Tatsinsky raid by General Vasily Badanov

The Tacin raid of Major General Vasily Badanov became one of the most glorious pages of the Great Patriotic War. In December 1942, when the situation near Stalingrad remained very tense, the troops of its 24th tank corps broke through the front and reached the German rear airfield, which was located in the village of Tatsinskaya and was used to supply Paulus' army surrounded by Soviet troops. For this feat of December 26, 1942 tank the corps was renamed the 2nd Guards, it was given the name "Tatsinsky", and General Vasily Badanov himself was awarded the Order of Suvorov II degree number one.


Speaking of Tatsin raid, one can not help but think about the role of the individual in stories. The operation was supervised by a man who dedicated a purely peaceful profession to Vasiliy Mikhailovich Badanov (1895-1971) for a long time in his life as a teacher. In his youth, he successfully graduated from the teachers' seminary, but the First World War changed a lot. In 1916, he graduated from the Chuguev Military School and by the revolution he commanded a company, being a lieutenant. After returning home from the front, he again takes up teaching work, returning to the army only in 1919, now in the ranks of the Red Army. In general, after the end of the Civil War, his military career went up. In January, 1940, he was appointed director of the Poltava Military Automotive Technical School, and 11 in March, 1941, right before the war, assumed command of the 55 Panzer Division from the 25 mechanized corps. The fact that the former lieutenant of the tsarist army did not fall under the “knife” of repression in 1937 shows that Badanov was born under a lucky star, he was “a man of high point.” This hour struck in December 1942 year, forever inscribing the name of the general in history.

The Catholic Christmas of 1942 was approaching the year, and near the banks of the Volga there was a climax of a grandiose battle, which in the future will mark with its result a radical change in the war. The troops of Manstein tried by all means to break through to Stalingrad by unblocking the army of Paulus surrounded by the city. For this, Operation Wintergewitter (Winter Storm, literal translation of Winter Thunderstorm) was organized, which became a tactical surprise for the Soviet command. The Soviet command was expecting a deblocking strike by the German troops, but not from the south, but from the west, where the distance between the main forces of the German armies and the encircled grouping was minimal.

Vasily Mikhailovich Badanov, spring 1942 of the year


The German offensive began on December 12 on 1942, and at the first stage it developed very well. The 302 th Infantry Division of the Red Army, which took the brunt of the Germans, was quickly dispersed and a breach appeared in the front of the 51 th army. This fact provided the German unblocking parts with rapid advance. By the end of the day, the German 6-I tank division, which was the backbone of the advancing grouping and was recently redeployed from France, reached the southern bank of the Aksai river. At the same time, the 23-I German Tank Division, deployed from the Caucasus, reached the Aksai River in the area north of Nebykov. December 13, having crossed the Aksai, the 6-I tank division was able to reach the village of Verkhne-Kumsky, where it was stopped by counterattacks of the Soviet units for 5 days, which ultimately decided the fate of the German counterblow. When the 20 of December units of the German group reached the Myshkov River (35-40 km remained before the surrounded Paulus grouping), they met part of the approaching 2 Guards Army of the Stalingrad Front. By this time, the Germans had lost in the battles before the 230 tanks and up to the 60% of their motorized infantry.

The encircled group of German troops at Stalingrad was supplied by air and did not intend to surrender in December 1942. The supply of the surrounded parts was carried out from a large aerodrome located in the village of Tatsinskaya. It was at this moment, when the units of Manstein continued their attempts to release Paulus’s troops, Vasily Badanov received his main combat mission about the army commander Vatutin. Badanov's tank corps was supposed to carry out something similar to a grand reconnaissance mission. The operation was largely designed for heroism without regard to circumstances and losses. Having broken through the positions of the 8 of the Italian army, the 24 tank corps was supposed to go back to the Germans, solving three tasks at once: try to cut off the German task force from Rostov-on-Don, divert German troops that were aimed at Stalingrad and defeat the airfield at the station Tatsinskaya, which was used to supply the surrounded 6-th army of Paulus.

