Who missed the beginning of the war, which became the Patriotic
70 years have passed since the beginning of World War II, but we still do not have an objective picture of its eve. But the forgotten and newly discovered facts allow us to begin the correct reconstruction of the last pre-war days. Here, for example, is the question: did Stalin see the proximity of the war? Or did he believe the provocateur Beria, who “washed into the camp dust” of all those who warned about the attack?
I’ll start with the famous Zorge telegram: “The attack is expected early June 22 on a broad front.” Firstly, its text differs sharply from real cipher codes. Second, no responsible manager will take any action based on such a message, even if it comes from a reliable informant. Thirdly, Sorge did not report anything of the kind. 16 June 2001, the organ of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation "Krasnaya Zvezda" published a roundtable on the 60 anniversary of the outbreak of war, with the recognition of Colonel SVR Karpov: "Unfortunately, this is a fake, which appeared in Khrushchev times. Such "little fools" are launched simply ... "
Alas, the same "fool" - and the alleged resolution of Beria: "Many workers ... sow panic. The secret employees of “Hawk”, “Carmen”, “Almaz”, “Verny” ... wipe into camp dust as accomplices of international provocateurs who want to embroil us with Germany ... 21 June 1941 of the year ”.
These lines have been walking on the printed pages for a long time, but their falsity has long been established by a number of independent experts. Moreover, since February 3 under the command of 1941, Beria did not have external intelligence, because the NKVD was divided that day into the NKVD Beria and the NKGB Merkulov. But how many people know about it?
Yes, the archives store Stalin's genuine visa from 17 June 1941 of the year on a special report by the people's commissar GB Merkulov
No. 2279 / M with the intelligence data of Petty Officer (Harro Schulze-Boysen) and “Corsican” (Arvid Harnak) dated June 16, 1941: “T-shu Merkulova. Maybe send your "source" from the headquarters of the Germans. aviation to e ... mother. This is not a "source", but a disinfectant. I. St. "
The visa is cited as an argument of the alleged blindness of Stalin on the eve of the war. But archival documents, as well as visas for them, must be read carefully. In the message Merkulov were given two reports, and Stalin negatively evaluated only one! He expressed distrust only to the informer from the Luftwaffe headquarters (Schulze-Boysen), but not to the informant from the Ministry of Economy (Harnack). And Stalin had every reason to do so because, although Schulze-Boysen was an honest informant, his message from June 16 did not inspire confidence. It was confused with the date of the TASS report (not 14 of June, but 6 of June), and the second (!) Objects of the German aviation raids, from which the war was supposed to start (!), Were called the second-level Svir-3 HPP, Moscow factories, "Producing separate parts for aircraft", as well as "auto repair (?! - SB) workshops". Could Stalin not doubt the good faith of such "information"?
Nevertheless, a tough visa did not put an end. Stalin summoned Merkulov and the chief of foreign intelligence, Fitin, was interested in the smallest details about the sources. After Fitin explained why intelligence trusts them, Stalin said: “Go check everything, double-check this information and report to me”.
STRANGE MATTERS
However, by all appearances, by the end of 18 June 1941, Stalin no longer needed to refine intelligence data. But about this - later, but now let me remind you of three important orders of the NPO of the USSR, which should not be forgotten.
27 December 1940, the new People's Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko issued Order No. 0367 with reference to Voroshilovsky’s Order No. 0145 from 09.09.39 about obligatory masking of the entire air force airfield network in the 500-km lane from the border with the end of July 1 1941. Neither the Air Force Directorate nor the district have executed this order. The direct fault lies in that - Inspector General of the Air Force, Assistant Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army for Aviation Smushkevich and Head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force, Deputy Commissar of Defense Rychagov. Both were shot after the start of the war.
Another NCB order was issued on 19 June 1941 of the year.
No. 0042. In it, Tymoshenko and the Chief of the General Staff Zhukov stated that “nothing has been done to disguise airfields and major military facilities”, that airplanes in the “complete absence of their disguise” are crowded at aerodromes, etc.
