“Of course, it’s not good to oppose old friends, but in politics you cannot do otherwise, and our natural opponent in the east is Russia”
The hostile attitude of the Austrian Empire was one of the main foreign policy factors that led Russia to defeat in the Eastern (Crimean) War. Although in the prewar period in St. Petersburg, Vienna was considered one of the main allies in Western Europe and counted on its friendly neutrality. In 1849, Russia saved the Habsburg dynasty with its military intervention when Hungary rebelled. However, during the Eastern War, the Vienna Court supported England and France, forcing Russia to keep a large army on the western frontiers (practically the main forces) that could not take part in the hostilities in the Crimea.
In 1853, the center of gravity of Vienna’s foreign policy shifted from Germany, where Austria fought with Prussia for influence on the German states, to the east. After the sudden death of Schwarzenberg, foreign policy of Austria was led by the new Minister-President Karl Ferdinand von Buol-Schauenstein. The Russian Empire occupied the Danube principalities (Moldova and Wallachia) and began military operations against Turkey, preparing for a campaign through Bulgaria. The Russian fleet under the command of Admiral Nakhimov destroyed the Turkish squadron in Sinop, ensuring dominance in the Black Sea. Russian troops successfully fought in the Caucasus. As a result, the Ottoman Empire was on the verge of military defeat, and Russia was great to the greatest triumph. Attractive prospects for the status of the Straits, Constantinople and the Balkans opened up. Russia could seriously strengthen its strategic position on the Balkan Peninsula, in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East. This did not suit not only England and France, which entered into an open war with Russia, but also Austria. The Austrians were afraid to become dependent on Russia if the Russians controlled the mouth of the Danube and established pro-Russian regimes in the Balkans, as well as received the Bosporus and Dardanelles.
Meanwhile, the Russian emperor Nicholas I, brought up on knightly notions and being noble, believed that other monarchs should follow a certain code of honor. He hoped that in the beginning of the Eastern war, in which England and France opposed Russia on the side of Turkey, Austria would remain neutral and support Petersburg in the diplomatic field. According to the tsar, the assistance provided to the Habsburg in suppressing the revolution in Hungary should catch the Austrians forever thanking Russia. However, the young Austrian emperor Franz Joseph I believed otherwise. “Our future is in the east,” he wrote, “and we will pound the power and influence of Russia into the limits for which it went out only because of weakness and disorder in our camp. Slowly, preferably imperceptibly for Tsar Nicholas, but surely we will bring Russian politics to ruin. Of course, it is not good to oppose old friends, but in politics it is impossible to do otherwise, and our natural enemy in the east is Russia. ” The Austrian emperor turned out to be a good student of Schwarzenberg and other Austrian politicians, who believed that union obligations and traditions meant nothing, political expediency — everything.
Emperor Franz Joseph I
In January, 1854, when there was almost no doubt that the matter was leading to a diplomatic break and possibly a war with England and France, Nikolay wanted to clarify the position of Austria. The “treason” of Austria could lead to a catastrophe. A fresh and well-armed Austrian army could bring down the right flank of the Russian troops during their possible future movement from the Danube to the Balkans. In order to try to achieve neutrality in Austria or to ascertain the danger threatening from its side, Count Alexei Orlov was sent to Vienna.
In Austria during this period there was a struggle between two groups. The “Russian Party” had rather strong positions, relying on the highest aristocracy, the generals and part of the highest bureaucracy. Nicholas saved the Habsburg dynasty not only from the Hungarian uprising, but also from the "damned democrats" (as the constitutionalists were called in Vienna), the king was the unshakable stronghold of the conservative forces of Europe. Therefore, many aristocrats and the military believed that one should not quarrel with Russia because of some Turkish Danube principalities, break the old friendship that brought Austria a lot of benefits.
However, the “anti-Russian party” also had strong positions since the times of Austrian Foreign Minister Klemens von Metternich, who led Vienna’s foreign policy for a very long time (1809-1848). Metternich and during the Eastern War in every way he tried to harm Russia. The leaders of the “anti-Russian party” relied on the long-standing fear of turning Austria into a vassal of the great Russian Empire. The consolidation of Russian positions, first on the Danube and then on the Balkans, led to Austria becoming an “island” in the middle of the Russian-Slavic sea. Metternich did everything he could to hinder Russian advance in the Balkans.
