Potapov factor
The contribution to the common Victory of General Potapov and the 5 army entrusted to him is difficult to overestimate - historians do not exclude that it was her strong defense that prevented the fall of Moscow in the fall of 1941.My acquaintance with the fate of Mikhail Ivanovich Potapov and history The 5 Army of the Southwestern Front began by chance. Several years ago, digging on the Internet, I noticed a map of the Soviet-German front as of 25 August 1941, apparently borrowed from some English-language resource. By this time, the Germans occupied Novgorod, Smolensk, approached Bryansk, besieged Odessa in the south and reached the Dnieper line from Kremenchug to the mouth.
And just south of the Pinsk swamps, a powerful wedge literally sank into the thickness of the territory occupied by the Nazis for several hundred kilometers. At the edge of this wedge was a laconic inscription "5 POTAPOV". It was the 5 Army of the South-Western Front under the command of Major General Potapov.
Of course, the front line could not be even, in different parts of it each other was opposed by unmatched in size and strength of the compound, and many circumstances influenced the success or catastrophe. In addition, such a wedge could not exist for a long time, since it was easily turned around by the environment. From the south, the Germans came close to Kiev, and it was required to level the front to organize a sustainable defense of the city. There was a potential threat to the right flank of the 5 Army, after the German forces of the Army Group Center, bypassing the Pripyat swampy basin, reached the line of Gomel and Starodub. August 19 The 5 Army received an order to withdraw beyond the Dnieper to a depth of 140 - 180 kilometers. Nevertheless, the fact that the path of the 5 Army’s retreat from the western border of the USSR, although for some time turned out to be almost three times shorter than that of its neighbors, caused a desire to learn more about this unit and its commander.
During the first two months of the war, Potapov’s troops threatened to hang over the German Army Group South from the north, but after the retreat beyond the Dnieper, the 5 Army had a significant influence on the decisions of the Reich High Command. In his first directive on hostilities on the Eastern Front (Directive No. 33 of 19.07.1941), Hitler points out: "The enemy 5 army must be quickly and decisively defeated." But quickly and decisively fails, and the following directive No. 34 from 30.07.41 again orders the German troops "5 th Red Army ... to force to the battle west of the Dnieper and destroy." The Fuhrer did not rule out the breakthrough of Potapov’s troops to the north through Polesie into the flank of Army Group Center and demanded that measures be taken to prevent this, frankly, improbable maneuver. It takes two weeks and Hitler once again angrily recalls that "the 5-I Russian army must be ... finally, destroyed." (Annex to Directive No. 34 of 12.08.41). However, a few days later, Potapov’s army disappeared behind the wide expanse of the Dnieper.
One cannot be surprised at the Fuhrer's perseverance - he saw the same maps of military actions that we see now, and quite adequately perceived the threat posed by the activity of the troops under the command of Potapov.
Finally, 21 August, Hitler issues an order in which he repeats the idea three times (!) About the need to destroy the 5 Army. But the main thing is that for the first time he is ready to allocate for this task “as many divisions as necessary”. Along with the success of the Leningrad blocking operation, the Fuhrer ranks the defeat of Potapov’s army as a prerequisite for a successful offensive “against a group of troops of Tymoshenko,” that is, the Western Front. It turns out that the way to Moscow, according to Hitler, lay through the defeated 5 th army.
I learned all these details later, but when I looked at the map, the surname Potapov, alas, did not tell me anything. Gradually, after getting acquainted with the documents and studies, conversations with the widow of the commander Marianna Fedorovna Modorova, the amazing life path of this person was revealed to me.
From deacons to generals
Mikhail Ivanovich Potapov was born in October 1902 of the year in the village of Mochalovo, Yukhnovsky Uyezd, then Smolensk Province, now the Kaluga Region. Although in the questionnaires, the future commander-5 attributed his parents to the “middle peasants”, rather, they would have to be counted among the wealthy artisans: Michael's father was a contractor in paving roads and streets.
Without leaving the parish, Michael received a very decent primary education for the village boy. In the village school, his teacher was an "idle" prince from the Gagarin family, later he studied at the parish school at the temple in the neighboring village of Putogino. The St. Petersburg millionaire publisher, a native of these places, Ignatius Tuzov, acted as a guardian of the church and the school, so for sure the students were cared for here.
