Military Review

The beginning of the Franco-Prussian war. Plans and the state of the French army

30
The outbreak of war


The main reason that led to the fall of the Second Empire was the war with Prussia and the catastrophic defeat of Napoleon III’s army. The French government, given the strengthening of the opposition movement in the country, decided to solve the problem in the traditional way - to channel discontent with the help of war. In addition, Paris solved strategic and economic tasks. France fought for leadership in Europe, who was challenged by Prussia. The Prussians defeated Denmark and Austria (1864, 1866) and resolutely went towards the unification of Germany. The emergence of a new, strong united Germany was a strong blow to the ambitions of the regime of Napoleon III. United Germany threatened the interests of the French big bourgeoisie.

It is also worth considering that in Paris they were confident in the strength of their army and victory. The French leadership underestimated the enemy; an appropriate analysis of the latest military reforms in Prussia and changes in attitudes in German society, where this war was perceived as fair, was not carried out. In Paris, they were confident of victory and even hoped to reject a number of lands on the Rhine, expanding their influence in Germany.

At the same time, internal conflict was one of the leading reasons for the government’s desire to start a war. One of Napoleon III’s advisers, Sylvester de Sassi, regarding the motives that pushed the government of the Second Empire in July 1870 to go to war with Prussia, wrote many years later: “I did not resist external war, because it seemed to be the last resource and the only means of salvation for the empire ... On all sides, the most formidable signs of civil and social war appeared ... The bourgeoisie was obsessed with some sort of insatiable revolutionary liberalism, and the population of the workers of the cities was socialism. It was then that the emperor ventured on a decisive bet - on the war against Prussia. ”

Thus, Paris decided to start a war with Prussia. The reason for the war was the conflict that arose between the two great powers because of the candidacy of the Prussian prince Leopold Hohenzollern for the vacant royal throne in Spain. 6 July, three days after it became known in Paris about the consent of Prince Leopold to accept the throne offered to him, French Foreign Minister Gramont made a statement in the Legislative Corps, which sounded like an official call to Prussia. “We do not think,” said Gramont, “that respect for the rights of neighboring people obliges us to tolerate so that an outside power, by placing one of its princes on the throne of Charles V ..., could disrupt the existing balance of power in Europe to the detriment of us and put threat to the interests and honor of France ... ". In the event that such an “opportunity” came true, Gramont continued, “then“ by your support and the support of the nation, we will be able to fulfill our duty without hesitation and weakness ”. It was a direct threat of war if Berlin did not abandon its plans.

On the same day, July 6, at the meeting of the Council of Ministers, the French Minister of War, Lebefé, made an official statement on the full readiness of the Second Empire for war. Napoleon III announced the diplomatic correspondence of 1869 between the governments of France, Austria and Italy, which created the false impression that the Second Empire, entering the war, can count on the support of Austria and Italy. In reality, France did not have allies in the international arena.

The Austrian Empire, after being defeated in the Austro-Prussian 1866 war of the year, wanted a rematch, but Vienna needed time to build up. The Prussian Blitzkrieg did not allow Vienna to take a tougher stance against Berlin. And after the battle of Sedan in Austria, they completely buried the thoughts about the war against the entire North German alliance, led by Prussia. In addition, the position of the Russian Empire was a deterrent for Austria-Hungary. Russia, after the Crimean War, when Austria took a hostile position, did not miss the opportunity to repay the former treacherous ally. It was possible that Russia would intervene in the war if Austria attacks Prussia.

Italy remembered that France did not bring the 1859 war to a victorious end, when the forces of the Franco-Sardinian coalition smashed the Austrians. In addition, France still held Rome, its garrison was located in this city. The Italians wanted to unite their country, including Rome, but France did not allow it. Thus, the French prevented the completion of the unification of Italy. France was not going to withdraw its garrison from Rome, thus it lost a possible ally. Therefore, the proposal of Bismarck to the Italian king to maintain neutrality in the war of Prussia with France, was received favorably.

Russia, after the eastern (Crimean) war, focused on Prussia. Petersburg did not intervene in the 1864 and 1866 wars, Russia did not intervene in the Franco-Prussian war either. In addition, Napoleon III, before the war, did not seek friendship and alliance with Russia. Only after the outbreak of hostilities, Adolf Thier was sent to Petersburg, who asked for Russia's intervention in the war with Prussia. But it was too late. Petersburg hoped that after the war, Bismarck would thank Russia for its neutrality, which would lead to the abolition of the restrictive articles of the Paris world of 1856. Therefore, at the very beginning of the Franco-Prussian war, a Russian declaration of neutrality was issued.

The British also decided not to intervene in the war. According to London, the time has come to limit France, since the colonial interests of the British Empire and the Second Empire clashed around the world. France has made efforts to strengthen fleet. In addition, Paris claimed to Luxembourg and Belgium, which were under the auspices of Britain. England was the guarantor of the independence of Belgium. Great Britain saw nothing wrong with strengthening Prussia to create a counterweight to France.

