OUN in the service of Hitler
In recent years, a large amount of archival materials of the federal and departmental archives of the Russian Federation has been declassified. stories armed nationalist underground in Western Ukraine in the 40 – 50-s of the twentieth century. Some of them relate to the negotiations of the OUN (b) with the Nazis on the joint struggle against the Red Army - the most "uncomfortable" issue for modern propagandists of Ukrainian nationalism.SEARCHING FOR HOST
For many years, Galician historians have categorically stated: Bandera is not the servant of the devil, the leadership of the OUN (b), on principle, refused to sign a document on cooperation with the German leadership in the fight against the Soviet Union. Stepan Bandera “understood,” writes, for example, Yaroslav Svatko, “that the conclusion of such an agreement would have caused the Ukrainian liberation movement in the future.”
Stepan Bandera, according to the memoirs of Yaroslav Svatko, refused to sign such a document, since “only very narrow-minded people sign agreements with political bankruptcies”. Here we note that this happened when the outcome of the war was obvious to everyone, and the last German soldier had already left Ukraine. In the meantime, there were battles on its territory, at the level of individual commanders a large number of so-called local agreements were concluded. This is evidenced by a number of German documents. The order of SS Brenadenführer SS Brenner about negotiations with the leaders of the UPA from 12 in February 1944 of the year states: “Negotiations started in the Deragno area with the leaders of the national Ukrainian insurgent army were also successfully held in the Verba region. An agreement has been reached: the German units are not attacked by the UPA. The UPA sends scouts, mostly girls, to the areas occupied by the enemy and reports the results of the reconnaissance department of the battle group. Prisoners of the Red Army, as well as Soviet partisans, are being forwarded to the intelligence department for interrogation; local alien elements are used by the combat group at work. ”
Intelligence is not limited. In April, 1944, a meeting was held in Kamenka-Strumilov between the head of the unit, UPA "Orel" and representatives of the German administration. Among the proposals of the Ukrainian nationalists, the following deserves special attention: “Orel announced his agreement,” says the report on the negotiations, “at the direction of the German side to bar their territory in 20 km east against the invasion of the Soviet-Russian gangs or their parts or, for example, to protect the Lviv – Przemysl road from sabotage attacks. ”
There are many such “local” agreements, but they allowed solving only tactical tasks of individual groups, units and subunits. For strategic partnerships required instructions of the main wire OUN. The leader of the Abuit Squad-104 of 11 on April 1944 of the year reported: “The UPA has an order forbidding the fight against German soldiers or sabotage acts against their military installations and communications ... By order issued by 6 of April, all units (of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. - AK) it was again forbidden to enter into any special deals with the German services. The purpose of this ban was to persuade the German command to establish contact directly with the leadership of the UPA ... Although common points were established and the leaders were interested in improving the situation, they still did not decide on a large-scale connection, as there were opposing orders . They promised to issue captured Russian agents along with documents, maps and written material in exchange for UPA officers taken by the German side. ”
Both the Germans and the nationalists looked forward to decisions on strategic partnership. And the negotiations began. Information about them is contained in the reports on the negotiations of the heads of the security police and the SD of Galicia with the representative of the OUN (b) Father Ivan Grignoch (nickname - Gerasimovskiy). These documents disclose the goals and objectives pursued by the contracting parties.
PRIEST TALKER
The negotiations took place in several stages.
The first took place on 6 March 1944. Father Ivan Grignoh began the conversation with a statement that “he is entrusted with conducting negotiations on behalf of the central leadership of the OUN-Bandera group, under the authority of the political and military sectors of this organization, and territorially on behalf of all regions and parts of the country in which they lived and live Ukrainians. " In turn, the SS Hauptsturmführer, criminal commissar Pappa, warned Ivan Grignoh that he could conduct negotiations "not on a political basis", but only in the interests of the security police.
