Unsuccessful Soviet offensive in 1942
The winter battles of 1941 near Moscow, Yelets, Rostov, Tikhvin, which were strategically successful, despite their bloodshed, led, if not to the encirclement, but at least to the retreat of the Germans - the obvious unpreparedness of the German troops for the battles in winter conditions led Stalin to an erroneous assessment of the military potential of Germany. This assessment was reflected in the well-known directive to members of the military councils of the fronts on the strategic objectives of military operations in the winter of 1942, where the task of victoriously ending the war in 1942 was set. Germany’s military defeat was evident, but victory was still far away. Unfortunately, our expected victory in 1942 was a mirage. Calculations The Supreme Command headquarters to wrest strategic initiative from the hands of the enemy by carrying out a whole series of private offensive operations in the spring and spring of 1942 did not materialize. Instead of new victories, a series of failures followed, significantly worsening the situation on the Soviet-German front.
“After the Red Army managed to exhaust enough the Nazi troops, it launched a counteroffensive and drove the German invaders to the west. In order to delay our advance, the Germans went on the defensive and began to build defensive lines with trenches, barriers, field fortifications. The Germans Thus they expect to delay our offensive until the spring, so that in the spring, by gathering strength, once again go on the offensive against the Red Army. The Germans want, therefore, to gain time and get a breather. Our task is to in not giving the Germans this respite, driving them to the west without stopping, forcing them to use up their reserves before spring, when we have new big reserves, and the Germans will not have more reserves, and thus ensure the complete defeat of the Nazi troops in the 1942 year, "- I. Stalin thought so. Stalin at that time still did not feel a great need for the advice of qualified military experts and was fascinated by the number of cash divisions, not taking into account their real combat power. However, in this, Hitler was like Stalin. Nemeche plans for an offensive on 1942 year were very adventurous.
The winter offensive operations of the Red Army took place in conditions of complete off-road, as a result of which it was impossible to quickly carry out deep operations on the environment and the defeat of German formations. The offensive was conducted according to the tactics of the First World War: infantry and cavalry with the support of artillery, which in winter conditions, which hampered off-road maneuver with the German defense strongholds covering them, led only to squeezing the Germans out of populated areas (in military reports of those years they mentioned names of the liberated small settlements, and not the number of German prisoners), while the Red Army suffered heavy losses. At that time, the headquarters and the command of the Western front were not planned to be systematically engaged in front-line operations, and local army operations to seize individual settlements (and even cities) did not bring much operational and, moreover, strategic success - a major defeat of the enemy troops. The neglect by Stalin of the functions of the General Staff led to a poor calculation (in terms of supplies for the lengthened communications of the troops advancing almost along the winter impassability) of the planned offensive. In the end, despite the unparalleled heroism of the advancing Soviet forces in the most difficult winter conditions of January 1942, it was precisely because of the lack of necessary supplies that the planned results were not achieved.
The battle for the Demyanka Cauldron is a battle that lasted for a year and a fortnight and, therefore, was the longest battle surrounded on the Eastern front. Demyansky boiler was completely blocked by Soviet troops from 25.02.1942 g. To 23.04.1942 g. Then the Germans managed to break through the front and form the so-called Ramushevsky corridor. Demyan ledge existed before 28 February 1943 g. For the first time in the military stories A whole German corps of six divisions of about 100 overall 000 man - almost a whole army - was successfully supplied with everything necessary by air. It was on the Valdai Upland in Russia that the first air bridge in the history of wars operated. About 100 aircraft should fly into the boiler and fly out of it daily. In certain cases, the number of aircraft reached 150.
