period there were 4 classes in the Soviet elementary school, not three as in the subsequent one. That is, the formation of the 4 class is the level of the current third grader!
Do you think things were better in other corps? Let's take a look, for example, on the 17 of the IK of Lt. Gen. Petrov:
“Recruitment with an ordinary squad is mainly due to the March call-up of recruits (70-90%). Separate parts are staffed by recruits at 100%.
Number of replenishment by education - up to 50% education not higher than 4 classes.
The presence of a large number of nationalities who speak poorly and who do not speak Russian at all will make preparation difficult ”. [12]
4-th MK met the war as the most powerful mechanized connection of the Red Army. And how are things with the personnel in the corps of Major General A.A. Vlasov?
"Education: Higher - 592, secondary - 3521, 9-7 classes - 5609, 6-3 class - 16662, illiterate - 1586, illiterate - 127". I had to, instead of combat training, to begin to teach the fighters elementary things, and some also the Russian language. It is not surprising that the corps received a “mediocre” grade based on the results of testing the training for the winter period of the 1940 / 41 school year.
“The personnel of the material part studied well. The new models of T-34 tanks have not been studied enough.
For independent action units prepared mediocre ...
For making marches tank units prepared mediocre ...
Control and communication in battle worked mediocre ...
Tactical training of troops is mediocre. ” [13]
Even if 50% of personnel has a clearly low educational level, they can be trained, another reader will think. Of course you can, if there are tutorials, and, most importantly, there is someone to teach! For example, in the 4 MK there are no: range, 122-mm howitzers firing tables, L-10 and L-11 tank guns, 122-mm howitzers tank manual, L-10 and L-11 tank gun manuals, training tower models, etc. etc.
In 15, the MK has an insufficient barracks fund, as a result of which there are no training classes, no training and visual aids, or instructions. There are no such fundamental instructions as ABTKOP-38 [Course of fire training of armored troops 1938 g. - approx. author], lack of training devices, machines, training rifles (!), etc.
In 16, the MK has a serious lack of textbooks, charters, instruments, training equipment and fuel, classes, shooting ranges, shooting ranges - in general, everything.
“In / part of the 8995 and 9325 - classes are not provided due to lack of space. Teaching aids are not enough: there are no manuals on the KV and T-34 tanks, instructions on the new material part weapons, BUP (combat regulations of the infantry - author's note) part II, UTV [regulations of tank forces - approx. author] part II-i, instructions on the field service headquarters. There is no new charter of the rear. There are no visual aids on new weapons ...
In / part of 9325 - the existing landfill (Green) is not equipped with a sufficient number of dugouts and devices for firing at moving targets.
B / part 8995 - landfills, shooting ranges and training fields do not have parts, because the entire territory belongs to the peasants and is occupied by crops ... Land plots for shooting ranges and training fields are not yet assigned to the parts. Materials on the issue of consolidation provided. " [14]
This is again about the 6 th mechanized corps, and more specifically about the 4 th and 7 th tank divisions. The commander of the 19 MK, General Feklenko, also complains:
“The corps is mainly equipped with Russian and Ukrainian nationalities, but there are 4308 people. different nationalities that either have little or no Russian. ”
But at the time of drawing up the report in the 19 of the MK, there were only 20575 people in the private and junior command staff! That is, every fifth man, instead of driving a tank and firing from a cannon, had to be put behind the desk and just learn the Russian language.
And further:
“43-I tank division.
There are almost no textbooks, I also lack the necessary layouts and manuals for studying new equipment and weapons.
40-I tank division. The divisions of the division are not sufficiently satisfied with the teaching aids and instruments (the whole connection has 2 copies. ABTCOP-38), there is not a single copy of the Course of driving combat and transport vehicles.
213 motorized division. Teaching aids provided no more than 10%. "
But the “record holder” of the 1941 spring of the year is the 24 th mechanized corps: “There are no visual aids, training devices, training weapons”. The personnel also distinguished themselves: from 21556 people higher education in 238 people, higher unfinished - 19, secondary - 1947, 9 classes - 410, 8 classes - 1607, 7 classes - 2160, 6 classes - 1046, 5 1468, 4 class - 4040, 3 class - 3431, 2 class - 2281, 1 class - 2468, illiterate - 441. The corps is staffed on 70% by recruits of the March conscription. What did they have time to teach for 22 June 1941 of the year without visual aids, training devices and training equipment? And the "examiners" of the fighters and commanders of the 24 mechanized corps were not the Germans who checked out of Moscow, but the tanks and guns.
