Malorussky project: on the solution of the Ukrainian-Russian national issue
History and alternativenessIn one piercing and beautiful song there are such words: "Nothing on earth passes without a trace." Everyone had to or necessarily have to make sure of their inexorable justice. But the question in this case is not about the moral (or energy) basis of the universe, but about history. And not only about cause-effect relationships.
They usually say: history does not have a subjunctive mood. And this is true: what happened happened exactly (and therefore the now popular genre “what would have happened if ...” is just a kind of okolonauchnoy fiction). But at the same time, history is an alternative process, rich in various options. Yes, under the influence of a multitude of objective, and more often and completely subjective reasons, only one of them is realized, as a rule. But this does not mean that all other options for the paths of historical development disappear completely. They continue to exist - in a latent or semi-patent state - as if on the periphery of social or mental processes or, in general, in the form of ideas and “book memory”, but often even in such a state exerting a very strong influence on the course of events. They are in a kind of "anabiosis", waiting for the "best times" - political, social, ideological changes (carriers and an indispensable condition for the occurrence of which, by the way, are) - in order to try to become a new reality.
The history of Russia is also full of such seemingly unrealized but potentially existing alternatives (for example, in parallel with the autocracy, there were alternative projects for the country's socio-political structure). Such a sphere of social being as national is very rich in them. Consider under this perspective (unrealized, but not disappeared alternatives) only one, but an extremely important and very painful problem, directly related to the state of Russia and the Russian world as a whole - the history of the "Ukrainian-Russian national question."
Ukrainian call
The fall (at the beginning of 2009) of the “orange” regime and the coming to power of V. Yanukovich did not entail qualitative changes either in domestic (especially humanitarian), or in foreign policy, and in particular, in Ukrainian-Russian relations. Now, only those who do not understand or don’t want to understand that the character of the Ukrainian government is anti-Russian and anti-Russian by definition (or it suits her) can entertain itself with a rosy tale about a strategic partnership and friendship with Ukraine. This character has become such since the moment Ukraine gained independence, and since then has remained unchanged.
It is not necessary to remind once again the well-known facts about how the demonization of Russia was conducted and continues to be conducted in Ukraine, how the characters who opposed it were magnified; to remind of persecution of the Russian language and Russian culture, of mass Ukrainization (a policy aimed at a violent change in the consciousness and national identity of the country’s population), of ignoring Russian proposals for establishing effective cooperation while simultaneously striving to carry out “European integration” Ukraine in NATO.
This policy is not at all the specificity of the “orange” regime, is not the answer to the “great power” of Russia (former and present) or the temporary “growth costs of the young statehood”, as some still believe (especially since, as they say, “the young not at all young "). This is the ideological basis of any Ukrainian government.
What is the reason for the anti-Russian and anti-Russian policies of the Ukrainian authorities? And why will any Ukrainian government reproduce it? Obviously, the point is not so much in the position of this or that leader, but in that ideology and, more broadly, the national identity on which modern Ukrainian statehood is built, and which, in turn, it reproduces.
How can I answer this challenge? With the help of what to change the situation and not only to resist the tandem of Ukrainian nationalism and state policy oriented towards the Russophobic and West-oriented tandem, but also to eliminate it as a national and political factor? This article is dedicated to finding answers to these questions.
Identity conflict
On national and nationalism
All aggressive ideological campaigns, linguistic and humanitarian problems, the issue of NATO membership, many political conflicts that have agitated Ukraine over the past twenty years and so far (but only temporarily) have faded into shadow, are only external manifestations of permanent opposition of identities, worldviews, systems values that have historically formed on the lands that now constitute it. This conflict has a geographical shape. However, the true battlefield is the consciousness of people regardless of where they live. And the conflict will continue for as long as the cultural types themselves represented in Ukrainian society will exist. This opposition is a given. And the attitude towards him as non-existent or irrelevant, as well as appeasement by the opposing side, cannot be extinguished. And once it exists, it must be used - in the name of its victory and the triumph of its values. The interests of Russia and those who relate to themselves with the Russian world are to actualize this conflict, to make all its participants clearly define their worldview and geopolitical position.
And for this you need to understand its reasons - that is, the historical and mental mechanisms of the emergence of "Ukraine" and, thus, the essence of the "Russian-Ukrainian issue." And also get out of the narrow framework of existing ideas, which play into the hands of the Ukrainian side, and create a completely new ideological context. And to carry out practical work on the basis of it, relying on the new methodology and modern humanitarian and sociological technologies. And above all on the constructivist understanding of the "national". It is constructivism that is able to most adequately and fully explain the processes of national genesis in many nations. It proceeds from the fact that national identity, national traits are not innate, originally given signs of an ethnic community, but acquired over time and under the influence of certain objective and subjective factors. That is, it considers the sphere of the national as created not only by environmental conditions, but also by will and consciousness.
And in practical terms, this approach allows using the mechanism of creating nations to transform the national sphere in the right direction, to translate their national projects and counter competing projects. Nationalism exists and is actively represented throughout the world (including in Ukraine), and it simply cannot be ignored. And the sooner and better we master this ideology and the technologies based on it, the better.