As Rokossovsky recalled: “The army troops went over to the counteroffensive without any pause. The further they moved away from Moscow, the stronger the enemy resisted. Even before approaching the Volokolamsk frontier, the front command began to resort to creating groups on one, then on another sector, for which some of the forces from one army were transferred to another. Such improvisation provided some success of local importance. With the release of our troops on the Volokolam border, it became absolutely clear that the enemy was able to recover from and our defense is becoming more organized. We could not continue our offensive with the expectation of a decisive breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses and further development of success. We could not even think about how our high command should take advantage of the results obtained begin serious preparations for the summer campaign of 1942, unfortunately, this did not happen, and the troops, carrying out the order, continued to advance. Moreover, the front command was tasked with harassing the enemy without giving him any respite. That was incomprehensible to me. It is one thing to exhaust the enemy with defensive actions, seeking to level up the forces, which we did before the transition to the counteroffensive. But in order to exhaust and weaken it with offensive actions with an obvious balance of power is not in our favor, and even in harsh winter conditions, I could not understand it at all. Our repeated reports to the front command about the serious condition of the army as a result of the losses incurred, about the incompatibility of its forces and tasks that the front set for us were not taken into account. It was necessary to advance with an effort, pushing the enemy out now on one or the other. On the breakthrough of the enemy defense could not be considered. Our capabilities were exhausted to the extreme, and the enemy continued to replenish his troops with fresh forces, transferring them from the west. "With great difficulty, the accumulated reserves in the 9 armies by the spring of 1942 were squandered in these unsuccessful battles.
In addition, the large losses of the Red Army were often facilitated by the fact that the march replenishment consisted entirely of poorly trained recruits. Only in 1942 they realized that the replenishment of the units should be done when they were withdrawn from the battle, while completing the mixed composition of the units from recruits and experienced fighters. In accordance with the Stalin directive, it was ordered in 1942 that all fronts go on the offensive. On January 8, 1942, the first major (grouping of over 1 million people) strategic offensive Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation to defeat Army Group Center began. The 39th Army (General of the NKVD Maslennikov) of the Kalinin Front made a successful breakthrough of the front south a little west of Rzhev, followed by escalation of the strike and, developing a breakthrough by the 11th Cavalry Corps, reached an important railway station. Sychevka station. German troops near Rzhev were in a critical position: according to the German command, tank an army without supplies could carry out hostilities for no more than three days.
Almost simultaneously, the 20 Army of General Vlasov successfully crossed the Lama River and the 2 Guards Kav. the corps began to move west from Volokolamsk to Zubtsov - in order to connect with the 39 army and complete the encirclement of the German Rzhev group. From the area of Sukhinichi from Medyn, finding gaps in the German defense (there was no solid front line), the 33-I army of Efremov and the 1-th Guards Kav began to advance to the north. Belov case. Airborne was dropped into the area west of Vyazma. The troops of the North-Western Front marched in unprecedented march through impassable forests in the snow to the rear of the German factions "North" and "Center." The Germans did not expect an offensive from this direction at all. The supply of Soviet troops on long winter roads was carried out poorly, the main resource was captured reserves captured in the towns of Andreapol, Toropets.
But the outposts of the German defense - Hill, Velikie Luki, Velizh, Bely, Olenin remained in the hands of the German troops. The only important result of the offensive in the 3 and 4 shock armies was the weakening of the coherence of the German defense: the important road Great Luki - Rzhev was cut. The successful start of the operation on the Kalinin and Western fronts led Stalin to conclude that the forces in the Rzhev direction were sufficient, and despite Zhukov’s pleas, he transferred the 1 th attack army, the right neighbor of the 20, to the North-Western front to surround the German group Demyan ledge. This eased the pressure on the front of Rzhev-Sychevka, and the 20-I army got stuck in the storming of the position area. The strategically important Smolensk-Vyazma railways and highways, which decided the outcome of the battle, remained in the hands of the Germans. The Germans formed the Rzhev strike group (two tank divisions of the 3 TA - 5 and 7, the SS division "Reich" and other units) at the expense of the front passive sectors and closed the breakthrough at Rzhev. They also successfully closed the breakthrough at Medyn by cutting off communications of the 33 Army. In the environment were, in addition to the 33-th army, and both cavalry corps.