The 24 tank corps Major General Vasily Badanov received in April 1942 of the year. After heavy fighting near Kharkov, where the corps lost practically 2 / 3 of its composition, it was taken out for re-formation. Until December 1942, the corps regained its combat readiness, actually being in reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters. At the time of the Tatsinsky raid, the corps consisted of three tank brigades: the 4-I Guards Tank, the 54-I Tank, the 130-I Tank, and the 24-I motorized rifle brigade, the 658-th anti-aircraft artillery regiment and the 413-nd separate guard, and the 24-zennite anti-aircraft artillery regiment and the 90-i separate guards, and the 70-th anti-aircraft artillery regiment and the 50-nd separate guards, and the 91-zennogo Zenit-artillery regiment and the 34-i separate guards, and the 70-zennogo Zenit-artillery regiment and the XNUMX-y separate guards, and the XNUMX-zennogo zenitenno-artillery regiment and the XNUMX-y separate guards, and XNUMX-zennogo guard troops division. By the time of the onset in the XNUMX-m tank corps, the manning of the tanks was XNUMX%, the personnel - XNUMX%, the road transport - XNUMX%. In total, it consisted of up to XNUMX tank (T and T).



The first stage of the 24-x tank corps was successful. December 19, being brought into battle with the Osetrovsky bridgehead in the 4-th Guards Rifle Corps action zone, on the front, which was defended by the Italian units, Badanov’s tank corps had hardly met any significant resistance from their side. The blocking units, which were involved in the depths of the Italian front, in the catchment basin of the Chir River, soon fled under the pressure of the attacks of the Soviet troops, throwing guns and vehicles on the battlefield. Many Italian officers tore insignia and tried to escape. Badanov tank crews crushed Italians, literally like bedbugs. According to the memories of the tankers themselves, they met combat vehicles that literally darkened from blood. Despite the fact that the Germans became aware of the advancement of the Russian tank corps, they did not have time to “intercept” it. In five days of rapid march, Badanova tankers were able to overcome 240 kilometers.

At the same time during the actions of the Soviet troops 8-I Italian army was actually defeated. More than 15 thousand of her soldiers were captured. The remnants of the Italian divisions retreated, throwing equipment and warehouses with food and ammunition. Many staffs were removed from the scene, losing contact with the units, all fled. At the same time, the 8-I Italian army, which by the autumn of 1942, numbered about 250 thousands of soldiers and officers, lost half of its composition by killed, wounded and prisoners.

By eight o'clock in the evening 21 December, the 24 tank corps was able to reach the settlement of Bolshakovka. After that, Vasily Badanov ordered the commanders of the 130 Tank Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel S. K. Nesterov, and the Commander of the 54 Tank Brigade, Colonel V. M. Polyakov, to send their units across the remaining bridges across the Bolshaya River, passing Bolshinka from the north-west and north, and by the end of 21 December to seize the given settlement. At the same time, the 4-th Guards Tank Brigade, commanded by Colonel GI Kopylov, was tasked to free Ilyinka from the enemy by the morning of December 22. Overcoming a water obstacle, units of the 130 tank tank brigade crushed the enemy’s military guard and broke into the northeastern outskirts of Bolshinka and started a battle there. Without having information about the forces of the advancing Soviet troops, the enemy threw his reserves against the 130 tank tank brigade. At this time, the 54-I tank brigade struck the enemy from the north-west. 21 December to 23 hours the village was captured.



The corps began to conduct heavy fighting only on the approaches to Tatsinskaya. So, with difficulty, Ilyinka was captured, which, strangely enough, very stubbornly defended the half-battalion of the Germans and up to a hundred and fifty Cossacks who joined the Wehrmacht. At the same time, less than half of the fuel reserves remained in front of Tatsinskaya in tanks of tanks, and the corps supply base was located at a distance of 250 kilometers in Kalach. At the same time, the case means of supplying fuel and ammunition were clearly not enough, but the corps successfully advanced in such conditions.