The example of the emergence of "Ukraine" confirms the correctness of the constructivist approach to nations and the national as created and created. The nerve of the whole history of this land since the end of the XVI century. - this is the problem of its choice by the people of cultural-civilizational and national identity and, as a result, the path of development itself. The choice of identity took place in the form of competition-confrontation of various religious and cultural orientations, from the middle of the XIX century. acquired the form of national projects (Polish, Union, All-Russian, Little Russian, Ukrainian, Ruthenian). The projects involved the development of a particular image of the nation, its linkage to specific conditions (ethnic, cultural) and the formation of a nation on the basis of a given population in accordance with the type developed. A logical continuation was the question of the political self-determination of this nation, and if we take it broader - its cultural, spiritual and geopolitical affiliation to either the Russian Orthodox world, or its original rival enemy - the West.
Ukrainian project
The basis of modern political and national-cultural processes in Ukraine is a new stage in the implementation of the Ukrainian national project. This project (Ukrainian idea) arose in the middle of the XIX century. His goal was to create a national-state organism "Ukraine" and a special Ukrainian nation as a non-Russian nation by definition. The project went through several stages: from Ukrainophilism, which preserved a dual cultural-national identity, to Ukrainians, who completely broke with Russianness, and its politicization occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century. On the basis of the elaborated image of this nation, adherents of the Ukrainian idea led the transformation of the population living in this region (Little Russian, Ruthenian).
The key principle of the Ukrainian project, on which the worldview of its adherents is based and their practical activity, is the denial of the members of the formed community of all-Russian spiritual and ethnic roots, opposing the whole of Russian: history, Church, literary language, culture. "Russian" is not in the modern sense of the word (ie, "Russian"), but to those deep layers in the history, consciousness and culture of its own people, which date back to the times of political and ethnic unity of Russia. And including the historical All-Russian (and Little Russian as its regional subspecies) consciousness.
The fact that "non-Russianness" was the essence of the project is evidenced by his adherents constructed at the end of the 19th century. For this nation, the name is Ukrainians (this term was sometimes used before, but not in the ethnic, but in the territorial sense, by analogy with "Baltic", "Crimean", "European", "Russian" - as the designation of the inhabitants of a certain geographical area ). And stubborn reluctance to use ancestral names - Malorussians, Little Russians, Russians. Thus, even at the level of terminology, a visible line was drawn that separated the Little Russians from the rest of the Russian world.
The Ukrainian project has its own historical and linguistic concept, religious figures and national myths. Among them: "the eternal ethnic difference between Ukrainians and Russians", "the centuries-old oppression of the Ukrainian language and culture", "colonial oppression of Ukraine by Russia", "Ancient Russia - the Ukrainian power", "famine", "heroic OUN-UPA", etc. constituting indissoluble integrity. From it and the Ukrainian identity develops. By accepting this identity, calling itself a Ukrainian, a person agrees with all its principles. Of course, now many people call themselves Ukrainians by virtue of habit, without thinking about the content that was invested in this identity by its creators. But this does not mean that there is no such content.
In the Ukrainian idea, the orientation to the West was originally laid down. Denying for themselves Russianness and Orthodoxy as a higher value than the Ukrainian idea, is in itself a rejection of the Russian world. In addition, the "Ukraine" belonging to the West, its culture, politics, mentality was constantly emphasized.
As originally an anti-Russian project, Ukrainian nationalism was oriented toward the “West” not only as an abstract idea, but also as completely specific opponents of Russia (the Poles, Austria-Hungary, the Third Reich, the USA). And he himself was in many ways the fruit of their not selfless influence. Opponents of Russia nurtured Ukrainians ideologically and organizationally, fed it materially, believing that the implementation of the idea of a special Ukrainian nation (as denying the all-Russian fate) would lead to a national split of the Russian world and, as a result, the political collapse of Russia (and the USSR). The twentieth century confirmed the correctness of this point of view. So, the desire of Ukrainian nationalists and politicians in the EU and NATO who exploit the Ukrainian idea is only a natural embodiment of the national project, which was and is carried by Ukrainians.
As a result of the decades of work of his adepts and the favorable combination of external and domestic political circumstances for him, the Ukrainian project was implemented. After 1917, Ukraine and the Ukrainian nation appeared (although not in the same way as the Ukrainian nationalists planned it).
At the very beginning of the 1990's. The party nomenclature of the Ukrainian SSR recalled a seemingly forgotten alternative (the Ukrainian project cherished by the emigrants and the nationalist intelligentsia with its entire ideological stuffing) and made it the state ideology of Ukraine. This project was already close to her from the very beginning, since the Ukrainian ethnocratic nomenclature was formed as such thanks to him (as the bearer of the idea of Ukraine). And most importantly, he allowed her to legitimize her power in the new conditions, and to justify the legality and necessity of Ukraine’s existence as a separate country before the outside world and its citizens, and itself as its “elite”.
Therefore, the Ukrainian ruling class reproduces this ideology using all the power of the state machine. So, the most important goal is building a nation as the basis of separatism. It is conducted on the above principles with the help of the assimilation-Ukrainization of all national groups (primarily Russian), as well as the radical reworking of the national identity and psychology of those millions of Ukrainians who, by virtue of their attachment to Russian culture, language, Soviet past, do not fit into the spread image of the nation .
Ukrainian nationalism has a powerful mobilizing potential, it has its own mythology and argumentation system. Behind him are the state and interested world players. But his claims to speak on behalf of all the people do not correspond to reality. For millions of people, very different values are important. They have other heroes, another worldview and images of the past.