Prussia also sought war to complete the unification of Germany, which was hampered by France. Prussia wanted to seize the industrialized Alsace and Lorraine, and also to occupy a leading position in Europe, for which it was necessary to defeat the Second Empire. Bismarck since the time of the Austro-Prussian War 1866 was convinced of the inevitability of an armed conflict with France. “I was firmly convinced,” he wrote later, referring to this period, “that on the way to our further national development, both intensive and extensive, on the other side of Mayne, it will inevitably have to wage war with France, and that in our inner and Under no circumstances should we lose sight of this opportunity. ” In May, 1867, Mr. Bismarck, frankly announced in a circle of his supporters about the impending war with France, which will be launched when "when our new army corps is strengthened and when we have stronger relations with various German states."

However, Bismarck did not want Prussia to look like an aggressor, which led to a complication of relations with other countries and had a negative effect on public opinion in Germany itself. It was necessary that France itself began the war. And he was able to crank this thing. The conflict between France and Prussia over the candidacy of Prince Leopold Hohenzollern was used by Bismarck to provoke further exacerbation of Franco-Prussian relations and the declaration of war by France. For this purpose, Bismarck resorted to gross falsification of the text of the dispatch sent to him on July 13 from Ems by the Prussian King Wilhelm for shipment to Paris. The dispatch contained the answer of the Prussian king to the demand of the French government that he officially endorsed the decision made on the eve of the father of Prince Leopold to abandon the Spanish throne for his son. The French government also demanded that Wilhelm guarantee that such claims would not be repeated in the future. Wilhelm agreed to the first claim and refused to satisfy the second. The text of the response dispatch of the Prussian king was deliberately changed by the Prussian Chancellor in such a way that the dispatch as a result of this acquired an offensive tone for the French.

On July 13, the day the dispatches from Ems arrived in Berlin, Bismarck frankly expressed his dissatisfaction with the conciliatory tone of the dispatches in an interview with Field Marshal Moltke and Prussia’s Military Forces von Roon. “We must fight ...,” said Bismarck, “but success largely depends on the impressions that the war originates for us and for others; it is important that we are the ones who were attacked, and Gallic arrogance and sensitivity will help us in this. ” By falsifying the original text of the so-called Emsk despatch, Bismarck achieved his intended goal. The defiant tone of the edited text of the dispatch played into the hands of the French leadership, who also looked for a reason for aggression. The war was officially declared by France on July 19 1870.


Calculation of mitralieza refi

Plans for the French command. State of the armed forces

Napoleon III planned to launch a campaign by the rapid invasion of French troops into Germany before the completion of the mobilization in Prussia and the connection of the forces of the North German alliance with the troops of the South German states. Such a strategy was facilitated by the fact that the French personnel system allowed a much faster concentration of troops than the Prussian landwehr system. Under the ideal scenario, the successful forcing by French troops across the Rhine violated the entire further mobilization in Prussia, and forced the Prussian command to throw all available forces to Mein, regardless of their readiness. This allowed the French to beat the Prussian units in parts, as they arrived from various parts of the country.

In addition, the French command hoped to seize communications between the north and south of Germany and isolate the North German alliance, preventing the states of southern Germany from joining Prussia and maintaining their neutrality. In the future, the South German states, taking into account their concerns about the unification policy of Prussia, could support France. Also on the side of France, after the successful start of the war, Austria could speak. And after the transition of the strategic initiative to France, Italy could have acted on its side.

Thus, France was counting on a blitzkrieg. The rapid movement of the French army was to lead to the military and diplomatic success of the Second Empire. The French did not want to drag out the war, as the protracted war led to the destabilization of the internal political and economic situation of the empire.


French infantrymen in uniforms of the Franco-Prussian war

Prussian infantry

The problem was that the Second Empire was not ready for war with a serious opponent, and even on its territory. The second empire could only afford the colonial wars, with the obviously weaker adversary. True, in a throne speech at the opening of the 1869 legislative session, Napoleon III argued that the military power of France had reached the "necessary development", and its "military resources are now at a high level corresponding to its world mission." The emperor assured that the French land and naval armed forces "were firmly constituted", that the number of troops under arms was "not inferior to their numbers under previous regimes." "At the same time," he said, "our weapons have been improved, our arsenals and warehouses are full, our reserves are trained, the mobile guard is organized, our fleet is transformed, our fortresses are in good condition." However, this official statement, like other similar statements by Napoleon III and the boastful articles of the French press, were only intended to hide the serious problems of the French armed forces from their own people and the outside world.

