Military Review

The role of Soviet aviation in the failure of Operation Brazil

27
The role of Soviet aviation in the failure of Operation Brazil



In late August - early September 1941, fascist troops, despite the stubborn resistance of the Soviet Army, captured Lyuban, Tosno, Mga station, Shlisselburg, reaching the Neva and Lake Ladoga. The blockade of Leningrad began. In order to deliver food, fuel and other goods to the city, evacuate deep into the country industrial enterprises and the population on Lake Ladoga, communications were created, called the Road of Life. Their uninterrupted operation required the organization of reliable protection, including air cover. So, providing transportation through Ladoga, only naval aviators in 1941-1942 completed more than 8000 sorties and conducted over 200 air battles. On the main lines of the alleged actions of the enemy aviation Soviet fighter guidance posts were equipped. The airspace above the lake lanes was divided into zones, which facilitated the management of aircraft groups, which provided cover for convoys and individual vessels.

To solve the tasks of the anti-airborne (PDO) and air defense (air defense) communications defense in the fall of 1941, the Ladoga Baltic Air Force was created fleet. The composition of the aviation units included in it, depending on the current situation, often changed. In the summer and autumn of 1942, for example, it included: the 11th fighter air regiment (IAP) - 14 I-15BIS and 8 I-16 aircraft at the airfields of Novaya Ladoga and Vystav; 12th Separate Fighter Squadron (OIAE) - 9 MiG-3 fighters at the Vystav aerodrome; The 58th squadron (ae), used as a night bomber, is 10 MBR-2 seaplanes based on the Novaya Ladoga hydroaerodrome.

Directly for the antiamphibious defense of the southern coastal areas of Ladoga, it was possible to use other units included in the Leningrad grouping of naval aviation, this is the 57 attack assault regiment (cap) - 9 Il-2, the Airfield Citizen; The 3 and 4 th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiments (HYAP) - the composition of the forces according to the situation and the 26-I separate reconnaissance squadron (Orae) - 6 Yak-1 and 5 Pe-2, Priyutino airfield. Each of these units performed specific tasks that were set by the fleet air force headquarters on a monthly basis, and according to the situation, were updated every day. So, 26-I separate reconnaissance squadron produced daily aerial reconnaissance of the lake. From 22 August to 23 October 1942, she performed for this purpose more 120 sorties. Over the same period, the 58 Squadron on the MBR-2 conducted reconnaissance and bombardment of the enemy's bases at night, while producing 52 aircraft.

Trying to disrupt transportation on the lake, the enemy aircraft, in turn, increased activity. Ship forces were also widely used. By August, 1942 had collected up to 30 amphibious high-speed barges and armed boats, 4 small mine layer, 5 torpedo boats and other warships and ships on Ladoga. All of them were consolidated into the united German-Finnish-Italian flotilla, which faced the following tasks: the destruction of our ships and ships sailing along the main road (Novaya Ladoga-Morye-Osinovets); setting minefields in the same area; destruction of vehicles engaged in transportation along the small route (Kobona-Osinovets) and in bases.



In the headquarters of the Ladoga military flotilla (LCF), taking into account the situation, they understood that the enemy had enough strength to ensure the landing of one of the important communication points in order to break or interrupt it. The flotilla headquarters, together with the fleet headquarters, developed additional measures to strengthen the antiamphibious defense, in particular, to conduct more intensive aerial reconnaissance and mine observation. In addition, aviation significantly increased the number of bombings and assault attacks on bases and moorings in Sortanlahti, Kexholm, Lakhdenpokhya, Sortavala, Salmi, and also in the skerries of the northern coast of the lake.

Soon the danger of active hostilities was confirmed. On the night of October 9, the 16 landing craft and the 7 patrol boats of the so-called flotilla of ferries under cover of 3 aircraft left Sortanlahti in order to attack counter convoys, scout the patrol system near the Volkhov Bay, and most importantly, test the strength and readiness of our anti-aircraft defense. As is now known, this was the first stage of the operation “Brazil” planned by the Germans to disrupt communications with the landing of a tactical landing force. The Soviet patrol boats, finding the enemy, imposed a battle on him, and the planes that took off on their call bombed. Several ships from the ferry fleet were damaged.