However, the approval of the Ukrainian project involves the elimination of all other worldviews that take place in Ukrainian society - even as potential alternatives. Therefore, all those who do not accept the image of the nation that he carries are doomed to defeat. As long as the struggle will be waged by the same methods and at the ideological level at which it is being fought now.
Alternatives
Russianism
What is this worldview? By and large there are three of them: Ruthenian, Soviet-Ukrainian and Little-Russian. Russinism in this case should be left out. It has long historical roots, clear goals, a comprehensive historical and linguistic concept. And therefore it is a serious obstacle to the total domination of the Ukrainian project, competing with it not somewhere, but in the western part of Ukraine. But with all that, this phenomenon is local, not going beyond the framework of a not very extensive Carpathian region. This is a special case that may make it harder to approve the Ukrainian project, but not eliminate it. This can be done only by such projects that seek to spread the identity carried by them to the population of the whole of Ukraine. And the first of them can be called Soviet-Ukrainian.
Soviet-Ukrainian identity
The Ukrainian project as a whole has been implemented. But it is not difficult to notice that under the name "Ukrainians" lurk identities with different, sometimes mutually exclusive value systems. The origins of this situation lie in the Soviet period, which had the strongest influence on the self-consciousness and national character of the people. The consciousness of millions of people, especially in the South and South-East of the Ukrainian SSR, has developed in many respects as the Soviet one, incorporating the cultural and ideological foundations of that period. Due to this, the Ukrainian identity, which the adherents of the Ukrainian project sought to approve among them, was seriously corrected. That is why they waged and are waging such a fierce struggle with the Soviet past.
Soviet identity, based on the Russian language and the Russian-speaking culture (which, incidentally, is not completely identical to the Russian culture), meant belonging to the vast state, historical and cultural space of the USSR. She had her heroes, her own value system, her key milestones. Soviet-Ukrainian identity is a kind of compromise. She had a “Ukrainian” basis, but some of the signs (ideas, heroes, milestones) were assimilated by Sovietness. So, the Ukrainians were considered to be a special non-Russian people, but a people, "brotherly" in relation to Russians and Belarusians; people having common political (Ancient Russia) and ethnic (Old Russian people) roots with them. Although this also implied that the Russian language and culture for Ukrainians are not completely their own (since they had their own). Another part of the signs - the one that came into conflict with the principles of a single state and national identity, was suppressed. Thus, in the activities of many adherents of the Ukrainian movement, for example, in the works and views of T. Shevchenko or I. Franko, the "people's democratic" principle was emphasized, while the nationalist principle was retouched or silenced. The image of Ukrainian nationalism was also overly simplified. Some of the same Ukrainian postulates were directly regarded as hostile to, say, the interpretation of the Great Patriotic War, the attitude towards the USSR and Soviet power.
In relation to pre-revolutionary Russia, more was allowed. For example, the statement about "national oppression of Ukrainians" - but not by the Russian people and Russia, (as adherents of Ukrainians would say), but by "autocracy" and "Tsarist regime" - that is, by a certain political system. But even then, the anti-people’s essence of Ukrainian nationalism and its consistent and logical servitude to the West — from the Polish gentry and Swedish kings to Hitler’s Germany and world capital represented by the Entente and the United States — were invariably emphasized.
But the collapse of the Union buried the Soviet people. The Soviet-Ukrainian identity is a rudiment, which can only be revived by a new state, similar to the USSR. In the meantime, this is not expected. Therefore, the Soviet-Ukrainian consciousness will disappear - and under the influence of time, and under the aggressive pressure of the Ukrainian project. However, this intermediate type of identity is quite common, especially in Eastern and Central Ukraine.
Rudimentary determines the ways of social behavior of its carriers. It comes down to passive resistance to the policy of the authorities and actions of Ukrainian nationalists. Many, not understanding the reasons for intolerance towards them by the latter, are trying to justify themselves that they are “the same Ukrainians”. But from the point of view of the Ukrainian project, their identity does not allow them to be considered members of the "real" nation that was conceived and created by generations of adherents of Ukrainians. Even those who deliberately reject the Ukrainian project do not have a clear ideology and a positive ideal goal.
The dilemma is simple: either surrender and assimilate into the type of Ukrainian nation that carries the Ukrainian project, or put forward an alternative to it.
Malorussky project
History
Such an alternative is the general Russian-Little Russian idea. It is she who most closely corresponds to the history and national consciousness, going back to the times of the cultural, ethnic and political unity of Russia. The feeling of their unity by the inhabitants of Russia was preserved for a long time after the Mongol invasion and even when its lands became part of different states, as evidenced by its spiritual and literary culture in both its eastern and western parts.
Russian (especially Moscow) chronicle arches and chronographs starting from the 13th century. consistently defended the idea of ecclesiastical, historical, dynastic unity of the Russian land, including the need for its political gathering, and did not recognize the historical and moral rights of foreign powers to Russian lands. Getting into Western Russia, they influenced the outlook of the local inhabitants, supporting their image of the Russian land as a single territory, and the neighboring Moscow state and its people - as if they were few others, but also Russians and their own.
Moreover. It was in Western Russia under the influence of European intellectual experience and the specifics of the position of Russians in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, at the turn of the XVI-XVII centuries. these ideas were transformed into the concept of national unity, where the main emphasis was not on dynastic and political unity, but on the people. According to her, both parts of Russia were inhabited by one Russian people ("Orthodox-Russian", "Russian", "Slav-Russian", in the terminology of the West Russian scribes).