During the revolution and uprising in Hungary, the problem of the “Russian threat” went into the shadows. Russia saved Austria. However, when the Eastern War began, sympathy for Russia was forgotten. The retired old Metternich resolutely expressed to everyone who had listened to his opinions that Vienna should oppose Nikolay and secure the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Danube. To fight - so to fight, if necessary, and best of all, if we could remove the Russian army from there by diplomatic maneuvers. Get out maneuvers, as Metternich said. The “anti-Russian party” included higher financial “aces”, large industrialists who wanted to cash in on the war, as well as liberals, Jesuits and clerics who hated the Russian “conservative obscurantists” and “heretics”.
In addition, in Vienna they were afraid of France. The Vienna court feared that France and England would take possession of her in Italy because of the pro-Russian positions of Austria. Indeed, Sardinia, for taking part in the war with Russia, promised to give Venice and Lombardy, which belonged to Austria (albeit, they did not fulfill their promises after the war).
Therefore, Orlov's suggestions were listened to, but more than that. Orlov invited Austria to declare friendly neutrality in the war between Russia and Turkey, and in a possible war between Russia and the Western powers. As a reward Petersburg promised to give a guarantee of the complete inviolability of the Austrian possessions and to induce Prussia and the entire German Union to join this commitment. In the event of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Russia and Austria were to jointly establish a protectorate over Serbia, Bulgaria, Moldavia and Wallachia. Orlova was received in Vienna with great honor. However, Franz Joseph I and Buol did not give any guarantees to Russia. It became obvious that Austria could easily be in the camp of the enemies of Russia. Immediately after the Orlov mission, Vienna concentrated 30-thousand in Transylvania. grouping of troops, which quickly increased to 50 thousand soldiers. In addition, Vienna began to threaten the Serbs with military intervention if they oppose Turkey.
After it became clear that Britain and France would oppose Russia, Austria became even more bold. Vienna newspapers were allowed to write about Russia, almost without embarrassment. Buol began to say that Austria is better to negotiate with France than with Russia. They began to accuse Russia of having departed from a conservative policy, as Nicholas plans to destroy one of the European powers, Turkey, and even instigates a rebellion among the Christian subjects of the Sultan.
In the spring of 1854, relations between Russia and Austria became even more aggravated. The transition by the Russian troops of the Danube and the siege of Silistra (Danube Campaign of the Eastern War; Part of 2; Part of 3; Part 4) caused a great anxiety and irritation in Vienna. The “observation corps”, which Austria first defined in 25 thousand people, then in 50 thousand, has grown to 150 thousand bayonets and sabers. A huge army was on the border of the Danube principalities, ready to intervene in the war and not on the side of Russia. England and France increased pressure on Austria. The Austrian press took a frankly anti-Russian stance, fanning Russian failures and problems.
8 (20) April 1854 was signed in Berlin defensive and offensive military alliance between the Austrian Empire and Prussia. Troops were sent to Galicia and Bukovina. Published an order of the emperor to mobilize 95 thousand people and the direction of their northeastern and southeastern borders of the Austrian Empire. Vienna concluded two conventions with Istanbul: according to the first, the Austrians received the right to temporarily occupy Albania, Montenegro and Bosnia; according to the second, Port invited Austria to occupy the Danube principalities. The worst fears of Paskevich and other most far-sighted dignitaries of Russia, who did not trust Austria, began to come true. Austria has spread to a hostile camp, although it has not entered the war. It was a difficult diplomatic defeat for Russia. The entire long-term policy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Karl Nesselrode, aimed at rapprochement with Austria and Prussia, maintaining good relations with England, has collapsed.
Russia found itself in diplomatic isolation. Its military strategic position has been greatly shaken. In the case of the movement of Russian troops through the Balkans and the refusal to withdraw the army from the Danube principalities of Russia, it was threatened by war with Austria, and possibly with the German alliance, led by Prussia. The military-political pressure of Austria almost completely constrained the strategic initiative of the Russian command in the Danube campaign, the Russian troops acted extremely cautiously and sluggishly.