To the south of Lake Ilmen, by the offensive of the 1st shock army from the north, by February 20, it was possible to completely surround two army corps (6 divisions) of the German 16th army in a demy ledge, formed after the successful advance of the 3rd and 4th shock armies to the south-west from Demyansk in the direction of Great Onions. At the same time, an attempt was made to break through the blockade of Leningrad by troops of four armies (4, 59, 2nd shock - the former 26th new formation - and 52nd) of the Volkhov Front (Meretskov), which occupied the defense along the river. Volkhov from Ladoga to Lake Ilmensky. However, the offensive was poorly prepared: surprise was not achieved, aviation there was virtually no cover and support; at the first, decisive stage, the necessary concentration of forces was not created. After forcing Volkhov and breaking through the front, by March 1, the 2nd shock army advanced 75 km. and was surrounded, along with units of the 59th Army (a total of 7 divisions and 6 brigades plus a cavalry corps). By mid-March, the 33rd Army near Vyazma was sitting in "cauldrons" and "bags", the 2nd shock between Chudov and Novgorod and symmetrically relative to Lake Ilmen on the eastern shore of Lovat - six divisions (two corps) of the German 16th Army under Demyansk.
During March - June, 1942 continued bloody battles in the marshes of the corridors to the encircled armies, during which the 54 Army (Fedyuninsky), which fought through bloody attacks against the 2 th shock, temporarily entered the Pogostya area. . The Germans ruthlessly bombed the 2 th and strike with super heavy bombs, and in the battles against the 54 Army at Pogost (already in June) they used the new T-6 heavy tanks - the "Tiger". The result was sad for the Red Army: the commander of the 33 Army, Efremov, shot himself after the actual defeat of the encircled army, and General Vlasov, surrendered and already in June headed the ROA (Russian Liberation Army of Prisoners of War), who fiercely fought against the Red Army at the end of the war.
The deadweight losses of the Volkhov Front and the 54 Army of the Leningrad Front for four months of fighting are estimated at 100 thousand (including 20 thousand captured). No one knows the exact figure: the remains of the dead, whose number has exceeded 70 thousand, are still in the swamps. First (if not Smolensk battle of the 1941 summer), the Stalinist strike was very expensive: only in the Rzhev-Vyazma operation killed more than 250 Thousands of Red Army soldiers, injured - over 500 Thousands. The same level of casualties was in the battle of Smolensk. And then, in 1941, and now, in 1942, this is a consequence of the illiterate Stalinist leadership. The reason for the defeat (the discrepancy between the results and the costs) is the impossibility of creating the required concentration of forces in the decisive sectors of the offensive due to poor security of the attackers. In general - an obvious miscalculation (and wine) of the Soviet General Staff and Stakes in terms of the risk assessment of the operation. The numerical advantage of the Soviet troops did not work, and the reserves were wasted in vain. A heroic and at the same time infamous page of the history of war.
One of the most difficult and unsuccessful offensive (as heavy as Smolensk and as unsuccessful as the Vyazemsky) operations of the Red Army during the war unfolded in Crimea in the spring of 1942. It began brilliantly - landing in Kerch and Feodosia in winter stormy weather in December 1941, the Germans had a critical situation: on the Kerch Peninsula they had only one infantry division and weak Romanian units. The commander of the army corps Count Shponek decided to leave the Kerch Peninsula, during the retreat, the Germans lost artillery on icy roads. Shponek was put on trial and sentenced to death. Within two weeks, the Soviet command had a real opportunity to enter Manstein’s communications with Dzhankoy. A truly lost victory. As Manstein wrote: "... even with a triple superiority in forces, the enemy did not dare to perform a bold, deep operation that could lead to the defeat of the 11th Army." Commander of the Transcaucasian Front D.T. Kozlov, who had no combat experience, whose headquarters were in Tbilisi (!), Made a truly fatal decision: postponed the start of the offensive for ten days, without warning either the commander of the Primorsky Army or the commander of the Black Sea fleet.