The second stage of the offensive operation is the direct assault of the village of Tatsinskaya. It began on the morning of December 24 in 7: 30 after hitting the Katyusha mortars from the 413 Guards Mortar Division. After that, on the German rear airfield, from which General Martin Fiebig, commander of the Luftwaffe 8 Corps, barely managed to carry his feet, Soviet tanks rushed. The blow was struck simultaneously from three sides, the signal to the general attack was the Katyush artillery attack and the 555 signal transmitted over the radio link.

The German pilot Kurt Schreith later recalled how this happened: “December morning 24 1942. In the east, a weak dawn broke, illuminating a gray horizon. At that moment, the Soviet tanks, on the move firing, suddenly burst into the village of Tatsinskaya and the airfield. Planes flashed like torches. Everywhere fires raged, shells exploded, stockpiled ammunition flew into the air. Trucks were rushing across the airfield, and desperately screaming people were running between them. Who will give the order, where to go to the pilots? Taking off and leaving in the direction of Novocherkassk is all that General Fiebig managed to order. The madness begins. Airplanes leave and start on the runway from all sides. All this is happening under the fire of the enemy and in the light of fires. The sky spread its crimson bell over the thousands of dying soldiers, whose faces expressed insanity. Here one U-52 transport plane, not having time to rise into the air, crashes into a Soviet tank and explodes with a terrible roar. Already in the air, the Heinkel collides with the Junkers and scatters into small fragments together with their passengers. The roar of aircraft engines and tank engines is mixed with the roar of explosions, gunfire and machine-gun bursts, forming a monstrous musical symphony. All together it creates in the eyes of the viewer of those events a complete picture of the open hell. ”



Less than 12 hours later, Major General Vasily Badanov reported on radio communications that the task had been completed. The Tatsinskaya village and the enemy airfield were captured. The Germans lost up to 40 aircraft (large command "posts", which brought the number of destroyed and captured aircraft to almost 400, appeared much later). But the main outcome was that the encircled Paulus group lost its air supply base. However, the Germans did not sit idly by. Back at night on December 23, Manstein, realizing that he was no longer breaking through to Paulus, was redeploying the 11th Panzer Division and the 6th Panzer Division, against the Badanov corps. They are moving in a forced march in order to stop the advance of the Soviet tank corps. The German tank divisions managed to clamp down on Badanov’s corps with mites, on which artillery and German strikes are now continuously operating aviation. As early as December 24th, the advance detachments from the 6th German Panzer Division, with the support of the assault gun units, captured areas located north of Tatsinskaya.

By December 25, in the Badanov case, 58 tanks remained in service: 39 medium tanks T-34 and 19 light tanks T-70, while the ammunition and fuel were running out. On December 26 in the morning, 5 trucks with ammunition and 34 tankers were able to break into the hull with the support of 6 T-5 tanks. No more supply corps can not get. At about the same time, Vasily Badanov found out that his corps had been awarded the title of Guards.

Vatutin tried to help Badanov by sending two motorized corps and two rifle divisions to help, but General Raus, who commanded the German 6 Panzer Division, was able to repel all the attacks of the Soviet troops. Parts of Major General Badanov were surrounded, desperately resisting. Many soldiers of the corps fought literally until the last bullet. Flame towers and granaries burning in the village of Tatsinskaya highlighted a terrifying picture of the fighting - warped anti-tank guns, broken supply columns, aircraft fragments, burning tanks, people frostbitten to death.



December 27 Vasily Badanov reports to Vatutin that the situation is very serious. The shells are running out, in the corps serious losses in personnel, it is no longer possible to hold Tatsinskaya. Badanov asks for permission to break the corps from the environment. But Vatutin orders to keep the village and "only if the worst happens," try to escape from the environment. Realistically assessing his capabilities and situation, Major General Badanov personally decides on a breakthrough. On a frosty night of December 28, the remaining forces of the 24 tank corps managed to find a weak spot in the German defense and broke from the encirclement to the Ilinka region, crossed the Bystraya River and joined the Soviet units. At the same time, only 927 people survived, just one-tenth of the corps, who launched the 19 December 1942 offensive. The larger and fresher forces could not break through to the rescue, and they were able to get out of the encirclement, having made a real feat.