Agreeing with this, Ivan Grignoch suggested that “if today the German and Ukrainian sides began political negotiations, during which the Bandera group would receive some concessions from the Germans and would thereby be politically recognized, then Stalin would it is advantageous to name all Ukrainians and members of the OUN who are again under his violence, German allies or their agents and [he] would extract the right to physically destroy them. Proceeding from this, his organization also does not require the political basis of negotiations and rather wishes that all negotiations and meetings, as well as, possibly, the subsequent cooperation after that, be conducted strictly conspiratorially. ”
Ivan Grignoh promised that the OUN (b) respects loyalty to the German authorities, does not interfere with the maintenance of order, transportation, construction; puts at the disposal of the German command intelligence material collected against the Poles and the Bolsheviks; conducts punitive operations in a manner consistent with German interests; does not undertake any unauthorized and independent actions against the Poles.
The political weight of Ivan Grignoh does not allow to doubt that he conducted the negotiations not on his own initiative, but the leadership of the OUN (b) was aware of his actions. For negotiation, he was not chosen by chance. First, in the event of arrest for him as a priest, the head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Andrei Sheptytsky, would intercede. Secondly, Grignoch is a former military chaplain of the Nachtigall battalion, a confidant and representative of the interests of the tripartite bureau of the OUN (b) wire, that is, those who came to power as a result of the removal of Nikolai Lebed.
The second meeting took place on 24 March 1944. At the beginning of the conversation, Ivan Grignoch “stated that there was complete clarity in his organization regarding the issues discussed with me in the first conversation from March 6 of March 1944 and that the detailed points were acknowledged and accepted by the OUN”.
A representative of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists stated that his organization “undertakes to transfer to the security police all its intelligence information about the Bolsheviks, the Communists and the Polish insurgent movement. In addition, the OUN is ready to cooperate with the Germans against the common enemy (Bolshevism) in all areas that will be necessary to fight. Thus, the OUN will keep its combat units behind the line of the Soviet front, harm the Soviet supply and supply bases, weapons centers, warehouses, etc. by active sabotage and corrupting action on the Red Army, and above all by permanent terror, physically destroy the NKVD staff. In addition, it will transmit to the Germans in various ways (radio, couriers) messages of a military and political nature from the territory behind the line of the Soviet front. " In order for this work to be effective, Father Ivan Grignoch proposed that the Germans secretly deliver ammunition to the UPA, weapon and explosives.
The next stage of the negotiations took place on 29 March 1944. This time, the German side was represented by the commander of the security police and the SD of Galicia, Obersturmmbuführer SS and senior imperial adviser Dr. Josef Vitiska. During the conversation, he put forward a number of practical requirements: the OUN-UPA should have stopped the decomposition of the Ukrainian Volunteer SS Division "Galicia" and the negative impact on the Ukrainian police, it was also necessary not to carry out counter-propaganda if the German side carried out a new mobilization of the Ukrainian population.
AGREE ON ALL
For all the above points, the commander of the security police and SD in Galicia received a positive response from Griñoh. Politics is dirty business! The nationalists were ready for anything, even for the promotion of the slavery of Western Ukrainian peasants.
We note in particular the cynical judgment of the father Ivan Grignoh regarding the mobilization of the Ukrainian population. “In his opinion, the Ukrainian people still have so much manpower that the German occupation authorities will be able to mobilize for themselves and there will still be enough forces to recruit the OUN into the ranks of the UPA ...” The nationalists were allies of the Nazis. Allies, to the best of mentality, are not reliable, but Germany no longer had any others in 1944.