In June, 1854 Austria presented Russia with an ultimatum in which it demanded the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from the Danube principalities. Petersburg reluctantly agreed. The siege of Silistra was lifted, and the Russian troops were taken beyond the Danube. The war lost its offensive character, Russia turned to defense (only on the Caucasian front did the Russians continue their offensive actions). According to a special Austro-Turkish treaty, Austrian troops immediately occupied the territory of the Danube principalities that had been evacuated by the Russians. Nicholas I stated with bitterness to the Austrian ambassador that the greatest fools in stories were the Polish king Jan Sobessky (saved Vienna from the Turks) and himself, since both had the misfortune to save the Habsburg dynasty. In anger, the emperor turned the portrait of Franz Joseph in his office facing the wall and wrote on the back: "Ungrateful."
Thus, Nikolai’s hopes for Austria did not justify themselves. All doubts of St. Petersburg were dispelled, another threat arose in front of Russia - the Austrian one. This immediately had a serious impact on the military-strategic situation. Russian troops on the Danube were first forced to act extremely cautiously, to abandon the campaign against the Balkans, and then to leave the Danube principalities. However, the matter did not end there; Russia had to hold a large Southern Army throughout the war, and the main forces in the western direction, fearing the strike by Austria, and possibly other German states.
Minister-President of the Austrian Empire in 1852 - 1859 Karl Ferdinand von Boole-Schauenstein
In July, the 1854 of Vienna agreed with the French peace plan: 1) Russia should have renounced its rights to Moldova and Wallachia, the Russian protectorate over the principalities was replaced by a general protectorate of all the great powers; 2) declared freedom of navigation on the Danube, that is, Russia was denied access to the mouths of the great European river; 3) Russia should have renounced its claims to the patronage of Orthodox subjects of the Sultan; 4) the status of the straits was revised not in favor of Russia.
I must say that Berlin immediately refused to union with Vienna, having made another sharp turn in foreign policy. The Prussian king Friedrich-Wilhelm IV was afraid of over-gaining Austria if she acquired the Danube principalities, and of bringing Austria closer to France. In addition, the Prussian king was afraid to tease the “Russian bear” unnecessarily, knowing that Nicholas, if he so wished, could declare war on Prussia and Austria without removing the troops from the Crimea, while the best Russian troops were in the western direction. All this forced Berlin to rush during the war between the two opposing sides. As Bismarck rightly pointed out, the Prussian king reminded him of a “poodle who lost its master.” The position of Prussia was supported by the majority of the states of the German Union, which occupied anti-British positions. At a conference in the city of Bamberg, the states of the German Union (Bavaria, Saxony, Württemberg, and others) spoke out against the war with Russia.
This forced Vienna to somewhat reduce the pressure on Petersburg. A significant part of the Austrian elite still did not want to fight with Russia, fearing internal complications. The generals were unhappy and did not want a war with Russia. The financial situation of the Austrian Empire was extremely unstable in order to get involved in a war. Almost all revenues were consumed by the army mobilized for the war. The financial crisis and the possibility of a new uprising frightened Vienna. In addition, the Austrians feared that a formidable neighbor would take revenge for treason if possible. Franz Joseph I very tenderly accepted the new Russian ambassador to Vienna, Alexander Gorchakov, who was a skilled diplomat and fought for the break of Austria with the anti-Russian coalition.
The unfavorable situation on the fronts forced England and France to increase pressure on Austria. It was not possible to take Sevastopol on the move, as well as to defeat the Russian army in the Crimea. Russian resistance near Sevastopol did not weaken at all. The Russians constantly staged sorties, but the allies could not block Sevastopol tightly. The Allied fleet could not succeed in the Baltic. The news came of the complete failure of the Allied operation fleet near Petropavlovsk-on-Kamchatka (The heroic defense of Petropavlovsk; Part 2). News from the Pacific Ocean was late and very embarrassed by public opinion in England and France. The unheard of 14 storm of November off the coast of Crimea brought such losses to the allied fleet and transports with supplies, which was almost equal to the lost naval battle. In addition, the allied army, wintering in the Crimea, faced great difficulties, and the troops suffered severely from cold, rain and snow. Winter in Crimea was unusually harsh. Epidemics continued.