The Supreme Soviet and the Soviet High Command commemorated the heroism of the 24 tank corps units, their gallant resistance to the end and the unparalleled tank raid in the deep German rear, which became a remarkable example for the rest of the Red Army. During their raid, the 24 tank corps reported on the destruction of 11292 soldiers and officers of the enemy, 4769 people were captured, the 84 tank was destroyed, 106 guns were destroyed. Only in the Tatsinskaya area were the enemy’s 10 batteries destroyed. After Tatsinskogo raid in the troops appeared a joke that the best way to fight German aircraft are tank tracks.

Vasily Badanov himself eventually rose to lieutenant general. Two years later, during the Lvov-Sandomir offensive operation, he received a severe wound and contusion. After recovering in August 1944, Lieutenant-General Vasily Badanov was appointed to the post of head of the department of military schools of the Main Directorate of the formation and combat training of armored and mechanized troops of the Soviet Army. This is how the combat general returned to teaching.

Monument memorial "Breakthrough"


Information sources:
http://warspot.ru/191-tanki-protiv-lyuftvaffe
http://windowrussia.ruvr.ru/2012_12_25/Tacinskij-rejd
http://gosu-wot.com/tank-general-badanov
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  1. Pers314 13 October 2015 07: 09 New
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    yeah, there were people.
  2. parusnik 13 October 2015 07: 50 New
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    So there was a return of the military general to pedagogical activity. .. Almost like in the movie "Officers": After winning the world capital, I’ll go to teach ... The memorial memorial "Breakthrough" is wonderful, the essence is shown ... everything is clear, without further ado ..
  3. Max repp 13 October 2015 07: 56 New
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    Wonderful article.
    1. Kilo-11 13 October 2015 18: 53 New
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      The article is weak. From the very beginning. The author writes: "... was appointed to the post of director of the Poltava VATU ..." - in the army, the head of the school is not the director, but the head of the military school. "Catholic Christmas was approaching ...", the author does not know the term Catholic Christmas. This is one of the main Christian holidays celebrated on two Julian calendars, on January 7, celebrates the Russian, Georgian, Serbian, Jerusalem Orthodox churches, as well as the Eastern Catholic churches; according to the Gregorian calendar, December 25, celebrates the Roman Catholic church, Protestant churches, as well as Bulgarian, Cypriot, Romanian and some other Orthodox churches. "... Army commander Vatutin ...", in December 1942 N.F. Vatutin was a "lieutenant general" and held the position Commander of the South-Western Front, and not the post "... the commander of the army ...", and what about the author of the army without a number. Now the essence of the matter. There was no separate raid taken on the 24th mc on German rear. During the period From December 16-30, the troops of the Voronezh Front / Commander Lieutenant General F.I.Golikov / and the South-Western Front / Commanders Lieutenant General N.F. Vatutin / carried out the Middle Don operation / Operation "Small Saturn" /, with the task of destroying German troops and their allies on the Middle Don, with the subsequent access to Rostov-on-Don. It was precisely within the framework of this operation that he acted 24 The 24st TK under the command of Major General V.M.Badanov, which of all Soviet tank and mechanized formations / units / had the greatest advance inland occupied by the enemy. The 17th TK was introduced into the battle on December 1942, 19, and not XNUMX December, as the author writes. About Italians who "fled", and “the officers broke the insignia and tried to hide”, it’s not clear where the Italian officers tried to hide, our tankmen crushed them “like bugs.” It looks like an agitation in the spirit of Comrade L. Mehlis. Italian formations and units in the early days of our attack stubborn resistance to our troops, and the Italians began to retreat after our tank and mechanized formations broke through their defense front and a threat of encirclement loomed over the Italian troops.
    2. Kilo-11 13 October 2015 19: 32 New
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      Continuation. In general, the operation "Small Saturn" is considered successful, including the plans of the German command to release the encircled 6th Army in Stalingrad were disrupted. The Army Group Don, under the command of Field Marshal E. Manstein, was already not until a breakthrough to the encircled 6th Army, it was necessary to stop the advancing troops of the Voronezh and Southwestern fronts. The 24th TC during the breakthrough, and not a specially planned raid on the enemy’s rear, was destroyed. Things should be called by their proper names, carried away not much offensive comrade V.M. Ba So, for example, at the Headquarters of the High Command and the General Staff of the Red Army, it was a complete surprise that the airdrome broke through and seized the airfield at the Tatsinskaya station of the 24th police station. .Stalin gave the order to remove the corps from the encirclement at all costs. Alas! Indeed, no more than 1 thousand people escaped from the encirclement. fighters and commanders of the 24th shopping mall, all heavy weapons and all material parts were lost, all seriously wounded were left in Tatsinskaya.
    3. Alekseev 16 October 2015 16: 41 New
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      Quote: Maks Repp
      Wonderful article.