The French army was supposed to be ready for the 20 July 1870 march. But when 29 July arrived in Metz, Napoleon III arrived to send troops across the border, the army was not ready for the offensive. Instead of the necessary for the 250-thousand army, which was supposed to be mobilized and concentrated on the border, only 135-140 thousand people turned out to be here: about 100 thousand near Metz and about 40 thousand from Strasbourg. In Chalon, they planned to concentrate 50-th. reserve army to continue to push it to Metz, but it did not have time to collect.

In this way, the French were unable to carry out quick mobilization in order to pull the forces necessary for a successful invasion to the border in time. The time for an almost calm offensive almost to the Rhine, while the German troops were not yet concentrated, was lost.

The problem was that France could not change the outdated system of recruiting the French army. The viciousness of such a system, which Prussia refused as early as 1813, was that it did not provide for early recruitment, in peacetime conditions, of combat-ready military units, which could be used in the same composition during the war. The so-called French peacetime “army corps” (there were seven of them, which corresponded to the seven military districts into which France divided with 1858) were formed from heterogeneous military units located on the territory of the respective military districts. They ceased to exist with the country's transition to martial law. Instead, they began to hastily form combat units from units scattered throughout the country. The result was that the compounds were first disbanded and then re-created. From here confusion, confusion and loss of time. As noted by General Montauban, who before the war with Prussia commanded the 4 Corps, the French command "at the time of entering the war with a power that had been ready for it for a long time, had to disband the troops that were part of large units, and re-create existing ones army corps under the command of the new commanders, who were barely known to the troops and in most cases did not know their troops well ”.

The French command was aware of the weakness of its military system. She showed up during the 1850 military campaigns. Therefore, after the Austro-Prussian War 1866, an attempt was made to reform the mobilization plan of the French army in case of war. However, the new mobilization plan prepared by Marshal Nielem, which was based on the presence of permanent army units suitable for both peacetime and wartime, and also assumed the creation of a mobile guard, was not enforced. This plan remained on paper.


The French are preparing for the defense of the estate, barricading the gate and punching picks embrasures for shooting in the wall

Judging by the orders of the French command from 7 and 11 in July 1870, first there was talk of three armies, they were proposed to be created according to Niel’s mobilization plans. However, after 11 July, the military campaign plan was radically changed: instead of the three armies, one united Rhine army was formed under the supreme command of Napoleon III. As a result, the previously prepared mobilization plan was destroyed and this led to the fact that the Rhine Army, at the time when it had to launch a decisive offensive, was unprepared and incomplete. Due to the absence of a significant part of the formations, the Rhineland army remained inactive at the border. The strategic initiative was given to the enemy without a fight.

Especially slow was the formation of reserves. Military warehouses were, as a rule, at a distance from the places of formation of combat units. To obtain weapon, uniforms and necessary equipment, the reservist had to travel hundreds, and sometimes thousands of kilometers, before he arrived at his destination. Thus, General Winua noted: “During the 1870 war, people who were in reserve regiments of the Zouavas located in the departments of northern France were forced to pass through the whole country in order to take a steamer to Marseille and go to Coleins, Oran, Philiphenville ( Algeria) to receive weapons and equipment, and then return to the part located in the place from which they left. In vain did they make 2 thousand km by rail, two crossings, at least two days each. ” Marshal Canrober drew a similar picture: “A soldier called up at Dunkirk was sent to equip himself in Perpignan or even in Algeria, in order to force him to join his military unit located in Strasbourg.” All this deprived the French army of precious time and created a certain mess.

Therefore, the French command was forced to begin to concentrate on the border mobilized troops before the mobilization of the army was fully completed. These two operations, which were carried out simultaneously, overlapped each other and mutually violated each other. This was promoted by the erratic operation of the railways, the preliminary plan of which military transport was also disrupted. On the railways of France in July-August, 1870 was dominated by a picture of confusion and confusion. She was well described by the historian A. Shyuke: “Headquarters and administrative departments, artillery and engineering troops, infantry and cavalry, personnel and reserve units, were packed into trains to failure. People, horses, the material part, the provisions - all this in great disarray and confusion was unloaded at the main assembly points. For a number of days, the railway station in Metz presented a picture of chaos, which seemed impossible to sort out. People did not dare to free the cars; the arriving supplies were unloaded and then loaded again into the same trains to be sent to another point. From the station, hay was shipped to city stores, while it was shipped from warehouses to train stations. ”

Frequently, trains with troops were delayed on the way due to the lack of accurate information about their destination. In some cases, the troops changed their concentration points several times. For example, the 3 Corps, which was to be formed in Metz, received an unexpected order on July 24 to head for Bulay; The 5 body, instead of the Bich, had to be forced into Sarrgyomin; Imperial Guard instead of Nancy - in Metz. Much of the reservists got to their military units with great delay, already on the battlefield, or generally stuck somewhere in the way, and not having reached their destination. Late and then lost their part of the reservists formed a large mass of people who wandered along the roads, huddled together, where they would have to and lived on charity. Some began to loot. In this confusion, not only the soldiers lost their units, but also the generals, the commanders of the units could not find their troops.