Huge was the incomplete commanders of companies, platoons and junior commanders. In the already mentioned 11-th MK, Major-General D.K. Mostovenko’s staffing was as follows:
Out of the total shortage in the commanders, without taking into account the orders appointed by the order, but not yet arrived, there is a sharply expressed incomplete link of company commanders and platoon commanders.
So, for example, staffing (in percent)
But it was precisely the commanders of companies, platoons and junior commanders who laid down the main task of training the rank and file. They were the ones who were supposed to lead the soldiers into battle. And their barely 30% recruited. And the connection? The 7486 corps OBS (OBS is a separate communications battalion) of the laid-on 91 of the junior commander has 10 available, of the laid-on 36, the middle-ranking man is 16. None of the commanders of the OBS 7486 radio unit does not know, since they are all "conductors", that is, specialists in wired communication! There is no one to teach the 7486 OBS drivers, for neither the junior nor the middle commanders can drive themselves.
So maybe the 11 Mechanic Corps is just an annoying exception? No, the situation is similar in the 13-MK: in the 521-I OBS, the rank-and-file 99% of the staff, senior and middle commanders - 50%, the youngest - 11%.
17-th MK:
“The command personnel of the division are staffed with 15-20%. Especially poorly equipped 21 td.
The junior commanders of the division are staffed on average by 11%. ”
20 th MK ZOVOVO:
“The average composition is equipped with - 84%. The junior commander is 27%. Com Composition: Highest - 90%, senior - 68%, medium - 27%. Engineers - 2,3%. Technicians - 35%.
And in KOVO everything is the same. The commander of the 9 Mechanized Corps, Major General K.K. Rokossovsky writes:
“There is a great lack of parts of the engineering staff (it is assumed by the 165 engineering staff that 5 is available, 3% security, and the 489 technicians are equipped with 110 22,5% security).
Manning with command personnel at the expense of those who have not finished tank schools extremely complicates matters of combat and special training.
The regiments of the divisions are not fully staffed by radio operator signalmen, there are no platoon commanders or radio engineers at all.
The junior commanders of the communications unit are staffed with 30%, the remaining positions of the ISS fulfill the corporal. Ordinary composition of the parts are equipped with 100% ".
I would like to finish the review on the personnel of the mechanized corps in 1941 a very lengthy document. I hope the reader will forgive me for such an extensive quotation, however, she very well draws the real situation with the personnel in the Red Army armored troops on the eve of the start of World War II.
"The report on the staffing of the 20 division with personnel on 10 March 1941 g .:
Commanding staff
According to the staff, 1342 people, there are 584 people. or 43%.
The situation is especially bad with the staffing levels of all degrees. There are not enough headquarters commanders - 85 people, including: battalion adjutants - 32, staff of the regimental staffs - 42, staff of the division headquarters - 11 people. In the headquarters of the regiments, 1,2,3 and 4 units are completely staffed; there is no one to plan and monitor combat training.
The division is manned by 25%, an incomplete 52 person.
It is not equipped with the personnel of the sapper company.
There are not enough communicators in the 25 state, there are no chemists in any part.
Poor staffing with artillery supply workers, the last person’s lack of 74, which threatens the accounting and saving of weapons.
Tank commanders lack 72%, including: heavy tank commanders - 60 people, tank and armored car platoon commanders - 48 people, company commanders - 12 people, pom. on the mouth of the company - 12 people. on the technical parts of battalions - 8 people, tank technicians - 32 people, repairmen - 18 people.
The same situation with motorists.
From the number assigned to the division by the orders of the KOVO command personnel, the 52 person has not yet arrived in the division. Their arrival is doubtful, since to a number of requests for the units from where the command personnel is appointed, the latter respond that the assigned personnel to us departed by OK cables (recruitment department - author's note) KOVO to completely different parts.
So for example: military technician 2 of ranag B. From the 33 auto regiment assigned by order, went by OK KOVO telegram to 2113 part, Chernivtsi, military technician 1 of rank M. and lieutenant P. from the 3 auto regiment assigned in part of the division, departed telegram OK KOVO in part 2434. The same with the commanders appointed from the parts of the 15 tank division.
