Helicopter contract. How is it done in America
At the end of July, an article by her columnist, Bill Gertz, appeared in the American conservative (or, more correctly, the nationalist) newspaper of the Washington Times, criticizing the well-known contract of the US Armed Forces for the purchase of the X-NUMX multipurpose Mi-21 helicopter for the new Afghanistan Air Force in Russia. At the same time, the main focus of this criticism is on the fact that the Russian side forced the Americans to sign this contract not directly with the manufacturer represented by Kazan Helicopter Plant, but with the state intermediary - Federal State Unitary Enterprise Rosoboronexport.FIRST AMERICAN CONTRACT OF ROSOBORONEXPORT
In short story such is - in 2010, the Pentagon (more precisely, the US Navy) provided a small American company Defense Technology Inc. (DTI) from Alabama contract worth 315 million for the purchase of a new Mi-21 helicopter 17 for the Afghan Air Force. Company Defense Technology Inc. (DTI) planned to directly order these helicopters from the Kazan Helicopter Plant, and then deliver them to Afghanistan.
However, when the US authorities started (for some reason, after the fact!) Negotiating this deal with the Russian authorities at the end of 2010, Moscow was asked a surprised question: why should some small American company and the US participate in this scheme? helicopters in Russia in accordance with the Russian standards for the export of military equipment abroad, that is, through the mediation of the Russian state in the person of Rosoboronexport.
Indeed, attracting DTI, a company with a turnover of only 2010 million in the year of 70, as an executor of a contract worth more than 300 million, looks strange. However, DTI itself is delicately referred to in the above-mentioned Bill Hertz article as “naval contractor”. That is, to put it simply, the company is associated with certain circles of the US Navy, receiving contracts thanks to these ties and, apparently, distributing the profits received accordingly.
At the end of last year, the Russian authorities rather firmly demanded that the American side go "legally" and enter into this contract only with the participation of Rosoboronexport and if there are "normal" government customers on the American side. The formal obstacle here was that Rosoboronexport, from 2008, was under the influence of US sanctions for arms supplies to Syria and Iran. Therefore, apparently, it was brought to the notice of the Americans that if they want to conclude this deal on helicopters, then they will have to lift the sanctions from Rosoboronexport. Which was produced by the Obama administration 20 May 2011.
This, in turn, opened the way for the signing of the 26 in May of a formal contract for the United States to purchase the 21 Mi-17 helicopter for Afghanistan. At the same time, the US Army directly acted as the customer, and Rosoboronexport was the supplier. That is, the first significant contract was signed at the state level for the purchase of weapons between the United States and Russia. The cost of the contract has increased to $ 367,5 million - the connection of "Rosoboronexport" increased the benefits of the contract for Russia.
IMPLEMENTATION IN THE SUPER-PRIORITY REGIME
The discontent of those behind the Washington Times-inspired article criticizing the contract is understandable in principle. A muddy American intermediary firm was excluded from the scheme (and apparently, guys from the American fleetwho issued her a contract), and the deal itself was transferred to the interstate level and turned into a fact of Russian-American relations. It’s no secret that a large part of American political circles (the views of which the Washington Times traditionally expresses their views) would like Russian-American relations to continue to be a “one-way street,” that is, America would continue to receive gingerbread and concessions from Russia and she would put them in her pocket without paying anything politically for it and at the same time continuing to pressure Moscow.
The interstate deal, clearly expressing US interest in the Russian technology in Afghanistan and, in general, in cooperation with Russia in Afghanistan, does not like these circles. It turns out that the United States is, as it were, obliged to Russia and dependent on Russia in this matter. An ample cause for chauvinistic escapades in the Washington Times.
But, if you look at the case objectively, and not through the eyes of American nationalists, then it is absolutely clear that the helicopter deal is completely mutually beneficial. American taxpayers received a fairly transparent contract involving directly the US government department. At the same time, America receives guarantees of fast delivery of the newest helicopters from the Kazan Helicopter Plant within firm agreed deadlines — the 9 Mi-17 machines will be delivered before the end of the year, and the rest 12 next year. According to information from the workers of the Kazan plant, the American contract was declared super-priority and “politically important” at the enterprise, the best forces were thrown at its execution, and the work was strictly controlled “from Moscow”. It is unlikely that such an effect would have a contract with some Alabama incomprehensible intermediaries.
The Afghan armed forces should also be satisfied that they will receive the newest Russian-made helicopters "just from the factory", and not capitally repaired and repainted Mi-8 vehicles assembled from all kinds of garbage dumps in the CIS and Eastern Europe, as has happened before Including with American shipments. Afghanistan, under a contract with Rosoboronexport, will deliver helicopters of special military modification, rather than civilian vehicles, which DTI was going to convert into “military” in the UAE. It is not difficult to understand in which "turntables" in reality Afghans are more interested - in the most new and truly military or in civilians, who stand out as "military".
HELICOPTERS
Trying to challenge its exclusion from the helicopter procurement scheme, DTI claimed that it was ready to deliver the first six Mi-17 helicopters already within 180 days from the date of signing the contract. At the same time, the company delicately kept silent about how the Kazan Helicopter Plant would be able to deliver at such a pace. From the outside it looks like a statement about the possibility of nine women having a baby in a month.