Even those troops that were able to concentrate on the border did not have full combat effectiveness, since they were not provided with the necessary equipment, ammunition and food. The French government, which had already considered war with Prussia as inevitable for several years, nevertheless thoughtlessly did not pay due attention to such an important issue as supplying the army. From the testimony of the quartermaster General of the French Army Blondeau it is known that even before the start of the Franco-Prussian war, when the 1870 campaign plan was being discussed at the state military council, the question of supplying the army "did not occur to anyone." As a result, the question of supplying the army arose only when the war began.

Therefore, from the first days of the war, numerous complaints about the insecurity of military units with food fell to the military ministry. For example, the commander of the 5 Corps, General Faye, literally called for help: “I am in Beech with infantry battalions 17. No money, no money at all in city and corps cash registers. Send a specie to the troops. Paper money has no circulation. " The division commander in Strasbourg, General Ducrot, telegraphed on July 19 to the Minister of War: “The food situation is alarming ... No measures have been taken to ensure the delivery of meat. Please give me the authority to take measures dictated by the circumstances, or I would not answer for anything ... ”. “In Metz,” the local quartermaster reported July 20, “there is no sugar, no coffee, no rice, no spirits, not enough fat, crackers. Send urgently at least one million daily rations to Thionville. ” July 21 Marshal Bazin telegraphed to Paris: "All commanders insistently require vehicles, camp accessories, with which I am unable to supply them." Telegrams reported a shortage of sanitary wagons, wagons, bowlers, hiking flasks, blankets, tents, medicines, stretchers, orderlies, etc. Troops arrived at concentration sites without ammunition and hiking gear. But there were no reserves at places, or they were extremely lacking.

Engels, who was not only a famous Russophobe, but also a major specialist in the field of military affairs, noted: “Perhaps we can say that the army of the Second Empire has suffered defeat only from the Second Empire itself. Under such a regime, in which his supporters were generously paid by all means of the long-established system of bribery, one could not expect that this system would not affect quartermasterism in the army. The real war ... was prepared long ago; but stockpiling, especially equipment, appears to have received the least attention; and now, at the most critical period of the campaign, the disorder that prevailed in this particular area caused a delay of almost a week. This small delay created a huge advantage in favor of the Germans. ”

Thus, the French army was not ready for a decisive and rapid attack on the enemy’s territory, missed an opportune time to strike because of the disorder in its own rear. The plan of the offensive campaign collapsed because of the unpreparedness for war by the French themselves. The initiative went to the Prussian army, the French troops had to defend themselves. And in a protracted war, the advantage was on the side of the North German Union, led by Prussia. German troops completed the mobilization and could go on the offensive.

France lost its main advantage: superiority of forces at the stage of mobilization. The Prussian army of wartime surpassed the French. By the time the war was declared, the French army had numbered about 640 thousand on paper. However, it was necessary to deduct the troops that were stationed in Algeria, Rome, the garrisons of the fortresses, the gendarmerie, the imperial guard, and the personnel of the military-administrative departments. As a result, the French command could count at the beginning of the war on about 300 thousand soldiers. It is understood that in the future the number of the army increased, but only these troops could meet the first enemy strike. The Germans also concentrated on the border in early August, about 500 thousand people. Together with the garrisons and spare military units in the German army, according to its commander in chief Field Marshal Moltke, there were about 1 million. As a result, the North German alliance, led by Prussia, gained a numerical advantage at the initial, decisive stage of the war.

In addition, the location of the French troops, which would have been successful in the event of an offensive war, was not suitable for defense. French troops were stretched along the Franco-German border, isolated in the fortresses. After the forced refusal of the offensive, the French command did nothing to reduce the length of the front and create mobile field groups that could counter the enemy attacks. Meanwhile, the Germans grouped their forces in the army, concentrated between the Moselle and the Rhine. Thus, the German troops also gained a local advantage, concentrating the troops on the main line.

The French army was significantly inferior to the Prussian and in their fighting qualities. The general atmosphere of degradation, corruption, which was characteristic of the Second Empire, encompassed the army. This affected the morale and combat training of troops. One of the most prominent French military experts, General Tuma, noted: “The acquisition of knowledge was not held in high esteem, but there were cafes in high esteem; officers who stayed at home to work were taken under suspicion as people alienated by their comrades. To succeed, it was necessary first of all to have a smart face, good manners and proper posture. In addition to these properties, it was necessary: ​​in the infantry, standing in front of the authorities, to keep, as it should be, hands at the seams and fix eyes on 15 steps forward; in cavalry, to memorize theory and be able to ride a well-trained horse through the barracks; in artillery - to feed deep contempt for technical studies ... Finally, in all kinds of weapons - to have recommendations. Truly a new scourge has fallen on the army and the country: recommendations ... ”.