From the end of the XVI - beginning of the XVII centuries, when the all-Russian idea was formed into a political concept, until the end of the XIX century it was a life-giving stimulus and political doctrine of both Great and Western Russia, allowing the first to overcome fragmentation and reunite the torn Russian space into a single Russian power, the second - to save in the conditions of foreign rule its national identity, and together - to create a powerful state and the great Russian culture. The main bearer of the all-Russian idea was the Russian Orthodox Church.
It would be a simplification to assume that the all-Russian idea was the only popular national-political concept. In the South Russian society of the times of the Commonwealth there was a different, sometimes opposite, understanding of their community and their future, implying different geopolitical and cultural orientations. But the all-Russian idea, expressed in the works of polemicists — opponents of the union, in the church and political texts of Orthodox hierarchs, leaders of church fraternities and even representatives of Zaporizhzhya Cossacks, in the “Synopsis” of Innokentiy Gizel, was one of the most common and it was her presence that made Pereyaslav Radu and political reunion.
The all-Russian idea did not imply a rejection of regional peculiarities, if they did not contradict the main thing - the idea of a cultural and political community. Its subspecies was the idea of the Little Russian (which also changed over time). According to her, there was a special people - Little Russians, Little Russians, who had their own characteristics, but at the same time remained part of a single national and cultural space of the Russian world, where the single Russian people lived. The border between Great Russians and Little Russians remained unsteady and fluctuated (in different interpretations) from more precise to almost non-existent.
Supporters of the all-Russian-Little-Russian idea in one form or another, until the 1917 revolution, were the majority of the spiritual, cultural, and political elite of Russia and Little Russia (the common people directly identified themselves as “Orthodox” and “Russian”), including many of its most prominent Representatives, for example, N.V. Gogol. He considered himself to be Little Russia and Russian man, and he himself understood these ethnic “natures” as parts of one soul separated by history, which should merge and form a single Russian people. And to realize his great task - to testify about Christ Truth. Therefore, he did not support the nascent Ukrainians, as having directly opposite goals. For a number of objective and subjective economic, domestic and foreign policy reasons, the all-Russian and Little Russian project was not implemented, but eliminated it as a reality (for that time) 1917 revolution. The Bolsheviks, like the entire left and liberal part of Russian society, considered "Ukrainians" special, non-Russian nationality. And, taking the point of view of the Ukrainians on the path of national development of the region, began to embody the Ukrainian project (of course, based on their own interests). However, the positions of Russianness (language, worldview, culture, national reflection of the population) and in the Soviet period remained significant.
The end of the communist era opened up the possibility of reformatting national processes. Adherents of the Ukrainian project took advantage of this and started building a nation according to their own recipe. But the choice remains always and nothing prevents to direct these processes in a different direction. You just need to understand that this is necessary and possible, and have the will and desire for it.
Strategic principles
1) And, understanding the sphere of the national as mutable and workable, and using a rich historical background, proceed to the construction of the Russian-Russian identity and its distribution in the intelligentsia, the people and government circles. That is, to do what the adepts of the Ukrainian project do with the Ukrainian identity. Therefore, the experience of the Ukrainian national movement must be studied and assimilated, with all its movements, including the OUN and modern organizations similar to it.
2) This requires the restructuring of consciousness and the rejection of a number of past ideological clichés that have become obsolete. Including from a view of nationalism as something negative. Nationalism is just one of the forms of understanding and interpreting the surrounding reality and social and political practices derived from this understanding. At the heart of the nationalist way of seeing the world are the ideas of "nation" and "national" as the cornerstone moments of human existence. Nationalism is not identical to chauvinism and Nazism. It has a planetary scale, it has a long history and traditions. And we must treat it as a historical and social givenness.
3) Nationalism can be defeated only by other nationalism. The denial of nationalism as something a priori unacceptable hinders the opposition to Ukrainian nationalism / Nazism. You can predict in advance the outcome of a boxing match, if one boxer is ready for a fight, enters the ring with gloves and a mouthguard, and the other is on skates or skis, and also claims that boxing is not good. If adherents of the Ukrainian project position themselves as nationalists, think and act in this system of coordinates, then you can only resist them by putting forward your own national project. It is not for nothing that they see their mortal enemy in the Little Russian-All-Russian project.
4) It is impossible to master the minds of people only in defense. Victory can only provide an active offensive on the national field. And for this we need a clear and positive goal, capable of giving meaningfulness and consistency to practical actions. In general, it should look like this: "We (you) are Little Russians, not Ukrainians. Our (your) Motherland is Little Russia, not Ukraine." Only with a positive goal and an offensive ideology can you fight for power.
5) Formation of identity and political struggle should complement each other. But for all the importance of mastering the heights of power and social institutions, the strategic goal should be the policy of developing identity and building a Little Russian nation and Little Russia. Everything else should be understood as tactical tasks necessary to achieve it, and commensurate with this main goal. Any attempts to "beat" Ukrainian nationalists (and officials) in the humanitarian field, not putting forward the Little Russian alternative, but continuing to use the "Ukrainian" coordinate system or rejecting the need for a national struggle, are doomed to failure. Even if they can be pushed aside from power, education, culture and the media, without bringing a new world view there, it will only lead to the rotation of personnel. And these departments, following the logic "Ukraine is the result of the Ukrainian project," will begin to reproduce the old ideology.