The part of the commanders appointed to the division does not correspond in their qualities to the positions to which they are appointed:
Sent by commanders of tank platoons ml. Lieutenants K. and K. have an extremely negative characteristic and were warned by the Military Council of KOVO about incomplete official compliance in January of this year.
Captain G., who was sent to the position of the Nachprodzabneniya division, is subject to immediate transfer from the economic work to the squadron commander position, according to the last attestation, he does not want to work and cannot. Had a series of penalties for the collapse of the work.
Appointed by the Division Inspector for the Division Division 3 Assistant of the rank of L., according to the certification available in the case, is subject to dismissal from the army or transfer. OBC battalion. The second designated Supply Inspector, Captain D., is sick with tuberculosis and is to be transferred to a non-combatant unit, sanatorium or hospital.
The same situation is with the political personnel sent to the division from other parts of KOVO for UPO KOVO outfits. For example, from the 8 people sent by the 45 rifle division to the positions of Zamkomidirov companies in the political section 6 have negative characteristics.
Ml. Political Commissar R. - in December 1940 was excluded from the candidates of the CPSU (b).
Ml. Political Commissar K. - In December, the 1940 of the KDP (divisional party commission - author's comment) 45 of the rifle division announced a severe reprimand for hooliganism and harmful conversations. It works in part badly now.
Art. Political Commissar B. - In December, the 1940 DPK 45 Rifle Division declared severe reprimand for drunkenness and decomposition in everyday life.
Ml. political officer M. - she speaks Russian poorly, does not want to study, never conducts political studies, never finished courses, the formation of the 4 group. He has an unhealthy mood - several times raised the issue of secondment to the Uzbek SSR, does not want to take his family to Ukraine.
Ml. political commissar L. - the formation of the 4 group, almost does not speak Russian, does not work in a company because of ignorance of the language.
Political Commissar J. - submitted to dismissal from the army, as unworkable and undisciplined political worker.
From the 8 Tank Division arrived ml. political commissar B., expelled from the CPSU (b) by the District Party Commission in September 1940 of the year.
From the same division arrived political commissar F., who 3 a month ago was transferred from the city of Stryi to the city of Lviv due to the illness of children who require special treatment. Just started to heal, was transferred to Shepetovka. In this regard, he has a very unhealthy mood, reflected in the work.
At the Political Commissar of the OPP 8 Tank Division presented material for dismissal from the army and at the same time seconded him to our division. Now K. fired into the reserve.
32 Cavalry Division seconded to the division ml. Political Commissar G., submitted for dismissal from the army for health reasons.
The same with political personnel arrived from 10 tank. Divisions.
As can be seen from these examples, parts of the District did not make a proportional selection of the commanders to recruit our division, but a real elimination.
Junior commanders
The division junior commander is staffed by 21%.
Incomplete - 1910 people. In the coverage of the incomplete Shelter KOVO dressed up, and the division received the rank and file of corporals from the 10 and 15 tank divisions. The quality of the corporals sent is very low; they cannot fulfill the posts of junior commanders, both in their development and in their preparation. Among the corporal: 211 people. non-Russian nationals poorly fluent in Russian, 2 German, 1 Persian, illiterate 7 people, illiterate 70 people demoted from junior officers to privates for XDUMX people who were before the army on trial and convicted - 11 people are family martyrs, people are family martyrs, people who are poorly educated 18 people unfit for combat service - 12 people
All sent by the corporal are now used at junior command positions, but there is little benefit from them, since Red Army soldiers of the 1940 call of the year are better prepared today.
For the training of junior commanders, units of the division formed training units with a training period of September 1941 of the year, the issue of which the incomplete will be covered.
Ordinary composition
To date, the division is staffed by an ordinary soldier in full staff, plus 1910 people received. Private personnel to cover the incomplete staff of the younger commanders and plus in excess of the staff 120 people. of the 131 motorized division along the corps. As a result, in the division, the supernumerary rank and file 127 people
People entered the division from all parts of KOVO and even from other districts. The units, directing people to the division, sent out screenings, contrary to the instructions of the OC KOVO. This forced me to part of the people sent from rifle divisions and artillery regiments to not accept and return them back for replacement.