It is clear that in the French army there were well-trained officers, people conscientiously related to their duties, commanders with combat experience. However, it was not they who defined the system. High command could not cope with their tasks. Napoleon III possessed neither military gifts, nor personal qualities necessary for the able and firm leadership of the troops. In addition, by 1870, the state of health had deteriorated significantly, which had a detrimental effect on his mental clarity, decision-making and operational coordination of government actions. He was treated (problems of the urinary tract) with the help of opiates, which made the emperor sluggish, sleepy and indifferent. As a result, the physical and mental crisis of Napoleon III coincided with the crisis of the Second Empire.

The French General Staff at that time was a bureaucratic institution that had no influence in the army and could not rectify the situation. In the years preceding the Franco-Prussian war, the French General Staff was almost completely removed from participation in government military activities, which were thought mainly in the depths of the war ministry. As a result, when the war began, the officers of the General Staff were not ready to perform their main task. The generals of the French army were cut off from their troops, often they did not know. Command posts in the army were distributed to persons who were close to the throne, and did not distinguish themselves by military successes. So, when the war began with Prussia, the seven corps of the Rhine army from eight were commanded by generals who belonged to the emperor's closest circle. As a result, organizational skills, the level of military-theoretical training of commanders of the French army lagged far behind the military knowledge and organizational skills of the Prussian generals.

In terms of armament, the French army was practically not inferior to the Prussian one. A new Chasspo rifle of the 1866 model of the year was adopted by the French army. Chasspo rifles could carry out aimed fire at distances up to a kilometer, while Prussian needle guns Dreyse fired just 1849-500 meters and more often misfired. True, the French army, due to the poor organization of the commissary service, extreme disorder in the army supply system, did not have time to fully rearm these rifles, they accounted for just 600-20% of all weapons of the French army. Therefore, a significant part of the French soldiers was armed with rifles of obsolete systems. In addition, the soldiers, especially from the reserve units, did not know how to handle the guns of the new system: the low level of military training of the rank and file of the French army made itself felt. In addition, the French were inferior in artillery. The La Gitta bronze cannon, which was in service with the French, was significantly inferior to the Krupp German steel cannon. The La Gitta cannon fired at a distance of just 30 km, while the Krupp guns fired at a distance of 2,8 km, and, unlike them, were charged from the muzzle side. But the French had 3,5-barrel mitraliases (canisters) - the predecessors of machine guns. Mitrallezy Refffy, extremely effective in defense, was beaten for a mile and a half, throwing bursts up to 25 bullets per minute. The Germans did not have such weapons. However, there were few of them (fewer than 250 pieces), and the problems of mobilization led to the fact that they could not collect the calculations. Many of the calculations were not sufficiently trained in the treatment of mitraliases, and sometimes they did not have any combat training at all, and they also had no idea about the sighting or range-measuring characteristics. Many commanders did not even know about the existence of these weapons.

The beginning of the Franco-Prussian war. Plans and the state of the French army

French Rifle Chassepo 1866 of the Year

Prussian needle rifle Dreyze, adopted by 1849 year


Mitraleza refi

As a result, the French army, which still had the glory of a first-class army, in the war with Prussia could oppose to the enemy mainly glorious traditions and the innate bravery of the soldiers. However, this was not enough to withstand the Prussian military machine. In almost all respects, the Prussian army was stronger. She was not inferior in the fighting spirit and the will to win. After the victories of 1864 and 1866, the Prussian troops had high morale. They fought for the unification of Germany, and the French were officially the aggressors. That is, for the German soldiers it was a just war.

To be continued ...
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  1. parusnik
    parusnik 29 March 2016 06: 48
    +7
    And then the style is different .. it doesn’t look like the language from the previous articles .. But the author is one .. But, in principle, everything is correctly indicated in the article ..
  2. venaya
    venaya 29 March 2016 07: 02
    -6
    Prussian troops ... fought for the unification of Germany

    An interesting turn - the Prussian troops fought for the unification of Germany. Excuse me, but before 1871, did anyone know about the existence of a certain "Germany"? This territory was inhabited by Russian-speaking tribes as early as the XNUMXth century. When and where did the Germans come from? Do you have any suggestions on this?
    1. Knizhnik
      Knizhnik April 29 2016 15: 11
      +1
      The concept of "Germany" existed ("German question"), meaning the territory of the Holy Roman Empire, if I am not mistaken.
      Wikipedia writes about Slavs from the XNUMXth century (it is better to check from other sources).
      About the resettlement of Germanic tribes, google the Great Migration and the Ancient Germans. And you will be happy.
      P.S. For what zamusunut, did not understand
  3. Bredovich705
    Bredovich705 29 March 2016 08: 34
    +3
    A terrible amount of spelling mistakes! Not solid, for VO! A article +!
  4. Trapperxnumx
    Trapperxnumx 29 March 2016 09: 22
    +2
    Thanks to the author. Very interesting and informative article !!!
  5. Aleksandr72
    Aleksandr72 29 March 2016 09: 45
    +5
    The article is very interesting and informative. But in the book about the unification of Germany with "iron and blood" (I cannot name the exact name and author, because I don’t remember from memory, but I don’t have it at hand) I happened to read that the Emperor Napoleon III himself, even after receiving offensive for France and his personally Ems dispatch, categorically did not want an immediate war with Prussia, because he knew very well (as rightly indicated in the article):
    The problem was that the Second Empire was not ready for war with a serious opponent, and even on its territory. The second empire could only afford the colonial wars, with the obviously weaker adversary.