As a result, the offensive of the Maritime Army from Sevastopol and the landing of troops, not supported by the offensive from the Kerch Peninsula, led only to casualties. And on January 15, Manstein delivered a strike at the junction of the 44 and 51 armies and on January 18 occupied Theodosius. The front command decided to accumulate more forces before going on the offensive: another (47) army was deployed from the Taman Peninsula along the ice (!) Road. Finally, from February 27 to April 9, the offensive began three times, but time was lost - the Germans organized a defense on a narrow isthmus. As K. Simonov wrote: “Everything got stuck in the mud, tanks did not go, guns got stuck somewhere behind, cars too, shells were carrying the arms. There were a lot of senseless people on the front line. I did not see such a large number of people earlier or later killed not in battle, not in attack, but with systematic artillery attacks. People stomped and didn’t know what to do. There were no trenches or cracks - nothing. Everything was happening on a bare, dirty, absolutely open field on all sides. they were buried in the mud, and death here, on this field, for some reason seemed especially terrible. "
On May 8, the Germans, having no numerical superiority, went on the offensive, ending in a catastrophe for the entire Crimean front: the losses of people and equipment were horrific (150 thousand prisoners). Manstein elementary "deceived" Kozlov in the direction of the strike, broke through the front and, forcing an anti-tank ditch, left the only tank division to the rear of the main forces in the north of the peninsula. Two months later, the Primorye army suffered a tragedy: after fierce battles with intensive use of artillery (305,600 caliber and even 800 mm) and aviation, the Germans with large losses (in advanced companies remained in the 10% order!) Broke through to the North Bay and suddenly crossed over at night. Under fire, evacuation of the army by the sea was impossible. At night, only senior management was taken out on the submarine. The heroic Primorsk army finally died at the last line of defense at Cape Chersonese. In this catastrophe - Stalin's personal personnel miscalculation (the result of his credo: "there are no irreplaceable"), including the result of his indulgence in the insane repression of the NKVD against the commanders of the Red Army in 1931 and 1937-1938.
The command of the Southwestern Direction (UZN) of the Soviet front under the command of Tymoshenko, in accordance with Stalin’s general instructions about an offensive in 1942, conceived a grand offensive to liberate Kursk, Belgorod, Kharkov (troops of the Southwestern Front - Kostenko) and Donbass ( troops of the Southern Front - Malinovsky). As eyewitnesses testified, the background of this unrealistic plan was Tymoshenko’s desire to raise his “rating” in Stalin’s eyes and to regain, probably after a quick victory, the post of Commissar of Defense. The balance of power, however, did not allow solving such large strategic tasks. At the beginning of 1942, with approximate equality in the size of the Soviet and German groups on the Southern Front (approximately 1 million people), the Germans outnumbered tanks and artillery. In the spring, they began to secretly concentrate the reserves for the impending offensive in the Caucasus, in particular, three new tank divisions from France (22, 23 and 24). However, none of the goals (the liberation of Donbass and Kharkov) was achieved - the Germans had prepared a strong positional defense, and the Soviet forces did not have a decisive preponderance of forces. In February, Tymoshenko decided to confine himself to taking Kharkiv. The decisive contribution to the disruption of the Soviet offensive of the shock armies near Kharkov and the defeat of the Barvenkovo grouping of the Soviet troops were made by Richthofen dive bombers, transferred from the Crimea on the orders of Hitler. The severed grouping (6, 57 and 9-I armies) was bombed without interruption. It was a real beating. Attempts to unblock the troops surrounded west of the Donets Donets did not lead to success, including due to strong aviation resistance. Only 20 thousand people fought out of the encirclement, more than 200 thousand were captured and killed.
