Today, many have "woken up" and are beginning to speak openly about the "unthinkable," unthinkable yesterday — a new great world war. But in addition to obscure conversations, there is more and more other valid evidence of the approaching wartime.
One of these indicators is that on the global political scene, the tough global competition of government mobilization projects is becoming increasingly acute. The basis for the effectiveness of such long-term programs is the level of consolidation of the ruling class and the whole society, the readiness of the state system to respond optimally to the tsunami of the approaching challenges, risks, threats, accumulated previous experience, the presence of creative individuals and groups in this area, etc.
It is especially important that the more thoroughly and systematically developed the mobilization projects of key players, the less likely there is a big war between them. That is, in fact, effective mobilization strategies are an integral component of strategic deterrence, preventing direct global confrontation.
Amazing paradox of the newest stories lies in the fact that for some reason Russia did not carry out a comprehensive, comprehensive, detailed analysis of the causes of strategic defeat in 80-s, which ended with the destruction of the Soviet Union.
Therefore, there is no corresponding detailed document, there is no corresponding simulation model. By the way, the absence of such an analysis is quite indicative of the deficit of a capable, strategic nationwide elite in the country. The bastard post-Soviet quasi-elite never learned the necessary lessons for the future from the strategic defeat of the USSR. And above all, an effective mobilization program is always systemic, without exception, in nature.
Although it was precisely the special qualities of the mobilization thinking of the Stalinist "Order of the Swordsmen" that became one of the most important prerequisites for victory in the Great Patriotic War.
This war was a cruel, antagonistic and, at the same time, deeply mystical confrontation between two fundamentally new models of corporate statehood in the twentieth century. Both the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany were examples of highly ideologized states. And the mobilization component was an integral component of these ideologies.
Did Stalin recognize the urgent need to develop and implement a special mobilization project as a strategic program for the country's survival in the context of the ongoing global systemic crisis of the 30s?
Yes, of course, since he had the appropriate revolutionary experience, participation in the civil war, and he had developed strategic thinking.
There are at least eight main reasons for the urgent need for accelerated development and implementation of such a special strategic mobilization project that Stalin took into account.
Firstly, by the end of the 20s - beginning of the 30s, the loose society of the Soviet Union remained:
- multi-structured in a socio-economic sense, with corresponding sharp contradictions and conflicts,
- class and, at the same time, clan-corporate in the socio-structural sense,
- deeply petty-bourgeois in the ideological and socio-psychological sense, with the prevailing principle "every man for himself, one God for all."
As a theorist and practical political leader, Stalin was well aware that, despite the loud declarations of revolutionary socialist slogans, despite the fact that the Communist Party was in power, the systemic crisis in the country had not been overcome by the end of the 20. Moreover, given the aggravation of internal contradictions, which is gathering the course of the world economic crisis and the beginning of deep transformations in the international system, this growing conflict potential in the Soviet Union could again turn into a violent confrontation of power.
In the new and recent history, three scenario models of temporary or final attenuation of the internal systemic crisis are recorded.
In the first case, such a crisis, especially against the background of the war, ends with the complete or partial collapse of the country. In the absence of a well-thought-out strategy, the systemic crisis further temporarily goes deep into the lower levels of society, continuing to undermine it.
In the second case, the ongoing systemic crisis finally undermines the internal forces of the given society and state, which inevitably leads to direct or indirect external occupation. In this case, the surrendered society is integrated into the global project of the winner, subjecting it to completely different long-term interests. At the same time there is a loss of the cultural and historical code of the people, the disappearance of the traditional mechanisms of national identity, the division of the country into parts. This happened to Germany and Japan after the Second World War. Something similar or worse threatened the Soviet Union after the defeat in the Third World War.
In the third scenario, the relevant charismatic leader and the responsible elite formulate, put forward and implement a draft long-term system strategy for overcoming a comprehensive crisis, while simultaneously constructing a fundamentally new historical subject of such a program.
Secondly, the factor of the steadily looming, ever more prominent danger of global war. Back in 1931, Stalin actually predicted that direct military aggression against the Soviet Union would begin in ten years.
Moreover, as a sensible politician, he was aware of how dramatically the country has lagged behind in comparison with Europe. The cultural revolution did not reach the main strata of society: the population, especially the rural, still remained largely illiterate, and most of the draftees were simply unable to cope with new, more and more complex, military equipment.