A close and easy victory was not expected. The war became protracted and could lead the Allied army in the Crimea to a catastrophe if the Russian forces were led by a more decisive commander than the passive Menshikov. It should be noted that the holders of French and English stock exchange securities quite quickly sensed the precariousness of the Allied position. From November 1854, a long and consistent fall in French securities on the Paris Stock Exchange began.
Everything forced the Allies to increase the pressure on the Vienna Court, which was threatened and then made vague promises. The accession of Austria, and behind it possibly the German Union to the anti-Russian coalition, should have forced Petersburg to capitulate. Buol advocated an alliance with the Western powers. He wanted to get Moldavia and Wallachia. Their capture expanded the empire, gave new sources of raw materials. Austria strengthened strategically, receiving the line on the Danube and closing the path of the Russians to the Balkans. Buol believed that the Allied victory was predetermined, and Austria should take the final step in order to get its piece of "bear skin". However, other Austrian dignitaries were more careful.
Up until December 1854, Vienna was hesitating. The transfer of Anglo-French troops from Bulgaria to the Crimea only increased Austria’s doubts. The Austrian troops, already included in the principality, were face to face with the Russian army, which stood at the Prut River. This neighborhood, which prompted a one-on-one battle, did not please Franz Joseph I. True, the Austrians could be supported by the Turkish troops of the Omer Pasha. However, the Austrian generals expressed doubts about the combat capability of the Ottomans. The Turks at best could keep in the fortresses. Therefore, the Austrians by all means tried again to persuade Berlin to an alliance.
Exaggerations of the failures of the Russian troops in the Crimea encouraged the "anti-Russian party" in Austria. Buol believed that it was necessary to immediately intervene in the war in order for the temporary occupation to become the political annexation of Moldavia and Wallachia to the Hapsburg empire after the end of the war. Buol stubbornly pushed Franz Joseph to speak out against Russia. But the head of the Imperial Headquarters, the commander of the group in Galicia and Transylvania, Field Marshal Heinrich von Hess and much of the generals were strongly opposed to the war with Russia. Austrian generals did not want to fight, not only because of respect for Nicholas, but also a better understanding of the situation in the army. The army was not ready for war, the generals were simply afraid of Russia. The finances of the empire also did not allow the start of war.
The Allies increased the pressure on Austria. The threats of France have reached an extreme degree. The French emperor Napoleon III actually gave an ultimatum: “Immediate signing of a treaty or a break.” In the event of a rupture, the French promised increased agitation, the revolutionary movement in Italy supported by significant cash injections and even immediately sent troops of Piedmont (Sardinia) to Lombardy and Venice and supported the seizure.
2 (14) December Austria announced an alliance with Britain and France. The essence of the agreement was as follows: 1) Austria, France, England pledged to jointly protect the Danube principalities; 2) the three powers pledged to negotiate with Russia only on the basis of four points in advance by the Russian government; 3) if the negotiations did not lead to peace, the three powers were to develop a plan of general measures aimed at achieving the goals set.
28 December 1854 (January 9 1855) opened the conference of the ambassadors of England, France, Austria and Russia, but the negotiations did not lead to success and were interrupted in April. In December, 1855 Austria presented Russia with an ultimatum, in which there were additions in the form of forbidding Russia and the Ottoman Empire to keep a military fleet on the Black Sea and have arsenals and fortifications on the shores of this sea, and Russia’s concessions to Moldova on the Danube section of Bessarabia . The Prussian king called on Emperor Alexander II to accept the terms of the ultimatum. After the death of Nicholas, the will to resist in Russian society weakened. Therefore, Alexander in January 1856 took an ultimatum. The Paris Congress brought peace back to Europe.
The Paris world gave almost nothing to Austria. Russia's positions were briefly weakened in the Balkans, and that was all. Vienna did not receive significant benefits from its diplomatic frills. Britain and France were unhappy; they believed that Russia could have been decisively defeated if Austria had entered the war from the very beginning. But in St. Petersburg now Austria was considered the main enemy in south-eastern Europe. In Russia, they attributed their defeat to the Austrian treachery. The Russians did their best to inflict maximum damage on Austrian interests. Although for tactical reasons, from time to time Petersburg and Vienna have repeatedly concluded agreements. As a result, the reckless decision of Franz Joseph I in 1854 gnomes him in 60 years (Franz reigned 68 for years and did not live a little until the fall of the Habsburg Empire). The road to the fateful 1914 confrontation for Austria-Hungary began in the days of the Eastern War. The strategic fallacy of the course of Franz Joseph and Buol led the Austrian Empire to ruin.