Even more interesting is the fact that DTI, it turns out, was going to buy helicopters not directly from the Kazan plant, but through Ukraine! Bill Hertz reports that DTI itself provided a letter sent “by its partner in the transaction by the Ukrainian state export company Ukrspetsexport, stating that the 21 helicopter could have been delivered to Afghanistan on completely legal grounds by the spring of 2011 of the year using Ukraine’s agreement with Russia about military and civil cooperation. " That is, it turns out that Ukrspetsexport was among the middlemen! And at the same time, the entire passage was no longer 6, but the helicopter 21 from their order through production from scratch and through the hands of two intermediaries, and with the re-equipment of the DTI had to take only a maximum of six months. Miracles, and more! Moreover, DTI stated that by the end of 2010, they had 4 helicopters purchased, which were in a certain hangar in Russia.
In fact, all these details clarify the issue sufficiently - it is absolutely clear that no new DTI helicopters could be delivered in terms of its declarations and could not in principle. And it is clear that the basis for the DTI delivery scheme was most likely a banal buying in Russia and Ukraine on the cheap, “used” Mi-8 airplanes “otkapitalivanie” at one of the Ukrainian aircraft repair plants (in Konotop or in Sevastopol) and then “vtyuhivanie” Navy The USA (and from them to Afghanistan) under the guise of new ones. This is precisely the key to the unprecedentedly short time of the declared delivery, and obviously lower prices than Rosoboronexport, and DTI’s strange need for Ukrspetsexport as another intermediary.
It seems that if the Washington Times would really care about the interests of the American state and the American taxpayers, then it would have to ask a little deeper how DTI was going to fulfill the clearly fantastic contract terms it had announced - if it was about delivering really new helicopters? And isn’t it why the Pentagon so quickly abandoned the DTI services and made a deal with Rosoboronexport that the professionals of the American Defense Ministry quickly came to the conclusion that the DTI application was doubtful? But the argumentation of staff journalist of the Washington Times looks like frank lobbying for a direct scam at the expense of the US budget.
ROSOBORONEXPORT MAKES GUARANTEES
Thus, the participation of Rosoboronexport in the contract for the supply of an 21 helicopter for Afghanistan is a guarantee that for the money paid the American government and the Afghan armed forces will receive genuine new special-purpose helicopters fully complying with the requirements for military use. The exclusion of all kinds of foreign intermediaries did not lead to an increase in the contract value, but in fact to its actual reduction in price - it is clear that the 21 new military helicopter for 367,5 million dollars is actually cheaper than the 21 “second-hand” civilian helicopter for 315 million. USD. Similarly, the participation of Rosoboronexport is a guarantee of the speed of implementation of the contract.
Finally, claims against Rosoboronexport for taking commissions for its participation in the contract look just strange. I would like to remind that, firstly, DTI and Ukrspetsexport also clearly intended to implement the contract for Afghan helicopters for free and not at a loss to themselves, and, secondly, Rosoboronexport is a state mediator, and its commission is a commission in favor of Russian state. And this commission goes, among other things, to support Russian defense enterprises (including through Russian Technologies) and to promote Russian military equipment abroad — that is, to find new orders for the domestic defense industry, to look for work for Russian citizens — workers and engineers.
And more about the cost of supply. One of the main forms of arms supplies by the United States abroad is the so-called Foreign Military Sales (FMS) through the US Department of Defense. In this case, the foreign government buys weapon not directly from the US manufacturer, but from the US government (represented by the US Department of Defense). Legally, this is carried out, as it were, by the US Department of Defense to resell the weapons they purchased to a foreign government (acting as the actual customer). That is, the US Department of Defense through the so-called Defense Cooperation Agency (DSCA) acts as a government mediator. At the same time, the cost of weapons sold does not have a direct correlation with its cost and frankly varies depending on the political interests of the US government and its financial interests.
Thus, the cost of weapons supplied by the FMS to rich Middle Eastern oil monarchies - Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates - is often several times higher than the cost of exactly such weapons supplied to the European allies of the United States in the NATO bloc. That is, in the United States it is frankly believed that you can take a little more money from rich Arabs, and there’s really nowhere to go if they want to have American weapons. It is strange that such a cynical approach, fully perceived when it comes to the United States, and causes violent indignation when it comes to sales of Rosoboronexport.
For some reason, the Russian state is considered by some to be obliged to sell weapons, if not to their own detriment, then at the minimum margin. But arms sales are not a charity event. I would like to remind you that the share of profits and commissions from contracts for the sale of Russian weapons should be determined on the basis of a wide range of Russian political, military, business and financial interests in each particular case. And the determination of specific rates of profit and commissions in each individual case is the work of professionals professionally engaged in such sales and not having to report to a wide audience about the motives of the decisions made in such delicate matters. The steady growth in sales of Rosoboronexport in recent years suggests that Russian specialists know their business quite well and work quite effectively for the benefit of Russia.
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