Valentin Falin: How and why Gorbachev forgave Yakovlev cooperation with the special services of the USA
The Institute for Dynamic Conservatism (IDK) has published a transcript of the final part of a series of seminars held at the IDK by the famous statesman, doctor historical Valentin Mikhailovich Falin. The full text of this publication is reproduced below:To recreate an objective picture of historical achievements is an architrual task. Why did development happen in such a way, and not otherwise, that was a guiding idea, programming fatal decisions? History is most often written to order with a crooked pen and clumsy handwriting. One of the prominent French moralists, Vauvenargues, highly valued by Voltaire, emphasized: "In the world, the truth is lasting." And then he remarked: "Truth is less worn out than words, because it is not so accessible." It is difficult to disagree with him, because at every step you are convinced how rarely the point of view coincides with the fulcrum.
Thank God, not all the witnesses of the past bend to the “authorities” and do not curry favor, holding their nose to the wind. Take in your hands the book of Gregory Chukhrai, an excellent director and in the literal and figurative sense of the chronicler of an entire era. 22 June 1941 g. When he tried to detain the German saboteurs, he received his first wound. And in April, 1945 of Mr. Grigoriy Naumovich, riddled with shrapnel, bad doctors were sentenced “for hopelessness” to death. Character and iron will helped him escape from the pool. In the book "My War" Chukhrai summarized his not only military experience: "Allies are not friends; they are together, but they have different goals. And if this is not understood, then the meaning of the war remains misunderstood. World War II only at first glance was a war anti-Hitler coalition against Hitler’s fascism. Essentially, it was conceived and implemented as a war of the capitalist West against the Soviet Union. Facts in politics acquire true meaning only in the light of goals, in the light of intentions, in the light of the doctrine that the war is fought. "
Delving into the background and the official history of the Second World War, you shouldn’t prettify its successor, the Cold War. On the occasion of the half-century anniversary of the landing of the Allies in Normandy, US President B. Clinton said: the Second World War ended with the collapse of "Soviet totalitarianism." Consequently, the cold war was nothing more than the final chapter of the disaster that cost 100 millions of lives to humanity. If everything and everyone are to be considered, not to be hypocritical, skillfully attributing lies about the past to unrighteous plans for the future.
At the suggestion of London, Washington and others like them, the German attack on Poland is taken as the starting point of all misfortunes, the green light of which was allegedly lit by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - the non-aggression pact concluded by 23 in August 1939. elementary facts and crossing the former recognition of the same British and Americans. So, F. Noel-Baker, head of the British delegation at the final session of the League of Nations (1946) stated: "We know that the world war began in Manchuria 15 years ago," in other words, in 1931, the same thing was recorded by Mr. Stimson, Secretary of State in the Administration of G. Hoover and Minister of War under Fr. Roosevelt.
Why are we so greedy for any falsification? Is this the cost of "the contempt of the traditions of one's own country," the rise of political science over scientific historiography, and the reading of the past through the prism of the command of those in power? When the “experts,” I quote G. Kissinger, hang on how to “synthesize and reproduce the edification of the authorities” more often, in order to slander the distant and intimate, the public is doomed to live in the plague atmosphere of self-indulgence and slander.
Why go back to this? What is happening now in the Caucasus, in the former Soviet republics, is derived from the plans for dismembering Russia that they hatched in the West in the context of the First World War and the Masonic (February) revolution of 1917. We take instructions from the US delegation at the Versailles Conference of 1919. from its “democratic reorganization”: Finland, the Baltic states, Belarus, Poland, Ukraine, the Caucasus, the Central Asian republics, Siberia, the Far East fell away. What is left? Moscow and the Central Russian Upland. Only incorrigibly naive will believe that the rooting of 1991-1992. Russia's challenges are met to the maximum. We will listen to M. Olbright or C.Rice's rant, get a grasp of the curse of Siberia between the pages of the manuscript. Everywhere the leitmotif: Tsarist Russia did not know how to govern Siberia, much less did the USSR, and the current Russian Federation did not succeed in this lesson. Conclusion: this region should become the property of all mankind as a "no man's land." Such is the scope! And, it seems, he will not come down from the agenda until the natural gifts of the Trans-Urals will run out and the appetites of politicians charging on someone else’s good will not be quenched.
I would like to remind you that Stalin’s post-war plans did not include building satellite rings on the periphery of the USSR. He preferred "peace-neighborly relations" to mutual benefit. Until the middle of 1947, the governments in Romania were headed by immigrants from the "Front of Farmers". The party of "small farmers" was in power in Hungary. President of Czechoslovakia was E. Benesh, far from pro-communist ideas. In Poland, the coalition government is at the helm. Moscow’s repeated attempts to preserve the German’s “democrats”, at least from the threshold, at least allow for a minimum of mutual understanding. At the end of 1946, the Truman administration took it as a guideline - whatever policy the Soviet leadership pursues, the very existence of the USSR is incompatible with the security of the United States.
In 1947, Washington began to put together military blocs into which they intended to include a separate West German state, re-armed to the next "drang na Osten".
How should the Soviet Union act? Wait for a miracle, reliably knowing about the fate prepared for him? A preemptive strike against yesterday's ally was assigned to 1949, then to 1952 and 1957. The megalomania that struck Washington almost turned into an apocalypse: under the plans to destroy the main adversary (there were dozens of them), "defenders of human rights" were missing in 1945-1949. warheads. The atomic age dictated its logic. Pilot Mao called it "the tip against the tip". Willy-nilly, to prevent the worst, the country had to tighten its belt. Instead of developing peaceful sectors of the economy, improving the social situation of the population, we have a heavy burden of an arms race and the arrangement of defensive infrastructures. International bad weather responded by tightening the screws, new reprisals and purges.
Mastering the Soviet Union Nuclear weapons and the means of delivering it to the targets led the US to make some adjustments to the course of the confrontation. No, the possibility of total battle was not excluded. “Balancing on the verge of war” (JF Dulles) remained the alpha and omega of geopolitics of Washington. The epicenter of tension in Europe is Germany, in the Far East - China and Korea, in the Middle East - the states owning oil deposits. The Soviet Union was under siege. It was continuously tested not only for defense, but also for the opportunity to provide its population with a proper quality of life.
1953 year. Stalin was succeeded by NS Khrushchev. A person who is not bypassed by natural gifts and endowed with irrepressible energy. The latter, in the absence of elementary upbringing and systematic education, exacerbated the defects of autocracy and the inescapable desire to show who was the boss. In one, Khrushchev definitely succeeded. He proved that absolute power spoils its carriers absolutely. I omit economic councils, corn, the rise of virgin soil. I will not dwell on the debunking of the personality cult of Stalin (if the personal contribution to this cult and its consequences is forgotten) or about the mines laid under our relations with the PRC. I will open one page, covered with oblivion.