6) It is necessary to deviate from the conceptual and terminological apparatus used by the Ukrainian project. Ukrainian statehood is based on the ideology and identity, which carries the Ukrainian project. And anyone who acts in this system of coordinates and uses its terminology will inevitably be forced to reproduce them, even if he does not personally separate them. That is why her shift is needed.
7) Therefore, it is necessary to learn that "Little Russia" is not "one more name of Ukraine", moreover, "obsolete", and, firstly, more correct historically, and secondly, it is an alternative to it in the national and state sphere. A different name is a completely different identity. A different identity determines other social and political practices and the course of the country as a whole.
Tactical moments
When achieving strategic objectives, one should keep in mind the following principles.
1) The main difference between "Little Russia" and "Ukraine" is the attitude to Russianness, and therefore to everything else: the historical path, the present, the future. At first glance, Little Russian and Ukrainian identities are similar. Both recognize the presence of a local ethnic community — the people. Both are based on local patriotism. Both recognize the specifics of their own history, language and culture. But for the Ukrainian project, all this is means of postulating their non-Russianness. In Little Russian, they do not contradict the idea of the common fate of all parts of historical Russia:
Local community - yes, but as part of a large;
Local patriotism is yes, but not an antagonist of patriotism in relation to the whole Russian world and Russia, which are understood as one’s own, and not someone else’s;
The specificity of the story is yes, but focusing attention is not on what distinguishes and separates Little Russia and Russia, but on what is common to them. And on the fact that actually caused the emergence of this specificity (that is, being part of Catholic Poland, and then the activity of the Ukrainian movement with its denial of belonging to the Russian world);
The specifics of the language, love for it - yes, but with the simultaneous recognition of the Russian language as not a stranger, but one of its own, like the Little Russian.
This cardinal difference implies other heroes, a different vision of the past, other reasons for grief and pride, a different attitude towards Russia and other parts of the Russian world. Let us say, to the same Russian problem, which does not exist within the framework of the common Russian identity (even if it is as widely understood as possible), since the Rusyn identity can coexist peacefully with the Russian one.
2) The term "Little Russia" itself should be used exclusively in a positive, not derogatory sense (as "under-Ukraine").
3) You can not blindly copy the ideological attitudes and stereotypes characteristic of the all-Russian and Little Russian project of the XIX century. National and political unity should be the ultimate goal, but not postulated rudely and openly.
The vision of their own and foreign Russianness by Great Russians and Little Russians (even absolute supporters of general Russian unity) has always been and will be somewhat different. Even in the XIX century. the attitude of some Great Russians towards Little-Russian peculiarities as nonexistent or artificially imposed was not quite right historically and tactically justified. The point is not how artificial and introduced from outside these features were in reality, but the fact that by many Little Russia they were already considered as completely natural and their own. And a careless attitude could be perceived as disrespect for oneself and one’s community, and then these differences, no matter how insignificant, could turn into symbolic values and become a political factor — and be used against the all-Russian idea by its opponents. All the more wrong and even harmful such a trend (present in some Russian supporters of unity) is today. It is unreasonable to assert (now) that "Ukrainians" are "Russians": this simply will not be understood. Or deny the presence of the Ukrainian nation. It exists, and this is a fact. The question of how wide its geographical scope will be and how deep its values will penetrate into the mass consciousness. The denial of the rights to national identity for the Little Russians will only undermine all integration initiatives. The task is that this particular should be viewed by both Russians and Little Russians themselves as a kind of Russianness, so that it does not contradict the general Russian idea.
At the moment, the emphasis should be shifted to the formation of Little Russian identity as the antithesis of Ukrainian and their struggle within Ukraine. The algorithm should be as follows:
a) we (you) are Little Russians, not Ukrainians, we (you) are of Russian root;
b) we are all Russians (albeit slightly different);
c) we are Russians and we have one destiny and interests.
4) Malorussianness can establish itself most quickly among the carriers of the Soviet-Ukrainian identity. For this, it must organically integrate the features of Soviet identity, its sacred milestones and heroes (combat and labor). Critically related to communism and revolution (their destructive, anti-Russian and anti-Christian aspects) and Bolshevik national policy, do not discard everything that attracts people in the Soviet period (Victory, the creation of the scientific and industrial potential of the country, a breakthrough in Space, building a society of social justice, systems of universal education and health care, self-reliance and tomorrow, etc.). On the contrary, to link national and social issues, making the Little-Russian project at the same time and social, aimed at protecting the rights of the majority of the population. Moreover, in recent years, the Ukrainian idea has been linked to a destructive-predatory capitalist system and materialistic bourgeois morality.
5) Orient Little Russian identity to ethnic Ukrainians, without extending it to individuals with Russian identity, even if they have Ukrainian (in modern terminology) origin. Combine both subspecies within the framework of all-Russian identity.