The First World War and the economic crisis did not in the best way affect the Potapov family well-being. As a teenager, Michael began to help his father. October revolution Potapov met in Kharkov, where they worked as bridges in a tram depot.
By the spring of 1920, Mikhail returned to his native Mochalovo, and in May he became a Red Army man at the military office in Yukhnov. Formally, Potapov is considered a participant in the Civil War, but he did not take direct part in the hostilities.
Potapov, after finishing the cavalry courses in Minsk in September 1922, was appointed the platoon commander of the 43 cavalry regiment of the Volga Military District. It was not easy 20-year-old, not sniffing gunpowder young man to command experienced riders from the Cossacks, many of which had two wars behind their shoulders. Strangely enough, a profound knowledge of church rituals contributed to the conquest of authority from subordinates - in Putugino, Michael not only studied at the temple, but also served as a deacon for some time. From deaconry, Potapov will have a well-appointed luxury baritone for life. Many years later, when he was already a general of the Soviet army, the former deacon did not shy away from attending church services in full "parade".
Potapov2.jpg After two years already in the position of assistant squadron commander, Potapov leaves for Moscow to take military chemical courses. New place of service - 67 cavalry regiment of the North Caucasian Military District. From 1931, he is again at school - now as a student at the Military Academy of Motorization and Mechanization of the Red Army. The cavalryman becomes a tanker. After graduating from the Academy in 1936, his career develops rapidly, which, however, is characteristic of many future commanders of the Great Patriotic War. It took Potapov exactly four years to make his way from the regimental chief of staff to the army commander.
Undoubtedly, a meeting with Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov played a significant role in his career. It happened in May 1937 in Belarus, where Potapov commanded a regiment, and Zhukov - a division. By the time they met, the future marshal had already received a new appointment, but since then the fellow countrymen have not lost sight of each other. In the book “Memoirs and Reflections,” Georgy Konstantinovich writes: “Practically in field exercises and maneuvers and in the 3rd and 6th buildings, I had to act with the 21st separate tank brigade (brigade M.I. Potapov). This commander was in the past my colleague, and we understood each other in a "combat situation", at a glance. "
When in June 1939-th Zhukov was offered to head the operation against the Japanese army at Khalkhin-Gol, he insisted on the appointment of Potapov as his deputy.
They flew to the Far East in one plane. Marshal recalled: “Kombrig Potapov was my deputy. On his shoulders lay great work on organizing the interaction of formations and branches of troops, and when we launched the general offensive, Mikhail Ivanovich was entrusted with the leadership of the main group on the right wing of the front. ”
In June, the 1940 of Zhukov became commander of the Kiev Special Military District, while Potapov was transferred to KOVO as commander of the 4 Mechanized Corps. Six months later, Mikhail Ivanovich becomes commander. In February, 41, appointed by the Chief of the General Staff, Zhukov moved to Moscow. The countrymen met again only in the post-war years.
It remains to be regretted that the remarkable mutual understanding between the two military leaders could not be used for the cause of victory. I note that these were very dissimilar people, in some ways even opposing, but this fact only contributed to their mutual attraction.
Blitzkrieg failed
In the event of an enemy attack, Potapov’s army was responsible for the “covering area No. 1”, the 170 length of km from Wlodawa to Krystynopol in the north of the Ukrainian part of the Soviet-German border. In the last peaceful days, Potapov took a number of measures to increase the combat capability of the army. On the night of 16 on 17 June, they stepped out of the camp of a part of the 62 th rifle division and after two night transitions took to positions near the border. June 18 Potapov ordered the 45 Infantry Division to be withdrawn from the test site. On the same day, she received an order to advance to the border of the 135 Infantry Division.
But this could not change the overall situation, which with the outbreak of hostilities was extremely unfavorable for our troops. On the Sokal bulge, the Germans achieved a threefold superiority in manpower and technology. Spread along the front, the Soviet divisions did not hold back the blows of the German army corps, which were closely built on the main lines of attack. The mechanized units of the 5 Army only pulled up to the border from their deployment sites.