The German leadership evaluated the negotiations with the UPA, frankly, ambiguous. On the one hand, “despite the fact that Gerasimovsky, as a representative of the authoritative leadership of the OUN, the Bandera group constantly assured that the organization’s orders were immediately issued not to harm German interests, and not to decompose the Ukrainian police and the volunteer infantry SS-division“ Galicia ”, which were in German services, and also to limit the merciless Ukrainian terror over Polish women, children and localities, - the units of the UPA in Galicia did not prove that they received instructions from the central "Wire", which The impact of the negotiations between the H-referent and Gerasimovskiy and the agreements that took place would have been noticeable. ”
On the other hand, the leaders of the security police and the SD in Galicia did not interrupt the negotiations, based on the following considerations: “By negotiating, the OUN could be prevented from causing great damage to German supply and German interests. Pacifying the obstinate Ukrainian people at the present time, with a large lack of punitive forces, can only be beneficial ... Communication with leading persons of the OUN and the UPA will be extremely important and valuable to the security police, as it will provide intelligence material about our state enemies and facilitate the work security police. "
Facilitating the “works” of the Gestapo, Ivan Grignoch 3 of May 1944 reported on the implementation of the “request” made to him at a previous meeting. He “contacted the units of the UPA in the district of Galicia and learned that the UPA had captured 20 Soviet-Russian paratroopers thrown into the territory of Galicia alive in their hands. Among these agents are several women, the so-called radio operators. The OUN (Bandera group) is ready to hand me these 20 parachutist agents. In the future, it is possible that I (the representative of the Lviv Gestapo. - A.K.) will receive all the sabotage funds taken away from the agents and at least one radio station for use in the interests of the security police. ”
The “request” of the Gestapo could be perceived by the OUN (b) associates in an ambiguous way, it was too painful for the blatant aiding the invaders. Therefore, in a conversation, Ivan Grignoh emphasized, “that neither the parachutists themselves nor the UPA should know about this transfer of agents to the security police. He suggested that the UPA be instructed to transfer the agents at its disposal to another place. He promised to tell me the route of the movement so that I would set up an ambush on the way of the reliable movement of the security police, attack the UPA escorts and select the escorted paratroopers. In order to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, the leadership of the Bandera group of the OUN will order not to give UPA weapons to the escorts at all or to issue the minimum number. Gerasimovskiy will personally be nearby to smooth out and settle the incident, if necessary. ” In compensation for his services, Ivan Grinoh demanded that the security police pardon and release the sentenced to death for possession of weapons of nationalists.
Father Ivan Grinoh bargained with the Nazis. 21 April 1944, he “stated that the failure to fulfill certain expectations expressed by the OUN’s Bandera group during negotiations with the security police may prove extremely dangerous for him personally, as the person charged with maintaining contact with the security police, as he alone cover and without guarantees sets out and presents the requirements of the security police at the headquarters of the OUN. He personally, as, indeed, the entire organization, it is very important that such a cover was provided with the opportunity to present the position of Bandera on the issue of negotiations of the security police with the Bandera group of OUN. The organization firmly believes that Bandera will undoubtedly support and approve the current contacts in the interests of mutual cooperation in the fight against Bolshevism ... In this regard, he asks to petition the competent authorities, who must give permission to meet a representative of the Bandera OUN group, possibly Gerasimovsky himself , with Bandera.
NAZIS CREATED HOPE
The negotiations were closely watched by the interested special services. 19 April 1944 on the issue of contacts between the Wehrmacht and the Abwehr with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army held an informational meeting of the heads of the three counterintelligence departments of Army Group South. There were arguments for cooperation with Ukrainian nationalists. Colonel Lynhardt (Abverkommanda-101), for example, was convinced that “without intelligence contacts with the UPA, this team’s intelligence and counterintelligence activities are unthinkable”, since “military intelligence materials received from the UPA are extremely extensive (10 – 15 reports daily). Most of these materials are of military value and are used by troops. To this we can add that in some cases the units of the Ukrainian gangs were fighting along with the German Wehrmacht against the Red Army and the Bolshevik gangs. ”
Lieutenant Colonel Zeliger (Abverkommanda-202) was of the opinion that in modern conditions the sabotage tasks behind the front line can only be performed by UPA. “In the occupied Russian territories, only the UPA is the only hostile force. Its strengthening through the supply of weapons and training of certain personnel is also in the interests of the Wehrmacht. Communication with units operating behind the front line can only be established by units located in the territory occupied by German troops. He will be forced to recruit UPA militants in Galicia, and then, after their training and equipment, drop Russians into the rear of the aircraft, and larger groups will penetrate through gaps in the front lines. Consent of higher authorities in Berlin obtained. Communication has been maintained for a long time through one contact person with Shukhevych, several people have already been recruited for the upcoming training. Mr. Sh .’s proposal to equip all units of the UPA on the territory of the Galicia District and gradually transfer them through gaps in the front line was not accepted for security reasons. And yet, in the near future, with the consent of Berlin, he will concentrate the group with a number in 100 a man directly at the front line in the Delyatyn-Stanislav sector, arm him and transfer him over the front line with the help of the German units operating there.