Many land generals, in terms of criminal neglect of service, have left the aviation generals not far. From the same order No. 0042 of 19.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX: “The artillery and motorized units show similar negligence to camouflage: the crowded and linear arrangement of their parks represents not only excellent objects of observation, but also targets that are beneficial for air damage. Tanks, armored vehicles, command and other special vehicles of motorized and other troops are painted with colors that give a bright reflection, and are well observed not only from air, but also from the ground. Nothing has been done to disguise warehouses and other important military installations ... "
And did the situation of Stalin worry in real time? Well, there is important evidence on this score of the Chief Air Marshal Golovanov. In June 1941, he commanded the Separate 212 Long-Range Bomber Regiment and arrived from Smolensk to Minsk to introduce the ZOVOV commander to the Air Force General Kopts and the ZOVOV commander to Army General Pavlov. During the conversation, Pavlov contacted HF with Stalin. And Golovanov witnessed how Stalin began to ask Pavlov counter questions, to which the commander of Zapovo replied: “No, Comrade Stalin, this is not true! I have just returned from the defensive lines. There is no concentration of German troops on the border, and my scouts are working well. I will check it again, but I think this is just a provocation. ”
At the end of the conversation, Pavlov left Golovanov: “Not in the spirit of a master. Some bastard is trying to prove to him that the Germans are concentrating troops on our border. ”
Today there is every reason to believe that this "scum" was ... Beria. After 3 February 1941, he did not direct foreign intelligence, but the border troops had their own border intelligence. She was not listed in the agents of the cream of society, but she was helped by train drivers, lubricators, switchmen, modest villagers and residents of border towns ... They collected information like ants, and, collected together, she gave an objective picture of what is happening. The result of the work of this “ant intelligence” was reflected in the notes of Beria to Stalin. I refer only to three of them.
The note number 1196 / B from 21.04.41 (to Stalin, Molotov, Tymoshenko) reported the beginning of a large-scale transfer of German troops to the Soviet-German border: "... in the Suwalki-Lyk region, arrived in two motomyhdiviziy, three infantry, four artillery and one motorized regiments, a cavalry regiment ... Combined headquarters arrived in the Tomash district, up to three infantry divisions and up to three hundred tanks, etc.
Beria reported that the concentration of German troops near the border occurs in small subunits to the battalion, squadron, battery, and often at night; that in those areas where the troops arrived, a large amount of ammunition and fuel was delivered ...
Even more disturbing was Beria’s personal note to Stalin No. 1798 / B from 02.06.41: “... Two army groups were concentrated in the areas of Tomashov and Lezajsk. The headquarters of the two armies were identified in these areas: the headquarters of the 16 Army ... and the headquarters of the army in the Usmezh farmyard ... commanded by General Reichenau (needs clarification) ... The 25 of May from Warsaw ... marked the redeployment of all arms. The movement of troops takes place mainly at night ... The generals of the German army make reconnaissance near the border ... Pontoons, canvas and inflatable boats are concentrated at many points near the border. The largest number of them is noted in the directions to Brest and Lviv ... ”, etc.
June 5 in note number 1868 / B Beria again reports to Stalin such data that clearly indicate a high probability of attack. In particular, it was reported that “in the Yanov-Podlaski district, 33 km north-west of Brest, pontoons and parts for twenty wooden bridges are concentrated ...”, etc.
Gradually it became clear to Stalin that the events of the Germans were not a cover for a strike on England (wooden bridges are needed for crossing not the English Channel, but through the Bug), not a demonstration of strength, but preparations for an imminent war.
But here was how some were preparing for war ... The 15 of June leaving for inspections in the western districts of the Deputy Commissar of Defense for combat training Meretskov stayed in Zapov and together with commander Pavlov watched the exercises in the aviation unit. In the midst of the exercises at the airport sat a German plane. Meretskov was amazed, but Pavlov explained that, by order of the head of the USSR Civil Aviation, German passenger planes were ordered to receive at this airfield.
Angered, Meretskov ordered to prepare a telegram addressed to Stalin, and then asked General Kopts: “If war begins and the aircraft fails to get out of attack, what will you do?” Kopec answered: “Then I will shoot!”
A week later, Kopec, thirty-two years old, shot himself. His chief Pavlov was later shot. For business or not?
But the General of the NKVD Sudoplatov writes ... On June 12, the General of the NKVD Eitingon phoned a longtime acquaintance from Spain, Commander of the ZAPOV Pavlov, and in a friendly way asked which border areas should be paid special attention in case of a war, but Pavlov responded, "stated something ... unintelligible. "
You read all this, and you think: “Why was Pavlov so blind?” And he is not alone, and above all - in ZOVOV! Are we dealing here with the remnants of the Tukhachevsky-Uborevich conspiracy? At one time they promoted Pavlova. And in the end, why did Hitler strike through Belarus, when he - in general opinion - needed Ukraine? Having occupied a huge mass of troops from the very beginning, depriving the USSR of a powerful industrial and raw material base in Ukraine, Hitler could count on a lot. And Hitler hit through the Pinsk swamps ...
Why would it, huh?