Nevertheless, from the very first hours of the war, Potapov’s troops fought hard and skillfully. For each destroyed or burned Soviet tank of the compound of the 1-th tank group of von Kleist suffered more damage in 2,5 – 3. 5-I army not only desperately defended, but also struck counterattacks against the enemy. “The leadership of the enemy forces in front of Army Group South is strikingly vigorous, its continuous flank and frontal attacks inflict heavy losses on us,” noted in his notes the chief of the general staff of the ground forces Franz Halder.
On June 26, the South-Western Front started a counterattack in the Brody-Lutsk-Dubno triangle where the oncoming tank battle in the history of World War II took place. Four Soviet mechanized corps (two of the 5 army) failed to develop initial success. The inconsistent position of the front command, which at the height of the fighting in the triangle ordered to go on the defensive, then returned to the offensive plan, also played its role.
I will note this detail: these days of fierce confrontation, namely 30 of June, Potapov issued an order in which he pointed out the inadmissibility of the execution of prisoners of war.
July 1 against the background of a general withdrawal of troops of the front 5-I army launched a powerful counter-attack on the northern flank of the German offensive. In particular, the 20-I tank division threw off enemy units by 10 – 12 km, destroyed up to 1 thousands of enemy soldiers, 10 tanks, 2 batteries.
Army General S.M. Shtemenko wrote: "The 5-I army ... became, as they say, a thorn in the face of Hitler's generals, put up strong resistance to the enemy and caused him considerable damage."
The German fascist troops could not quickly break through the front here. Potapov's divisions knocked them out of the road Lutsk - Rovno - Zhytomyr and forced them to abandon the immediate attack on Kiev.
Shtemenko, in those months one of the leading employees of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, had in mind the successful counterattack of the 5th Army, undertaken on July 10. Then the tankers of Potapov, behind the backs of formations of the III Army Corps, intercepted the Novograd-Volynsky-Zhytomyr highway over a width of more than 10 km. What a headache for the Germans was the loss of this most important communication can be judged by the fact that the commander of the army group "South" Gerd von Runstedt seriously planned to use Aviation for the transfer to the Zhytomyr region of the German Goering infantry regiment.
While Potapov's troops attacked the northern flank of the German offensive, the defenders of Kiev received a respite. The command of the 6 of the German army was forced to declare: "The nature of the threat to our troops from the main forces of the 5 of the Russian army is still such that the said threat should be eliminated before the attack on Kiev." The loss of the Ukrainian capital was postponed for two months.
The German military historian Alfred Filippi also points out that the reason for the slowdown in the advance rate of Army Group South was the opposition of the 5 Army. "And although this opposition ... was not completely unexpected for the German command, it nevertheless brought tactical successes to the Russians from the very beginning of the campaign, and then in the Novograd-Volynsky area, Zhytomyr acquired operational significance, much more serious than it was assumed. This had a rather significant paralyzing effect on the will of the command of the 6 Army to fulfill the main operational task, which was to enter the Dnieper near Kiev. ”
At the end of July - early August, during the fighting for Korostensky fortified area, the Potapov army again did not so much strive to keep the Germans with strong defense, but also with strong counterattacks and pressure on the flanks made the attackers weaken the blow. Here the enemy concentrated against the 5 Army 11 divisions. If we consider that the staff of the German infantry division was 14 thousands of people, the enemy troops, at least, were twice as strong as the forces available to Potapov. The German military historian Werner Haupt notes that "the 5-I Soviet army, commanded by the talented Major General Potapov, was located on the left flank of the German army 6 and inflicted very heavy losses on it." After the war, it will be calculated that, on average, every day of the military operations in the 5-army zone accounted for from 8 to 10 strikes of our troops on the enemy.
9 August commander von Runstedt ordered to suspend the offensive at the turn of Kiev, Korosten and temporarily go on the defensive, so that, dispersed troops in depth, to provide them with the opportunity to rest. In assessing the situation presented in the OKH, the command of Army Group South expressed a rather pessimistic opinion about the situation on its northern wing. It was even suggested that the Russians intended to "go on the offensive from the area of Kiev and from the area of Ovruch in order to crush the northern wing of the army group." However, physical exhaustion and losses to which von Runstedt complained were no less, if not more, affected the condition of the Soviet troops.
Fateful triumph?