In 1853, the center of gravity of Vienna’s foreign policy shifted from Germany, where Austria fought with Prussia for influence on the German states, to the east. After the sudden death of Schwarzenberg, foreign policy of Austria was led by the new Minister-President Karl Ferdinand von Buol-Schauenstein. The Russian Empire occupied the Danube principalities (Moldova and Wallachia) and began military operations against Turkey, preparing for a campaign through Bulgaria. The Russian fleet under the command of Admiral Nakhimov destroyed the Turkish squadron in Sinop, ensuring dominance in the Black Sea. Russian troops successfully fought in the Caucasus. As a result, the Ottoman Empire was on the verge of military defeat, and Russia was great to the greatest triumph. Attractive prospects for the status of the Straits, Constantinople and the Balkans opened up. Russia could seriously strengthen its strategic position on the Balkan Peninsula, in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East. This did not suit not only England and France, which entered into an open war with Russia, but also Austria. The Austrians were afraid to become dependent on Russia if the Russians controlled the mouth of the Danube and established pro-Russian regimes in the Balkans, as well as received the Bosporus and Dardanelles.
Meanwhile, the Russian emperor Nicholas I, brought up on knightly notions and being noble, believed that other monarchs should follow a certain code of honor. He hoped that in the beginning of the Eastern war, in which England and France opposed Russia on the side of Turkey, Austria would remain neutral and support Petersburg in the diplomatic field. According to the tsar, the assistance provided to the Habsburg in suppressing the revolution in Hungary should catch the Austrians forever thanking Russia. However, the young Austrian emperor Franz Joseph I believed otherwise. “Our future is in the east,” he wrote, “and we will pound the power and influence of Russia into the limits for which it went out only because of weakness and disorder in our camp. Slowly, preferably imperceptibly for Tsar Nicholas, but surely we will bring Russian politics to ruin. Of course, it is not good to oppose old friends, but in politics it is impossible to do otherwise, and our natural enemy in the east is Russia. ” The Austrian emperor turned out to be a good student of Schwarzenberg and other Austrian politicians, who believed that union obligations and traditions meant nothing, political expediency — everything.
Emperor Franz Joseph I
In January, 1854, when there was almost no doubt that the matter was leading to a diplomatic break and possibly a war with England and France, Nikolay wanted to clarify the position of Austria. The “treason” of Austria could lead to a catastrophe. A fresh and well-armed Austrian army could bring down the right flank of the Russian troops during their possible future movement from the Danube to the Balkans. In order to try to achieve neutrality in Austria or to ascertain the danger threatening from its side, Count Alexei Orlov was sent to Vienna.
In Austria during this period there was a struggle between two groups. The “Russian Party” had rather strong positions, relying on the highest aristocracy, the generals and part of the highest bureaucracy. Nicholas saved the Habsburg dynasty not only from the Hungarian uprising, but also from the "damned democrats" (as the constitutionalists were called in Vienna), the king was the unshakable stronghold of the conservative forces of Europe. Therefore, many aristocrats and the military believed that one should not quarrel with Russia because of some Turkish Danube principalities, break the old friendship that brought Austria a lot of benefits.
However, the “anti-Russian party” also had strong positions since the times of Austrian Foreign Minister Klemens von Metternich, who led Vienna’s foreign policy for a very long time (1809-1848). Metternich and during the Eastern War in every way he tried to harm Russia. The leaders of the “anti-Russian party” relied on the long-standing fear of turning Austria into a vassal of the great Russian Empire. The consolidation of Russian positions, first on the Danube and then on the Balkans, led to Austria becoming an “island” in the middle of the Russian-Slavic sea. Metternich did everything he could to hinder Russian advance in the Balkans.