In fact, there was no military-industrial complex and, above all, the production of modern species weapons. The society, as a result of the First World War, revolution, civil war, mass hunger and deprivation, numerous internal ideological zigzags, was largely fragmented and split. By the beginning of the 30s, the groups of the ruling Soviet political establishment were in a state of fierce inter-elite civil war. At the same time, the moral character of both the “tops” and the “bottom” degraded before our eyes.
A big war was approaching, and in these conditions the country was objectively doomed. Only a miracle could help. And it was precisely the strategic mobilization project that made it possible to accomplish such a miracle breakthrough: in ten years, the Soviet Union turned into a state that could really, at the expense of all its internal forces, win the battle for its survival.
Thirdly, the experience of Russian history taught Stalin that it was only within the framework of successful mobilization projects that it was only possible to effectively carry out a comprehensive modernization of the country.
In other words, outside the framework of a well-thought-out Russian mobilization program, a modernization jerk is in principle impossible.
It was precisely within the framework of a special, strategic mobilization project that takes into account the tense situation in the world that the Soviet Union was able to make a truly civilizational breakthrough. It was about the revolutionary structural modernization of Soviet society, the formation of a new type of Soviet personality, the creation of a fundamentally new economic mechanism of the USSR based on the principles of long-term planning, the implementation of a genuine innovative technological breakthrough in a number of key industries.
Fourth, the top leadership of the Soviet Union and, above all, Stalin, most likely knew about the real scale of corruption in the country. With such a corrupt shaft of the USSR, of course, was doomed to a total defeat in the impending big war. Only the urgent deployment of a smart strategic mobilization project made it possible to forcefully and rigidly dismantle this corrupt system.
Fifth, in the framework of the policy of preparing for a world war, huge financial resources began to be allocated for the rearmament of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. And due to significant restrictions for the vast majority of the population. And this is in conditions where the standard of living of the main classes and strata remained extremely low.
Without the deployment of an extremely tough mobilization project involving a nationwide control system, a significant portion of these resources would have been mercilessly plundered. If there is a corrupt yoke, the country would approach an unprepared war.
In addition, without appropriate permanent personnel work, without increasing the effectiveness of mobilization consciousness on a national scale, without targeted social and institutional modernization, even the best weapons very quickly turn into scrap metal.
Sixth, it was only within the framework of a special mobilization project that it was possible to form a new, effective anti-crisis system of state administration capable of adequately responding to the growing strategic uncertainty, critical challenges and threats of the coming long, hard power period in the world.
Finally, seventh, then, in the 30s of the last century, in the context of the ongoing global systemic crisis, the intense competition of the relevant national mobilization projects became objectively toughened.
What are the most basic meaningful, semantic components of a strategic mobilization project that was implemented in the Soviet Union in the thirties of the twentieth century and which allowed not only to win the Great Patriotic War, but also turned our country into the greatest power in the world?
Mobilization ideology and strategy
Millions and tens of millions of people participate in global wars. And the role of ideologies as living semantic systems is of infinite importance here. It is impossible to prepare and win in such wars, if peoples and societies do not clearly and clearly know, for the sake of what, for the sake of what great goals are necessary the ultimate tension of forces, numerous sacrifices and personal sacrifice are necessary? For what, ultimately, should societies and people suffer? For what great ideas and goals should soldiers and officers rise and die?
The Second World War became a systemic war, that is, geopolitical, geo-economic (for strategic resources), ideological, information-propaganda, cultural-historical, etc. But the Great Patriotic War was primarily an ideological war in the highest sense of the word - a civilizational war: class ideology against national-racial ideology.
As the military threat grows, the importance of ideology, ideological values and norms will necessarily increase. The need for clear, understandable political answers to basic ideological value questions "who are we?", "Where are we from?" and "where are we going?" turns into a major factor in the struggle for national-state survival.
It was in the 30-s in the Soviet Union that the national mobilization ideology of the “common cause” was formed as a permanent mechanism of coordination of interests for the consolidation of the majority of society.
As Stalin had hoped, such a communist ideology of the “common cause” not only became the basis of the strategy of turning the USSR into a great power, but also the cornerstone of the practical mechanism of mobilization crisis management.
Within the framework of the Soviet mobilization ideology, the ideal of building a society on the principles of justice, solidarity, and corporate mutual assistance was formulated and fixed. It fixed the basic value system - justice, patriotism, social solidarity, personal will, self-discipline, etc., which is extremely important not only in the face of growing external threats and challenges, but also for the cohesion of society on the eve of an imminent war.