S.P.Korolyov brought the intercontinental rocket to mind. A dozen or two of these "products" (the so-called D.F Ustinov complexes) entered service. So what? In no way Khrushchev declared the surface fleet "floating coffins" and ordered to scrap metal aircraft carriers and heavy ships of the class not yet lowered from the stocks. I was friends with aircraft designer A.S. Yakovlev. I report from his story: Khrushchev cut the financing of military aircraft by an order of magnitude. Some design offices were disbanded due to their lack of prospects. Ahead of them, American developers on 12-15 years do not count. We pay for this outrage to this day. The volunteer interconnection of phenomena manifested itself in a special way in the Cuban crisis 1962.
To the political portrait of N.S. Khrushchev could add a few azure strokes. After all, he returned the good name to the dead "enemies of the people," rescued thousands and thousands of innocently condemned people from GULAG. Under him even thawed in the cultural sphere. Short, however, because, as the "supreme art historian" believed, she scattered heresy in the public consciousness.
Behind the stinginess of time, I will not go into the peripeteias of Khrushchev's displacement and the formation of a triumvirate in the person of Leonid Brezhnev, N.V. Podgorny and A.N. Kosygin, which existed for about three years. The Prague Spring was his final sentence. A.N. Kosygin opposed the introduction of troops in Czechoslovakia. Of course, and here it is necessary to do without simplifications. Together with the assistants to the General Secretary, AM Aleksandrov and A.I.Blatov, I was instructed to monitor the development of events, so that I would inform L.I. Brezhnev twice or three times a day. When the arguments against the use of force outweighed the pros in our reports, the secretary general grumbled: "You don't know everything." Naturally, we did not know many details. Who ruled the "spring"? One headquarters was in Paris, the other in Zurich. Much time later, I learned that 16 in August, 1968, Dubcek himself, in a telephone conversation with Brezhnev, had asked to send troops of the Warsaw Pact to Czechoslovakia. Later, he strongly discouraged from this conversation.
The August crisis of 1968, which crushed the post-Stalinist evolution, including in the Soviet house, prompted a number of European countries to think seriously. Paris was the first to sign the de-escalation of tension. Certain shifts made themselves felt in the Federal Republic. When the Soviet troops entered the borders of Czechoslovakia, F.-J. Strauss ordered to withdraw parts of the Bundeswehr from the Czechoslovak border by a couple of tens of kilometers in order to avoid an accidental collision.
The Bonn political landscape as a whole has undergone significant changes at that time. The Christian Democrats were forced to join the "big coalition" with the Social Democrats. V.Brandt was in charge of foreign affairs, which gave a chance to enrich our German palette. In the autumn of 1968, I was assigned to head the 3-m European Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (two Germany, West Berlin, Austria). The commission stated: to analyze the experience of relations with Bonn, and, having renounced the fruitless polemics, formulate considerations where and how it would be possible to engage in productive dialogue with the Western Germans. When discussing the note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the political bureau of A.A. Gromyko, Yu.V. Andropov and A.N. Kosygin, they were opposed, first of all, by MASuslov and B.N. Ponomarev. The Secretary General spoke in favor of stopping to pound water in a mortar, and, as far as depended on Moscow, try to normalize relations with the FRG.
On the horizon - elections to the Bundestag 1969. Much depended on their outcome. A very painstaking work on the cultivation of the soil was started, on which the seeds of prudence were to be cultivated. So much so that the “hand of Moscow” does not appear anywhere. I tell one symptomatic episode.
A.A. Gromyko and U.Rodzhers, the US Secretary of State, met in New York just on the day of the counting of votes in the West German elections. And the first question that came up in the discussion was what the Germans would bring to the world. Gromyko offered to hear experts. M.Hillenbrand, head of the European department of the State Department, reported: "The CDU / CSU, even with losses, is ahead and, therefore, no significant changes are expected." The floor is given to me: “According to our observations,” I noted, “shifts on the Bonn political scene are not excluded.”
Rodgers immediately offered a break. Hillenbrand approaches me: “What makes you think that changes are brewing? Washington controls every cell in the Federal Republic and there are no signals indicating changes,” he said. “You can control actions,” I said to a colleague, “but even you cannot control the thoughts of people.” The next morning it turned out: without waiting for the final results of the counting of votes, President Nixon, at the suggestion of the State Department, congratulated K.-G. Kisinger on his victory and expressed hope for the continuation of Bonn’s close cooperation with Washington. The Americans did not know about the contacts of G.Vener and V.Sheel with the President of the Federal Republic of Germany G.Haynemann about the alternatives of the “big coalition” if the Social Democrats and the Free Democrats together got a majority in the Bundestag.
A.A. Gromyko used the opportunity to meet with V. Brandt (in September 1969 he headed the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany at the session of the UN General Assembly) to invite him to proceed to direct negotiations about filling the Soviet-West German relations with constructive content the exchange of notes. Brandt briefly replied: "Well, this is worth thinking about." Then I met with the future Chancellor.
At the same time, the “special communication channel” by V. Kevorkov and V. Lednev with E. Bar was being debugged, which allowed to avoid many potholes on the paths to mutual understanding. After all, the Bonn state apparatus, especially the Foreign Ministry apparatus, was formed during the years of the Cold War. Inertia of thinking made itself felt literally at every turn. The followers of West German bureaucracy were mentors from overseas, as well as advisers from Paris and London.
Negotiations "on the rejection of the use of force" (the preliminary round lasted from 8 to 23 in December 1969) began with probing the reserves in the positions of both parties. Replacing Ambassador H. Allardt with E. Bar as head of the Bonn delegation (January 30 1970) did not immediately move matters. In addition to the difficulties of their problems, the massive raids on the new "Eastern policy" by opponents of the social-liberal coalition in the Bundestag and the campaign unleashed in the West German media hampered their resolution. The style of A.A. Gromyko also had an effect - even in small things he tried to take over the partners, putting them, to put it mildly, in an awkward position. Rescued our internal "special channel".
“Andrei (Gromyko),” Leonid Brezhnev said in a conversation with me, “is an experienced negotiator. But sometimes he needs to be corrected. Keep my negotiators in detail.” In practice, it looked like this. After each plenary session and separate meetings with Bar, I introduced A.M.Aleksandrov most often to affairs, who managed to inform the chief even before the minister’s report. And more than once the secretary general cooled the ardor of his friend.
It is useful to recall the nervousness of Washington, which has grown in the course of working out the Moscow accords. R. Nixon strongly advised V. Brandt to refrain from traveling to Moscow to sign an agreement. The Chancellor took this demarche. The head of the White House did not calm down and "recommended" Brandt to restrict the initialing of the document until the four powers agree on how to deal with West Berlin.