And now we come to two key facts, without which it is impossible to have an honest picture of the last pre-war days. Both facts are reliable, but it is useless to look for them in academic publications. But the facts are deadly, they completely turn over all our ideas about what was happening in the Kremlin on the eve of the war.
Major General Aviation Zakharov before the war, commanded 43 th IAD Zapovo in the rank of colonel. Had experience fighting in Spain and China. The quotation from his book “I am a fighter” will be extensive, but every phrase is important here! Here is what Zakharov wrote:
“... Somewhere in the middle of the last prewar week ... I received an order from the aviation commander of the Western Special Military District to fly over the western border. The length of the route was about four hundred kilometers, and was to fly from south to north - to Bialystok.
I flew U-2 with the navigator 43-th fighter troops. In the villages, on the farms, in the groves stood poorly camouflaged, if not completely camouflaged tanks, armored vehicles, guns. Motorcycles, staff cars scurried along the roads ...
... Everything that I saw during the flight was layered on my previous military experience, and the conclusion I made for myself can be formulated in four words: from day to day.
We flew then just over three hours. I often put the plane on any suitable (allocation here and further mine. - SB) site, which might seem random if the border guard did not immediately approach the plane. The border guard appeared silently, silently taking the hood (that is, he knew in advance that our plane would soon get on with urgent information! - S. B.), and waited a few minutes while I wrote a report on the wing. Having received the report, the border guard disappeared, and we again flew into the air and, having traveled 30 – 50 kilometers, sat down again. And I wrote the report again, and the other border guard waited silently and then, with a salute, disappeared silently. By evening, in this way, we flew to Bialystok ... ”
There, Zakharov reported to the deputy commander of Zapovo Baldin, who conducted the analysis of the exercises. General Boldin, who ended the war deputy. the commander of the troops 3-th Ukrainian Front, the information taken into account Zakharova. But Pavlov’s reaction in Minsk, according to Zakharov, was different: “... Army General ... looked at me as if he had seen it for the first time ... At the end of the message, he asked if I was exaggerating. The commander’s intonation openly replaced the word “exaggerate” with “panic” ... ”But one often reads that Pavlov supposedly“ warned ”.
But more importantly, this ... The frontier guards are the service of Beria! From the border "secret" report of Zakharov could leave only Beria along the chain from the frontier post to the table of the People's Commissar. And in genuine stories War, the flight of Colonel Zakharov must be written in capital letters! Thanks to this flight, Stalin knew from 18 on June 1941 of the year that the war would start very soon. In addition, this "reported" Moscow itself ... Hitler!
That's how it all seemed to be ...
Zakharov formally flew on the instructions of Kopts, but he flew, no doubt, on the instructions of Stalin, although he himself, of course, did not know about this, as Kopec did not know either.
Let us think: why, if Kopets gave the task to Zakharov, that is, the person from the department of the people's commissar of defense Tymoshenko, the border guards from the people's commissariat of internal affairs Beria received reports from Zakharov? And they took it silently, without asking questions: who, they say, are you and what do you want?
How come?! In a tense atmosphere, an aircraft sits down near the border, and the border guard is not interested in the pilot: “What do you really need, dear friend, here?” This could be the case: when, at the border, under each bus, figuratively speaking, this plane waited.
Who in real time could give an order that brought together the efforts of the subordinates of Tymoshenko and Beria? Only Stalin. But why? There can be one explanation: the flight of Colonel Zakharov was one of the final elements of Hitler’s Moscow’s strategic sounding. Imagine the situation of that summer ...
Moscow receives reports of a impending war from the illegal immigrants and legal zakordonnyh residencies Merkulov from the NKGB, from illegals General Golikov, the head of the GRU General Staff, from military attaches and through diplomatic channels. But all this may be a provocation of the West, who sees his own salvation in the clash of the USSR and Germany.
However, there is intelligence from the border troops, and you can trust her information. This is integral information from such an extensive peripheral intelligence network that it can only be reliable. And this information proves the proximity of the war.
But how to check everything finally?
The ideal option is to ask Hitler himself about his true intentions. Not the environment of the Führer, but of himself, because the Führer unexpectedly and often changed the terms for implementing his own orders even for the environment! The timing of the attack on the Western Front in 1940 was changed by Hitler more than 20 times!
And Moscow 18 June 1941 of the year appeals to Hitler about the urgent direction to Berlin Molotov for mutual consultations. This is not a hypothesis, but a fact noted in the diary of the OKW chief, Franz Halder. In it, among other 20 entries on June 1941, we find: “Molotov wanted 18.6 to speak with the Führer.”
