“Weak Russia is the worst nightmare for the USA”
Vladimir Putin’s return to the Kremlin in 2012 could change Russia's foreign policy. Russia’s relations with a key world power - the United States after Dmitry Medvedev’s departure from the presidency - was achieved, what was achieved in three years of a reset, why Russia is still not a WTO member and whether a single missile defense system will be created in an interview with Kommersant US Ambassador to Russia JOHN BAYERLY.- The reboot will soon be three years old. What are the main achievements of this process?
- The results are mostly positive. By the time Barack Obama became President of the United States, and Dmitry Medvedev was President of Russia, it became clear that Russian-American relations are increasingly characterized by our differences, and not by points of coincidence. And when the presidents first met in London in 2009, they made it clear that joint actions by Russia and the United States could lead to positive changes in the world. It is from this understanding that several highly successful projects have grown. First of all, I would note the change in tone in relations between the two countries. We began to listen to each other and pay much more attention to each other's concerns. The leaders agreed to create a bilateral presidential commission, which has become an important mechanism for coordinating the efforts of governments to create a common agenda for the two countries. Within the framework of this commission, a number of historical breakthroughs, first of all - the signing in 2010 of a new treaty on strategic offensive weapons. The United States and Russia continue to reduce their nuclear arsenals and send a signal to the world that all other countries should move in this direction. Agreement 1–2–3 entered into force, opening a new era in Russian-American cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear energy. This issue was in limbo for many years, but was resolved as a result of a reboot.
We have signed commercial contracts for billions of dollars, relating both to the export of American goods to Russia and to investments in Russian companies by our largest firms: GE, jointly with United Technologies, Boeing, PepsiCo, and Severstal acquired a number of assets in the United States. And we saw a much more active dialogue between our societies as a result of the reset: more students, more exchange programs and an unprecedented number of Russians applying for a US visa. So we have a lot more in common than we ourselves sometimes think, and if we focus on the positive, the possibilities for our joint actions are almost endless.
- How will the possible return to the Kremlin of Vladimir Putin affect the reset?
- I am sure that the reset is in the national interests of the United States, Russia, and the whole world. Therefore, I think that the future of our relations does not depend on who exactly wins the next presidential election. We are ready to continue the policy of restarting with the next president of Russia, but the Russians themselves must decide who it will be.
- Has the 2008 crisis of the year affected the reboot? After all, before it, pumped up with petrodollars, Russia behaved much more self-confidently and did not think to reboot.
- I think the economic crisis has had a big impact. And, frankly, not only to Russia, but also to the United States. It hit both countries and made us appreciate the fact that our economies are interconnected. The business achievements in the reboot process, about which I spoke, were born from the understanding that our relations need a solid economic foundation that could endure both economic and political shocks. It is necessary to create a base of companies-shareholders, which will have something to lose in case of deterioration of relations, and this will make our ties much stronger. This is understood both in Russia and in the USA.
- You were appointed ambassador even by George W. Bush in 2008, so the reboot took place before your eyes from beginning to end. What was the first reaction of Russian officials to the US proposal?
- She was very pragmatic. I participated in the preparation of the first meetings of Presidents Obama and Medvedev. And from the very beginning, my colleagues from the Russian Foreign Ministry and the presidential administration had a noticeable desire not only to look for points of contact, but also to intensify them and start working together — bilateral projects and joint ideas immediately began to appear. And thanks to this, we have moved much further than if we were moving separately.
- When President Obama first came to Russia, he described Vladimir Putin as a man who had one foot in the past. Did you feel the negative attitude of the so-called siloviki during the restart process? Did they put sticks in the wheels?
- Not. In any state there are always internal differences as to where the country should go, regarding the economic course. Just look at the discussion that is currently taking place in the USA regarding the budget and the ceiling of borrowing. We have seen that the same thing is happening in Russia - there is nothing unusual here. And although your country is actively discussing what the economic course should be, no one questions the need for a market. And the fact that Russia is now more than ever close to accession to the WTO shows that most of these issues within the country have already been resolved. It seems to me that in your country there is an understanding that the future of Russia should be linked to integration into the world economy, which is now interconnected more than ever. That is why the Obama administration announced that Russia's accession to the WTO is one of our priorities. Because it will have positive consequences not only for Russia and the United States, but also for the world economy as a whole. And Russia already has an understanding of this.