So from the parts listed in the order of KOVO No. XXUMX, I really did not accept people for the following reasons:
164 Infantry Division - February 25 sent 125 people. There was no duty to receive them in the division. The telegram from the corps on the attire of people from 164, 141 and 130 rifle divisions was received by the division 1.3.41, it indicated the expulsion of the receivers for the selection of people in the listed parts.
Among the 125 people targeted by the division were: 64% or 78 people of non-Russian nationalities, 22 people. old ages (28-30 years) from the stock 2 category, 67 people. illiterate and illiterate (educational program, 1-2 gr.), 3 people. repressed, 28 people. undisciplined, having disciplinary offenses up to unauthorized absenteeism, as indicated in the characteristics sent to the 164 rifle division, 28 people. patients, including hernia - 1, heart disease - 2, trachoma - 3, rheumatism - 1, pulmonary process - 3, perforation of the eardrum - 1, chest deformity and limb - 3, appendicitis - 1, catarrh of the digestive system - 3.
These people were not accepted by me and returned, in return, their representative sent by me selected and brought 120 people.
330 howitzer artillery regiment - people from the regiment arrived at the same time as the outfit, the division did not have time to send a representative. I returned 50 people, including: illiterate and illiterate 31 people, convicted and repressed people - 6 people, patients - 12 people, eczema - 1 people, pulmonary process - 3 people, low vision - 2 people. who do not speak Russian - 21 people.
February 10 on the telegram of the OC KOVO in the regiment was sent to the representative, who received in return for returning fit for service in tank units.
315 artillery division - the representative of the division did not have time to leave, as the people of the regiment were sent to Shepetovka. My people were returned back, including: illiterate people - 15 people, illiterate people - 29 people, convicted and repressed - 13 people who do not speak Russian at all - 17 people. Instead, they received fit.
The 15 and 10 tank divisions were to send the first 679 to the division, and the second 239 to the division. cadets for staffing training divisions of the division from among the Red Army 1940 conscription of the year, and the directive of the OC KOVO indicated that before sending people to us, the division will be eliminated unsuitable for educational divisions and will be sent only suitable ones. Upon the arrival of people, it was established by me that among those sent were sent people who were not only unfit for staffing training units, but also for service in tank units. So, among the tank divisions sent by 15 were: 25 people. illiterate and illiterate, 17 people. patients, including: 5 people. hearing impaired, 5 pers. with reduced vision, 2 people. lung process, 1 pers. with eczema, 1 pers. with spinal curvature, 1 people. with hernia, 1 people. with dropsy testicle, 1 people. hemorrhoids and varicose veins.
This is confirmed by the division commander of 15, who, having received people back from us, sent them to the garrison commission, as a result of which 4 people. dismissed from the army, 7 people. put in a hospital, the rest are recognized fit for non-combat service.
Similar cadets were sent by the 10 Tank Division, including 47 people returned to it. It was: 26 patients, illiterate, illiterate, do not speak Russian and can not be in educational units. From the division in return received other people.
In addition to the above parts, which sent an unprofitable rank and file and were replaced by my request, the remaining parts, which were given the order by the KOVO Headquarters, were also of poor quality, especially unruly, with a number of major discipline violations.
So, from 348 artillery regiment 141 rifle division arrived 29 people, including non-Russian nationalities 12 people, low-literate people - 7 people, old age - 4. On the third day after sending people to the unit, four of them deserted. One of them is detained in Shepetovka, the rest are wanted. The deserter Red Army soldier I. during the time of his stay in the 348 artillery regiment (2 months) had penalties: 12.11.40 - reprimand for dishonest attitude to the horse, 7.12 - 5 days of arrest for violation of discipline, 23.12 - 5 days of arrest for deviation for avoiding a horse for evading discipline, 10.2 - 10 for arrest of evasion for evading a horse 20.2 days for non-execution of the order, 4 - 22.2 outfits for a fight, 3 - XNUMX days of arrest for a fight, was tried by a friendly court.
As a result of this recruitment, there are currently hundreds of people in parts of the division entrusted to me, in their physical condition, literacy and knowledge of the Russian language are completely unsuitable for service in the tank forces and are in fact ballast, namely:
Natives nat. Republics of non-Russian nationality - 1914 people or 23,2%. Of them do not speak Russian at all - 236 people.