    However, the emperor's wife - a lady with a very determined and adventurous character, at the suggestion and with the support of aggressive marshals and generals - the future "heroes" of the Franco-Prussian war, MacMahon, Canrober and others, categorically demanded that her husband declare war on Prussia and begin preparations for this the war itself, shaking the aforementioned Ems dispatch (brilliant in its simplicity and execution, the move of the Iron Chancellor, who pushed France to war with Prussia on deliberately unfavorable conditions and subsequently finally secured Prussia in the first place among all German states, which made it possible to unite these very states around Prussia - and the Prussian king also became the German emperor). Emperor Napoleon III, being in a bad mood and being ill (he had a neglected urolithiasis - the sensations were not the most pleasant) yielded to the demand of his wife and his marshals - so France slipped into war, being completely unprepared for it, which naturally ended for the French army by the defeat at Sedan and Metz, the surrender of the emperor, army and country.
    I have the honor.
    1. venaya
      venaya 29 March 2016 10: 51
      -3
      Quote: Aleksandr72
      the chancellor’s brilliant simplicity and execution, which pushed France to war with Prussia on obviously unfavorable conditions and subsequently finally secured Prussia in first place among all German states, which made it possible to unite these same states around Prussia - and the Prussian king also became the German emperor

      This version has been actively disseminated for over a century. But recently, MGIMO professor Fursov clarified that the whole process was controlled not by the former Ambassador of Prussia to the Russian Empire and at that time the current Chancellor of the Kingdom of Prussia, Bismarck, but by Rothschild, who was more influential in European affairs and indeed the organizer of this war. The fact is that Rothschild is often considered "the king of all Ashkenazi", and Ashkenazi have not only the genetics of the Turkic peoples, but also their Yiddish language is of Turkic origin. This is where the suspicion arises that the introduction of the Western Turkic Dalekt as the main language of communication on the territory of the Holy Roman Empire was possibly carried out by the Ashkenazi. Initially, it could be the owners of the Hanseatic League, the Oldenburg family, later the Rothschilds intercepted this initiative. So to ascribe such significant changes in Europe to some chancellor of a not very large kingdom to Bismarck, I think it is not sufficiently justified.
      1. Cartalon
        Cartalon 29 March 2016 13: 06
        +1
        They don’t have Ashkenazi of Turkic genetics, do not be afraid in the next world to meet with Prince Bismarck and get a cane from him for the koment for this koment?
        1. venaya
          venaya 29 March 2016 19: 49
          0
          Please add for clarification of the situation from the results of the study by representatives of medical science: MD Eran Elhaik of the Institute of Genetic Medicine, Johns Hopkins University, USA, who transcribed genome of the Ashkenazi Jews, revealing a mosaic from the genes of Turkic, Caucasian, Slavic and other ancestors, thereby confirming the earlier assumptions that Eastern European Jews descended from a mixture of Turkic tribeswho settled the Caucasus at the beginning of our era and adopted Judaism in the VIII century. AD, supporting individual enclaves of Judaism until the XIII century. After the collapse of the empire, the Judeo-Khazars fled to Eastern Europe. The emergence of European "Jews", therefore, is due to the influx of Judeo-Khazars, mixed with European peoples, especially the Slavs. Those. "Jews" is an ideological group.
          1. Cartalon
            Cartalon 29 March 2016 20: 49
            0
            You already would have quoted the second paragraph from the wiki if you started already, and there everything is already completely wrong and 80% of Ashkenazi from southern Europe
      2. kumaxa
        kumaxa April 1 2016 19: 56
        0
        and even so it is Bismarck who is considered the creator of gyrmania! it was he who united the gyrman kinyshestv with iron and blood! even though the word germany itself is of Latin origin and this name! the Romans even had an ampirator guy Germanicus! like Africa, too, with him Libya Libya or Julia Julius! interesting to read the history of the ancient world so much new! and everything is as old as our civilization!
    2. revnagan
      revnagan 29 March 2016 11: 36
      0
      Quote: Aleksandr72
      But in the book about the unification of Germany with "iron and blood"