- Why, then, Russia has not yet joined the WTO? Although Moscow and Washington seem to have signed a bilateral agreement on the completion of negotiations, there are still questions. President Medvedev at an economic forum in St. Petersburg even linked these difficulties with Western policies.
- 2011 year is not over yet. And we are convinced that by the end of the year we can still see Russia in the ranks of the WTO. Why didn't this happen in 2009 or 2010? You might as well ask why this didn't happen in 2002. There are many questions. In recent years, the most important of them is the creation of the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. This required additional study of the structure of tariffs in the Russian Federation, since they have greatly changed within the CU. And this should have been reflected in the documents on Russia's accession to the WTO. It took a huge amount of technical work that was done over the past year. There are also very intense discussions on some individual issues of the level of state subsidies for agriculture, industrial car assembly, and phytosanitary control norms. At the bilateral level, we have resolved these issues, technical work has remained in Geneva, and it goes every day. There are a number of issues that are about to be agreed with European partners. So we are convinced that joining the WTO in 2011 is a very real opportunity.
- But at the same time there are problems with Georgia. Many Russian officials very much hope that the United States will help to solve them. It is no secret that Washington has a great influence on Tbilisi. Are the US ready to convince the Georgian government to seek a compromise??
- There are negotiations between Russia and Georgia through the mediation of Switzerland, which brought both parties to the negotiating table. We support these efforts. From the very beginning, the United States made it very clear to our Georgian friends that Russia's accession to the WTO would be useful not only for Russia or the United States, but also for Georgia itself. So I am sure that all these issues will eventually be resolved and together we will greet Russia in the WTO, where it belongs.
- Many European and American diplomats share concerns that if Russia does not have time to become a WTO member in 2011 under President Medvedev, the process can be slowed down again for many years, because Vladimir Putin is increasingly skeptical about the organization. Do you share these fears?
- I would not call it fears. One thing is clear: the sooner Russia finds itself in the WTO, the better. That is why we are so focused on 2011.
- How has the behavior of Russia in the international arena changed after the reset? For example, Moscow unexpectedly for many supported sanctions against Iran.
- In the case of Iran, it was already clear that Russia, like the United States and other members of the world community, does not want to see Iran as a nuclear power weapons. So here we are in the same boat. For many years we have been working in multilateral formats to convince the Iranians to abandon their nuclear ambitions and their desire to get an atomic bomb. And with the help of Russia, over the past two years we have adopted a number of sanctions at the UN, which should show Tehran that it must fulfill its obligations to the UN and the IAEA. I would not characterize Russia's position as the result of a reset. Just now there is a general understanding that Iran is moving in an extremely dangerous direction and it is necessary to find peaceful ways to stop this movement.
- Do you also consider the position of Russia on Libya to be the result of a reset?
- Libya is an example of a situation that developed rapidly and unexpectedly. This required a very quick response from the world community. The population of Libya for many years lived in extremely difficult, almost tyrannical conditions. And as a result, people rebelled, and only peacefully, partly inspired by peaceful protest in other countries covered by the “Arab spring”. They made it clear that Gaddafi had to leave. He responded by sending weapons and an army against his own people. Russia supported the UN Security Council in adopting the first package of sanctions against Libya. Russia also recently voted in favor of a resolution that would allow softening sanctions and return people to a peaceful life in conditions when the Gaddafi regime fell and a new leadership was formed. Russia's support for progressive forces in Libya made a significant contribution to the success of the Libyan people.
- But the situation with Syria shows that Russia's desire to cooperate with the West and the United States does have a limit. Don't you think that the United States and other NATO countries themselves are to blame for this, very freely interpreting the UN Security Council resolution on the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya?
- The situation in Syria, in our opinion, is very similar to the Libyan one. There are people who are already fed up with the rule of a person who does not reflect their aspirations. And in response to the generally peaceful protests calling on President Bashar Assad to resign, we see the use of military force, repression and landing. We, along with other members of the international community, believe that President Asad has lost his legitimacy due to the use of force against his own people. It's time to retire. Russia believes that there is still room for dialogue between Assad and the Syrian opposition. In our opinion, to be honest, this time, unfortunately, has already passed. Therefore, we, as an international community, should be united and send a clear signal to Damascus. And we hope that Russia will eventually join our efforts, as it did in Libya. As a result, her assistance led to an end to violence against innocent people.