6) A flexible language policy is required. Giving an advantage to the Russian language (as historically common to all parts of the Russian people, created by their works and therefore native to them), be attentive to the Ukrainian, not discarding the Ukrainian-speaking speakers of the Soviet-Ukrainian and all-Russian consciousness. At the same time, pursue a policy of separating the popular Little-Russian speech and the modern literary Ukrainian language, returning the latter to the Little-Russian fundamental principle and purifying from innovations whose goal is to have Ukraine as far as possible from Russia. 7) The construction of Little Russia should not imply the elimination of its statehood. The Russian Federation and Ukraine are only fragments of historical Russia, the restoration of which should become a maximum program. However, this idea should not be taken as a task in the near future. On the contrary, it is necessary to emphasize respect for the little-Russian statehood. It will be a different state, with different goals and priorities. Between Little Russia and the Russian Federation, friction can also arise, which will disappear only in a single state, and we must be ready for this. However, it is first important to eliminate those initial contradictions that produce conflicts where there are none, and which, in general, are aimed at creating them (as is the case with the Ukrainian statehood). National and cultural unity should set the stage for political integration.
8) The formation of mass consciousness is a time consuming process. Do not expect immediate success from the project. It should be treated as long-term.
9) The project will require intellectual and material resources and will need active and ideological personnel (developers, carriers, adepts). Therefore, paramount attention should be paid to the personnel issue: search, training, support and employment (in Russia and Ukraine) of humanitarian specialists, creation of appropriate structures of historical, sociological, philological, political science direction, educational organizations, whose activities would be directly or indirectly directed on the implementation of this project.
10) We must be prepared that the idea will meet with fierce resistance and sabotage by its opponents (in Ukraine and in Russia), as well as a simple misunderstanding. But habit is a matter of time. Its adherents had to affirm the Ukrainian identity for decades, with difficulty convincing their fellow tribesmen that they were not “Russians,” “Little Russians,” and “Rusyns,” namely, “Ukrainians.” And this very name not so long ago met with misunderstanding and rejection among the people. (D) it will be easier to construct Little Russian because of its historical truth. And the understanding of their Ukrainianness by many people is essentially similar to a little Russia.
11) The foundation of any national project is its own concept of history. The primary task is to create the history of Little Russia, in which its key points, cult figures, and, above all, the initial principle — Little Russian history as part of the general Russian historical process will be identified. Those events and characters that the Ukrainian project seeks to use as “their own” should be (where the facts allow it) adapted to the Little Russian concept or simply cleared of falsifications. Similar problems are posed in relation to the history of Little-Russian literature. On their basis, study guides should be developed (for specialized universities) and paragraphs (for school courses) with subsequent official approval, as well as the introduction of the courses themselves and hours in educational plans (for a start in Russia). Here is the point of contact of the project as a public initiative and popular movement with the state (Ukrainian and Russian). And a special role in the final success or failure of the project belongs to Russia.
Russia and the Russian Federation
And whether it is necessary?
For those who know history and treat Russia not as “this”, but as “our” country, this question is, at first glance, strange. But since there are people who ask him, it makes sense to answer him. Below we will talk about Russia as such, with its real interests, and not about the current Russian Federation.
Despite the fact that formally the Russian-Ukrainian relations have shifted to the external-political plane, for Russia they will remain precisely an internal problem. For not only the state of Russian-Ukrainian interstate relations, not only the geopolitical situation in the Eastern European region, but also what Russia itself and the Russian people will be directly depend on this or that version of the development of national, cultural, political processes in Ukraine.
It's not just about economic and political power. Our historical roots go back to the times of Kievan Rus. The rejection of this heritage will lead to a crisis of Russian identity in Russia itself and abroad. And to the crisis of the historical legitimacy of the Russian statehood in general, since it would deprive Russia of its civilizational fundamental principle - the ancient Russian baptismal font. Russia's disengagement from what is happening in Ukraine, the reluctance to understand that this does not just affect one or another of its interests, but directly concerns its fate, will not lead to the collapse of political Russophobia there. And it will not stop the desire of Ukrainian nationalists to create centers of self-independence within Russia itself (for example, in the Cossack regions) and split the Russian nation into a number of local communities, imposing on them the “Ukrainian script”. Like their activities aimed at inciting ethnic tension and separatist aspirations among the peoples of Russia, in particular, the Volga region.
The Russian Federation and Ukraine originated in a common cultural, historical and ethnic space, which is the Russian world. On both sides of the border - our history and our people. We have common problems, interests and tasks. After all, there are millions of people in the Ukraine who, consciously or at the level of cultural reflection, consider themselves to be in the Russian world. In the conditions of the demographic crisis, the acute and in many respects artificial depopulation of the population of Russia and, above all, Russians, it is at least unwise, if not criminal, to reject them. Moreover, for their minds and hearts, for their consciousness and national identity, the struggle has been going on for several centuries.
The root cause of the struggle has an external origin: the aggregate West began it, in different historical periods it acted under different guises. Just like papal Rome and Poland, now in the form of Polish nationalism, now in the form of Austria-Hungary and Kaiser Germany, now advancing with its striking force the United States, the NATO bloc and the European Union. It was precisely this confrontation that provoked the inflaming, now almost inconspicuous conflict that gave rise to a cultural and ideological split in the Russian world itself and its people. The schism that has its roots both in the southwestern lands of this World, and in its very heart - the Russian capitals. And because Russia is involved in this struggle by the very logic of history.
It may be objected that Russia and Ukraine are separate states, and the Russian side can speak only for itself, but not for the citizens of Ukraine. That they have their own view of the problem and they may not even notice this conflict or evaluate it differently. Yes, the people of Ukraine have the right and should choose their own destiny. But, first of all, there is no unity on the question of "who we are and where we should go" in Ukraine. Secondly, there are very many who are aware of or feel their belonging to the Russian world. And thirdly, the Russian side has the full right to determine its interests, and to offer its own vision of the situation and options for its resolution. For the “Russian-Ukrainian dialogue” is a two-way thing, and the Russian world, being destroyed from outside and from within, can be revived to self-state only by the joint efforts of all its parts.