      "Battle of the Iron Chancellors" VS Pikul?
      1. The comment was deleted.
      2. Aleksandr72
        Aleksandr72 29 March 2016 12: 39
        +4
        Unfortunately no. This is a fiction book and read documentary historical research. In my opinion, the author's surname is Nenakhov (not sure). I remembered the title of the book - "Iron and Blood".
        hi
        1. Rastas
          Rastas 29 March 2016 21: 20
          0
          In my opinion, this biography of Bismarck was called that. The Franco-Prussian war is the work of H. Moltke.
        2. Alex
          Alex 30 March 2016 18: 05
          +5
          Quote: Aleksandr72
          In my opinion, the author's surname is Nenakhov (not sure). I remembered the title of the book - "Iron and Blood".

          There is one. The full title is "With Iron and Blood (German Wars in the XNUMXth Century)". The author is Yuri Nenakhov. It is written in a rather interesting, somewhat non-standard (though not entirely unexpected) view of Russian-German relations.
    3. Rastas
      Rastas 29 March 2016 21: 14
      +1
      Napoleon’s plan was to quickly defeat Prussia, because he understood that in a long time the Germans would be stronger. Napoleon knew about the numerical superiority of Prussia, and about the superiority of the fighting qualities of the Prussian army. In addition, reports came to him that the people did not want to fight - anti-war demonstrations were held in Paris, Lyon and other cities.
  6. Cartalon
    Cartalon 29 March 2016 09: 47
    +4
    The mobilization of the French is marvelous; trips to Algeria for ammunition and the brave soldier Schweik would not surpass.
  7. Your friend
    Your friend 29 March 2016 11: 34
    0
    "The Second Empire could only afford colonial wars, with an obviously weaker enemy."
    It's a shame for RI in the light of the Crimean War. (
    1. Trapperxnumx
      Trapperxnumx 29 March 2016 16: 56
      0
      Quote: Your friend
      "The Second Empire could only afford colonial wars, with an obviously weaker enemy."
      It's a shame for RI in the light of the Crimean War. (

      Nothing offensive. Firstly, France was not alone, but in a union. And secondly, this alliance could not even occupy the whole of Crimea.
      1. Your friend
        Your friend 29 March 2016 17: 17
        +1
        Quote: Trapper7
        Quote: Your friend
        "The Second Empire could only afford colonial wars, with an obviously weaker enemy."
        It's a shame for RI in the light of the Crimean War. (

        Nothing offensive. Firstly, France was not alone, but in a union. And secondly, this alliance could not even occupy the whole of Crimea.

        Actually, this alliance defeated the Republic of Ingushetia, and the Crimea is not clear here. The purpose of the allies was to save Turkey, which was done. Of course, this is a disappointing defeat. The Allies acted thousands of kilometers from their borders along complex sea lanes. RI acted on its territory and lost.
        1. Olezhek
          Olezhek April 29 2016 14: 34
          0
          RI acted on its territory and lost


          The army was defeated, St. Petersburg was occupied by the allies ...

          No loss was of course the place to be.
          But not a disaster like a sedan.
    2. The comment was deleted.
  8. unknown
    unknown 29 March 2016 15: 25
    +2
    Quote: venaya
    Prussian troops ... fought for the unification of Germany

    An interesting turn - the Prussian troops fought for the unification of Germany. Excuse me, but before 1871, did anyone know about the existence of a certain "Germany"? This territory was inhabited by Russian-speaking tribes as early as the XNUMXth century. When and where did the Germans come from? Do you have any suggestions on this?

    Out of nowhere. What and how was happening, roughly showed Outskirts.
    A completely artificial process for obtaining from the Russian new peoples: Germans, Poles, French and so on ... according to the list.
    And the beginning of everything: the merchant heresy - Protestantism, Troubles in the metropolis, the desire of local feudal lords to become princelings, the Thirty Years War, the seizure of the metropolis by "new Europeans", the death of a single state, new peoples, new history, new languages.
  9. Sergey-8848
    Sergey-8848 30 March 2016 01: 30
    0
    The second empire, Fifth republic. The calculation itself somehow evokes the idea that they are not final at all, just in a disordered system. So much for that - 1871, 1940. And now, maybe, and more, moreover, from those same zuavs, etc. etc. (from their great-grandchildren).
  10. Vladislav 73
    Vladislav 73 30 March 2016 20: 27
    -1
    venaya An interesting turn - the Prussian troops fought for the unification of Germany. Excuse me, but before 1871, did anyone know about the existence of a certain "Germany"? This territory was inhabited by Russian-speaking tribes as early as the XNUMXth century. When and where did the Germans come from? Do you have any suggestions on this?
    Ndaa ... Insanity grows stronger! Apparently, the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation (962-1806), created by Otton 1, was an exclusively Russian-speaking entity? And then the vile Bismarck in 1871. ordered everyone to be called Germans and invented the German language? belay What is it like? belay request
    1. venaya
      venaya 31 March 2016 04: 24
      -1
      Quote: Vladislav 73
      Was the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation (962-1806) created by Otto 1 an exclusively Russian-speaking entity? And then the sneaky Bismarck in 1871. ordered everyone to be called Germans and invented the German language? Is that all?