Stick in the wheel tried to insert the heads of the GDR. 7 August 1970 G. in the USSR flew E.Honneker. He convinced B.N. Ponomarev that the Moscow Treaty was a mistake. At the very least, it should have been accompanied by the conclusion of a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic. I will mention some other skeptics. PMMasherov asked me: "Will the Germans not deceive us once again?" VV Shcherbitsky found in the text of the contract a lot of risks. A.A. Gromyko and Yu.V. Andropov did not flinch. Politburo decided: to be a contract.
How did the development go on? Inspirers of public hysteria erected the Berlin Wall as a symbol of the Cold War, a visiting card of the “Soviet totalitarianism.” According to some of the zealous Bicopists, the wall is a landmark act in the division of Germany and Europe, before which armed conflicts in Asia and Africa, in the Middle and Near East, and in Central and Latin America, which caused millions of victims, faded. The dismemberment of other states, the half-century blockade of Cuba, visible and invisible barriers crushing the once united ethnic and economic spaces were pushed out of sight. Start - do not finish.
Let's return to the unfinished topic. W. Brandt signed the Moscow Treaty. However, its ratification by the Bundestag was at the request of Washington due to a preliminary settlement on West Berlin. What to do? I report to Leonid Brezhnev: focusing on dogma - West Berlin outside the sphere of interests of Germany, Moscow actually recognized for Washington the quality of the arbitrator who determines the reality of Brandt-Scheel's "Eastern policy". The Secretary General without my lengthy explanations truncated what can not be done without settling the situation. He invited Gromyko and instructed the minister to weigh the "business consideration", if he did not connect, without compromising on principles, the Western Germans to the disentangling of the Berlin knot. Brezhnev proposed to assign a new ambassador (by this time, Bonn gave me an agrémen) together with Kevorkov to work on probing possible options for neutralizing the West Berlin splinter. Brezhnev equipped me with the following directive: "You know our interests, and I expect a good agreement from you."
A series of confidential meetings in West Berlin with E. Bar started, then the US ambassador to Germany K. Rush joined the dialogue. About the content of the exchange of opinions, which sometimes lasted until late at night, I notified A.M. Alexandrov of HF communication, after which I wrote a telegram to the Minister. In short, as in the course of discussions on the Moscow Treaty, the Secretary General was equipped to listen to A.Gromyko’s reports.
Neither the British, nor the French, nor the GDRs were devoted to the fact, and especially to the content of tripartite meetings. When the construction of the future settlement was determined, I was sent to V. Ulbricht to get his "good". The chairman of the GDR government, V. Shtof, helped me a lot in this difficult lesson.
Why these details? The elaborated settlement facilitated the maintenance of the human relations of the West Germans with the population of Berlin and the GDR. But. The rights of the East Germans in terms of visiting both the Federal Republic of Germany and the western sectors of Berlin by them remained curtailed. In several visits, Leonid Brezhnev tried to convince E. Honecker of the need to “humanize” the border. The latter listened, but did not devote any of his colleagues in the leadership of the republic to the considerations of Moscow. In particular, we proposed to dismantle the so-called "crossbow", to facilitate family reunification. After all, up to 60% of the inhabitants of the GDR had relatives in West Germany and more than a third of the West Germans in the German Democratic Republic. Sooner or later, dissatisfaction with the dissection through the living would have to burst out.
I turn to the restructuring. Giving in to the arguments of M.S.Gorbachev and A.N. Yakovlev, I was stupid and in 1986 I returned to big politics. The return was stipulated by me by a number of conditions, in particular by granting the right to directly report to the new general secret on any questions concerning the life of the country and its international relations. At the initial stage, Gorbachev himself did not conceal that he did not know much from the past and far from everything could be deducted from the papers.
So, he was interested in what N. Khrushchev and A.D. Sakharov quarreled about when and how Moscow broke up with the West in German affairs. In the autumn of 1986, I sent Gorbachev a note from Professor R.A. Belousov, who predicted that at the turn of the 1989-1990s. Friends of the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA will find themselves in an economic pit with immense social, political and other consequences. The Soviet Union itself will remain in an unenviable position, which does not allow the Allies to give a shoulder.
In total, Gorbachev received from me more than 50 memoranda on various issues. There was even a note on Church matters among them. Some of them were written by hand. I didn't leave copies for myself.
In March, 1988 I wrote to the General Secretary that in the next three months the GDR could be completely destabilized. At this time, a number of Bonn politicians turned to the Americans with a proposal not to force anti-government sentiments in East Germany. While not the time, they heard in response. I did not receive any response to this more than reasonable warning. Feedback did not function.
The turning point in the estimates of Mikhail Gorbachev for the future of the GDR fell on May 1989 of Mr. E. Honecker gathered for the celebration of the anniversary of Magnitogorsk. Among the young German communists, he half a century ago participated in the construction of the famous metallurgical plant. On the way, stop to meet with Gorbachev in Moscow. I reproduce the atmosphere and the essence of the conversation. For the first time, without stuttering, Honecker uttered the Russian word "perestroika". "We take note of what you are doing at home," he said, "the restructuring in the GDR has long been made." Gorbachev responded in the same way as at the end of 1988, speaking at the UN General Assembly Session, he described the meaning of our obligations under the Warsaw Pact. I recall, without prior negotiation with the allies and without a decision by the politburo, he stated: the Soviet armed forces protect friends from external threats; they do not interfere in their internal affairs and do not determine the order in which the people of friendly states intend to live.
At the time of Gorbachev’s speech at the UN, G. Kissinger and I sat next to each other. He expressed his impression of what he heard in words: "If I knew the content of the speech in advance, I would give President Bush other recommendations for the forthcoming conversation with your leader." Kissinger asked for help in organizing his meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev: the United States is interested in ensuring that the withdrawal of the USSR from Central and Eastern Europe does not resemble a flight.
The catastrophic earthquake in Spitak prompted the Soviet delegation to urgently leave New York. Kissinger asked me to inform Gorbachev that he would be ready to fly to Moscow at any time for the said conversation with our leader. The meeting took place in a couple of weeks. MS Gorbachev summarized its outcome as follows: "Kissinger was and remained a reactionary." In January 1992, at Sheremetyevo Airport, we unexpectedly meet with Kissinger. “Why, after all,” he asked me, “Gorbachev did not accept the proposal that Moscow should not run headlong from Europe?” "Obviously, your ideas did not fit into his political solitaire," I answered.
To complete the picture. E. Honecker invited Mikhail Gorbachev to arrive in Berlin to celebrate the 40 anniversary of the GDR. The Secretary General is consulting with Shakhnazarov and me how to proceed. "If Gorbachev does not arrive on the 40 anniversary, the GDR regime will be swept away immediately. If in Berlin he can meet with the entire leadership of the republic, then there is some chance to prevent the situation getting out of control", I had the illusion that the second echelon in the leadership of the SED had a certain potential.