      Quote: Kilo-11
      The article is weak.

      Perhaps it is more correct to say it has flaws, is not a historical study. Although it transmits, in general, it correctly correctly describes the significance of the Tatsin raid of 24 TK.
      But ... In addition to the mistakes of Kilo-11, the sent gene is mentioned. Vatutin to the rescue of 24 TC motorized corps, which were not in the Red Army, manning tanks in the amount of 91 pcs. not 90%, about 40%.
      It seems a trifle ...
      But ... From these figures it follows that the rkid in the rear of the enemy was not carried out by an armada of tanks, but by a connection limited in its combat capabilities.
      “Some civilians” sometimes do not understand the difference between the German and Soviet tank corps, the tank regiment of the German TD and, say, the Soviet heavy TP (in which there are only 21 tanks in the state) and make an erroneous conclusion about the overwhelming numerical superiority of our troops over the German ...
  4. evil partisan 13 October 2015 08: 12 New
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    Thanks to the author.
    I immediately remembered an episode from Yakovlev ("Purpose of Life"):

    I recall an episode of that period related to the capture of Tatsinsky airfield by our tanks. In late December 1942, late in the evening, we sat with the People's Commissar in his office, doing business. Stalin is calling:
    - Our tank units broke through in the area of ​​Tatsinskaya station, captured the airfield, where 300 German planes are located. These units cannot be delayed for a long time, they have to move to other positions, and therefore it is necessary to disable all the aircraft located there in the shortest possible time. In what way would you advise to disable enemy aircraft so that they could not be restored later? Please note that there are no aviation specialists, only tankers.
    Shakhurin said:
    - Now let's think and report.
    We began to think how and what to do. We went through different ways: to break the crankcases of engines, to pierce tires, set fire to aircraft. But then they decided that it wasn’t so easy to set fire to the aircraft in winter, at night, not for an aviation specialist: you need to know where to approach, where to open the tap, how to put gas in [325] and set it on fire. The same thing is to break the engine crankcase - you need to remove the hood and know where to hit.
    In the end, they came to the conclusion that the most reliable way is to drive tanks along the tails of aircraft. Disfigure, knead tails, that's all. Aircraft for a long time out of order.
    The People's Commissar called Stavka and reported on our considerations.
    1. xan
      xan 13 October 2015 12: 51 New
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      Also read about it. An aircraft damaged in this way, and this is due to the geometry of the hull, can only be repaired in the factory, which in those circumstances means the loss of the aircraft.
      They shot a decent film about this raid in the USSR, called the "General Shubnikov Corps".
  5. I love Motherland 13 October 2015 08: 43 New
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    In 1988-1990, I served in the 4th Guards Minsk Regiment, the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Division. At first, Major General Pshenichnikov was the commander. After his departure to study at the Academy of the General Staff, the division was headed by Colonel V.A. Rams. Which subsequently commanded a group of federal troops in the Chechen Republic. On May 09.05.2004, 1990, he was wounded during a terrorist attack together with Akhmat-Hadji Kadyrov. A glorious military unit, glorious traditions .... Our commanders have always inspired us with the idea that this was the best tank division in the USSR Armed Forces. In XNUMX, a part was withdrawn from the territory of the MPR (the city of Choibalsan) to the territory of the USSR, Chita Region, the Bezrechnaya station.
    1. Black Colonel 13 October 2015 18: 37 New
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      By the way, from the Tatsinsky district of the Rostov region, many children were called up to the Tatsinsky division.
  6. Fotoceva62 13 October 2015 09: 06 New
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    BETTER AIR DEFENSE, this is our tank at the enemy airfield! Yes there were people at that time, heroes ... This is called the asymmetric and very effective answer.
  7. Cap.Morgan 13 October 2015 09: 13 New
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    Only I did not quite understand why it was necessary to keep the airfield. After the destruction of the base and aircraft, it was safe to break through. Badanov’s corps suffered losses in 90% of the personnel. High price. Alas.
    1. alstr 13 October 2015 10: 36 New
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      In order to divert the enemy’s forces (2 tank divisions) plus we don’t forget that if we left the airfield we would be able to restore its activity simply by transferring aviation from other directions.