Abwehr was convinced of the benefits of such contacts. In turn, the security police in this cooperation saw both negative aspects and advantages. The commander of the security police and SD in the district of Galicia, Obersturmbanführer Vitiska, wrote about this:
Not only men, but also women were happy to serve their new owners in the occupied part of Ukraine. 1941 Photo of the Year
“On the one hand, the Wehrmacht is interested in cooperation with the UPA. The arguments of Lieutenant Colonels L. and Z. (Linhardt and Seliger. - AK) are quite convincing. On the other hand, the UPA will take advantage of the freedom of movement gained and the unofficial recognition of the possibilities of strengthening its own ranks. The mobilization carried out in almost all districts has a negative effect on economic activities (the killing of Polish specialists, the mobilization of agricultural contingents, etc.).
The Volunteer SS regiment, construction organizations, as well as the Ukrainian auxiliary police, are mostly on the verge of decay. ”
At the same time, “it is striking that fact,” clarifies another Nazi document, “that a great change has taken place in the attitude of the Ukrainian population towards Reichsdoch. A few months ago, a categorical hostile attitude of the Ukrainians towards the Germans could be seen in the villages, now the German teams are welcomed even often by the German greeting. Whether this change needs to be explained by the fact that the Bolshevik danger is approaching, or by the fact that the Bandera group and the UPA have carried out propaganda work - this we still cannot say. ”
“It will be right,” concludes Obersturmbannführer Josef Vitiska, “if we continue the negotiations in order to deter acts of sabotage and sabotage on German communications by the UPA, in order to get intelligence from it and to prevent it from carrying out subversive work, as emphasized in during the negotiations, without giving any serious promises, such as, for example, equipping with weapons. ”
PRACTICAL RESULT
7 June 1944, the next meeting took place. The theologian, public and political figure Ivan Grignoch (the Ukrainian media outlets position him today) and the commander of the security police and SD in the district of Galicia Obershurtmbanführer SS Josef Vitiska discussed the use of saboteurs agents and radio saboteurs radio operators behind the line. front, as well as the abandonment of radio agents in case of a retreat of German troops from the territory of Galicia.
Ivan Grignoh used the meeting to “in the course of reporting on the activities of the UPA in the Soviet rear ... to indicate that the UPA is deprived of the ability to replenish weapons, ammunition and medical materials. That is why it has to spend these funds very economically and carefully, which, in turn, cannot but affect the activity and effectiveness of its actions. He argues that the interests of Germany will not suffer in any way, if the German side agrees to drop weapons, ammunition and medicines for the UPA units operating in the enemy’s rear. On the contrary, being better armed and equipped, the UPA-Ost will be able to more reliably defend the military interests of Germany. ”
Did the agreements have a practical implementation? Of course, yes! Details of the interaction of Ukrainian nationalists and the Nazis, we learn from the interrogation protocol of Siegfried Muller, an employee of the Abverkommand-202.
In the autumn of 1944, Lieutenant Siegfried Muller was seconded to the Abvercommand-202 (Krakow). Upon appointment, he was instructed. "The deputy head of the I-C section of the General Staff for Intelligence Affairs captain Damerau and captain Stolz informed me that in October 1944, the head of the Abnwe-202 command captain Kirn established contact with the southern headquarters of the UPA and is negotiating with the Ukrainian nationalists about bringing UPA insurgent units to conduct sabotage work in the rear of the Red Army ".
In Krakow Muller arrived 1 December 1944 of the year. “When meeting with captain Cyrne, the latter told me that in October 1944 of the year he had a meeting with the liaison of the southern headquarters of the UPA, with whom he crossed the front line at the Abweeter-206 section and negotiated with the southern headquarters of the UPA.
The command of the rebel detachments of the UPA gave Captain Kearn a principled agreement to carry out subversive work in the rear of the Red Army together with German intelligence ... Regarding the practical work of organizing sabotage in the rear of the Red Army, the Ukrainian nationalists set the following conditions: German intelligence agencies must create German-occupied territory sabotage schools for Ukrainian nationalists and conduct training for the nationalist radio communications and military training of the UPA ... With appropriate authority I am the headquarters of the German army, Kirn accepted the conditions of the Ukrainian nationalists and, for his part, put the conditions of the German command before the UPA. They boiled down to the following: the southern headquarters of the UPA placed at the disposal of the Abnwe-202 such a number of saboteurs, as the command of the Abwerers-202 considers necessary. Abverkommanda-202 reserves the right to recruit subversive groups of these persons, determines the place and objects for sabotage.