Gorbachev arrived in Berlin was greeted by a jubilant crowd with posters of "Gorby! Gorby!" The next day, Gorbachev’s detailed conversation with Honecker and Mittag. The General Secretary was in shock, setting out his vision of the urgent changes. He finished the monologue with the famous phrase: "Whoever is late, punishes him for life." Gorbachev repeated these considerations with an emphasis on the need to reckon with the demands of the times before the leaders of the GDR. "Are there any questions?" - addressed Honecker gathered. Silence. "Then let me have a few words. Recently, together with the delegation, I was in Magnitogorsk. I was offered a ride around the city, which had changed a lot since the end of 20-s. I stayed in a guest house, and the delegation members went on a tour. Looking in a few shops , they were amazed - the shelves are empty, there is not even salt and soap. " It hung in the air: those who brought the country to such a state try to give advice to others.
After serving half an hour at a reception, Gorbachev, referring to urgent matters at home, flew to Moscow. On the way to the airfield, Ambassador V.I. Kochemasov asks me:
- Well, how?
- Once, probably, it is time to stop the gimp. Friends convince us - Honecker is sick, radical change at the top is inevitable. We hold them for tails. Why not tell them: solve staffing issues on your own? "
A decade later, the leader of the SED was E. Krenz, who, it seemed, could keep development in a non-force field. Indeed, the change of everything and everything, including the fall of the Berlin Wall, has done without bloodshed. The sentence of the German Democratic Republic, the main pillar in our security system in the European direction, was drafted and executed, bypassing the government structures of the GDR, behind their backs, with the connivance of Moscow.
The fundamental question - he, in my opinion, was to become the credo of our restructuring - said: was it possible to return to the beginning of the beginnings, that is, to the program of the October revolution? What is the Soviet government? This is the power of the people. At first, democracy in Soviet Russia was a key. Everything and everywhere was chosen, including the Red Guard commanders and university professors. In economics, according to Lenin’s idea, drawn from Fourier, enterprises had to co-operate with working teams, communities in rural areas — to grow into voluntary cooperatives. The future socio-economic system was to be derived from the results of the competition of all orders.
How realistic could such a philosophy be in practice under conditions of a hostile environment and external armed intervention? Since the second half of 1918, the dilemma has become a categorical imperative: to defend the right to own historical choice, or to disappear at any price. Unfortunately, military communism has turned from a method of struggle against imperialist expansion into a way of existence. Tips and other generic features of non-verbal, direct democracy have been emasculated. The party was degraded into a knightly order, headed by a master, overseeing the life and death of any of the subjects.
It is simpler than simple to prove that the “civilizers” did not for an hour refuse to carry out the purpose of studying at the root of the “Russian bastard”, that they were the godfathers of Stalinism.
This, however, does not cancel the other parcel. Borrowing Peter I's copybook: "Having protected the fatherland with safety from the enemy, it is necessary to find the glory of the state through art and science." When the Soviet Union equaled the United States in the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction, we could and should have allowed ourselves to escape from the damn circle of the arms race, not to play up to those who turned the race into military technology and fanning the arsenals of weapons into the method of warfare.
With Khrushchev bribes smooth. He himself is a product and an apologist for Stalinist tyranny, and therefore was hardly fit for reincarnation from Saul to Paul. But what prevented rethinking the post-October experience of Nikita Sergeyevich’s successors, to modernize, or rather, humanize state power? In another way, it was quite possible to do and do a lot. Triumvirate I already touched. Leonid Brezhnev's health came to frustration. He was aware that he was not able to pull the state strap, and twice or three times he asked to let him go. But companions did not know whom to identify as successors of the escheat power. It was more convenient to take it away on the bottom of the barrel. As it was said backstage then, the “gang of four” - Andropov, Gromyko, Ustinov, Suslov (after his death - Chernenko), the ball rules. Doctors brought Brezhnev more or less back to normal and shoved a stack of pre-prepared projects for him to sign. So he endorsed a "piece of paper" on the introduction of troops into Afghanistan.
At the end of 1979, the deployment of American Pershing (first-strike missiles) in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany acquired special urgency. Yu.V. Andropov is calling me:
- How are we going to respond to the Pershing?
- Since we did not want to respond to the proposal of G. Schmidt ("Pershing" within the Federal Republic of Germany will not appear if the number of warheads on the Pioneer missiles is not greater than on the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles removed from combat duty) to trust in the will of God.
- Well, when you have a good mood, let's return to this item.
- I have a question for you: is everything well weighed when deciding on military intervention in Afghanistan? The British in the last century 38 spent their years planting their orders there and left without a dreary reception. The weapons have changed, but the mentality of the Afghans has remained the same.
- How do you know about our decision?
- No matter where. It is important that this is so.
- That is how it does not matter? The operation can fail if someone plays to the public! Remember, talk to anyone else about Afghanistan - blame yourself.
At that time, by the way, SF Akhromeev and a number of our other military were against military intervention in Afghanistan.
In October, 1982, Mr. Yu.V. Andropov, invited me to consult on urgent issues. The most difficult and dangerous I called the disintegration of Soviet society.
- What do you mean?
- There are many signs of erosion of what is called the Soviet people. Here is one of them. You come, for example, to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR. Someone in the company sings. Gathered people of different generations pick up the song, know both the words and the melody. And we have? Even at party meetings and conferences, party members sing the Internationale in pieces.
- I will tell you something more. A third of the draftees from Central Asia and the Caucasus do not know Russian. We are forced to send them to construction battalions and other non-combat units.
- In my opinion, this is the result of obvious miscalculations in the organization of state and party structures. What units exist in the apparatus of the Central Committee? Departments of heavy and light industry, military technology. There is an agitprop, which for some reason plays a sport. High School is subordinated to the science department. There are no departments for health care, for work with families and young people.
- Do you know when was the last time the politburo or the secretariat discussed the issue of youth?
- No.
- Even before World War II. Write a note on how we can restructure work, even with young people.
Then Yu.V. Andropov inquired what difficulties were foreseen in the foreign policy sphere.
- In 1983, 40 has been celebrated since the exposure of the Katyn tragedy. Burdenko report unreliable. It would be necessary to find out what documents the Smolensk and other NKVD directorates came to the Germans, that Stalin spoke about the fate of the Polish officers at a meeting with Sikorski in November 1941, that Beria blurted out at the same time.
- Contact F.D. Bobkov (KGB), N.V.Ogarkov (Chief of the General Staff) and with whom the Ministry of Foreign Affairs needs to prepare proposals.
In the KGB, Katyn was engaged in Pies. He came with the text of the report Burdenko. I had to remind him: there is an order from the general secretary (Andropov by this time became the general secretary) to deal seriously with the essence of the problem, and not to turn over the papers that we both know along and across. Pies says:
- Do you want to be shown the dossier with the neck "Not to be opened"?
