Alternative Story: Was Red Blitzkrieg Possible?
One of the favorite questions of alternative stories (on this subject the myth of “Hitler’s preventive strike” was even created) - so that it would be if the Soviet Union struck first. According to this myth, Stalin was hatching a plan of advance attack on Germany, and the USSR had thoroughly prepared for war, and an offensive one, on the territory of the enemy. Thus, according to Meltyukhov, the Third Reich was preparing for the same war, at the beginning of 1941, this process for both sides moved to the final stage, which “made the beginning of the Soviet-German war inevitable in 1941, no matter who initiated it ". Meltyukhov continues: “Both sides in their calculations proceeded from the fact that the war would begin on their own initiative” (plans of “Barbarossa” and “Thunderstorm”). And further: “Initially, the Wehrmacht was preparing the invasion on 16 in May, and the Red Army on 12 in June 1941. Berlin then postponed the attack, transferring it to 22 in June, a month later, Moscow did the same, defining a new indicative period, approximately on 6 -15 July. The same idea was developed by V.Suvorov and I.Bunich. Although these ideas are not innovation - they were voiced by Hitler, developed Goebbels, and then the "beaten" generals of the Wehrmacht supported. A very advantageous configuration is obtained - to accuse the “bloody Stalin” of preparing for the war and transfer the Soviet Union to the rank of “instigators of war”.
The main weakness of such assessments is that even in Berlin they did not consider that the USSR was capable of such an operation. In the reports of German intelligence, the Western grouping of the Red Army was considered defensive, and no serious offensive actions by the USSR in the summer of 1941 were expected.
Operational development of the General Staff of the Red Army 1940 — 1941
At present, the 4 version of such plans is known, the main idea of the General Staff, which corresponded to the general idea of “offensive - better defense”, is “pre-empting the deployment of troops” of the enemy near the Soviet borders. To do this, the German troops had to strike a sudden blow. The plan of the General Staff, approved on October 14 1940 of the year, laid down two options for the directions of delivering the main attack: on East Prussia and on South Poland. As a result, they concluded that the most effective solution would be to deliver the main attack in the South-West direction while simultaneously pinning the enemy in Romania and in the north-west, in East Prussia.
This option is described in the note of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of 15 in May 1941, this is the so-called “Zhukov's Note. The purpose of the operation was stated as follows: “the defeat of the main forces of the German army, deployed south of the Brest - Demblin line, and access to the 30 day of the operation on the front of Ostroleka, r. Narev, Lovic, Lodz, Creutzburg, Oppeln, Olomouc ". After - “an attack from the Katowice region in the north or north-west direction, crush the large forces of the center and north wing of the German front and seize the territory of the former Poland and East Prussia”. The operation was planned to be carried out by 152's divisions, against tentatively 100 German divisions.
But it is obvious that these were the usual for any General Staff study of a variety of scenarios. For their real implementation, very important elements were necessary: 1) a political decision of the top political leadership of the USSR, but it was not there; 2) a more detailed study of operational documents, you can see how everything worked in detail in the Third Reich before the attack, this was not done in the USSR; 3) creating shock groups in the main lines of attack; 4) in the USSR, rearmament was not completed, and only began retraining on new types of equipment, weapons. In the summer of 1941, the Red Army was not ready to attack such a powerful enemy as Reich. She could conduct limited offensive operations, relying on the powerful lines of defense. As the war confirmed, the Red Army had to study for two years, paying in blood for “lessons” in order to outperform the Wehrmacht and its generals.
"Zhukov's Note" is just the development of one of the many options for action that the General Staff recommended to resort to in the event of extreme danger and at the last moment. All the documents of that time, the foreign policy of the USSR, indicate that the Soviet political leadership wanted at all costs to avoid this war, gain time, complete the preparation of the state, army and fleet to repel terrible aggression.
What would have happened if the USSR had struck a preemptive strike?
Firstly, because of poorly developed infrastructure in the western regions of Belarus and Ukraine, in Lithuania — highway, country, and railway roads, bridges — the Red Army could not concentrate and transfer considerable forces in time, which had not yet been noticed by the enemy. This was noted by a commission of generals N. F. Vatutin, G. K. Malandin and A. M. Vasilevsky, and did not have time to correct the situation in 1941. Therefore, the blow would not have been able to make the most powerful.
Secondly, Hitler would have won a convincing diplomatic, political victory. After all, for years it has been argued that Moscow is preparing a "world revolution", "Bolshevization of Europe", and here such a pleasant surprise. Hitler would be able to rally even more forces around the so-called. "Anti-Comintern block". Italy and Spain would take a more active part in the war with the USSR. England could go on a truce with Berlin, there was for this and Rudolf Hess was. The United States would also maintain neutrality. Japan could help an ally - not even with a major operation, but with the Halkin-Gol-2. The result would be a full-fledged "Crusade" against "Bolshevism" that threatens Western civilization. That is, Moscow would have fallen into international isolation, the situation would be dire.
Thirdly, the Red Army was not ready for such kind of actions, besides against the best army in the world at that time. Rearmament and retraining has not been completed. The upcoming groups in the end, after the first successes, could be surrounded and crushed or broken and retired. A long war of attrition would have begun. True, there was a chance that the enemy could be stopped at the turn of the old borders. The idea that the Red Army would be able to carry out the "red blitzkrieg" is doubtful - it has not had experience in conducting brilliant offensive operations for several years.
A very unfavorable geopolitical picture for the USSR would have been formed: all of Europe (Hitler’s European Union) and Japan are against us. England and the United States could keep us cold neutrality or even support Hitler - at least diplomatically and economically. The USSR would be in complete isolation, then there was virtually no “third world”. The rest of the planet was mainly controlled by the West. Even if the USSR and Hitler concluded a truce, making sure that it was impossible to defeat each other by armed means, there would have been a “cold war”. And without a socialist bloc, and the West could save the colonial system or part of it. Third World countries would not have appeared. As a result, the USSR would be much harder to withstand the arms race, technology against almost the whole world.
Sources of:
Bunich I. Operation "Thunderstorm" or an error in the third sign. Book 1. M., 1998.
Meltyukhov M. Lost chance of Stalin. The Soviet Union and the struggle for Europe: 1939 — 1941 (documents, facts, judgments). M., 2000.
Solov'ev B.G. The suddenness of an attack is a weapon of aggression. M., 2002.
http://www.fondsk.ru/news/2011/06/08/vtoraja-zhizn-gitlerovsko-gebbelsovskoj-versii-istorii.html
http://www.itogi.ru/polit-tema/2011/25/166330.html
http://militera.lib.ru/h/tippelskirch/index.html
Information