      Let's try in order: At the moment we have such a nation as "Ukrainians". Have you ever wondered what year such a nation was created? According to my information, this happened on October 14, 1914, when a newspaper with the term "Ukrainian" was first published in North America. Do you have any other data on this? Perhaps you do not agree with this statement and stubbornly believe, and as a true Svidomo think that "Ukrainians" arose millions of years ago? Even on this page of our site, you took the trouble to read the post of our colleague, with whom I agree:
      Quote: ignoto
      Quote: venaya: ... This territory was populated by Russian-speaking tribes in the XNUMXth century. When and where did the Germans come from? Any suggestions on this?
      Out of nowhere. What and how was happening, roughly showed Outskirts.
      A completely artificial process for obtaining from the Russian new peoples: Germans, Poles, French and so on ... according to the list.
      And the beginning of everything: the merchant heresy - Protestantism, Troubles in the metropolis, the desire of local feudal lords to become princelings, the Thirty Years War, the seizure of the metropolis by "new Europeans", the death of a single state, new peoples, new history, new languages.

      After that, now give your version of the time of occurrence of "Germanic nation", "German language". If you do not have any information on this, then I would like to inform you that the very emergence of nationalities, nations is determined by time in the region of the XYII century. By the way, the first alphabetic-phonetic writing of the German language appeared in the 1906th century by Martin Luther's translation of the Bible into the newly created "German" language, which was most likely brought to these places by the Turkic-speaking Ashkenazim. And when was the German language created? In 80, the emperor of the German Empire and the former king of the Prussian kingdom, Wilheim, was first brought for signature a law introducing the national German language. It turned out that he did not know him and refused to sign this document, so now up to 1914 dialects of the German language are used on the territory of present-day Germany. By the way, the law banning the use of the Russian language in the German Empire was introduced only in XNUMX. As far as I understand, you are not familiar with this information and unfortunately use all sorts of fakes from Radio Liberty, BBC, Voice of America or Wikipedia, etc., funded from one pocket. From the point of view of elementary decency, it was desirable to apologize, this is our culture. If you still have questions, then I am ready to share my own and not my knowledge.
      1. Vladislav 73
        Vladislav 73 31 March 2016 10: 04
        -1
        Quote: venaya
        . From the point of view of elementary decency, it was desirable to apologize, such is our culture

        Our culture is such that it’s not shameful to call nonsense! I didn’t call you names or insult you! So I don’t consider it necessary to apologize! This is the first. Second. Do you hear yourself? We are talking about the Germans, and you tell me about the Ukrainians! Well, what can I talk about? request The third.
        Quote: venaya
        Out of nowhere. What and how was happening, roughly showed Outskirts.
        A completely artificial process for obtaining from the Russian new peoples: Germans, Poles, French and so on ... according to the list.
        And the beginning of everything: the merchant heresy - Protestantism, Troubles in the metropolis, the desire of local feudal lords to become princelings, the Thirty Years War, the seizure of the metropolis by "new Europeans", the death of a single state, new peoples, new history, new languages.

        You could be in solidarity with anyone, but this is not a proof of the truth of your words. Do you offer me this nonsense, where everything is in a heap, causes and consequences are mixed, how is the proof? belay Sorry, I won’t argue. I think it’s completely pointless! Fourth. You have changed many times, you have been accused of Svidomo, different fakes, how’s that? Do you need to apologize. Are you not shy about choosing words? You, dear, you need to develop culture before presenting anything to people! I consider talking with YOU as an absolutely pointless waste of time! Good luck in an alternative story!
  11. cant
    cant 30 March 2016 21: 14
    +1
    The article is very informative, even some parallels are obvious.
  12. 2005 Aleksey
    2005 Aleksey April 3 2016 18: 20
    +1
    Battle of the sedan. September 1, 1870
    Moltke, skillfully dividing his army into 3 parts, surrounded the army of Napoleon 3, moving to help the besieged Metz. A fierce battle ended in the rout and surrender of the remnants of the French army, who retreated to the Sedan fortress on the Franco-Belgian border. 82 thousand surrendered. French soldiers led by the emperor himself.
    1. dvg1959
      dvg1959 April 3 2016 19: 33
      0
      Dear colleague, I admire your knowledge of military history. And also admired the military talent of Moltke.
  13. Olezhek
    Olezhek April 29 2016 14: 35
    0
    Thanks for the little article - write well. Easy and informative.
    I did not come across any sensible material on the Franco-Prussian ...