- It’s not up to me to decide which documents the committee can put into circulation, fulfilling the instructions of the leadership
Maybe I should not have risked at the same time, justifying the need for a drastic change in our policy on Afghanistan. I contact Fedorchuk, the successor of Andropov in the KGB: our troops turned into mercenaries of Babrak Karmal; pro-government personnel fire into the air or pray to Allah. I suggested to think together who could assume the role of national leader. Will General Kadyr or Ahmad Shah Massoud fit this mission? I knew from military intelligence officers that Masoud was not averse to heading the government in Kabul and believed that if he had free hands, then after 6-8 months there would be peace in Afghanistan.
One of the most influential employees of the Central Committee informed Andropov that "using his official position, Falin draws the party and the Secretary General personally into a dubious history." Yuri Vladimirovich was so ill that he completely forgot about the order given to me to do Katyn. Phoned to Fedorchuk, he also learned about my liberties for Afghanistan. Punishment was not slow to wait.
We have forgotten how to look at two or three moves ahead. At least Najibullah was not surrendered to the Taliban. According to the latest polls, Afghans believe that they have never lived a calmer life in the last half century than during Najibullah. And we did not strike a finger to save it.
Let's get to your questions.
M.V. Demurin. Valentin Mikhailovich, could you describe in more detail the role of external and internal factors in the collapse of the USSR? You spoke of a constantly acting factor about external threats and aggressions during the entire Soviet period of Russian history. Was the operation yielded to change under such circumstances? War communism caused foreign aggression. Aggression in one form or another continued, which seriously impeded the improvement of the political, economic and social structure. There seemed to be a second way: to try to change external circumstances by agreeing with the West. But attempts to do this, the games around the so-called "peaceful coexistence" and "convergence" just led to such changes in the ruling Soviet elite, which in the saddest way affected our history. What is the dialectic of external and internal?
V.M. Falin. Politics is the art of priorities. And priorities depend on the economic, social, defense readiness of the state to repel external and internal threats, on the provision of each program with proper material components in their inseparable set. Before we created the first hydrogen bomb in the world, there was one situation (let me remind you that at the time of the first hydrogen bomb test, the United States had only a device weighing about 40 tons). Consequently, when the opportunity arose to respond to the Americans, there is no question about the Europeans, adequately to how the Americans tried to hit the Soviet Union, the choice was outlined: whether the Americans were further behind in the military technology race and imitated defense sufficiency, stop playing up the strategy of Washington to bring the Soviet Union to an economic collapse. Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Andropov have repeatedly spoken about this. They were not convinced by references to Bert von Suttner, who was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1905 for the study "Arms Race as a Method of Warfare".
The question is legitimate, why the chance remained unclaimed? The military-industrial complex of the United States has defined and in many respects still determines the sovereign policy. At some stage, our military industrial complex became self-sufficient in the USSR’s domestic and foreign policy, as well as in the social sphere. It was as if we forgot that every dollar we spent on the arms race was 7 times more difficult than for the Americans. The economic base of NATO plus Japan by 7 times, if not more, exceeded our capabilities. In the secret report of Weinberger, War Minister Reagan (partially published by the New York Times), you can read the recommendation: you must impose on the Soviet Union all new rounds of the arms race to bring the Soviet economy to ruin. Gorbachev once quoted this passage.
Even before Reagan, in December 1981, Washington and his allies made a decision in NATO to impose rivalry in the field of "smart weapons" on the Soviet Union. It requires 5-7 times more money than nuclear. Chief of the General Staff N.V.Ogarkov reported to the politburo that the Soviet economy could not cope with such a load. “You cannot cope,” he heard back, “another will come who can cope.” NK Baibakov, Chairman of the State Planning Committee, spoke against further unwinding the military flywheel - Baibakov was prescribed a rest. To nothing to be deceived: the agony of the Soviet Union began before Gorbachev.
M.V. Demurin. Consequently, it was necessary to go for some, relatively speaking, "Sakharov variant"?
V.M. Falin. In the sense, yes. Experts suggested Khrushchev to warn the West: if you hit the vital interests of the USSR or the interests of our friends, you would alert the hydrogen bomb. After the attacks of England, France and Israel on Egypt (1956), Nikita Sergeevich scared: not only Cairo, but also the aggressors themselves are vulnerable to modern weapons. Soon, against the background of the Hungarian events, Khrushchev lowered his tone and proposed complete disarmament under strict international control. This initiative came to "democrats" not in the best way, just like our proposals to stop the work on the militarization of new physical and other knowledge.
R.N.Gazenko. I would like to touch on the topic of relations between state leaders and experts. Without exaggeration, history depends on it. Let us compare Leonid Ilyich (nowadays they paint him rather insane) with modern politicians. We were touched by the congratulations on the new 2011 year. It turns out, our country is only something 20 years. Then on the portraits of Yuri Gagarin, hung about the 20 anniversary of the first manned flight into space, the letters "USSR" disappeared. How did Leonid Brezhnev react to critical problems? For example, when did the Stasi plunge his partner, Willy Brandt, into a famous scandal? Did he address you? Was he sane at all or not?
V.M. Falin. Sickly and in the end physical weakness could not but reflect on the behavior and thinking of Brezhnev. But I am ready to fully confirm the diagnosis of E.I. Chazov, that Leonid Ilyich did not fall into childhood. He was not completely refused a sense of humor. He loved the joke and was ready to joke himself. The next morning after the signing of the Moscow Treaty call from the Secretary General:
- What have you done!
- What, Leonid Ilich?
- In the region from the Volga to the Urals, the people of salt, matches, snapped up soap. The contract with the Germans was signed, then wait for the war ... (pause) Well, okay, I was joking.
After the removal of Khrushchev, a triumvirate arose. A good start, a Russian proverb says, is half the battle. But there were homegrown Danites who skillfully played on the weak strings of Brezhnev. It was sad to observe how his individuality faded, his willingness at the right moment to put a dot on the "and" faded.
1973. The official visit of Leonid Brezhnev to the Federal Republic. He is in great shape. W. Brandt asked me to convince the guest to accept the invitation of the head of the government of the North. Rhine - Westphalia H. Kün and visit the ancient fortress of Burg, near Cologne. The enemies, the chancellor noted, are already slandering about the “retreat” of Brezhnev under the supervision of police cordons. Neither we nor you are not good. Having heard my message, Brezhnev summoned Gromyko, Patolichev, Bugaev and announced that in the morning he would take a helicopter with Brandt to go to Burg Castle. The Secretary General laid siege to Gromyko, who tried to say the word "against": "Whoever does not want to accompany me or cannot, let him remain. Everyone is free."
We leave Brezhnev’s apartment, Gromyko pounces on me: “Do you interfere in your affairs? Leonid Ilyich just underwent an operation, vibration is contraindicated for his health. If anything happens, are you in demand?” Two days later I submitted an application to the Minister for resignation from the post of ambassador in Bonn and about resigning from the diplomatic service. Further I worked under his authority as impossible and unnecessary. The satisfaction of my resignation letter has been delayed for five years.