During the revolution and uprising in Hungary, the problem of the “Russian threat” went into the shadows. Russia saved Austria. However, when the Eastern War began, sympathy for Russia was forgotten. The retired old Metternich resolutely expressed to everyone who had listened to his opinions that Vienna should oppose Nikolay and secure the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Danube. To fight - so to fight, if necessary, and best of all, if we could remove the Russian army from there by diplomatic maneuvers. Get out maneuvers, as Metternich said. The “anti-Russian party” included higher financial “aces”, large industrialists who wanted to cash in on the war, as well as liberals, Jesuits and clerics who hated the Russian “conservative obscurantists” and “heretics”.
In addition, in Vienna they were afraid of France. The Vienna court feared that France and England would take possession of her in Italy because of the pro-Russian positions of Austria. Indeed, Sardinia, for taking part in the war with Russia, promised to give Venice and Lombardy, which belonged to Austria (albeit, they did not fulfill their promises after the war).
Therefore, Orlov's suggestions were listened to, but more than that. Orlov invited Austria to declare friendly neutrality in the war between Russia and Turkey, and in a possible war between Russia and the Western powers. As a reward Petersburg promised to give a guarantee of the complete inviolability of the Austrian possessions and to induce Prussia and the entire German Union to join this commitment. In the event of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Russia and Austria were to jointly establish a protectorate over Serbia, Bulgaria, Moldavia and Wallachia. Orlova was received in Vienna with great honor. However, Franz Joseph I and Buol did not give any guarantees to Russia. It became obvious that Austria could easily be in the camp of the enemies of Russia. Immediately after the Orlov mission, Vienna concentrated 30-thousand in Transylvania. grouping of troops, which quickly increased to 50 thousand soldiers. In addition, Vienna began to threaten the Serbs with military intervention if they oppose Turkey.
After it became clear that Britain and France would oppose Russia, Austria became even more bold. Vienna newspapers were allowed to write about Russia, almost without embarrassment. Buol began to say that Austria is better to negotiate with France than with Russia. They began to accuse Russia of having departed from a conservative policy, as Nicholas plans to destroy one of the European powers, Turkey, and even instigates a rebellion among the Christian subjects of the Sultan.
In the spring of 1854, relations between Russia and Austria became even more aggravated. The transition by the Russian troops of the Danube and the siege of Silistra (Danube Campaign of the Eastern War; Part of 2; Part of 3; Part 4) caused a great anxiety and irritation in Vienna. The “observation corps”, which Austria first defined in 25 thousand people, then in 50 thousand, has grown to 150 thousand bayonets and sabers. A huge army was on the border of the Danube principalities, ready to intervene in the war and not on the side of Russia. England and France increased pressure on Austria. The Austrian press took a frankly anti-Russian stance, fanning Russian failures and problems.
8 (20) April 1854 was signed in Berlin defensive and offensive military alliance between the Austrian Empire and Prussia. Troops were sent to Galicia and Bukovina. Published an order of the emperor to mobilize 95 thousand people and the direction of their northeastern and southeastern borders of the Austrian Empire. Vienna concluded two conventions with Istanbul: according to the first, the Austrians received the right to temporarily occupy Albania, Montenegro and Bosnia; according to the second, Port invited Austria to occupy the Danube principalities. The worst fears of Paskevich and other most far-sighted dignitaries of Russia, who did not trust Austria, began to come true. Austria has spread to a hostile camp, although it has not entered the war. It was a difficult diplomatic defeat for Russia. The entire long-term policy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Karl Nesselrode, aimed at rapprochement with Austria and Prussia, maintaining good relations with England, has collapsed.
Russia found itself in diplomatic isolation. Its military strategic position has been greatly shaken. In the case of the movement of Russian troops through the Balkans and the refusal to withdraw the army from the Danube principalities of Russia, it was threatened by war with Austria, and possibly with the German alliance, led by Prussia. The military-political pressure of Austria almost completely constrained the strategic initiative of the Russian command in the Danube campaign, the Russian troops acted extremely cautiously and sluggishly.