Thus, Hitler's order from 21 of August, aimed at the destruction of Potapov's troops, looked quite reasonable. It is impossible to call spontaneous and the idea for the accomplishment of this task to single out the tank forces of Guderian operating in Belarus. A month earlier, in the very first document concerning the 5 Army - Directive No. 33 from 19.07.1941, the Führer had already proposed using the southern flank of Army Group Center for operations north of Kiev. Perhaps he thought it worthwhile to note the proposal that had arrived the day before from the headquarters of the Southerners: strike through Mozyr on Ovruch by the forces of the 35 corps of Army Group Center. 9 August von Runstedt again asked to attract neighbors to his aid.
Consequently, by 21 August Hitler had a firm conviction about how the campaign should develop in the East. First, it is possible to launch an attack on Moscow only after the defeat of the 5 Army, which, on the one hand, will ensure the security of the right flank of the troops aimed at the Soviet capital, on the other, will create favorable conditions for action in Ukraine on the von Runstedt group. Second: to achieve this goal successfully, it is necessary to attract the forces of the Army Group Center. Do not forget that for the Fuhrer the priority was the methodical destruction of enemy forces in the territory, regardless of geographic or political objectives. On July 13, he declared to the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Walter von Brauchitsch: "It is not so important to quickly advance to the East, like to destroy the enemy's living force."
Meanwhile, the general staff was almost unanimously inclined to reinforce Army Group Center and strike directly on a narrow front in the direction of Moscow. The Führer’s turn-south order caused the most displeasure among the key figure of the upcoming operation - 2 commander with Heinz Guderian’s tank group: “On August 23 I was summoned to the Army Group Центр Center’ for a meeting in which the chief of ground forces took part. He told us that Hitler decided to attack first not on Leningrad and not on Moscow, but on Ukraine and the Crimea ... We were all deeply convinced that Hitler’s planned attack on Kiev would inevitably lead to a winter campaign with all its difficulties ... " .
These lines, written after the war, clearly relate to the genre of generals memories "How Hitler prevented us from winning." “It is always easier to extol the virtues of some hypothetical alternative than to justify caution and disappointing reality. And in this case, moreover, it turned out that all people who opposed the offensive in the center have already died. Keitel, Jodl, Kluge, Hitler himself - they didn’t have time to write exculpatory memoirs, ”notes the British military historian Alan Clark not without sarcasm.
In fact, on the 20 of August 41, the question was not so categorical: either to Moscow or to Ukraine. The operation against the troops of Potapov was conceived by the Führer as auxiliary precisely in the framework of the Wehrmacht’s decisive attack on the capital of the USSR.
30 August in a conversation between Hitler and Halder noted that the troops of Army Group "Center" turned to Ukraine, not for the "war in the south", but in order to start as soon as possible "operations against the forces of Tymoshenko." The order from the Fuhrer of 21 of August notes that the defeat of the 5 Army should guarantee Army Group South “the possibility of creating a bridgehead on the east bank of the Dnieper in its middle course, in order to continue the offensive in the direction of Kharkov and Rostov”. As we can see, the immediate task looks quite modest, but the capture of Kiev, especially the rout of the South-Western Front, is not at all.
The German generals couldn’t have known for certain that the turn of Guderian to the south would lead to a winter campaign, as the “fast Heinz” states in their notes, as they couldn’t even know that the fragile building of the South-Western Front would collapse and bury under its rubble plans for a quick and smooth transition to an attack on Moscow. Because it is no longer Hitler's directives, but the rapid development of events - which are developing very favorably for the Germans - dictated the logic of actions to the German command.
September 1 from the headquarters of Army Group "South" comes the following report: "If the enemy in Eastern Ukraine is not destroyed, neither Army Group" South "nor Army Group" Center "will not be able to conduct an offensive without stopping ... Strike at Moscow the direction earlier than in Ukraine, it cannot be because the operation and actions of the southern wing of the Army Group “Center” started by Army Group “South” to support this operation went too far (highlighted by me. - MZ) to transfer the main efforts to another area ... ". The Germans have no other choice but to act according to the situation. The rapid advance of Guderian in the north and the occupation of the Derievsky bridgehead near Kremenchug on the southern flank of the South-Western Front prompted von Rundstedt on September 4, even without the consent of the high command, to order a decisive offensive.