Another example. In 1976, on the eve of the meeting between Brezhnev and Ford in Vladivostok, the secretary general quarreled with members of the politburo. Our Areopag refused to approve the draft directives submitted by Brezhnev to negotiations with the US president. Defense Minister A.A. Grechko accused him of “betraying the interests of the country” (the military insisted on including medium-range missiles in the package, the United States was against it). Omit the details. In the end, the results of the meeting between Brezhnev and Ford were confirmed by the politburo, and Grechko apologized to the Secretary General for his “fervor”.
It would seem that the black band passed. Politically, perhaps so, what can not be said about the health of Brezhnev. While still in Vladivostok, he picked up bilateral pneumonia. The death of the mother was the hardest hit. In short, in 1977, Brezhnev entered into something other person, even if the sense of proportion did not refuse him. I refer to the trip of Brezhnev to Azerbaijan in the autumn of 1978. He included me among the accompanying ones. Among other things, it was planned to visit the Baku Museum of the Little Land. Secretary General was dissatisfied with the exposure. "It turns out this way," I heard from him, "that the Great Patriotic War was won on the Lesser Land." During the official reception, G. Aliyev began to lay out more colorful rhetorical carpets before the guest, Brezhnev pulled him up, and I was obliged, without coordinating with anyone, to clean up the sounding of the sound of idle talk.
VG Budanov. I would like to ask you a question about what happened to the country under Gorbachev. What motivated them: some intent, tyranny or some kind of chimera? At some point, Gorbachev began to repeat the same words. There was the impression that he had an organ inset. The scale of the person did not reach, he could not adapt to super-complex and responsible situations? Or something happened to a man?
V.M. Falin. The cult of personality takes revenge. First of all, in critical situations, when there is a discrepancy in the potential of an individual to the challenges ... MS Gorbachev often said: “We will engage in a fight, then we will look around!” He attributed this password to Lenin. The first mistake was that the phrase came from Napoleon. And so in almost everything - the new leader did not know where it was from.
Having come to power without a program, a well-thought-out concept, Gorbachev took up improvisations, often ignoring the lessons that the Democrats repeatedly taught our country. The Americans asserted that after the unification of Germany, NATO would not move an inch to the East. I personally, more than once, warned Mikhail Sergeyevich that there is no faith in the words of Washington, he juggles them at his discretion, even violates treaties ratified by the Senate. “You are too strict in assessments,” Gorbachev objected, “I believe the assurances that are given to me.”
As V. Brandt told me, during the Arkhyz negotiations, G. Kohl raised the question of the fate of the leaders of the GDR. How to deal with them? "You Germans," Gorbachev declared, "will better understand this yourself." Betrayal in a concentrated form. By surrendering the German Democratic Republic, appropriating the right to speak on behalf of the GDR, without coordination with its government, we repeated the worst of precedents that the rulers never did honor to.
How to explain this? Even before Arkhyz Kohl was sent by Gorbachev's appeal - give a loan of 4,5 billion marks, I have nothing to feed the people, and you get everything you want. Negotiator Mikhail Gorbachev did not bother to open Kohl’s second or third position. Even our commercial debts to the GDRs were not written off. In compensation for the property of our military, retreating to a united Germany, costing hundreds and hundreds of billions of marks, we were barred from building barracks for soldiers from the group of troops in Germany, 14 billion.
Warnings and warnings to Gorbachev about the consequences of an ill-considered line in international affairs rained down from different sides. He did not favor troublemakers. I will illustrate the thesis. In September, 1986, he received from me a note in which it was suggested ahead of time to prepare for the anniversary of the German attack on Poland. Specifically, it was pointed out that it would be expedient to clarify the disputes about the existence of secret annexes to our agreements with Berlin 1939. In February, 1987, Gorbachev convened a politburo meeting to discuss this topic. GLSmirnov, Assistant Secretary General, dedicated me to the discussion. All participants, including A.A. Gromyko, spoke in favor of acknowledging the existence of secret protocols. Summing up the exchange of views, Gorbachev said: "Until the originals of the protocols lie on my desk, I cannot take political responsibility, recognizing that such existed at all." Meanwhile, three days before the meeting, V.I. Boldin, head of the general department, showed him the named documents, about which an appropriate mark was preserved in the registration card. In other words, Gorbachev lied to his politburo colleagues.
The laboratory of the Moscow Criminal Investigation Department, at my request, conducted a comparative examination of the texts of the non-aggression treaty and the secret annex (its photocopy was obtained from the Germans). The result was confirmed: the documents were printed on one typewriter. I report this in the presence of Yakovlev to Gorbachev. "Do you think you told me something new?" - said Gorbachev and left. I was given another lesson - live with your mind.
Back in June, Gorbachev’s 1986 held another meeting on how to make the restructuring understandable to the Soviet intelligentsia. It was attended by members of the Politburo, and the editors-in-chief of the media, social scientists, writers, and agitprop workers participated. As chairman of the board of the APN, I was given the floor.
The Chinese, I recalled, took two years after the death of Mao Zedong to disqualify the "cultural revolution" as a military-feudal dictatorship. We lack thirty years after the 20th Congress to tell the truth not about Stalin’s identity, but about Stalinism as an ideology, regime, system of power. Do not do it now - restructuring will deprive itself of the future. Gorbachev began to argue with me: "We can not move forward and simultaneously pay off with the past." I object to him: "Tying one foot in the past, we will not take a step forward." EK Ligachev joined our altercations. Hall was silent.
Let me explain what meaning I put in and put into the concept of "de-Stalinization". Socialism is not the first and not the last, who was destined to introduce himself on the test stones of history. The world chronicle is overloaded with events confirming the rightness of V.O. Klyuchevsky - “a great idea in a bad environment is distorted into a number of absurdities”. Let us recall some of the most significant: the mastering of the Western Hemisphere by the “civilizers”, crusades, and the Inquisition. They were carried out under Christian standards, although, to oaths in spite of them, there was not a grain of commandments of Christ in them. They confirmed to Aristotle: there is nothing worse than armed injustice.
How far have we managed to deflect the threats that the “democrats” have welcomed to the October revolution - “crush sedition in the cradle”, and at the same time destroy Russia itself? The belief that the country emerged from the flame of purgatory is not scorched, without waste of ideological and moral baggage, does not withstand the elementary verification of facts.
Once Stalin enriched with his own hand his ceremonial portrait, created by the group of PNPospelov, with the formula: "Stalin is Lenin today." It is not clear why the current interpreters of the former prefer to look at the "successor of the cause of October" through the Stalin eyepieces? They should listen to M.N.Ryutin, a prominent figure in the Moscow organization of the CPSU (b), who was not afraid of the dictator's revenge: "Genuine Leninism now (after the Fifteenth Party Congress) went into the illegal situation, is a forbidden doctrine ... the proletarian revolution under the flag of the proletarian revolution and socialist construction under the flag of socialist construction. " "Putting Stalin's name next to the names of Marx, Engels, Lenin - this means mocking Marx, Engels, Lenin". (See M. Ryutin. "Stalin and the crisis of the proletarian dictatorship").