People of nationality are not subject to the direction of the troops of the border districts (Germans, Poles, Greeks, Bulgarians, Turks, Czechs, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians) - 36 people.
Demoted from junior commanders to the rank and file of the lack of discipline - 13 people.
Illiterate 211 people., Illiterate (1-2 groups and educational program) - 622 people. and with the formation of 3-4 groups 3571 people, old age - 26-30 - 745 people, who were on trial and convicted - 341 people, whose relatives were repressed - 137 people. Unsuitable for military service according to the garrison medical commission - 81 people. Unsuitable for service in tank units and for combat service according to the conclusion of the medical commission of the part, but not yet passed the garrison commission - 418 people.
NEEDED:
1. To speed up the appointment of commanders to the division, especially to staffing the headquarters of units, tankers and arsenal supply commanders, since the lack of such forces slows down the planned and high-quality course of combat training, control and planning of the latter and the formation of units.
2. Out of the division a detachment of soldiers who are unsuitable for service in tank units and are ballast, namely: those who are unsuitable for the 499 combat service are people who are illiterate and illiterate people of 833 who have been tried and repressed by 478 people. 236 people who do not speak Russian, people who are not subject to sending troops to the 36 group of people. Total 2082 man, instead of which to dress people in quality suitable for service in tank units. " [15]
True, an interesting document? Who is the author? Any nervous schoolgirl? No, the commander of the 20 th TD of the 8 of the MK at that time was Colonel M.Ye. Katukov, whom it is difficult to suspect of excessive nervousness and the desire to "sting" on the injustice of fate. And now, after reading the report of Mikhail Efimovich, let the reader ask himself a simple question: would you not like him to command the division of Colonel Katukov in 1941? The reader has the opportunity to refuse, Mikhail Efpimovich - was not. And the fact that he managed to do in such a situation - causes only exorbitant respect.
The problems of the auto armored troops of the Red Army on the eve of the beginning of the Second World War were by no means exhausted by the shortage of trained personnel and the lack of shells for the guns of new types of tanks.
Incomplete combat vehicles were 5220 units, and in the report of the head of GABTU, Lieutenant General Fedorenko said that with the existing plan for the release of tanks this incomplete can be covered only by the beginning of 1943 year. Again, this is not about re-equipping the mechanized corps with T-34, KV, T-50, but at least just manning them up to the regular number while maintaining such "formidable" tanks as the ancient BT-2, double-tower T-26 and “swimmers” T-37A and T-38.
But tanks are still fine! But what about the situation with the equipment that should serve combat vehicles? How are things with tankers, repair shops on the automobile chassis, mobile command posts of staffs of all levels, and just trucks and cars?
From the report of the head of GABTU, it follows that 26 thousands are required for cars and pickups in the Red Army for peacetime needs, while the need for wartime is 49305 units. There were only 17280 units in stock, that is, a shortage of "only" in 32 is thousands! That is, in the presence of all 30% of the need. True, according to calculations still 23864 cars should come from the national economy to mobilize. A logical question arises - when and in what condition will these cars go to specific parts and connections? Practice has shown that these vehicles arrived in significant quantities only in the second half of July, 1941, that is, about a month later, when 80% of the car park in the western border districts was already destroyed. In addition, about a third of the number of cars received immediately after mobilization required capital and medium repairs.
With trucks, the story was about the same: the need for peacetime - 211920, the need for wartime - 470827, and in the presence of all 193218 units, which is much less than half. Even if you "scrape the bottom of the barrel" and tear the entire national economy of the USSR to the skin (which will give 209880 more trucks of dubious quality and condition), a shortage of 67729 trucks will remain.
With special machines, the availability of which largely determined the combat capability of the USSR tank forces, the situation was generally monstrous! For example, the need for repair shops of type "A" in peacetime - 5423 units, of wartime - 7972, and in the presence of all 2729 units. And no mobile reserves! These are special vehicles, they simply did not exist in the national economy. Thus, the shortage of mobile workshops of type "A" amounted to 5243 pieces.
Mobile auto repair shops of type "B" were required for peacetime states 3648 units, for wartime states 4378, and for 1556 units. In the column "will arrive machines on mobilization from a national economy" flaunts zero. Incomplete 2822 pieces.
Gas tankers: the need for peacetime - 19683 units, the need for wartime - 60914, in the presence of 11252 units. Incomplete - 49662 pieces. By mobilization - 0.