Operation Brazil itself was carried out on the night of October 22 1942. Taking advantage of the fact that, due to bad weather, our aircraft did not conduct reconnaissance for three days, the enemy secretly formed a landing party, landed it on ships and sent combat forces to Suho island. The detachment consisted of over 20 vessels, including 7 heavy, 4 light, several boats, as well as several transport, staff and sanitary barges.

The landing site was chosen by the enemy with all care. A small artificial island, which was created in the first half of the XVIII century in the southern shoals of the lake, had a very favorable location. Since near about. Sukhoi, covering the entrance to the water area of ​​the Volkhov Bay, passed a large water route, then the seizure of the island made it possible for the Germans to exert the most active and direct influence on our transportation. In addition, the Soviet patrol ships in this case were deprived of artillery support (the coastal battery of 100-mm naval guns was located on the island), and convoys and aviation also had a convenient reference point, which was the lighthouse. The latter served as a pointer for landing craft. In 7 h 15 mines 22 October, approaching the island, the Nazi ships opened fire on him.



True, they didn’t catch the garrison by surprise, since the Post of the Surveillance and Communication Service (SNiS), located on about. Suho managed to detect an enemy squad of ships before. The gun crews of the coastal battery, which were on time alert, responded with fire. They were supported by Soviet patrol boats TSCH-100 and MO-171 on patrol. An hour later, enemy boats and inflatable boats under the cover of their ships and aircraft approached the coast and began to land. Since the radio station located on the island was out of order at the very beginning of the battle, the patrol ships sent the report to the flotilla headquarters about the enemy landing.

A permanent connection was established with the ships deployed on the lake, as well as with the headquarters of the Leningrad, Volkhov and Karelian fronts. The command of these fronts, promptly reacting to the situation, singled out aviation groups for strikes against enemy naval targets, and also began deploying land forces and units along the coast in accordance with anti-airborne defense plans.

Major-General M.I., Commander of the Air Force of the Baltic Fleet, headed the command of naval and front-line aviation operations Samokhin, who made the decision: by airplanes of the Ladoga and Leningrad air groups to carry out a series of consecutive concentrated attacks on the landing techniques of the fascists in the region of Fr. Dry. Monitoring of the landing in order to determine its composition, location and maneuver of ships, the state of the weather was entrusted to the crews of the 26 separate reconnaissance squadron. In 8 h 15 mines, the task was assigned to the commanders of the 8 th air brigade (Leningrad air group) Colonel E.N. Preobrazhensky, and 61-th air brigade (Ladoga air group) Colonel P. V. Kondratiev - to destroy the landing squad.

Within a few minutes, commanders of aviation units received instructions. For example, the 11 Fighter Aviation Regiment (Commander Major I.M. Rasdokov) had, using all operational aircraft, make multiple flights to the area of ​​operations of the landing force and inflict bombster attacks on it, 12 separate fighter squadron (Commander Captain G. V. Kraynev) - cover shock groups.

Joint operations of naval and front-line aviation began after 57 minutes after the landing of an enemy landing. The reliability of the interaction, as well as the accuracy of the strikes, were ensured by the withdrawal of front-line aviation groups to enemy ships by the leaders of the naval air force. Total 12 strikes. The first of them was produced in 9 h 7 mines with the four I-15bis (lead captain S. S. Belyaev) from the Novaya Ladoga airfield without fighter cover, the second — after 13 minutes, also with the four I-15bis (lead captain AA Mironenko), operating under the cover of the six MiG-3. The appearance of our aircraft broke the situation, supported the defenders of Fr. Dry, already with difficulty restraining the onslaught of the enemy, and also brought confusion into the battle formations of the enemy. The fascists, bearing losses, began to retreat to the coastline, hastily boarding boats and boats. At half past ten the ships with the remnants of the landing on board departed from the island. Having built in the wake column, they, under the cover of German fighters, headed for Sortalahti.