      Another thing is that one could try to transfer their aircraft, and also supply them by air (at least the very minimum), but apparently they could not allocate resources for this.
    2. Alexey RA 13 October 2015 11: 41 New
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      Quote: Cap.Morgan
      Only I did not quite understand why it was necessary to keep the airfield. After the destruction of the base and aircraft, it was safe to break through.

      It would be if Badanov’s corps really went on a raid. Then yes - burst into the airfield, quickly destroyed everything that is possible - and moved on.

      But Badanov did not have a raid, but an offensive. Accordingly, he fulfilled the standard task of the mechanical unit - he captured an important supply unit in the depths of the enemy’s defense. But, breaking away from his own, came under the counterattack of the German "fire brigade". Further, Vatutin hoped that Badanov’s corps would be able to be unblocked by forces of 25 mk and 1 guards mk. From this point of view, Badanov really had to hold his positions until the approach of his units, fettering the forces of the Germans and preventing them from recapturing the unit occupied by him.
    3. cth; fyn 13 October 2015 11: 56 New
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      And where would the German tanks move to stop them? Especially considering the one hundred defense of the Soviets was already dented, they delayed the blow and gave time to reform the defense, tighten reserves.
      1. Black Colonel 13 October 2015 18: 40 New
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        "... defense of the Soviets"
        You write directly as an anti-adviser. Apparently, the site was confused.
        1. cth; fyn 14 October 2015 12: 40 New
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          But I write briefly and clearly on the case.
    4. Aljavad 13 October 2015 19: 25 New
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      Only I did not quite understand why it was necessary to keep the airfield.


      The order "Not a step back" has not been canceled. The idea of ​​a tactical retreat was not popular, and there was a very serious justification for why this occupied position was surrendered to the enemy.

      But in life it’s even more difficult ...
  8. The comment was deleted.
  9. Kazakh 13 October 2015 11: 00 New
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    The fact that the former lieutenant of the tsarist army did not fall under the “knife” of repression in 1937 indicates that Badanov was born under a lucky star,
    In general, I liked it, but such vysyres are annoying. That is, from the very bottom it’s not noticeable to even kick a couple of lines. Imperceptibly introduce “yes, there were repressions who repressed anyone, no luck.” Again the creatures, respected authors claim that they won in spite of.
    1. cth; fyn 13 October 2015 12: 27 New
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      I agree, my great-grandfather generally fought for Kolchak at first and no one repressed him in any way
      1. xan
        xan 13 October 2015 12: 53 New
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        Quote: cth; fyn
        I agree, my great-grandfather generally fought for Kolchak at first and no one repressed him in any way