Field-charging stations: the need for peacetime 1860 units, wartime - 2571, there are 725 units in stock and there is nowhere to take them. Incomplete - 1846 units.
Other special vehicles: the need for peacetime 81240, wartime - 159911, in the presence of 45380. Received by mobilizing 6000 units. Incomplete - 108531 thing.
All in all, vehicles of all types are required in wartime 755878 units, in peacetime 349775 units, and in stock 272140 units. The 239744 units will be mobilized, and anyway, the shortage will be 234994. And almost all of it is a special car.
Lieutenant-General Fedorenko stresses that “for the VMS trucks, workshops of type“ A ”and“ B ”, and for camping-charging stations, the Red Army has a significant shortage. It’s not possible to count on covering the shortage of these machines due to deliveries from the national economy, as shown by the experience of the Finnish and Polish campaigns ... ”. [6]
As a result, the situation with motor transport in mechanized buildings looked like this [16]:
11 th MK ZOVOVO
13 th MK ZOVOVO
19-th MK KOVO
7-I MD 8-th MK KOVO
Like 7-I MD motor transport (except for special vehicles) is provided normally. And there is no, there is still a stupidity - remember, the commander of the 8 of the MK, Lieutenant-General D.I. Ryabyshev writes 1 May 1941: “Rubber trucks and wheeled vehicles are provided with 60%, armored vehicles with 100%. From the availability of trucks, 200 machines are on the pads due to the lack of rubber. Average tire wear by 70%. "
The shortage of trucks and automobile tires questioned the ability of the mechanized corps of the Red Army not so much as to a “deep operation”, but even to counterattacks against a broken enemy. An attempt to somehow organize the supply of fuel and ammunition to tank divisions of mechanized corps, as a rule, left them without motorized infantry, which was forced to move after the tanks "on their own two." I offer the reader another interesting document [17]:
“INFORMATION ABOUT MARRIAGE OF TANK PARTS OF KIEV SPECIAL MILITARY DISTRICT as of 5 in May 1941 of the year.
4 BODY
The 8 Panzer Division is fully operational, and the vehicle is completely operational.
The 32 Panzer Division is combat-ready, can carry out close combat, is provided with 35% road transport.
81 motorized division - fully combat-ready, motor vehicles provided.
8 BODY
The 12 Tank Division is efficient, it does not have heavy tanks, it is fully transported by road.
The 34 Panzer Division is efficient, it does not have medium tanks, and by road transport - by 60%.
7 Motorized. division - combat vehicles are 60% efficient, 90% vehicles.
9 BODY
20 Panzer Division - not combat-ready.
35 Panzer Division - not efficient
131 Motorized. division - not combat ready.
15 BODY
The 10 Panzer Division is fully operational, and the vehicle is completely operational.
The 37 Panzer Division is efficient, it has no heavy and medium tanks, and there is a vehicle by 40%.
212 Motorized. division - not combat ready.
16 BODY
The 15 Tank Division is efficient, it does not have heavy tanks, it is fully transported by road.
The 39 tank division is 50% efficient, it has no heavy and medium tanks.
240 Motorized. division - not combat ready.
19 BODY
The 43 tank division is 40% efficient, it has no heavy and medium tanks.
40 Panzer Division - not combat-ready.
213 Motorized. division - not combat ready.
22 BODY
19 Panzer Division - not combat-ready.
The 41 Panzer Division is efficient, it has no heavy and medium tanks, and there is a vehicle by 50%.
215 Motorized. division - not combat ready.
24 BODY
45 Panzer Division - not combat-ready.
49 Panzer Division - not combat-ready.
216 Motorized. division - not combat-ready. "
Think about it - from 24 armored and motorized divisions, the entire 5, or 20%, is fully combat-ready! Partly combat-worthy 7 divisions, or 29%. The rest of the 12 divisions are FULLY IMPOSSIBLE. And this is the most powerful district in the USSR! Pro combat divisions of the Wehrmacht need to be reminded?