Now the air strikes were delivered to the retreating enemy in order to destroy him. Under these conditions, a large load fell both on the flight and on the technical composition of the aviation units. For example, in the 11 Fighter Aviation Regiment, the preparation time for re-departure was reduced by the fact that by the time the fighters landed at the place of their stay, bombs and other ammunition were coming up, and tankers were coming up. The impact of aviation on the landing coincided with the entry of our ships into combat contact with the ships of the enemy. This imposed increased responsibility on the officers who carried out the interaction of disparate forces. Therefore, the naval air force headquarters, with all the thoroughness and scrupulousness, specified information on sea targets and, together with the weather data along the flight route, were communicated to flight crews.

Noteworthy is the eleventh strike, in which naval and front-line aviation operated (12 attack aircraft Il-2 and 20 fighters of various types). The accuracy of the aircraft on the target was provided by the leadership of the commander of the 57 assault air regiment, Lieutenant Colonel F.A. Morozov. Approximately an hour and a half before the combat mission he, under the cover of two Yak-1, flew to Il-2 from the airfield Citizen in Kasimovo, where he took part in the general gathering of front-attack aircraft and fighter jets. Under his leadership, was a short draw of the goal. The pilots also familiarized themselves with the characteristics and distinctive features (from photographs) of the enemy amphibious ships and Soviet ships that were at that moment in the battle area. Information about the change in the situation was transmitted by the crews who conducted the aerial reconnaissance. By the way, to perform reconnaissance tasks during the day, Soviet aircraft performed 5 sorties. Information obtained by reconnaissance aircraft largely ensured the accuracy of strikes against enemy ships. In 14 h 40 min fighters took off cover, after five minutes - twelve IL-2 and leader, with a cover of two Yak-1. Ahead was a leader Il-2, which exactly brought the group to the goal. The German assault force, already retired a considerable distance from the southern shore of the lake, was attacked by attack aircraft from low altitudes. As a result of the air strike, 3 barges were sunk. Another one was damaged by the leader Il-2 with two direct hits of missiles.

Departures were made and later for the application of the next attacks - the thirteenth and fourteenth. But they were unsuccessful, because with the onset of twilight and deterioration of visibility contact with the enemy was interrupted. However, the search for enemy ships was not stopped. He was led, in spite of the gathering darkness, by single flying boats MBR-2 from 58 air squadron, which made 7 aircraft sorties. Since no ships could be found on the lake, the bombs were dropped on spare targets.



Fight in the area of. Dryly led to the defeat of the landing and tangible losses of the enemy in the ship. The enemy lost 19 (according to other data - 17) landing barges and boats, i.e. half of their surface forces on Ladoga. Moreover, the largest number of enemy ships and ships was destroyed by aviation, which made 200 sorties in one day. For example, only on the account of the crews of the 57 th assault aviation regiment 7 destroyed ships. It should also be noted that the air strikes inflicted on the landing force were carried out under conditions of constant opposition from enemy aircraft. She lost 14 airplanes: 8 Bf.109, 2 Fiat G.50, 2 Caproni Sa.311, one Ju-88 and Do-215. Our losses: 2 IL-2, 2 I-15bis, 1 IL-2 (burned during a forced landing, but the pilot was still alive).

The fact that during the period of the landing of troops on Fr. Dryly, as well as at all stages of the battle on that day, a link was established between the coastal command post of the Ladoga military flotilla and Moscow. The General Staff was constantly interested in the situation in the area. In addition, on instructions from Moscow, the compound of the long-range bomber reserve of the Supreme High Command was ready to assist front and naval aviation.