A.V. Yakovlev. You mentioned A.N. Yakovlev several times. Is it possible more detail about this figure? I read that a certain Westerner who stood behind the Prague spring of 1968 recruited Yakovlev when he was ambassador to Canada.
V.M. Falin. Shortly after the departure of A.N. Yakovlev to Canada, the Center received information that he was "in the pocket of the Americans." A very respectable British gentleman warned a longtime acquaintance, employee of the Soviet embassy in Ottawa: "Be careful with the new boss." Similar information came from another source with the clarification that Yakovlev fell into the net of US intelligence during an internship at Columbia University, USA.
Yu.V. Andropov ordered Yakovlev to be closely monitored, if possible, withdraw from Canada, but not allowed to enter the Central Committee apparatus, where he had previously worked. He was appointed director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. Already under Gorbachev, the KGB received documentary evidence of compromising data from Yakovlev. I know about this from V. Kryuchkov, who was instructed to meet with the person involved, to outline the essence of the reports and see what the reaction will be. Yakovlev, according to Kryuchkov, did not utter a word and the question of what to report to the General Secretary, went around in silence.
After hearing the report by V.A. Kryuchkov, Gorbachev asked and answered himself: "Is Yakovlev a useful person for restructuring? If useful, then we will forgive him. Whoever had sins in his youth!" So they resolved the tricky question.
A.I. Neclessa. Valentin Mikhailovich, I want to thank you first of all for joining us to the living fabric of events. You have painted a very sad picture not only of the level of the leaders of the USSR, but of the political paradigm itself, the mental matrix. I mean, first of all, the priority of mechanistic hardware thinking. "Apparatus" is not in the Soviet sense of the word - "party apparatus", but in the way it is used now. You talked about the arms race. Indeed, the main problem is the problem of the ratio of tangible assets. At the same time, the strength of the structure, the organization that existed in the Soviet Union, proceeded from the strength of socialist ideas, the strength of the new world order. I apologize for the long introduction, but without it the meaning of my question would not be completely understood. I want to ask you about such a structure of the Central Committee of the CPSU as an international information department: how did it work, what kind of people were these?
V.M. Falin. The effectiveness of the structures and the meaning of their existence depend on the tasks that are put before them and on the possibilities of performing the functions assigned to them. Let us take the soviet information department created in 1958 in the Central Committee of the CPSU. He was obliged to prepare for each meeting of the political bureau a review of the current international situation, analysis of documents submitted to the meeting by the Foreign Ministry, intelligence services, military intelligence. The head of the department, G.M. Pushkin, reports to NS Khrushchev that nothing good will come of the idea of a “free city of West Berlin”, and if we overdo it, it can lead to violent conflict. Khrushchev rudely interrupts the speaker: "Nonsense! Even if we send troops into West Berlin, there will be no war." And dismissed the department.
Later, a department of foreign policy information. He performed other tasks: he reacted to events abroad and made recommendations on how to present what was happening in our media. I can say one thing about the personnel employed in this and other departments of the Central Committee: people are people everywhere, and they are different everywhere. Lovers walk on thin ice units. Most firmly learned: it is difficult to tell the truth, not knowing what is expected of you.
After the dissolution of the department of Pushkin, I was made a classic diplomat. Once, when I was working on Khrushchev’s message to President Kennedy, I misunderstood a word from the dictation of the prime minister. Gromyko gave me an execution. In response, he heard: “I didn’t suggest myself at the Foreign Ministry. If my work does not suit you, please accept the resignation letter. But I will not allow anyone to treat me in a disrespectful tone.” After this incident, the minister avoided raising his voice to me.
Father John (Mirolyubov). You touched the attitude of the authorities towards the Church in the last years of the USSR. From your words it followed that Gorbachev was insensitive to this topic. He is now posing as an atheist. But how did it happen that such people could play a certain role in this matter? In 1986, I had the opportunity to participate in a scientific conference dedicated to the millennium of the baptism of Russia. It was attended by scientists of world renown. Then there was a conference in St. Petersburg in 1987, and after the already widespread celebration of 1988. I would like to know in more detail how the attitude towards this issue has changed at the top and how it all happened.
V.M. Falin. During the period of ambassadorial work in Germany, I had good relations with the Moscow Patriarchate, as well as local Protestant pastors. Thanks to his personal connections with W. Brandt, he managed to overcome the resistance of the Bonn Foreign Ministry and return the church treasures to the Pskovo-Pechersky Monastery.
At the above-mentioned June meeting in the Central Committee of 1986, I proposed to celebrate the thousandth anniversary of the baptism of Russia as a national holiday. None of the management or those present in the hall responded to this call. Constructive movement at the power level was not noted in the following year. It was no longer possible to delay. Through the chairman of the Council on Religious Affairs, K.M. Kharchev, I invited the Press Agency "News"Vladyk Pitirim, Juvenal, the future Patriarch Alexy and other prominent figures of the Russian Orthodox Church.
I was interested in how preparations for the celebration of the millennium proceed. In response, I hear: atheists do not miss the opportunity to humiliate the church. The provision of the Bolshoi Theater for a solemn meeting is denied: if you want, hold a meeting in the October Hall of the Russia Hotel. Consent to the coverage of holiday events on television do not give. About the return of church relics and stutter is not allowed. I appeal to Metropolitan Pitirim: "Write a note reflecting the minimum and maximum wishes of the Church. Agree on the content of the note with Patriarch Pimen and pass it on to me as soon as possible." A few days later, a very modest maximum note appears on my desk. Immediately I am writing a memorandum to Gorbachev: for the solemn event dedicated to the millennium of the baptism of Russia, provide the Bolshoi Theater. To the celebration to invite representatives of major foreign denominations. The churches transfer the religious buildings seized from it, as well as the preserved shrines. In particular, the Trinity-Sergius Lavra return its library. To provide for a live broadcast of the ceremony of the celebration of our television and broadcast through the appropriate channels abroad.
Passing the secretariats, the memorandum arrived at MS Gorbachev. In the agitprop of the Central Committee, having learned about my communication with the clergy, they prepared a draft decision of the politburo to remove me from work. Was nominated and candidacy of the new head of the APN. From those who know, I know that Gorbachev inscribed on the memorandum: "Members p / b. Your opinion?" A.N. Yakovlev was the first to say pro. He was made the coordinator. Considerable difficulties arose with V.V. Scherbitsky. He did not want to give the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra. The patriarchate then got only half of it. It cannot be said that everything went smoothly elsewhere, without open and secretive resistance from the authorities. But the cost.
I asked the rulers not to award me any church awards, for everything that was done by me was done by conviction. Before the opening of the celebration at the Bolshoi Theater, Patriarch Pimen blessed me and offered to take a chair on the stage with two other laity.