According to Werner Gaupt, the battle for Kiev was the most important battle of the entire war: “Because of the events of the next two weeks, the decisive German offensive against Moscow was ignored. This probably changed the outcome of the Eastern campaign. ” But let us repeat: everything that happened is the result of a paradoxical situation, when the very real prospect of defeating a whole front made adjustments to the strategy and tactics of the enemy, and the catastrophe of the Soviet troops and the triumph of the Hitler armies in the Kiev cauldron took the whole month away from the start and the onset of cold weather.
The Chronicle of the Catastrophe
Unfortunately, the Germans made their task easier for the miscalculations of the South-Western Front command. Together with the 5 th army, the 27 th rifle corps also retreated over the Dnieper. Meanwhile, the corps not only did not obey Potapov, but also made a departure according to its own schedule. Easily predictable inconsistency led to the fact that on August XE, the Germans broke through the weak rear-guard veil at the junction of the army and corps, reached the Dnieper north of Kiev near Okuninovo, captured the bridge and occupied the bridgehead on the eastern shore. Parts of the 23 Army and 5 Army under the command of A.A. Vlasov unsuccessfully tried to eliminate the expanding Okuninovskaya grouping of the enemy.
29 August Potapov tried to launch a counterattack, this time unsuccessfully. Not surprising, because the 5-I army has ceased to be the formidable force that a month ago. Almost the third part (five divisions) was transferred to the 37 Army; The 135-th Infantry Division and the 5-I artillery anti-tank brigade joined the 40-th army. The 5 airborne corps, which entered the front reserve, was also withdrawn from the 1 Army. 9-th and 19-th mechanized corps because of the lack of tanks had to be reorganized into battalions. Due to heavy losses, rifle divisions had no more than 20 — 25% of personnel.
Only an immediate withdrawal of the 5 Army to the Desna River made it possible to avoid the danger of encirclement. With such a proposal, Potapov in the morning of August 30 applied to the Military Council of the South-West Federal Front, but it did not meet with due understanding.
On the same day, the 21-I Army of the Bryansk Front unexpectedly withdrew from their positions, and units of the Wehrmacht immediately rushed into a breakthrough on the approaches to Chernigov. September 1 The Germans occupied a bridgehead on the bank of the Desna in the near rear of the 5 Army. Abandoned to eliminate the breakthrough parts to succeed failed. Began counting the time remaining until the inevitable catastrophe.
In the evening of September 5, Potapov again addressed the HF to the front commander Kirponos with a proposal to withdraw his troops, but received a categorical refusal. It is noteworthy that it was on this day, according to Halder’s notes, that Hitler first spoke about the Kiev cauldron. Only 9 September The Stake authorized the withdrawal of the 5 Army to the Desna River. By this time, the main forces of Potapov were securely surrounded. From the entire army of 70, thousands of personnel remained less than 4 of thousands of fighters, as well as about 200 guns and mortars of different systems.
At the end of 14 September, Potapov and his headquarters once again attempted to stop the withdrawal of the remnants of the army, and to delay the advance of the superior enemy forces. However, it was not possible to gain a foothold on any of the subsequent frontiers, since the Germans, cramping from the front, simultaneously avoided both flank. In the morning of September 16, at the headquarters of the 5 Army, it became known that on the eve, in the rear of the front near Lokhvitsy (Poltava region), troops of the 2 Tank Group of Guderian, advancing from the north, had joined the troops of the 1 Tank Group of Kleist, who had broken through with south. The encirclement was already five Soviet armies. Kiev boiler became a reality. According to German data, more than 660 thousand of soldiers and officers of the Red Army were captured, 884 of the tank and more than 3 of thousand guns were captured.
September 21 combined detachment of the remnants of the front headquarters and the 5-th army gave the last battle to the enemy. Potapov was contused and lost consciousness. In the heat of battle, the general was mistaken for a slain and hastily “buried”, throwing the bodies of the dead.
Potapov's documents were handed over to Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko, the future marshal, and then to the commander of the 15 Infantry Corps of the 5 Army. "I literally sobbed when they handed me the documents of our commander. I did not know at all what would happen to us now, since Mikhail Ivanovich was killed."