"... Within three weeks, the South-Western Front, thanks to its levity, not only lost the half-won Kharkov operation, but managed to still give the enemy 18-20 divisions ... It is also about the mistakes of all members of the Military Council, and above all Comrade Timoshenko and Comrade Khrushchev. If we told the country in its entirety about the catastrophe that the front survived and continues to worry about, I’m afraid that you would be treated very coolly, "- this is what Stalin told the Military Council of the UZF. After the Kharkov catastrophe, Stalin did not allow Marshal Tymoshenko to develop plans for military operations for a cannon shot. G.K. Zhukov pointed to another significant consequence: "Basically, I agreed with the Supreme operational and strategic forecasts, but could not agree with him on the number of planned front-line offensive operations, believing that they would absorb our reserves and this would complicate preparations for the subsequent general offensive of the Soviet troops "
The Soviet General Staff planned for the summer of 1942 a major attack on the Eagle (the Germans knew about it - Halder noted, referring to the Kharkov Soviet offensive: "Soon the same" film "we will watch about the Eagle"), for which the Bryansk Front was concentrated large tank formations in the form of five separate corps (1000 tanks) and a reserve, recently formed and located in the Yelets area of the 5 tank army (Hero of the Soviet Union Lizyukov) as part of 700 tanks. Soviet troops here had a numerical superiority in tanks. The natural decision of the Stavka in the situation that had arisen was to organize a counterattack from the north to the flank of the advancing German grouping. It was an opportunity to disrupt the strategic German offensive. However, the suddenness factor was absent: the Germans were aware of the presence of a tank army — this was taken into account, that is, counterstrike was waiting for them. As a result, the Germans organized strong anti-tank defenses, including tank ambushes and a mine war, as well as intensive air attack on Soviet tank units, especially destructive for artillery and light tanks (up to 50% of Soviet tank forces).
The poor leadership of the counterstrike by the command of the Bryansk Front and Headquarters, expressed in a rush and lack of aviation and artillery support, led to the loss of the force concentration factor necessary for success. Tank units in a hurry were introduced into the battle in parts in the combat order of the infantry against an unsuppressed strong anti-tank defense and without air cover. In the Headquarters it was rashly believed that “tanks can do anything” (they completely forgot about the failure of tank counterattacks exactly a year earlier in the summer of 1941). The arithmetic advantage in the tanks did not work again: throughout July, tank attacks against the German defensive line, which defended the rear of the southward attack force, were unsuccessfully conducted. How many tanks and people were lost at the same time — only God knows (I must think, about 1000 tanks). Among others, he died in a battle on his HF and commander Lizyukov.
A particularly intensive use of dive bombers by the Germans is characteristic of 1942: according to the memoirs of the participants of the war, for some reason, it was in 1942 that the German bombings were especially unbearable. Our troops were completely defenseless in front of massive bombings: as noted earlier, direct losses from bombing reached 50% of total losses, in addition, long unpunished bombings had a huge demoralizing effect on the personnel of infantry formations.
19 August 1942 The enemy’s mobile group broke through the Soviet defenses north of Kalach and on August 23 reached the Volga River northeast of Stalingrad. But neither the new and new troops being deployed at Stalingrad, nor the punitive battalions and the military field courts, nor Stalin’s scolding, helped anything. A.M. Vasilevsky stated bitterly: "Despite all the events we conducted on 23 and 24 in August, it was not possible to eliminate the enemy who approached the outskirts of the city directly, to close the corridor and restore the situation in those days." Why? A.M. Vasilevsky gives an honest answer: "Hastily created shock groups consisted, as a rule, of rifle formations weakened in battles. The troops sent by the Stavka by rail came slowly and, without finishing concentration, were immediately put into battle ... Time to prepare counterstrikes, for working off the interaction and organization of command and control of the troops were not enough. " September 2 German troops reached the outskirts of Stalingrad. In order to prevent their further penetration into the defensive orders of the 62 and 64 armies, Stalin ordered G.K. Zhukov, who was on the Stalingrad front from August 26 as a representative of the Stavka, organizes a counter attack on the flank of the enemy grouping that had broken through. 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of September, Soviet troops stormed the enemy’s well-fortified positions with heavy losses. While the 1-I Guards, 24-I and 66-I armies were bleeding in aimless assaults, the Germans did not waste time. The attack groups from the 4 Tank Army Goth significantly expanded the gap between the Stalingrad and South-Eastern fronts and continued to push the 62 and 64 armies in the city itself.