This Stalinist ideological doctrine of the “common cause” enshrined the need to protect traditional values and meanings of the majority as the basic moral system of society, and fixed the main hierarchy of internal and external enemies, as well as allies and partners.
The ideology and strategy of the “common cause” really consolidated various regional, ethnonational, corporate, political, power elite groups and, at the same time, most of the society through the nomination of a definite, clearly and carefully regulated mechanism for coordinating the main class, social and group interests.
It is very important to emphasize that the ideology and strategy of the “common cause” became the key prerequisite for restoring legal consciousness in society, which, after 1917, has been substantially devalued.
The most important component of the Soviet mobilization ideology has become the "national" system of responsibility. An effective mobilization project requires mandatory implementation of a rigid system of responsibility both in the state apparatus and in the whole society.
We are talking about a system that, especially in pre-war and military conditions, should include moral and ideological, and administrative, and political, and criminal, and personal, and collective responsibility for the success of the process and the phased results of the implementation of the "common cause" mobilization policy. . Without such a system, any long-term strategy of the “common cause” is sooner or later doomed to failure.
A nationwide system of responsibility, including formalized and unofficial "rules of the game," was originally to be perceived as the embodiment of traditional justice by all leading elite groups in the Soviet Union, and by an absolute majority of Soviet society.
The organizational core of such a system of nationwide responsibility has become an extensive and all-encompassing mechanism for large-scale public (popular, party, trade union, Komsomol) control over the implementation of the state strategy of the “common cause”.
At the same time, the nationwide system of responsibility became the USSR in the 30 and in the 40 in an important tool to ensure the manageability of the bureaucracy.
Political organizational structure of the mobilization project
The Communist Party has become such an organizational structure, but on the eve of the war it was no longer the 20 party. The Stalinist Communist Party, which more and more resembled the “Order of the Sword,” has become, especially after large-scale purges carried out in 30, not only as a central component of the national responsibility system, but also at the core of the Soviet state, which was preparing for its “decisive battle "for survival.
This state represented at that historical moment a fundamentally new corporate model "people-state". On the one hand, the ideology and strategy of the "common cause" required the maximum participation of millions in large-scale social creativity - the building of a new socialist civilization. On the other hand, mobilization design required the formation of the strictest system of making and implementing major decisions "from top to bottom" as the core of such a corporate mechanism of state administration in key segments of national politics and economy.
An important component of this Stalinist "Order of the Sword" was the cultivation of political will in all segments of this nation-wide people-to-state corporation. As a matter of fact, strategic mobilization projects are in principle impossible to implement without an iron political will.
The formation and deployment of the mobilization org.aruzhiya, where Stalin was not equal, pursued five strategic objectives.
Firstly, it was necessary to create a mechanism of new personnel policy capable of ensuring unhindered vertical mobility of personnel required for the effective implementation of the mobilization project.
In 1931, Stalin instructed the OGPU to go through the whole country and find thousands of smart, capable people. They were really searched and found; if they did not have a secondary education, they organized accelerated courses and then sent them to various special higher educational institutions, including the leading party Institute of the Red Professorship. Then, in the 1937-38 years, it was from among these people that thirty-year-old ministers and first secretaries of the regional committees appeared, including Kosygin, Ustinov and other talented people who fully manifested themselves during the Great Patriotic War.
Secondly, this mobilization org.mechanizm allowed to form and implement a new model of personality-manager, able to take responsibility for making and implementing decisions in the war period.
Thirdly, the mobilization project in the conditions of the growing strategic uncertainty of the prewar and military period required the provision of effective feedback from the highest political leadership to the main components of Soviet society.
Fourth, such mobilization organizational structures guaranteed the day-to-day, fair functioning of mechanisms for coordinating the key interests of the main classes and social groups of Soviet society within the framework of the "common cause" strategy, which was an all-out struggle against the enemy under the slogan "Everything for the front, everything for victory!" ...
Fifth, the mobilization organizational structures provided coordination of the implementation of numerous interrelated, developing projects in the field.
Consolidation of the ruling class, including using the most severe means, is one of the most important conditions for effective preparation for a major war. Only a loose ruling class united by a common long-term ideology, rigid organizational structure, and unconditional mutual responsibility can become a real and effective subject of the implementation of the national mobilization strategy. In addition, if the upper establishment is consolidated - politically and ideologically, then potential enemies and adversaries in subsequent stages of conflict escalation will find it much more difficult to manipulate certain elite groups.