Development Strategy
The vital need of both the people of Russia and the people of Ukraine is a future-oriented joint strategic development project, a common and great cause. The great is not only in its material (economic, political, geostrategic) goals, but also in its intangible aspirations. History shows that such projects must necessarily have and have an ideological fundamental principle. For, even though economics is a powerful tool of integration processes, it is only derived from politics. And politics is always determined by worldview. And a country can be truly strong, united and attractive (for its population and others) only when the goals and the world view of its people and its ruling groups are common.
A world view on which it is possible to carry out a joint strategic development, and further integration of Russia and Ukraine, can become a revived and time-tested all-Russian Little Russian national project, as the most organic one in the entire national historical tradition. Its implementation will allow:
Russia:
1) Retain geopolitical positions in the Eastern European and Caspian-Black Sea regions;
2) Save your own Russian national identity;
3) Prevent disintegration of the Russian Federation itself.
To the people of Ukraine:
1) Avoid assimilation and loss of their own national and cultural "I" (those who do not accept Ukrainian nationalism and do not wish to assimilate into the type of Ukrainian nation that it carries);
2) Master the effective and modern ideological weapons and to participate equally in a conflict of national identities;
And together:
1) Ensure the national and cultural integration of the core of the Russian world (or a large part of it), prepare the ground for subsequent unification;
2) Stop the degradation, restore the economic potential and get the opportunity to become one of the leading world powers;
3) Contribute to overcoming their demographic catastrophe and depopulation;
4) To restore its geopolitical and spiritual-psychological independence as a special Orthodox Russian civilization. As a center of power, not only balancing the world political system, but also holding the world in an eschatological sense.
Russian participation
The Malorussky project is a common cause of both interested circles in Ukraine and the Russian side. Without the participation of Russia, he will face considerable difficulties. First, in view of the negative (or indifferent) attitude of the Ukrainian authorities towards him. And secondly, because of the objectivity (and not subjectivity) of Ukraine itself. In geopolitical terms, Ukraine (the land, its components) has never been and is not an independent center of power, but represents the periphery, the zone of influence of other powers and the civilizational border between the Russian world and the West.
Russia should take the project implementation (at the first stage) into its own hands, give a distinct signal to the people of Ukraine and that part of its government circles that could potentially go towards integration, which does not consider them "strangers", provide targeted ideological and material support. That is, to act as the political and spiritual elite of Russia acted in the XIV-XVIII centuries. Then the Orthodox people of Western Russia were guided by Russia. Ideas of political unity were transmitted from it, help was coming. And most importantly, Russia remained for them a pole of attraction, a guideline, a political and spiritual force, carrying and defending its own, independent path.
The policy towards Ukraine (foreign, economic, especially humanitarian, which should be given priority) can be conducted through the line departments, public, youth and non-governmental organizations in coordinating their actions with the appropriate structure. The Little Russian-All-Russia Project should become the ideological basis of this policy. Its specific content (current tasks, methods and means of achievement) is a purely technical matter, entirely dependent on the interest of the government. With regard to Ukrainian cultural organizations operating in the Russian Federation, extremely careful policies should be pursued, regarding their activities (especially those funded by Ukraine) as undermining the national and political unity of Russia and the Russian world. Watch for their personnel (both Ukrainian and Russian citizens). To create parallel analogous societies with a clear Little Russian-all-Russian ideology and push out with their help those that carry the Ukrainian idea, taking as an example the policy of Ukraine regarding the Rusyn organizations of Slovakia, Poland, etc.
To promote the emergence of cultural works (including mass and youth) and media products that openly or covertly conduct the concept of Russian minority and all-Russian unity. A classic example is the film by V. Bortko "Taras Bulba" (2009). By organizing tourist excursions in Russia, children's and youth camps, military sports events and others. To shape the mood of the youth of Russia and Ukraine in the spirit of unity, fraternity and mutual respect. Actively exploit anti-Bandera sentiment, linking Bandera with Ukrainians in general.
At the same time contribute to the maintenance and sharpening of national-mental contradictions within Ukraine, including by providing versatile support to Ukrainian nationalist organizations of the most primitive, brutally aggressive, xenophobic sense. The activities of such organizations and their propaganda campaigns aimed at insulting and degrading the historical memory, cultural identity and national identity of the majority of the population of Ukraine, forced and will force this population, to a certain extent amorphous in national and political terms, to defend their values, to seek its historical and national "I" and, thereby, work on the approval of the Little Russian project.
Obstacles
Above it was about how "as it should." And about Russia as an independent world player, the expression of their national will, the bearer of their own historical and cultural path. But the opposition “Russia - Russian Federation”, which is in the title of the section, which has almost a philosophical meaning, compels us to speak not only about the “must”, but also about the “being”. Whether this project is necessary for the Russian Federation and whether it is possible in the current state of affairs. For almost all the obstacles that stand in his way are not so much objective, as subjective.
This should include the inertia of consciousness and the fear of novelty, as well as the lack of will. In part, they are explained by the complexity of the challenges, the political separation of Ukraine and Russia, the hostility of the Ukrainian state and nationalists, the low availability of information, financial and power resources for project supporters, both on both sides of the border.