The bitter fate of the commander
Three days later Potapov was discovered by the Germans. Began the test of captivity. In the fascist concentration camps, the paths of Mikhail Ivanovich intersected with generals M. Lukin and I. Muzychenko, senior lieutenant J. Dzhugashvili, defense leaders of the Brest fortress major P. Gavrilov and captain I. Zubachev. In the 1992 year, reports and transcripts of Potapov’s interrogations were made public, when asked whether “the Russian people are ready to wage war if the army retreats to the Urals,” answered: “Yes, he will remain in a state of moral defense, and the Red Army will continue to resist. " German investigators assessed the behavior of the General of the Red Army as follows: “he kept himself as a prisoner with dignity”, “on issues of strategic importance he referred to his ignorance”, “answered questions concerning his future with a restraint”. The Germans also described Potapov as a “Russian nationalist”, although it is difficult to say what they meant by this wording.
Potapov categorically refused to cooperate with traitors from the POA. At the same time, until the end of his life, Mikhail Ivanovich spoke respectfully of Vlasov himself, did not believe in the betrayal of his southern “neighbor” on the South-Western Front, believing that the Germans had somehow used the general for their own purposes against his will.
The victorious spring of 45, Mikhail Ivanovich, met Hammelburg in the “general's” camp. 22 April, American troops came close to them. The commandant of the camp went with the white flag to Patton's army. The Americans arrived at the camp and transported all the prisoners to themselves, then transported to the French, and already from Paris the recent prisoners of war returned home.
However, the homeland met them unkindly. Literally, from the ramp, Potapov and his comrades were sent to the “object” in the Moscow Region Golitsyno. Seven months passed special inspection, which left in the soul of Mikhail Ivanovich indelible marks.
Until the end of his life, Potapov, invariably balanced and witty, became gloomy and closed at the mention of the name of the former chief SMERSH Abakumov, whom he considered a rare villain.
Nevertheless, the results of the check, most likely, turned out to be objective, since Potapov was restored to the rank of Major General and returned to military service. Mikhail Ivanovich wrote a statement about the restoration of the party. And again Zhukov came to the rescue, who gave the following recommendation to his longtime comrade: “As for commanding qualities, Comrade Potapov was the best commander in chief, and the units and formations he commanded were always leading. In the border battle 5-I fought with exceptional tenacity and valor. Departing under the influence of superior enemy forces, she repeatedly counterattacked and defeated the Germans. Comrade Potapov army ruled brilliantly. I’ll also say that he was a big-hearted man who was loved by all his subordinates for his benevolence and understanding. ” It is difficult without excitement to read these lines from the official document, which came from the pen of a marshal far from the sentiments.
Obviously, the opinion of Zhukov was shared by many in the political and military leadership of the USSR. In any case, Mikhail Ivanovich turned out to be the only one of the highest Soviet officers who had been captured, who not only returned to the army, but did not make it enchanting, but, given the ups and downs of our post-war history, it was a worthy career. He served in Transbaikalia, in the Far East, death found Colonel-General Potapov in January 1965 as the first deputy commander of the Odessa military district.
The place of Mikhail Ivanovich Potapov in the peculiar hierarchy of the military leaders of the Great Patriotic War, built in the post-war period, clearly does not correspond to his military talent and contribution to the Victory.
But still it is impossible to say that the name of the commander of the 5 th army was hushed up. The commanding talent of the commander was praised in post-war memoirs by the Soviet marshals I.Kh. Bagramyan, I.I. Yakubovsky, and former opponents - Guderian, Keitel, Halder. It should be noted that the 5-I army became a real forge of personnel - from it came such recognized commanders as M.Ye. Katukov, K.S. Moskalenko, K.K. Rokossovsky, I.I. Fedyuninsky. All of them praised the merits of their former commander. During the life of Potapov in the USSR, A. Filippi's book “The Pripyat Problem” was published, in which the role of the 5 Army in blitzkrieg disruption was investigated.
And nevertheless, the name of Potapov over 70 years past after the victorious May of 45 did not become available to the general public. So, today, the memory of Mikhail Ivanovich is immortalized only in Ukraine, where streets in Kiev and Zhytomyr are named after him. How long? It seems that the anniversary of the Great Victory is a worthy excuse for Russians to note the merits of a remarkable commander and patriot of our Motherland.
Information