The original of my memorandum, as far as I can judge, is kept in the Gorbachev Foundation. Attempts to get the text of the result did not give. The archive of Kharchev, in which there was a copy, after the removal of Konstantin Mikhailovich from his post, was allegedly burned.
G.Ya. Mysuna. Valentin Mikhailovich, your conversations here at the IDK covered a century-old segment of the history of Russia. The rhythms of this story pulsed: fading, bursts, fading again. I formed the opinion that nations and nationalities who cherished the current world rulers, for example, the Anglo-Saxons, deserve a more sad fate and regret than we are with our history. Take at least the plot with Livia.
V.M. Falin. V. I. Lenin was mistaken, calling imperialism the highest stage of development of capitalism. In fact, his highest rank is oligarchism. Today, the world is filled with about 150-160 oligarchic associations. The oligarchs have no nationality.
Let me remind you that at the end of World War I, Churchill said: "We floated to victory on the flow of oil." French Prime Minister Clemenceau in the same 1918, proclaimed: "A drop of blood is equal to a drop of oil." The United States adopted in 1944-1945. a program to establish control over the most important oil fields. Note this date. Mindful of her, it is easier to explain what is happening in Iraq and Libya and why attacks are being prepared on Syria and Iran.
Replica. And then the turn of Russia.
V.M. Falin. After the collapse of the USSR, the efforts of the “liberals” Russia turned into a raw materials appendage of oligarchic capital. 53% of the country's budget is formed by selling oil and gas abroad. Before they used to say: you cannot sit on bayonets. Is it possible to sit on a hydrocarbon needle endlessly long, wasting natural resources belonging to future generations?
Replica. So what are our prospects?
V.M. Falin. I do not want to frighten either myself or others. But there is even something worse than wasting our mineral wealth. Even greater damage is caused to our present and future outcome from the country of intelligence. In Soviet times, due to a shortage of manpower and free funds, one of seven inventions was implemented on average. In the process of the collapse of the USSR, American services hunted for archives in which the donkey unclaimed intelligence. The new rulers of the country did not hinder this. Worse, a brain drain was actually encouraged. As a result, a little more than a third of the number of scientists remains today, and now we hardly reach up to a dozen percent of past returns in terms of the efficiency of research institutes.
A couple of years ago I had a long conversation with the former German Chancellor G. Schmidt, who came to Moscow with a farewell visit. “I don’t understand,” said the interlocutor, “why do you, the Chinese, the United Arab Emirates, keep afloat the US? Today, the United States is the main debtor and troublemaker in the world. Without foreign injections, their economy would have burst long ago.” Only from the Russian Federation, Americans pumped out over 20 years from 400 to 600 billion dollars. That you have nowhere to put them at home, Schmidt reasoned.
From the revelations of Yalmar Shacht, the chief Nazi financier, I personally remember this passage: "Hitler led the country to a standstill. In 1939, he had to start a war or declare Germany bankrupt." Is there some parallel here? Now Americans are tight on the power pedal. All louder saber weapon. Let me remind you that G. Schmidt himself as early as 1983 drew attention to a dangerous tendency: American desires are increasing in proportion to the development of military technologies. The withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the world arena of change for the better is not marked.
M.V. Demurin. You said that Washington was not averse to "streamline" Gorbachev's flight from Europe. But if the American leadership wanted to prevent the USSR from fleeing from Europe, but it did take place, then who was interested in the flight? Who pushed Gorbachev to this?
V.M. Falin. There are Americans and Americans. Kissinger and Brzezinski different fields of berries. Bush senior and Bush junior do not pull on political twins. The "neocons" and other extremists, as we warned Gorbachev, took for the weakness of Moscow’s malleability and pushed the White House to dismantle the bipolar world system. A “fifth column” was introduced into the battle, which was issued as the “elite” of Soviet society. Reforms of the “young democrats” of foreign ferments drove Russia into the abyss or, as Chubais put it, to the “point of no return”.
As for MS Gorbachev, at the last time of his government he was only concerned with how to remain president, albeit nominal. Having destroyed trust in the country, he relied on support from the outside and, for the sake of it, “thinned out” our defense arsenals more than was expected of him. For example, he used Pioneers (CC-20) under the knife located in the Far East and Central Asia, although Reagan’s “zero solution” didn’t provide for this. Washington hinted at the possibility of temporarily keeping some strongholds in the Baltic states behind us. Zero interest. The caressing rays of the Nobel Peace Prize covered the horizons.
The last meeting of the politburo. Gorbachev sat down at a separate table. A.N.Girenko takes the floor: "I have an instruction from the Ukrainian party organization to ask you, Mikhail Sergeyevich, the question whether the results of the referendum are taken into account in the Novogarev process? After all, three-quarters of the population spoke in favor of preserving the USSR." Gorbachev is silent. Girenko insists on an answer. He is supported by a member of the Politburo, Yu.A. Prokofiev. Tapping a pencil on a notebook, Gorbachev says: "And if I tell you about what is being discussed in Novo-Ogaryovo, will you understand something?" Theatrical pause: "The results of the referendum are taken into account." Indignation is ready to go into the explosion. Gorbachev gets up: "Enough, talk a lot. Let's go to the next room to the leaders of regional and regional organizations." Instead of the understanding he might have hoped for, he was met by an obstruction there.
M.V. Demurin. I have the last, but important, in my opinion, question. Without an answer to it, the vision of 1970-1980. it would not be complete. The Helsinki process, the meeting itself, the Helsinki Act - taken together, did it play a positive or rather a negative role in the history of the USSR? Your mark.
V.M. Falin. By itself, the Helsinki Final Act, like many other international documents of the time, adequately responded to current needs. It is a different matter how the agreements were implemented. Memorandum No. XXUMX of the US National Security Council spelled out: negotiations are “an instrument of political war” against the USSR. The results of this kind of negotiations, captured in legal acts, carry a destructive charge. So it, unfortunately, happened more than once. Take treaties with the United States on START and PRO 112-1972. The Reagan administration launched into their "extended interpretation", everything turned upside down. These exercises did not meet due repulse. O our weak-minded partners wiped their legs at the unification of Germany and the liquidation of the Warsaw Pact organization. The rule should be - do not put a signature on the treaties, the wording of which allow for voluntary interpretation.
Returning to the Helsinki Final Act. Where is the general security, legal and economic space? Where are all the cornerstones of the all-European home? After sifting through the NATO sieve, the “third basket” remained (human freedoms in their purely western interpretation). It is clear that this has very little to do with the 1975 arrangements.
Noah was an incomparably more perfect democrat. In his ark was found a place both clean and unclean.
M.V. Demurin. Valentin Mikhailovich, let me thank you for the three rich conversations. You are always welcome guest in our institute.
V.M. Falin. Thank.
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