In addition, somewhere in the rear of the Soviet divisions rushing towards the tank wedges of the Wehrmacht, artillery, towed at a snail's speed with agricultural tractors, dangles. And that is, if they are available! For example, a motorized rifle regiment 37 th TD on 12 122-mm guns and 4 152-mm guns had a total of 5 tractors. How to transfer artillery? In parts? In three "stages"? The first day we transport 5 guns, on the tractor night, on the second day, the second 5 guns ... And so on. And we pray that no tractor will break. Total, minimum 3 days only to move 15 guns (instead of 16 available). Three days in the summer conditions of the 1941 of the year is an eternity! Will the Germans wait for our artillery so much? Will not. What will be the result? He is sad: infantry without artillery cover, knocked out of positions and destroyed. An attempt to counterattack the Soviet infantry without artillery preparation and escort leads to huge losses from the enemy’s un-suppressed firing points, it suffers with large losses and is actually incapable of further combat operations.
The artillery regiment 212-th MD, having 8 76-mm guns, 16 122-mm guns and 4 152-mm guns of mechtyag had only one division. The guns had to be brought into position as the tractors were released, or generally manually.
Even where there were enough tractors, the situation was also difficult. For example, the commission which verified the 15 th TD of the 8 of the MK indicated in the report that “the howitzer regiment is equipped with the STZ-5 tractors. These tractors are thin and slow. When moving to a hoist, one gun must be towed by two or three tractors. ” [18]
At the meeting of designers with representatives of the Red Army in April 1941 on the FCZ regarding the operation in the STZ-5 troops, the military did not hesitate in expressions: “... take this tractor and try to work with a gun: do not pull the required weight of the gun, power as a military machine is small .. The smooth course, barbaric conditions for the driver in the cab completely devalue this tractor. And if you leave this car as a transport vehicle and as a means of transportation, it is also not suitable for carrying capacity ... All your transport vehicles have a unique number of flaws ... The maximum speed of this machine is 8km / h, but usually it makes 6 km / h ... The machine doesn’t pull itself on 4 speed ... if I took up a combat position, and then I need to change position immediately, but I need 40 minutes just to start a tractor ... "[19]
In general, the technical characteristics of domestic tractors used for towing artillery pieces to guide the Red Army were not a secret. In the same report, Lieutenant-General Fedorenko, head of the GABTU, to the military council of the spacecraft on the state of providing armored vehicles and property of the Red Army, this was stated directly and unequivocally [6]:
“Among the total availability of tractors on 15.06. 1941 d. There are 14277 obsolete tractors of type CTZ-60, STZ-3 and Kommunar, which are subject to seizure, because of their technical qualities, they cannot ensure the military work of military units, especially artillery.
The use of divisional and corps artillery of low-speed and low-power tractors ChTZ and STZ as arttyagachi does not provide artillery with tractors that meet its modern requirements .... "
The total number and demand of the Red Army in tractors is also given there: the need for peacetime is 49552, the wartime 94548, and the availability of 15.06.41 is 42931 units. Incomplete - 51653 pieces.
As a result, 1941 year became a nightmare for all commanders of any Soviet mechanized formation. Not enough cars for the supply of fuel and shells? We remove them from motorized divisions, as a result, motorized rifles stomp on foot and turn into ordinary infantry, tanks automatically lose infantry support, and even with the success of a counterattack, they cannot hold the captured territory, because infantry, the backbone of any field defense, is not yet fit. We don’t have enough repair tools, especially mobile ones, which means we cannot repair wrecked tanks, even at the risk of our lives, taking them out of the battlefield. There is not a powerful enough tractor capable of pulling down wrecked cars? We have to pull out the wrecked tanks by other tanks, spending and so their small lifespan, distracting them from solving the actual combat missions and exposing valuable equipment to unnecessary danger. Tanks are also forced to go on the offensive without the support of artillery - it drags somewhere in the rear, especially heavy cannons and howitzers, moving at a pedestrian speed.
And so on and so forth. If the tanks are a kind of "muscles" of mechanized corps; then trucks, repair shops, tank trucks, tractors are the “blood vessels” feeding muscles. And we have them barely half of what is needed. Tank units without shells, fuels and lubricants, maintenance and repair are doomed to destruction. What happened in practice. And the number of tanks here plays far from the most important role!