Stalin's group seized the main levers of government in 1929, and the final consolidation of the upper establishment was largely complete by 1939. By the early thirties, the communist elite in the USSR was split for ideological, economic, moral, personal and political reasons. Nevertheless, ten years is an unacceptable long. And it was this that became one of the main reasons for the severe defeats in 1941-42. Hitler's group came to power in 1933, and it took the Fuehrer only two years to basically rally the German establishment.
Unconditional preservation of controllability.
One of the most important tasks of the national mobilization strategy is, first of all, to preserve political, military-political and socio-economic controllability during the war period. At the same time, the most essential criterion for such controllability is the minimization of threats, risks and vulnerabilities for the national economy.
Stalin and his team were able to forcefully develop an emergency program of force majeure transfer of the Soviet economy to the mobilization rails. And above all, to envisage a complex, comprehensive reformatting of the economic management system in the conditions of a possible long extraordinary period.
A very important component of the Stalinist mobilization project was the purposeful formation of a "defense consciousness" among various groups of the Soviet population, but above all among the workers and management personnel of the military-industrial complex. At the same time, a consistent policy of introducing "defense consciousness" into all strata of Soviet society has objectively become an important factor in minimizing corruption.
The effective introduction of the patriotic "defense consciousness" created a real opportunity to forcefully form a fundamentally new type of Soviet mobilization elite.
Total struggle with internal enemies.
The Stalinist mobilization project envisaged not only the elimination of the inner-party opposition, but also a purposeful, ruthless suppression of all real and potential competing mechanisms of power influence on Russian society, such as criminal mafia structures, corruption mechanisms and connections, regional clan systems, etc.
Coalition potential.
For the planning and implementation of the mobilization project, the question is very significant: who will be the main opponent?
For Stalin, the dilemma was as follows: Germany or England with France?
Depending on the main enemy, the focus and quality of the mobilization strategy should change. This is the first thing.
In addition, and secondly, a real mobilization project requires efforts and even super-efforts to build up the coalition's foreign policy potential.
It is not only about strong partnerships with various countries and regimes, but also about establishing and maintaining special trust relationships with important regional movements, influential elites and counter-elites, with certain significant social groups in other countries, etc.
Leaders of a state that is preparing for a big war should consolidate their allies in key foreign policy regions.
Stalin knew very well that London and Paris sought to push him to Berlin. However, a coalition with France and the UK, even if temporary, was more attractive to him than a coalition with Hitler. And not only because of the principled ideological antagonism with the Nazis, but also for practical reasons: Germany militarily represented a much more dangerous enemy than any other European country. After the Nazis came to power, Germany literally in a few years became the leading power of Europe, demonstrating unprecedented economic growth rates.
But Stalin was also a talented, flexible diplomat. After many months of negotiations with Paris and London in 1939 did not lead to anything, he signed an agreement with Germany within a few days. This allowed the Soviet Union to win almost two years.
In addition, in such critical situations, when the question is about "life or death", the leader must also be as pragmatic as possible with regard to ideological values. In the conditions of the approaching big war for survival, certain ideological values, such as proletarian internationalism, the Comintern, etc., naturally fell into the second or even the third plan.
Even recent historical experience demonstrates that it was the great powers with their national mobilization projects that proved to be most effective during the period of profound transformations on the world stage, usually became the basis for the formation of subsequent new global systems: “Show me your mobilization project and I will say that you will day after tomorrow!".
After the Second World War, it was on the basis of the long-term strategies of Stalin and Roosevelt, which were the result of the implementation of relevant national mobilization projects, that a new global bipolar system was formed.
A very small number of world players in today's world have such a unique experience of force majeure system mobilization design and mobilization project implementation, which Russia has as an heir to the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the implementation of successful national mobilization projects of China, the DPRK, Vietnam, Cuba was largely influenced by the careful study and use of the Soviet experience of the 30-50 of the XX century.
Thanks to the effectiveness of the emergency mobilization design, thanks to the creation of a special mobilization mechanism as a system, the Soviet Union was able to:
- to win the Great Patriotic War;
- to carry out a record in the history of socio-economic and cultural modernization of the backward society;
- make a sharp breakthrough in economic development in the 50-s;
- develop your own civilization model;
- to ensure and preserve the geostrategic balance of forces in the world until the 80-s of the XX century.
A great many real achievements of the USSR were the result of precisely the carefully thought out and implemented Soviet strategic mobilization project.
In the photo: Nizhny Novgorod. Kremlin. Panel "Our Victory", created from copies of 15 thousand photographs of the war years
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