In June, 1854 Austria presented Russia with an ultimatum in which it demanded the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from the Danube principalities. Petersburg reluctantly agreed. The siege of Silistra was lifted, and the Russian troops were taken beyond the Danube. The war lost its offensive character, Russia turned to defense (only on the Caucasian front did the Russians continue their offensive actions). According to a special Austro-Turkish treaty, Austrian troops immediately occupied the territory of the Danube principalities that had been evacuated by the Russians. Nicholas I stated with bitterness to the Austrian ambassador that the greatest fools in stories were the Polish king Jan Sobessky (saved Vienna from the Turks) and himself, since both had the misfortune to save the Habsburg dynasty. In anger, the emperor turned the portrait of Franz Joseph in his office facing the wall and wrote on the back: "Ungrateful."
Thus, Nikolai’s hopes for Austria did not justify themselves. All doubts of St. Petersburg were dispelled, another threat arose in front of Russia - the Austrian one. This immediately had a serious impact on the military-strategic situation. Russian troops on the Danube were first forced to act extremely cautiously, to abandon the campaign against the Balkans, and then to leave the Danube principalities. However, the matter did not end there; Russia had to hold a large Southern Army throughout the war, and the main forces in the western direction, fearing the strike by Austria, and possibly other German states.
Minister-President of the Austrian Empire in 1852 - 1859 Karl Ferdinand von Boole-Schauenstein
In July, the 1854 of Vienna agreed with the French peace plan: 1) Russia should have renounced its rights to Moldova and Wallachia, the Russian protectorate over the principalities was replaced by a general protectorate of all the great powers; 2) declared freedom of navigation on the Danube, that is, Russia was denied access to the mouths of the great European river; 3) Russia should have renounced its claims to the patronage of Orthodox subjects of the Sultan; 4) the status of the straits was revised not in favor of Russia.
I must say that Berlin immediately refused to union with Vienna, having made another sharp turn in foreign policy. The Prussian king Friedrich-Wilhelm IV was afraid of over-gaining Austria if she acquired the Danube principalities, and of bringing Austria closer to France. In addition, the Prussian king was afraid to tease the “Russian bear” unnecessarily, knowing that Nicholas, if he so wished, could declare war on Prussia and Austria without removing the troops from the Crimea, while the best Russian troops were in the western direction. All this forced Berlin to rush during the war between the two opposing sides. As Bismarck rightly pointed out, the Prussian king reminded him of a “poodle who lost its master.” The position of Prussia was supported by the majority of the states of the German Union, which occupied anti-British positions. At a conference in the city of Bamberg, the states of the German Union (Bavaria, Saxony, Württemberg, and others) spoke out against the war with Russia.
This forced Vienna to somewhat reduce the pressure on Petersburg. A significant part of the Austrian elite still did not want to fight with Russia, fearing internal complications. The generals were unhappy and did not want a war with Russia. The financial situation of the Austrian Empire was extremely unstable in order to get involved in a war. Almost all revenues were consumed by the army mobilized for the war. The financial crisis and the possibility of a new uprising frightened Vienna. In addition, the Austrians feared that a formidable neighbor would take revenge for treason if possible. Franz Joseph I very tenderly accepted the new Russian ambassador to Vienna, Alexander Gorchakov, who was a skilled diplomat and fought for the break of Austria with the anti-Russian coalition.
The unfavorable situation on the fronts forced England and France to increase pressure on Austria. It was not possible to take Sevastopol on the move, as well as to defeat the Russian army in the Crimea. Russian resistance near Sevastopol did not weaken at all. The Russians constantly staged sorties, but the allies could not block Sevastopol tightly. The Allied fleet could not succeed in the Baltic. The news came of the complete failure of the Allied operation fleet near Petropavlovsk-on-Kamchatka (The heroic defense of Petropavlovsk; Part 2). News from the Pacific Ocean was late and very embarrassed by public opinion in England and France. The unheard of 14 storm of November off the coast of Crimea brought such losses to the allied fleet and transports with supplies, which was almost equal to the lost naval battle. In addition, the allied army, wintering in the Crimea, faced great difficulties, and the troops suffered severely from cold, rain and snow. Winter in Crimea was unusually harsh. Epidemics continued.
A close and easy victory was not expected. The war became protracted and could lead the Allied army in the Crimea to a catastrophe if the Russian forces were led by a more decisive commander than the passive Menshikov. It should be noted that the holders of French and English stock exchange securities quite quickly sensed the precariousness of the Allied position. From November 1854, a long and consistent fall in French securities on the Paris Stock Exchange began.