September 13 German troops launched a general assault on Stalingrad. The city was defended by all the same soldiers of Chuikov and Shumilov, against whom the harshest measures were previously taken in accordance with the requirements of order No. 227. But the advancement of the Germans was carried out at a snail's pace. What's the matter? The reason was simple: the Germans lost the freedom of maneuver, they had to storm every house and for every step forward pay with blood, blood and blood. From the second half of September, the battle for Stalingrad entered the Germans in an extremely unfavorable phase of the struggle for exhaustion. Now the outcome of the struggle was decided by the number of reserves. In such conditions, the German command had to force additional forces into the city, weakening the flanks.
In the Soviet General Staff closely monitored these movements. The development of Operation Uran was in full swing, the purpose of which was to encircle the entire group of German forces in the Stalingrad area. The plan of the operation was to defeat the weak Romanian and Italian troops and close the ring around Paulus's army with powerful blows to the flanks. November 19 began the Stalingrad offensive operation. Soviet troops achieved complete surprise. The Romanian units, without putting up serious resistance, turned into erratic flight. As a result of skillfully executed strikes in converging directions, the troops of the South-Western and Stalingrad fronts, with the active assistance of the right wing of the Don front, 23 November united in the area of Kalach. In the ring were 22 German divisions. It was the first large encirclement of the enemy troops since the beginning of the war.
In addition to Operation Uran, the Soviet General Headquarters developed another offensive operation, larger in scale and mission. She was called "Saturn". The South-Western Front was to strike at Rostov through Kamensk. It was assumed that the success of this operation could create conditions for the complete defeat of the entire southern enemy grouping on the Soviet-German front. At the same time, not only Paulus’s army, but also 1-I and 4-I tank, 11-I German armies, 3-I and 4-I Romanian, 2-I Hungarian and 8-I Italian armies appeared in the boiler. In fact, it was about achieving a decisive victory over the armed forces of Germany and a radical change in the course of the Second World War. Hitler to inflict a catastrophic defeat was assumed for the winter campaign 1942-1943. However, at this crucial moment, the Soviet command began to make one mistake after another. First of all, according to A.M. Vasilevsky, the General Staff seriously miscalculated in assessing the number of German troops surrounded in Stalingrad. Prior to the offensive, it was believed that 85-90 would be surrounded by thousands of enemy soldiers and officers. But suddenly it turned out that the true figure is about 350 thousand people. The headquarters was also worried about the presence of German army groups Don and Gollidt at an insignificant distance from the boiler, the last of which was from the surrounded group just 40 kilometers away.
It was decided to "temporarily abandon" the operation "Saturn". Instead of a strike on the Rostov, the South-Western Front shifted to a strike on the flank of the enemy’s Tormosinsk group. From that day, the former plan of the operation was divided in two parts: the “Big Saturn” operation, which provided for the encirclement of the entire southern wing of the German troops, was postponed, and the “Small Saturn” operation was put in place, which turned the main forces of the Southwestern Front southward, in the direction of Morozovska. As for the idea of dissecting the Paulus group, it had one significant flaw. As is known, powerful defensive belts were created around Stalingrad and in the city itself in the summer of 1942. The Germans broke off all their teeth, breaking through them for four months. Now Paulus used these fortifications to organize a solid defense inside the ring. And the Soviet troops attacked them. What came out of this can be found in the memoirs of A.M. Vasilevsky: “Meeting the stubborn resistance of the surrounded enemy, the Soviet troops were forced to suspend the advance ... Following the instructions of the Stavka, we tried to dismember and destroy the surrounded grouping in the first days of December. However, this time we didn’t achieve any significant results. relying on a network of well-trained engineering fortifications, he fiercely resisted, responding with fierce counterattacks to our every attempt to advance. "
Debate over Operation Saturn lasted another two weeks. By that time, the troops of the Stalingrad and Don Fronts were finally bogged down in battles with the Paulus group. On December 12, Manstein launched an offensive from the Kotelnikovo area, prompting a tide of gloomy sentiment at GHQ. Therefore, December 14 made the final decision: to change the direction of the main attack of the South-West and the left wing of the Voronezh fronts. Instead of Rostov, to the rear of the entire enemy grouping on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, the task now was to defeat only the 8 of the Italian army and exit to the rear of Manstein. This was the "Small Saturn". However, the task assigned to the Soviet troops according to the plan of "Small Saturn" operation was not carried out. Manstein noticed a threat from the troops of the Southwestern Front and led his group out of the flank attack. After two and a half months, the 57 tank corps, along with the other parts of Manstein, took an active part in the devastating battle for the Red Army for Kharkov. These were all the fruits of "Little Saturn".