And note that I have not mentioned such factors as:
1. The repeated non-obligation of the execution of orders of the senior command of the middle.
2. Biased assessment of its activities.
3. Poor intelligence work at all levels.
4. Bad communication, inability and fear of using radio communications.
5. The passivity of many commanders and their fear of taking the initiative, etc.
I repeat: the armored box on the tracks, along with its crew, is just a small brick of the huge “tank unit” castle. For normal operation, behind each tank must be pulled the train of "servants" more than the medieval knight. Otherwise, the tank will turn into a “disabled person” and neither millimeters of armor, nor the power of the weapon, nor speed will save it.
Of course, you can blame the Soviet military leadership of short-sightedness. They allegedly donated a huge number of tanks without bothering to provide these same tanks with crews with higher technical education, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery, BREM and other vehicles of the "tank plume", as well as scooter-scouting reconnaissance aircraft hanging in the sky - up to a vice and files in repair packs. Sitting warmly behind a computer monitor make it easier than ever. I will repeat my question: dear reader, would you like to command any (to choose from!) tank division? Red Army in June - July 1941 years?
If the reader thinks that this article is aimed at “denigrating” the tank forces of the pre-war Red Army, he will be deeply mistaken: “In total, the ... division had 215 tanks. The only infantry unit was the motorized infantry battalion transported by buses! There were practically no radio stations in the division, and orders were delivered in parts by cyclists. Artillery division consisted of several parts of the reserve. Supply and maintenance services practically did not exist. ” think talking about the Red Army? Wrong, this is written by someone General de Gaulle, do not you remember that? So the French (and the British, by the way, too) a year before the USSR faced the same problems — the presence of a large number of tanks in “semi-finished” tank units, the lack of communication, the inability to manage bulky mechanized formations, and the absence of “their” infantry in tank divisions poor interaction of the armed forces, etc. etc.
Moreover, the quality of the French tanks even surpassed the German, as well as the Soviet T-34 and KV. Yes, and the quantitative superiority was for the allies. At the same time, there was no surprise whatsoever - the war has long been declared and lasted for half a year already. Neither in France nor in England in the twentieth century there were no revolutions or civil wars. Nobody shot the officers with experience of the PRC and did not “squeeze” into emigration. The French soldiers were supposed to fight not for Stalin’s “bloody dictator”, but for the completely democratic Third Republic. The educational level of the population in France and England was differently higher than in the USSR. However, the result of the collision with the Wehrmacht turned into a real catastrophe for France and England.
The Red Army, despite all its flaws, in contrast to the French, British, Polish, Belgian, Dutch, Yugoslav, and Greek forces, was able not only to stop, but even after six months, inflict the first serious defeat of the strongest army in the world.
Sources of:
1. http://mechcorps.rkka.ru/files/spravochnik/shtat/org_td_0640.htm
2. TsAMO RF. F. 3447 op.1. d. 66, l. Xnumx
3. TsAMO RF. F. 3447, op. 1. d. 66 l. Xnumx
4. TsAMO RF f. 38, op. 11360, d. 1, l. Xnumx
5. TsAMO RF f. 38, op. 11360, d. 1, l. Xnumx
6. Report of the Chief of the GABTU to the Military Council of the Spacecraft on the provision of armored vehicles and property of the Red Army. TsAMO RF f. 38, op. 11373, d. 67, ll. 97 - 116. Script. June 1941
7. TsAMO RF, f.38, op. 11353, d. 899, l. Xnumx
8. TsAMO RF, f.38, op. 11353, d. 896, l. Xnumx
9. TsAMO RF, f.38, op. 11353, d. 896, l. Xnumx
10. TsAMO RF f. 81, d. 759, l. Xnumx
11. TsAMO RF f.38, op. 11353, d. 899, ll.140,141
12. TsAMO RF f.38, op. 11353, d. 899, l. Xnumx
13. TsAMO RF f.131, op. 12980, d.3, l. Xnumx
14. TsAMO RF, f. 38, op. 11353, d. 899, ll. Xnumx
15. TsAMO RF f.131, op. 12980, d. 3, ll.200-205
16. TsAMO RF, f. 38, op. 11373, d. 67
17. TsAMO RF f. 38, op. 11355, d. 896, l. 34,34 about
18. TsAMO RF, f. 131, op. 12980, d. 3, l. Xnumx
19. TsAMO RF f. 38, op. 11492, d. 16, l. Xnumx
20. The materials of the book by D. Shein and A. Ulanov “Order in tank forces?” Were used. Moscow, Veche, 2011 year.
Information