Everything forced the Allies to increase the pressure on the Vienna Court, which was threatened and then made vague promises. The accession of Austria, and behind it possibly the German Union to the anti-Russian coalition, should have forced Petersburg to capitulate. Buol advocated an alliance with the Western powers. He wanted to get Moldavia and Wallachia. Their capture expanded the empire, gave new sources of raw materials. Austria strengthened strategically, receiving the line on the Danube and closing the path of the Russians to the Balkans. Buol believed that the Allied victory was predetermined, and Austria should take the final step in order to get its piece of "bear skin". However, other Austrian dignitaries were more careful.
Up until December 1854, Vienna was hesitating. The transfer of Anglo-French troops from Bulgaria to the Crimea only increased Austria’s doubts. The Austrian troops, already included in the principality, were face to face with the Russian army, which stood at the Prut River. This neighborhood, which prompted a one-on-one battle, did not please Franz Joseph I. True, the Austrians could be supported by the Turkish troops of the Omer Pasha. However, the Austrian generals expressed doubts about the combat capability of the Ottomans. The Turks at best could keep in the fortresses. Therefore, the Austrians by all means tried again to persuade Berlin to an alliance.
Exaggerations of the failures of the Russian troops in the Crimea encouraged the "anti-Russian party" in Austria. Buol believed that it was necessary to immediately intervene in the war in order for the temporary occupation to become the political annexation of Moldavia and Wallachia to the Hapsburg empire after the end of the war. Buol stubbornly pushed Franz Joseph to speak out against Russia. But the head of the Imperial Headquarters, the commander of the group in Galicia and Transylvania, Field Marshal Heinrich von Hess and much of the generals were strongly opposed to the war with Russia. Austrian generals did not want to fight, not only because of respect for Nicholas, but also a better understanding of the situation in the army. The army was not ready for war, the generals were simply afraid of Russia. The finances of the empire also did not allow the start of war.
The Allies increased the pressure on Austria. The threats of France have reached an extreme degree. The French emperor Napoleon III actually gave an ultimatum: “Immediate signing of a treaty or a break.” In the event of a rupture, the French promised increased agitation, the revolutionary movement in Italy supported by significant cash injections and even immediately sent troops of Piedmont (Sardinia) to Lombardy and Venice and supported the seizure.
2 (14) December Austria announced an alliance with Britain and France. The essence of the agreement was as follows: 1) Austria, France, England pledged to jointly protect the Danube principalities; 2) the three powers pledged to negotiate with Russia only on the basis of four points in advance by the Russian government; 3) if the negotiations did not lead to peace, the three powers were to develop a plan of general measures aimed at achieving the goals set.
28 December 1854 (January 9 1855) opened the conference of the ambassadors of England, France, Austria and Russia, but the negotiations did not lead to success and were interrupted in April. In December, 1855 Austria presented Russia with an ultimatum, in which there were additions in the form of forbidding Russia and the Ottoman Empire to keep a military fleet on the Black Sea and have arsenals and fortifications on the shores of this sea, and Russia’s concessions to Moldova on the Danube section of Bessarabia . The Prussian king called on Emperor Alexander II to accept the terms of the ultimatum. After the death of Nicholas, the will to resist in Russian society weakened. Therefore, Alexander in January 1856 took an ultimatum. The Paris Congress brought peace back to Europe.
The Paris world gave almost nothing to Austria. Russia's positions were briefly weakened in the Balkans, and that was all. Vienna did not receive significant benefits from its diplomatic frills. Britain and France were unhappy; they believed that Russia could have been decisively defeated if Austria had entered the war from the very beginning. But in St. Petersburg now Austria was considered the main enemy in south-eastern Europe. In Russia, they attributed their defeat to the Austrian treachery. The Russians did their best to inflict maximum damage on Austrian interests. Although for tactical reasons, from time to time Petersburg and Vienna have repeatedly concluded agreements. As a result, the reckless decision of Franz Joseph I in 1854 gnomes him in 60 years (Franz reigned 68 for years and did not live a little until the fall of the Habsburg Empire). The road to the fateful 1914 confrontation for Austria-Hungary began in the days of the Eastern War. The strategic fallacy of the course of Franz Joseph and Buol led the Austrian Empire to ruin.
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