The disruption of the German operation "Brazil" showed the important role of aviation in the air defense and antiamphibious defense of lake communications. It cost our aircraft due to bad weather to temporarily suspend the observation of the lake, ports, bases and moorings, as the enemy was able to secretly form a ship detachment, land landing, make the transition to the designated area. Our patrol ships were able to detect enemy ships with troops already near the island. The forced isolation of aviation at important stages of active anti-landing defense (reconnaissance, assault on landing points, impact on it at the crossing, assistance to the defensive garrison during enemy landing on the bridgehead) led to the temporary operation of Brazil. The landing, in spite of the fire of our naval and coastal artillery and the resistance of the garrison, managed not only to seize the coast, but also to go deeper into the territory of the island, to inflict considerable damage on its defenders, to mine one of the guns. But the appearance of Soviet combat aircraft made a turn in the course of the battle. Nevertheless, aviation played a decisive role only at the last stage of the antiamphibious defense of communication — the pursuit and the rout of the landing force.

Equally important was the interaction of naval and front-line aviation, as well as the unified management of their actions, which was carried out by the Commander of the Air Force BF through the command of commanders of aviation units and units. The accuracy of the strikes on the landing force was largely predetermined by the preliminary joint elaboration of the mission, the withdrawal of aircraft (especially front aviation) to the target by the leader — the sea pilot, and also, during the battle, air reconnaissance. Fight at about. Suho was the final failure of Operation Brazil. The combined flotilla of enemy ferries after it was never able to recover, and its presence on the lake was no longer noticed at all.



Sources:
Ammon G., Berezovsky N., Komarov A. Military Chronicle of the Navy. 1941-1942. M .: Voenizdat, 1992. C. 187-191.
Kovalchuk V. Protection of Traffic // Leningrad and the Big Earth. History Ladoga communication of blocked Leningrad in 1941-1943 M .: Science, 1975. C. 232-237.
Samsonov A. The Red Banner Baltic Fleet in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. M .: Science, 1981. C. 241-248.
Ermilov S. Aviation actions to disrupt the operation "Brazil" // Military history magazine. 1989. No.9. C. 27-31.
Epatko A. How Operation Brazilian Fails // St. Petersburg Gazette. 16 January 2013.
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  1. semirek
    semirek 23 December 2015 06: 54
    +8
    Yes, we know almost nothing about many episodes of the Second World War. Thanks to the author for a very interesting and detailed article!
  2. qwert
    qwert 23 December 2015 07: 02
    +2
    The photo shows a very interesting ship with the Nazis. Some kind of direct floating Zenith battery. And apparently not so slow judging by the breakers
    1. bionik
      bionik 23 December 2015 10: 41
      +2
      This is the German ferry of artillery support "Siebel". There were 4 modifications.
      1. bionik
        bionik 23 December 2015 10: 43
        +1
        Gun crews on their 88mm FlaK 36 anti-aircraft guns on the German Siebel artillery support ferry while sailing in Lahdenpohja.
      2. Alex_59
        Alex_59 24 December 2015 11: 53
        0
        Quote: bionik
        This is the German ferry of artillery support "Siebel". There were 4 modifications.

        People, where do you find such high-quality foty ferries? Share the link.
    2. The comment was deleted.
    3. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 23 December 2015 14: 20
      +3
      Quote: qwert
      The photo shows a very interesting ship with the Nazis. Some kind of direct floating Zenith battery. And apparently not so slow judging by the breakers

      You will not believe, but about the "anti-aircraft" you hit the spot. smile
      Ferries "Siebel" (and in the photo it is he) on Lake Ladoga were manned by servicemen of the Luftwaffe and were subject to backlash. Formally, this whole mess was called the 144th anti-aircraft artillery battalion (Flak-Abteilung 144).