One phrase ...
But this phrase, reliably fixing the fact of the Soviet proposal to Hitler about an urgent visit of Molotov to Berlin, completely turns the whole picture of the last pre-war days! Completely! And this second silent fact destroys the whole established — both in our country and in the West — scheme! In reality, everything was different!
Stalin is alarmed. He personally dictates to the head of TASS the text of the TASS statement of June 14, which states that “according to the USSR, Germany is also unswervingly complying with the conditions of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, like the Soviet Union, in view of which, according to Soviet circles, rumors of intent Germany to break the pact and to attack the USSR are devoid of any soil ... "
Berlin is silent.
There is an idea to send to Hitler Molotov. Hitler refuses. The Fuhrer could not go on a meeting with Stalin's deputy.
Even if Hitler began to pull back, this would be proof of the proximity of the war for the Kremlin. But Hitler refused altogether. Immediately! After the refusal of Hitler, it was not necessary to be Clausewitz to draw the same conclusion that Colonel Zakharov made: “from day to day.”
And here Stalin instructs to provide urgent air reconnaissance of the border zone. Could Kopets choose a better candidate than Zakharov?
On the other hand, Stalin instructs Beria to ensure the immediate transfer of information collected by an experienced aviator to Moscow. That is why Zakharov on the entire route of his flight, in the zones of several border detachments, was waiting for a border guard under each bush, without even asking what kind of aircraft he had landed in the border strip. Zakharov, after all, was sitting on “suitable sites” not on his own initiative. He was told in advance that he should periodically transmit all information through border guards, making landings 30 – 50 kilometers. All clear! First, time did not wait - Stalin was waiting for information. At a speed of Y-2 of approximately 120 – 150 kilometers per hour, the time factor on the 400-kilometer route was already significant.
Secondly, the Germans could have shot down Zakharov, even over our territory. After all, they could not help but see the Russian airplane flying along the edge of the border and could not but understand that the frontier dislocation of the German group is now being opened, ready to rush into Russia. But Zakharov would sit down from time to time, and even if he had problems from a certain moment of flight, at least some of the operational information would reach Moscow.
She came altogether completely. And by the evening of 18 June 1941, Moscow knew for sure: the war was close.
UNMISSED ORDERS
Realizing that Hitler had decided to go to war, Stalin, no later than the evening of June 18, began to give the appropriate instructions to the leadership of the NKO. The new activity was also noticed by someone else’s eye, which is confirmed in a note to Stalin, Molotov and Beria, sent by the people's commissar GB Merkulov 21 June 1941, with the text of the conversation of two foreign diplomats held on 20 June. There were the words: “Here everyone is worried - war, war. - Yes Yes. The Russians learned. ”
Yes, the Russians learned!
And they learned in advance because the efforts of many large and small intelligence officers in recent months crowned the successful strategic sounding of Moscow! It was an intelligence class in the full sense of the word at the highest level — the Führer himself turned out to be an informant for the Kremlin.
Now it was necessary to give an indication of the urgent reduction, without much noise, of the troops of Special Districts to alert. And here, alas, far from all the generals were on top. Then, in his memoirs, someone referred to the “demagnetizing” -de influence of TASS statements from 14 June. But any political statements can not be a guide to action for the military. For a military man, such is only an order!
From the beginning of May 41, each senior commander and general in the western military districts was supposed to be like a taut string. It was also the responsibility of the “teams” of Tymoshenko and Zhukov in Moscow, Pavlov in Minsk and Kirponos in Kiev. But the army “prepared” for war in such a way that, with an insignificant 1941 year in January, the mobilization reserve of fire fighting equipment at KOVO and the GAU preferred to unsubscribe and “reassured” Kiev, which supposedly everything would be shipped during the 1941 year.
The country gave the army a strong armor of fast newer T-34 tanks, but in the pre-storm time, ordinary tankers could not master this technique as soon as possible. On the other hand, new mechanized and tank corps were formed almost at the border. Yes, in general, the Red Army was strong, but it had, as it turns out now, a number of weak links. But the chain breaks on them! And Stalin is responsible for this only to the extent that the top leader is responsible for everything, even without being directly guilty. The guilt of the generals was much more specific.
Many, many obscure we have in the coverage of the pre-war 1941 half of the year, and especially the last pre-war week. Say, the famous "merit" of the People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov in bringing fleets into readiness No. 1 ... Was it really so great in reality?