- In Russia, many are convinced that the United States simply uses these situations to change undesirable regimes in the Middle East, and they don’t touch their allies. For example, in Yemen, exactly the same situation as in Syria, but for some reason in the US no one calls for the resignation of President Saleh.
- In the end, we are guided by what we consider the will of the people in each individual country. We saw it in Tunisia, in Egypt, and then in Libya. It is very important to remember that these are not just any wishes and plans of the USA - it is necessary to support the efforts of the world community on peaceful political evolution in the Middle East. And you are absolutely right: there are many peoples in the Middle East, this is a very volatile region, and it is very important that the events there do not lead to a complete collapse of the existing order. We are fully aware of the risks. That is why we want to continue working through the UN, through the League of Arab States, through the African Union, in order to create a movement towards change in an evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, way.
- We are talking about the success of the reboot, but there are also obvious failures. For example, the problem of missile defense, which worries Moscow since the time when Vladimir Putin worked as president. Why did the United States and NATO reject the plan proposed by Dmitry Medvedev to create a unified European missile defense system?
- I do not think that we can talk about the failure of negotiations on missile defense. We are not at the end of the road. We must remember that the contradictions on missile defense between Russia and the United States did not begin yesterday, but have a long history. For over 20 years, Moscow and Washington have different views on this problem, sometimes diametrically opposed. You can recall the initiative of "star wars" of the times of Ronald Reagan. This is not the same as the START treaty, where we simply revived the tradition of dialogue on the limitation of strategic weapons, which had existed since the days of the USSR, but was terminated for a while. So here we are starting something completely new. We are starting cooperation on the issue where previously there were only disagreements between Russia and the USA. So the fact that during the year of intensive negotiations we did not agree on anything should not be considered a failure. On the contrary, this is a very positive sign - we are not just continuing to talk, but we are discovering a completely new area for interaction. The most important question is trust. We proposed to Europe a system that is designed to protect against potential missile threats from the Middle East. Does Russia perceive this system as a threat to its nuclear potential? We know that it does not pose any threat, and we have repeatedly stated this. At the same time, we understand that history has taught Russia to be suspicious of all kinds of declarations. Therefore, we are not limited to statements. We invited Russian experts to very detailed briefings on the structure of the missile defense system that we offer to Europe. We brought Russian officials to the headquarters of the United States Missile Defense Agency, organized their meetings with our leading experts in this field so that they could ask their questions. And we tried to answer all the questions of the Russians in order to dispel all doubts from them. We are well aware of their presence. But if we want to build a truly effective system of protection against missile threats from the Middle East, we would like to work together with Russia and use the facilities that it can offer (radar stations in Gabala and Armavir. - “Kommersant”). This will create a more powerful coordinated system than two separate systems.
- Why, then, Washington does not want to create a unified system, as proposed by President Medvedev? This would automatically dispel Russian fears and an absolute guarantee that this missile defense system will not be used against Russia.
- Do not need a unified system to get this one hundred percent guarantee. This warranty does not arise from the creation of a unified system. The confidence that our missile defense system is not directed against Russia will appear if Russia understands what the system consists of. And for this we offer three things. The first is an agreement on cooperation in the field of defense technologies, which we are now actively discussing with the Russian side. It will allow us to exchange information and even technology, which will reduce the level of suspicion. In addition, we want to offer two separate centers. In the first of them - data on rocket launches, which we receive and the Russian side, where they would be combined and analyzed together. The second center is a single system that would allow us to work together if we fix the rocket launch in a third country. This is what we are working on right now. The process is not fast, but I am very pleased that we were able to significantly increase the level of trust. It may not be visible to the rest of the world, we do not sign any documents, but instead we lay bricks of trust from both sides.
- Is it supposed that Russian and NATO specialists will work in these centers together?
- Yes.
- Is the future location of these centers discussed?