      It was not enough for fat German airfield divisions - he also acquired a fleet. smile
  3. drop
    drop 23 December 2015 07: 55
    10
    At school, and I studied in Leningrad from 1946 to 1953 a year, we knew about this battle for the island of Sukho. Then in schools the history of the country and its victory was studied. Later, as a cadet, I had to visit this island. Stepping on the island, I bowed to his defenders. The article shows the role of the Finns in this war. Manerheim had the task set by Hitler to capture not only all of Ladoga, but also to occupy Arkhangelsk. I have the honor.
  4. parusnik
    parusnik 23 December 2015 08: 15
    +2
    The author spoke about an interesting episode of the Great War, thanks!
    1. Profan
      Profan 21 February 2016 13: 05
      0
      In the very good book "Baltic Sky" (and the film is magnificent), this episode is reflected in sufficient detail, I would say chronometrically.
  5. kvs207
    kvs207 23 December 2015 09: 19
    +3
    Quote: Drop
    At school, and I studied in Leningrad from 1946 to 1953, we knew about this battle for the island of Sukho

    I also learned about this while studying at school, but from the magazine "Koster". I was struck by the fact of the defense of this piece of land, insignificant in size, but important in value.
  6. infantryman2020
    infantryman2020 23 December 2015 09: 25
    +1
    Autumn 1942, I-15bis, I-16 ??? !!!
    Here, I did not expect that such an ancient technique was still in the first line ... :(
    1. Isk1984
      Isk1984 23 December 2015 11: 00
      +4
      Not quite ancient, rather aviation developed rapidly, three years ago in 38-39 and in Spain, it fought on equal terms and with the Japanese, they made a lot of cars, you won’t transfer them all to yaks and lags ...
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 23 December 2015 14: 23
      +2
      Quote: infantryman2020
      Autumn 1942, I-15bis, I-16 ??? !!!
      Here, I did not expect that such an ancient technique was still in the first line ... :(

      This is the Air Force fleet. Golubev on the I-16 fought with the FW-190 already in January 1943.

      And after that, I-16s flew to the Baltic - in the summer of 1943.
    3. qwert
      qwert 23 December 2015 15: 41
      +3
      Quote: infantryman2020
      Autumn 1942, I-15bis, I-16 ??? !!!
      Here, I did not expect that such an ancient technique was still in the first line ... :(

      Leningrad Front, however. There, until the end of the blockade, the T-26 and T-38 also fought.
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 23 December 2015 17: 39
        +1
        Quote: qwert
        Leningrad Front, however. There, until the end of the blockade, the T-26 and T-38 also fought.

        BA-10 on the Lenfront was fought in the first line even after the lifting of the blockade, in 1944.

        However, in addition to Lenfront, there was also the Karelian Front. Here there was a museum, so a museum - obsolete and limited-edition domestic and imported cars were driven to this front.
  7. holgert
    holgert 23 December 2015 10: 17
    +1
    Thanks VO ---- very interesting !!!! Another little-known episode of the War.
  8. rubin6286
    rubin6286 23 December 2015 12: 48
    0
    From one of the participants in the defense of Leningrad, I heard about a story in childhood, of which, of course, I cannot vouch for the reliability:

    In the autumn of 1941, a permanent telephone connection was established and maintained near Shlisselburg between the Mannerheim headquarters and the command of the Leningrad Front. In October 1942, Mannerheim personally called Stalin and warned of the preparation of a German landing on the island of Sukho with the aim of disrupting the delivery of goods to Leningrad along Lake Ladoga and eliminating the "Road of Life".

    The German operation was carefully prepared. As part of the landing were selected and well-trained soldiers who participated in the battles for Sevastopol, allocated for this and transferred to Leningrad by General Manstein.

    Despite the warning, the Germans landed on the island missed and information from the ships of the Ladoga Flotilla arrived late when a brutal hand-to-hand battle of a combined company of marine corps with the landed German paratroopers was already on the shore. At the cost of heavy losses, the company did not allow the Germans to seize the island and install an artillery battery on it. Of the more than one hundred sailors, about nine were injured, five of them seriously. Non-flying weather impeded the actions of aviation, but Stalin ordered that nothing be taken into account and that the assault force should be destroyed. They bombed and stormed everything from I-15 and MBR-2 to DB-3. IL-2 attack aircraft bombed and shot German airborne infantry battalions and ferries, almost point blank, dropping to a low-flying flight. It was they who sank most of the watercraft and personnel of the enemy.