In addition, the headquarters of the UPA should provide Abverkommand-202 with all the spy information they have about the Red Army, as well as information about the general activities of Ukrainian nationalists in the rear of the Red Army, in the area of the southern group of troops of the German army, that is, from Warsaw to the Romanian border .
The southern headquarters of the UPA agreed with these conditions, and it was decided to exchange liaison officers between the Abvercom-202 and the southern headquarters of the UPA. The post of liaison officer from the Abvercom-202 Kirn offered me to take (Siegfried Muller. - AK). ”
To communicate with the Abverkommanda-202, Ukrainian nationalists sent Professor Danilov to Krakow (nickname is Orlov). Danilov participated in the recruitment, training and recruitment of sabotage groups exclusively from the Ukrainian nationalists and their transfer to the rear of the Red Army to commit sabotage. He did this regularly until April 1945.
The “human material” was selected by the specialists of the Abbrocket-206 (a structural unit of the Abvercommand-202. - AK) directly behind the front line in the UPA detachments in the Carpathian Mountains. From Bandera Nazis scooped sabotage agents, trained her in short-term courses, and then threw in the rear of the Red Army. In recent months, before the capitulation of Germany, 45 saboteurs from among Ukrainian nationalists were trained in the Moltke commando school. 25 people from them were sent by the UPA headquarters from the territory of Ukraine.
Here we go back to the beginning of the article and once again recall a quote from Stepan Bandera’s memoirs, according to which “only very narrow-minded people sign agreements with political bankruptcies”. The truth of the memories of the leader of the nationalists today is not possible to establish. One thing is obvious - in the conditions of the end of the war written agreements, all the more entailing easily predictable negative political consequences, it was pointless and even dangerous to conclude. Practical help to an ally is another matter.
From the interrogation protocol of the same lieutenant Muller, we learn that after the liberation of Stepan Bandera in December 1944, "arrived at the disposal of the Abnwe-202 in Krakow and personally instructed Danilov, as well as our agent, sent to us for communication to the UPA headquarters."
On the occasion of the arrival of Bandera in Abverkommandu-202, Captain Kirn gave a banquet. Bandera, Captain Kirn and Professor Danilov spoke on it. “There I met Bandera, and then a few days later I met him on business grounds,” Muller recalled. - 27 December 1944, I prepared a group of saboteurs to transfer it to the rear of the Red Army with a special task. This group consisted of three Ukrainian nationalists — Lopatinsky, Demed, and one radio operator, whose name I do not remember. Stepan Bandera, in my presence, personally instructed these agents and transmitted through them to the UPA headquarters an order to step up the subversive work in the rear of the Red Army and establish a regular radio contact with the Abvercom-202.
Lopatinsky's group was transferred to the rear of the Red Army from the Krakow airfield to the Lviv region and had with her to transfer to the command of the UPA 1 million rubles, medicines, explosives and a walkie-talkie.
During the interrogation, Lieutenant Muller pointed out three more groups that he had abandoned in the Soviet rear. The first, “Paul-2”, in the amount of eight people, was deployed on 7 on April 1945 in the region of Sarny with the task of reestablishing communication with the headquarters of the Volyn group of UPA and deploying sabotage work on the railway line in the area of Sarny. The second group, “Paul-3”, also consisted of eight people and was transferred to 13 on April 1945 in the Vladimir-Volynsk region. All members of the group are natives of Volyn villages. The third sabotage group - “Paul-1” - paraded 20 on April 1945 in the area of Kovel, in the amount of nine people. All participants are natives of the Kovel district.
Who did they have to fight with? For whose interests they poured their own and someone else's blood? The answer is obvious: the sabotage work carried out by Ukrainian nationalists in the rear of the Red Army was carried out in the interests of German intelligence and was personally sanctioned by Stepan Bandera. The absence of an agreement on "strategic partnership", signed personally by the Ukrainian nationalist number 1, did not prevent this. So it turns out that Bandera-the servants of the devil!
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