But the main obstacle lies in the position of the ruling "elite" of Russia and Ukraine. The position of the “elite” of Ukraine is quite clear, but with its apparent independence, in fact it is derivative, and not even so much the United States and the West in general, but from the Russian position. And its attitude towards Ukraine is determined by two points.
The moment the first. The Russian Federation is essentially the same fragment of the geopolitical space of Russia-USSR as Ukraine. And a fragment not only in the territorial, but most importantly, in the worldview and spiritual dimension. The Russian and Ukrainian "elites" (the bureaucracy, in many ways with the party-Komsomol past, the oligarchs and the big bourgeoisie, mostly trading and reselling both the banking and the criminal elements and some of the power structures who have grown together) have a common origin and ideology, and are regional parts of a social whole. Only one part of it in the name of saving its position uses Ukrainian nationalism, and the other - the liberalist-cosmopolitan doctrines borrowed from the West.
Therefore, the Russian "elite" proceeds from the priority of completely different interests and values than the problems of the Russian world. Even in Russia itself, she prefers to “ignore” Russianness and sees the country not as a national, but as a multicultural state, to which she applies a strange conglomerate of the doctrines of “Leninist national politics” and Western political and social theories.
She recognized the naturalness and inviolability of the divorce of Ukraine and Russia, “giving away” the population to be the first to be bought by its “elite”. It is the absence of an independent ideological and geopolitical center of power in the face of the Russian Federation that makes that part of Ukrainian society and its leaders who would not object to integration, ideologically unarmed. Leaves the anti-Russian Ukrainian idea the only political context of Ukraine. It predetermines the absence of pro-Russian political forces in the Ukrainian establishment. The Russian ruling class does not see its own benefits from integration and therefore is not inclined towards it. And she has not only the will, but also the desire to change something.
After all, the Little Russian project involves changes in Russia itself. Namely, the assertion of the all-Russian idea is not only as features of the popular consciousness or position of the Russian Orthodox Church, which is the case, but also as the ideologies of the ruling circles.
And then this idea should form the basis of Russian domestic policy, primarily national. It will take a return from the concept of "three though fraternal, but different peoples" to the idea of the Great Russian nation, which is not at all an anachronism. With regard to Russian citizens, the emphasis should immediately be placed on Russianness: you (we) are Russian of Little Russian (Belarusian, Ruthenian) origin. Moreover, the national consciousness of the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians, Rusyns, Belorussians of Russia allows it. Accordingly, the practical work of federal and local authorities responsible for national relations, youth and humanitarian policies, propaganda and mass information should be developed.
In other words, the implementation of the All-Russian and Little-Russian project implies the actualization of the Russian factor in social and political practice (not only external but also internal political). That is, the recognition of the Russian people is not an impersonal "population", but an independent historical "I" with its own interests and needs.
And then a second moment arises. This is precisely what the Russian power “elite” and the loud-voiced “public”, which are close to it, are opposed to. They prefer the concepts of “Russian nation” (like “American”, by the way, a fiasco) and multiculturalism to the all-Russian idea (and national-patriotic in general). Naturally, with all their attributes: the priority of minority interests over the majority, migration policy, rigid ideological censorship, called "political correctness", etc. Or they don’t strive for anything at all, except to be able to satisfy their (only?) Financial, domineering and ideological appetites without hindrance and not feel any responsibility towards the country and the people with which they seem to be connected with their origins. And therefore they are trying to get rid of the memory of this origin (their own and among the people) - even at the level of a column about nationality in passports that is harmless and useful for state needs.
They are afraid of the actualization of the Russian factor as capable (in their opinion) of challenging it themselves and the socio-economic system created by them. And the Russian Federation, which has lost its historiosophical independence, is increasingly turning into a semi-wild suburb of both Western and Asian-Eastern civilizations, into a “black hole”, where there is no history, no culture, no education, no science, no health care; into the hole sucking their own people.
Only a strong, self-sufficient, nationally oriented elite, spiritually connected with its people, living with it alone goals and thoughts, aware of its responsibility to the country and history, is capable of integration. Unfortunately, in modern Russia these features are absent.
Therefore, the anti-Russian policy of a number of post-Soviet republics (including Ukraine), which consider Russophobia and the movement “to the West” as an integral part of the “national revival” of their own peoples, does not meet with any serious objections. Although it was precisely the ignoring of the feelings and interests of the Russians, as well as the breakdown of the interests of the people and the authorities that at one time predetermined the collapse of both the Russian Empire and the USSR. And the Russian Federation is not insured by this scenario.
The main obstacle to the Little Russian project lies precisely in Russia. And this is further proof that the so-called "Ukrainian question" is not external, but internal, and by solving it, we solve many problems in Russia itself. And vice versa.
Afterword
And yet, you should not indulge in despondency. Water wears away a stone. But only under one condition: if we ourselves do not sit with folded arms. There is an alternative to the present state of things, and its spirit is maintained by the people. The implementation of the Little Russian project as one of the important means for restoring the independence of the Russian world is primarily a public, national matter, and only then involves the participation of the state. And the main work should be done by us - the Russian public (Russian in spirit and outlook, regardless of ethnic origin and nationality of a person). After all, as the saying goes, "The eyes are afraid, and the hands are doing."
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