- Not. We have not yet come to the point of discussing the specific location of the centers. The key point is that specialists from Russia and NATO countries should work side by side in them, share information and develop the habit of cooperation. This will lower the degree of distrust. In addition, within the framework of NATO, we have a Russia-NATO Council.
- Well yes. And in it Russia is represented by Dmitry Rogozin, who is unflattering about NATO, and especially about missile defense.
- Ambassador Rogozin is my colleague, we communicate with him a lot. And it seems to me that on this issue he is very constructive. He defends the Russian position very well - just as our experts defend the positions of the United States. And he shares the idea that America and Russia are not doomed to be enemies. I would say that we are doomed to be partners.
- I had a completely different idea. Dmitry Rogozin, for example, told us that Russia could even withdraw from the recently signed START treaty if the United States refuses the initiative of European missile defense launched by Dmitry Medvedev.
“I am convinced that by the next NATO summit, which will be held in Chicago in May 2012, we will already have a missile defense agreement between Russia and the North Atlantic Alliance.” I do not think that all these hypothetical scenarios that you mentioned should be considered seriously.
- But while the course of negotiations suggests otherwise. For example, as Russian officials told us, at the G8 summit in Deauville, the presidents could sign a statement of guarantees that the missile defense system would not be directed against Russia. The document was already agreed by the State Department and our Foreign Ministry, but at the last moment Obama refused to sign it due to pressure from the Pentagon. It turns out that not only our security forces do not believe Washington, but your security forces do not believe Russia.
- Your description of what happened in Deauville is not entirely complete. I can not go into details. But you rightly raised an important question: there is also a lack of confidence on the American side. The problem is not only that someone in Russia does not trust the United States. In both countries, after a long cold war, various suspicions are still smoldering. So our common task, and especially my task as ambassador, is to break down these stereotypes and create the basis for a truly trusting partnership. We should not just call each other partners, but work on common problems in the same room on 24 hours per day for many months. Then in a short period of time we will be able to create a critical mass of trust.
- Are there any other reasons to be afraid of Russia? Even US Vice President Joe Biden in July 2009, in an interview with the Wall Street Journal, said that the decrepitude of Russia would force her to become a junior partner of the West.
“I can't say better than President Obama said when he spoke at the New Economic School in 2009.” He very clearly said that America wants to see Russia strong, peaceful and prosperous. We are not at all interested in a weak Russia. A weak Russia is the worst nightmare for the United States. That is why our entire policy towards Moscow is not just to strengthen relations between the Russian Federation and the United States, but also to make Russia itself stronger and more self-confident. That is the kind of partner America needs in the 21st century. We are well aware of the challenges that confront us before 2020. And we must cope with them in alliance with powerful partners. Russia, thanks to its geostrategic position, its history, vast material resources and human capital, can be just such a powerful ally. This is the basis, the essence of the process that we call the reboot.
- Why, then, in dispatches published by WikiLeaks, the situation and intentions of the United States are drawn in a completely different light? From the telegrams sent by the American embassies in Eastern Europe and the CIS countries, Washington’s desire to limit the sphere of influence of Moscow can be seen.
- First of all, a few words about WikiLeaks. I would be very careful about what is being served as an American diplomatic telegram. We have already seen attempts to fabricate some documents and present them as part of the WikiLeaks archive. It is difficult to vouch for the authenticity of all these documents. And although some of these dispatches do reflect the views of certain ambassadors and diplomatic missions, it is important to understand that American foreign policy does not depend on the messages that I send from Moscow or my colleague sends from Beijing. It depends on the general analysis and the line that the State Department, the Pentagon and the National Security Council jointly develop in Washington. Do not consider the recommendations to Washington, as reflected in the WikiLeaks telegrams, as the policy of the United States.
- But the actions of Washington also speak for themselves. For example, US support for projects like Nabucco or the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline in Moscow is considered to be unequivocally anti-Russian.
- I would not say that these projects are obvious evidence of some anti-Russian course of Washington. It is easy to confuse politics and economics. There will always be economic competition in some areas between Russia and the United States, just as America competes with the EU. As for pipelines, our position was always simple: let the market decide. If the market says that pipe A is better, then this pipe will be built. And if pipe B is too expensive or suggests the wrong route, then there will never be money for it. If you look at the last five to ten years, the struggle for influence between Russia and the United States in the classical geopolitical sense has shrunk noticeably.