There are “Notes of the participant in the defense of Sevastopol” by Captain 1 of the rank of Yevseyev, which are stored in the Central Naval Archive. And it follows from them that the combat readiness of the Black Sea Fleet was announced after the first German bombs exploded on Primorsky Boulevard of Sevastopol, filled with people walking on the occasion of the completion of large maneuvers. Komflot Oktyabrsky gave a banquet that night.
Maneuvers led by Admiral Isakov. It was he who secretly wrote Yevseyev’s notes in 1943, “with the right to use everyone working in Sevastopol”. We note: he did not give the order to punish Yevseyev for slander, but “only” classified the inconvenient truth about the admiral banquet under the German bombs.
But the head of the State Border Guard of the NKVD General Sokolov on the night of June 22 was in the area of the 87 border guard detachment of the Belarusian Border District. The main border guard of the country could not be there without Beria’s order and Stalin’s sanction, and it is clear that Sokolov was needed in Belarus in order to organize the combat work of the border guards in wartime with the start of hostilities. June 21 outposts, border commandant’s offices and detachments left the barracks and occupied the fortifications. The frontier guards always knew how to fight, and one experienced border soldier (there were about 100 thousand in the western districts) in a difficult dynamic battle cost, perhaps, a dozen ordinary Red Army men. And so it happened: the border guards in the outbreak of the war immediately played a strategic role without exaggeration. For days they were kept in an environment in which many army units rolled back in hours. However, the strategic feat of the frontier troops of the NKVD of the USSR in June 1941 of the year has not been evaluated by its significance so far!
General Pavlov, on the last pre-war evening, enjoyed the operetta at the Minsk Theater, although at that moment he should have been not in the theater box, but at the front command post.
It was front-line, not district, because no later than 19 of June, the relevant orders were received from Moscow to Minsk and Kiev. And the general lack of readiness of the NKO border military districts for June 22 looks more than strange against the background of the readiness of the NKVD border districts. Why? After all, apparently, Stalin gave a common "good" three days before the war! Not the version, but the fact that no later than the second half of the day 19 June from Moscow received an order from the field headquarters of the district headquarters from Moscow immediately to relocate to the city of Ternopil, where the front command post was located in the building of the former headquarters of the 44 rifle division.
Near Baranavichy, in the area of Obuz-Lesnaya station, the front command post of ZOVOVO was deployed. Only Pavlov did not appear there before the start of the war!
But in the OdVO, General Zakharov arrived at his field command center in the Tiraspol area of 21 June on time and assumed command. And Zakharov arrived there because 14 of June (!) Received an order from Moscow to allocate the army management of the 9 th army and 21 of June to take him to Tiraspol.
Rear Admiral Derevyanko, former deputy chief of the Odessa naval base, writes directly about the directives of Tymoshenko and Zhukov from 14 and 18 of June and reports that the commanders of other western districts received their 18 of June! However, Marshal Zhukov doesn’t mention these directives in Memoirs and Reflections - only the directives from April 14 and May 13 are mentioned. About the directives 14 and 18 June - not a word!
Yes, traces swept and swept. For example, it is reported that 13 Jun Tymoshenko asked Stalin for permission to bring in combat readiness and deploy the first echelons of cover plans, but Stalin did not allow. Well, 13 Jun, so, I suppose, it was. Stalin, realizing that the country was not yet ready for a serious war, did not want to give Hitler a reason for it. It is known that Hitler was very unhappy that Stalin could not be provoked. Therefore, June 13, Stalin could still hesitate - is it time to take all possible measures for the deployment of troops. Therefore, urgent probes began, starting with the TASS statement of June 14, which Stalin most likely made up after a conversation with Tymoshenko. Then came the “moment of truth” with the flight of Colonel Zakharov and Berlin’s refusal to accept Molotov. In his memoirs, Zhukov wrote: “After the death of Joseph Stalin, versions appeared that some of the commanders and their headquarters, on the night of June 22, did not suspect anything, were sleeping peacefully or having fun without a care. This is not true. The last peaceful night was completely different ... "
Alas, with all due respect to George Konstantinovich, I cannot help saying that here one can see the desire and honor to observe, and to acquire capital ... First, General Pavlov and Admiral Oktyabrsky were just having fun. Secondly, if on the last peaceful night the commanders and their headquarters were on the ground and on alert, then why did the troops sleep? Moreover, some were sleeping, while others were already moving towards the border ... How to understand this?
70 years have passed since those days. And all these years, many of the “darkness of low truths” turned out to be more precious than their “elevating” deception. It remains to be understood - what is necessary for us today: the continuation of a lie or bitter, as a life-saving medicine, the truth about the beginning of the Great Patriotic War?
Information