The refusal of Operation Saturn was the largest mistake of the Soviet command in the entire war. How was this operation possible? The ideal option was to synchronously conduct operations "Uranus" and "Saturn". In this case, the main thing was that absolute suddenness was achieved. There was enough strength. The strike of the Stalingrad and Don fronts wore the functions of auxiliary, and the Voronezh and South-West fronts - the main one. Actually, it was assumed in the Stavka and the General Staff before they learned the real number of the Paulus group. Of course, the enemy would have attempted to escape from the ring. But what were his opportunities in this regard? First of all, all the fears of the Soviet command regarding the army of Paulus were groundless. General Paulus, firstly, did not have the appropriate order of Hitler. And secondly, the cessation of fuel supply turned the 6-th army technique into a pile of dead metal. Paulus reported to the Fuhrer General Headquarters that for his tanks, of which even about 100 were ready for battle, there was no more than fuel for more than 30 kilometers of the course. In order to ensure a breakthrough, it was necessary to transfer tons of gasoline over the 4000 air bridge. Of course, it was impossible.
With such a course of action by the Red Army, the troops of Gollidt and Manstein would not have time to slip out of the trap. The fact is that the distance from the positions of the 8 of the Italian Army to Rostov was only 300 kilometers. Therefore, Soviet troops would advance 100 kilometers ahead. Thus, not only the capture of Rostov was achieved. In March, 1943, the Germans would have virtually nothing to conduct an offensive in the Kharkov region. It is interesting to consider the potential for the collapse of the entire southern wing of the German Eastern Front. First of all, the loss of such a mass of troops could not be compensated by anything. The Germans did not have such reserves. A gap of almost 400 kilometers appeared in the front line. Again, there was nothing to close it. The Red Army, which, unlike the Wehrmacht, possessed considerable reserves, could solve two tasks: defeating the Army Group Center by striking the flank and rear and developing a deep breakthrough in Ukraine, liberating Kiev, Donbass, Crimea without any losses, and access to the state border. In fact, it was about the complete defeat of Nazi Germany back in the 1943 year. And the storming of Berlin would have taken place in the spring of forty-fourth.
In fact, it should be recognized that before the radical change there was still more than six months. The loss of the troops of the Stalingrad group, of course, was a catastrophe, but not so severe as to really reverse the course of the hostilities in favor of the Red Army and finally break the Wehrmacht, both psychologically and militarily. Indeed, a little more than a month has passed since the capitulation of Paulus, when the Soviet troops suffered a severe defeat in the battle for Kharkov and retreated under the onslaught of the enemy on 150-200 kilometers to the east. All this, alas, does not speak in favor of the assertion of a radical change. A real radical change came after the Battle of Kursk. Then the German army really suffered a final defeat and completely lost the initiative. But it could happen much earlier. This is confirmed by the words of Manstein: "No matter how great was the gain of the Soviet troops, they still failed to achieve a decisive victory - the destruction of the entire southern flank, which we could not compensate for in any way."
Information