    Around 1944, Mannerheim in communications again warned Stalin that Hitler was preparing to use nuclear weapons and work to create them on the Soviet-German front and against England.

    It is possible that these actions of Mannerheim were evaluated by Stalin and at the end of World War II, Mannerheim escaped the fate of the German war criminals and the Nuremberg Tribunal.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 23 December 2015 14: 57
      +4
      Quote: rubin6286
      The German operation was carefully prepared. As part of the landing were selected and well-trained soldiers who participated in the battles for Sevastopol, allocated for this and transferred to Leningrad by General Manstein.

      Both the flotilla and the landing party were backlash.
      Under cover of fire from the Siebel, the Germans landed 3 assault groups and 1 destruction group from landing boats. The result was discouraging:
      The German losses were 18 killed and 57 wounded and 4 missing. They lost heavy artillery ferries number 13 and 21, light artillery ferries number 12 and 26 and infantry boat I 6.
      Our losses: killed - 8 people, seriously injured - 16, lightly wounded - 7 people. Captured by 6 people.

      18 killed and 57 wounded versus 8 killed and 23 wounded. With the absolute superiority of the Germans in artillery and rifle shooting (on our side, the landing forces repulsed the personnel of the coastal battery) and the complete absence of any anti-air defense on the island measuring 60 x 90 m.
      Here, by the way, is a complete report on the operation on the other side:
      http://t22.nm.ru/history/efosuho3.htm

      In general, the Ladoga military flotilla in the Great Patriotic War was, PMSM, the best formation of the Navy. On her account successful landing and anti-landing operations, supporting the army’s lakeside flank, successful evacuations of the Red Army units pressed to shore in 1941, and most importantly - supplying and evacuating Leningrad and supplying / transferring forces of the Leningrad / Volkhov Front.
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 23 December 2015 15: 33
      +1
      Quote: rubin6286
      Despite the warning, the Germans landed on the island missed and information from the ships of the Ladoga Flotilla arrived late when a brutal hand-to-hand battle of a combined company of marine corps with the landed German paratroopers was already on the shore.

      What is a consolidated company? The garrison of the island (less than 100 people) is the personnel of the battery, the post of the monitoring and communication service, the manipulation point, and several people from the engineering service of the flotilla. All!
      Gusev’s battery did not have any infantry cover. Early, as well as equipped anti-airborne defense, they simply did not have time to build.
      Quote: rubin6286
      Of the more than one hundred sailors, about nine were injured, five of them seriously

      The battery commander Gusev in the report estimated the total losses of the dead and wounded at 50%.
      Quote: rubin6286
      They bombed and stormed everything from I-15 and MBR-2 to DB-3. IL-2 attack aircraft bombed and shot German airborne infantry battalions and ferries, almost point blank, dropping to a low-flying flight. It was they who sank most of the watercraft and personnel of the enemy.

      Most of the boats were sunk by sloppiness and carelessness of backlash. These cranks poked around the island, not having an accurate map of the adjacent waters. The end is a bit predictable: ferries 12, 13, 22 and 26 flew aground and rocks. Moreover, the steam 13 backlashes stranded while trying to steal the steam 12 from it. laughing
      1. rubin6286
        rubin6286 24 December 2015 14: 15
        -3
        The parties to the military conflict, as a rule, underestimate their own losses and exaggerate the losses of the enemy, but, in any case, they do not pass responsibility for the outcome of hostilities.

        In my commentary, I cited a story from a war veteran about the battle at Sukho Island. Some authors cited it and substantially supplemented it, citing foreign material. I was forced to familiarize myself with this material, compare it with the content of the article, and, in my opinion, the conclusion about the real role of Soviet aviation in the failure of Operation Brazil can be made only on the basis of a comprehensive study of the available archival materials of the warring parties.

        The purpose of the operation "Brazil" was not just the capture of the island, giving the Germans the opportunity to have the most active and direct impact on our transportation, as the author of the article writes, but the disruption of the delivery of goods to Leningrad along Lake Ladoga, the elimination of the "Road of Life" and the killing of city defenders by starvation.