        I have the same.
  10. pogis 13 October 2015 12: 54 New
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    Yes, the monument is just oh .... th! Tanking Mother Mother! Well, what a feat such a monument!
  11. Jääkorppi 13 October 2015 17: 00 New
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    It seems that the author was obliged to bend to the liberals! If he were a Trotskyist, he would fall under repression, and so ... Almost all Soviet generals served in the tsarist army.
    After the end of hostilities Badanov served as commander-commissar of the regiment and division as part of the troops of the Cheka and OGPU. In 1927, Badanov completed advanced training courses for command personnel. - this is a note!
  12. Reptiloid 13 October 2015 21: 32 New
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    I really liked the article. Thank you very much.
    -People from different walks of life were repressed, at the same time, some always thought that they were being repressed, A. Akhmatova, for example. And they did.
    On one side, the ancestors of Zimny ​​took from me, one (?) Was repressed. On the other hand, they first served in the tsarist army - and nothing. Fate.
  13. Sterkh 13 October 2015 22: 22 New
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    which r ... put a minus to the article?
    1. SVT
      SVT 14 October 2015 15: 50 New
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      The minus was posed, as I understand it, not by a historical event, but by its presentation in this article, the article is historically weak with many inaccuracies and incorrect presentation of facts. For example, I was jarred by the fact that everything was written in a row and whoever got it, but Badanov was lucky, what is this? It turns out they cut everyone in a row? In Zhukov who served in the tsarist army? And the rest who served normally? So there is not enough in the article.
  14. AlBir 12 March 2017 00: 16 New
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    Firstly, on the offensive of December 19th, not 91, but 144 tanks left (90% to 159 in the 10/270 state). 91 - this is either before the battle for Skosyrskaya, or after, on the night of the 24th, before the assault on the village of Tatsinskaya and the air base south.
    Secondly, the losses were not 9/10, but 4/5 of the corps personnel. According to the state, with attached units - there should have been about 7,5 thousand. About 5,5 thousand (70% of the staffing) went on the offensive. It turned out about 1000 in Ilyinka.
    Thirdly, there was no attack on the airfield from three sides, simultaneous and unexpected. Two brigades entered the village from the west, took its western part at 9 o’clock, an hour and a half after the Katyush volley, and only at 11 reached the northern and western parts of the already empty airfield. The third brigade, 130th, with one battalion stormed the Tatsinskaya station, and the second battalion left at half past eight, an hour after the Katyusha salvo, to the northeast entrance to the base. 10 t-34 and 10-t70. There was practically no resistance, they reached the beginning of the parking lots, and then on leaving the fog and lowland - two t-34s were shot in the strip with a 75mm Romanian dual-gun air defense battery from the northern part of the airfield. The battery from the lowlands was not seen, as were the tankers. The attack stopped there, and continued after leaving the 11th brigade from the Tatsinskaya tanks at 54 o’clock to this battery. By this time, in 45 minutes, from 8.45 to 9.30, the commandant of the base gave the command to evacuate. About 130 transport and bombers took off, with base personnel. Prior to this, 15 transport workers loaded from the evening took off to Stalingrad. About 45-50 transport workers remained on the ground. Basically, on which there were no pilots, or requiring repair. The last transporter was personally piloted by the commandant of the Fiebig base. One of the transporters managed to pick up and land the Luftwaffe ground service officer, who had no previous experience of independently piloting bombers and transporters. One plane was shot down on takeoff over the heads of the Nechaev battalion, two collided on takeoff.
    Nechaev himself died with the 5th t-34 of his battalion remaining in service on December 26 or the 27th (from memory), during a counterattack from the southwest of the 6th tank division of the Germans that broke through to the airfield. It was then that his "fiery ram" was described.