- Really?
- Take Central Asia. As a result of our efforts to eliminate Al-Qaida’s outbreaks in Afghanistan, unprecedented agreements between Russia and the USA were concluded, thanks to which more than 200 thousands of our servicemen were transported through the territory of the Russian Federation to our transit center at Manas airport. Russia signed this agreement in 2009 because it was in its interest to strengthen stability in Afghanistan. I have very productive communication with my colleagues at the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation on the Middle East and even on the South Caucasus. The United States and Russia are members of the OSCE Minsk Group, which is a key part of the mechanism for resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. This is a long and painful process, but Moscow and Washington work together. The same is true of Transnistria and Moldova. Even in the case of Georgia, where the positions of Russia and the United States diverge the most, our experts work in Geneva as part of the negotiation process. Very often, you can pay attention to those regions where we have differences, and lose sight of the situation in which our views coincide.
“Even if the positions on foreign policy issues begin to converge, the US’s desire to uphold democratic freedoms causes obvious irritation among the Russian leadership. Reset did not affect this sphere?
- The United States has always defended fundamental human rights. And it is a great honor to defend justice, so that these rights are respected throughout the world. Sometimes we are accused of interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. Of course, it is important that we do not follow the policy of double standards and that our own democracy is flawless. In the US, too, not all is well, but we work on it every day. The sphere of human rights, like the problem of missile defense, is an aspect of our relations where we were more at odds than agreed. But within the presidential commission, a subcommittee on civil society was created, co-chaired by First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Vladislav Surkov and Senior Director for Russia at the US National Security Council Michael McFaul (the White House introduced his candidature to the Senate as the next US ambassador to Russia .— “b”). Within this subcommittee, we managed to start a dialogue. And this is a positive sign. The more we discuss these issues, the greater will be the points of coincidence. Or, at least, we will clearly understand where we do not coincide.
- Is the McFaul dialogue with Surkov an effective way to fight for human rights in Russia? Do you think that sanctions against officials would have a much greater effect? As the United States acted in the case of the case of Sergei Magnitsky, tortured in a Russian prison.
- Of course, sanctions have a big effect - this is true for African countries, for the countries of the Middle East, and for the countries of the former Soviet Union. But the most important factor that will allow not to repeat the tragedy that occurred with Sergei Magnitsky is the voice of the Russians themselves. They require a fair investigation. And we already see that these voices are starting to get louder and louder. And for me it is the most reliable guarantee that justice will win sooner or later.
John beyrle
11 was born on February 1954 of the year in Mascigon, Michigan. In 1975, he graduated from undergraduate studies at the University of Grand Valley, and then graduated from the National Military College. In 1976, he studied Russian at Leningrad State University. In 1982, he joined the State Department. From 1983 to 1986, he is a political officer at the US Embassy in Moscow. After that, he worked in the political department of the embassy in Bulgaria, he served as adviser on political and economic affairs at the US embassy in Prague. As part of the US delegation, he participated in the negotiations in Vienna on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. In 1993-1995, i. about. Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for the Former Republics of the USSR, Director for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia at the US National Security Council. Then he worked in the State Department. From 2003 to 2005 year - deputy head of the US embassy in the Russian Federation. In 2005-2008 - US Ambassador to Bulgaria. 13 May 2008 was appointed ambassador to Russia.
11 was born on February 1954 of the year in Mascigon, Michigan. In 1975, he graduated from undergraduate studies at the University of Grand Valley, and then graduated from the National Military College. In 1976, he studied Russian at Leningrad State University. In 1982, he joined the State Department. From 1983 to 1986, he is a political officer at the US Embassy in Moscow. After that, he worked in the political department of the embassy in Bulgaria, he served as adviser on political and economic affairs at the US embassy in Prague. As part of the US delegation, he participated in the negotiations in Vienna on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. In 1993-1995, i. about. Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for the Former Republics of the USSR, Director for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia at the US National Security Council. Then he worked in the State Department. From 2003 to 2005 year - deputy head of the US embassy in the Russian Federation. In 2005-2008 - US Ambassador to Bulgaria. 13 May 2008 was appointed ambassador to Russia.
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