        The Germans, of course, knew the approximate composition of the forces and means of defense of the island, and, while capturing the island, tried to get by with minimal forces, relying on the surprise, stealth and high training of the landing force. From the combat report of the anti-aircraft artillery commander, Lieutenant Colonel Wehtel (Operation Brasil report) dated October 27, 1942, sent to the headquarters of Army Group North, it follows that 3 transport ferries and 5 landing boats were used for landing, and forces supporting the landing and cover included 11 anti-aircraft artillery ferries and 3-4 Italian torpedo boats. If we talk about the correlation of forces, then the size of the landing should be about three times more, compared with the defenders. If, as some commentators write, there were about a hundred of our sailors on the island, then German paratroopers need at least 300, and all together with the crews of the ships and crew calculations there could be up to 500 people. Wehtel was forced to withdraw the landing on the ships, not because he lost contact with him, but because it became clear that the moment of surprise was lost and the island could not be restrained by these forces.
        Were there other forces? If they were not there, then the German casualties were minimal, and in boats they barely exceeded 40 percent of the total number used. What, in this case, is the role of Soviet aviation? If Vechtel speaks the truth, then it is insignificant, because 400 bombs were dropped, but not a single boat was sunk. The Germans shot down 8 Soviet planes at the exit and damaged several ships and boats.
        Where did the German casualties from the battle of Fr. Dry 17 or 19 landing barges and boats, i.e. half of its surface forces in Ladoga? Our military “historians” may have deceived, or apart from joining Vechtel’s, the Germans sent additional forces to the island to hold him, which came under the blow of Soviet aviation. From the contents of the article, I did not receive an answer to this question.

        As for the assertion that the “backlash” was engaged in the landing, I will remind you that the Luftwaffe, in addition to aviation, included anti-aircraft artillery and airfield divisions (as they called the airborne troops), but this doesn’t ... Who. Manstein from Crimea also sent a company of selected paratroopers, and not some "pimple and narrow-shouldered bespectacles."
    3. Akuzenka
      Akuzenka 27 December 2015 01: 26
      0
      There are 12 such stories for a dozen and all about "stupid Ivanov" and someone's warning.
  9. Doctor Evil
    Doctor Evil 23 December 2015 13: 44
    +3
    As a child, I read "Baltic Sky" by Nikolai Korneevich Chukovsky. There is a detailed description of the battle for Suho Island. Who cares http://militera.lib.ru/prose/russian/chukovsky/10.html
  10. kvs207
    kvs207 23 December 2015 19: 42
    +2
    Quote: Doctor Evil
    As a child, I read "Baltic Sky" by Nikolai Korneevich Chukovsky. There is a detailed description of the battle for Suho Island.

    There is a lot of literature on the Ladoga Flotilla. I recommend the book “Battleship Ladoga” by Captain I Rank N. Yu. Ozarovsky
  11. bionik
    bionik 23 December 2015 19: 54
    +1
    Ivan Konstantinovich Gusev.
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. bionik
      bionik 23 December 2015 20: 02
      +3
      Lighthouse on the island of Sukho after the battle.
  12. Kir1984
    Kir1984 28 December 2015 07: 30
    0
    Eternal glory to our heroes!
  13. fitter71
    fitter71 25 March 2016 16: 46
    0
    Quote: rubin6286
    marine corps companies

    I'm not actually a military man, but to place a company of marines on a piece of 90 x 60 m, and even a battery of guns of not the smallest caliber ... they have to sit there on top of each other, but there is nowhere to hide from the enemy. so your narrator is a dreamer. Well, the losses of the Germans, according to their words - ka-aneshna-a, the Germans do not compose, only "stupid ivans" lie in their favor, and the Germans - no, no. I remember the writings of one such "warrior" I read - on a kilometer of the front, his company fought off the "Vanek" division for weeks and nothing - fought back, only a few people were lost. I still believe, yeah.
    Well, the author of the article is definitely "+".