Calculating the American communists, he determined that they had formed their network of small cells that were not connected with each other. In the existence of such a network, Louis Amoss saw a real threat to state security. The effectiveness of the communist activities was achieved through good conspiracy — if one cell could be found, the rest remained safe and connected their lobbies, both to help their colleagues who were in danger and to achieve their goals. The Communists of the United States were at that time representatives of all classes of society - from shopkeepers to senators, so the effect of their activities was very noticeable. So the impetus for the development of the theory and methods of waging network wars by the US military (Louis Amoss was followed by Arthur Sibrovski) was received from the US Communists, who were supported by the USSR special services.
In 1983, a member of the American Ku Klux Klan, Louis Bim, published an essay "Commandless Resistance," proposing to abandon any hierarchy, since the conventional pyramidal model of organization poses a serious threat to its members. Louis Bim was on the other side of the American system, but used its fruits to promote his ideas. As a more stable form, he proposed to create small groups that would not be connected with each other, and a propaganda body would perform the function of a mediator. Bim suggested introducing a two-tiered approach to the revolutionary struggle. One part would represent the ground "information agencies", which "distributed information using newspapers, leaflets, computers, etc.". Information authorities should not carry out any illegal actions, but rather provide guidance as propaganda is used for the purposes of recruitment. The second row would be composed of individual operators and small “phantom” cells that would conduct attacks. These people must be very careful, restrained, anonymous and not maintain any links with "ground" activists.
After the attacks of 11 in New York in September, analysts began to more seriously consider network structures as a tool for the struggle of various terrorist groups. Also for the reconstruction of social networks began to use network analysis, aimed at identifying previously unknown sites. A similar analysis was used in armed conflicts - in the French army (under the leadership of Yves Godard, the Algerian underground was thus destroyed in 1955-57), as well as in the British special service MI6 against the Irish Republican Army (in exactly the same way and with success the Irish separatists fought against the UK).
At the present stage, hundreds of different organizations use the methodology of command-free resistance — US neo-Nazis, Islamic fundamentalists, radical ecologists, whom the US government also identifies as a terrorist organization (for example, Animal Liberation Front). Usually, all such organizations have a pronounced ideology and use their own media as a propaganda mouthpiece (previously - samizdat, now - Internet sites). Also, through their propaganda agencies, the cell informs their supporters about the goals and methods of the boycott campaign (this may be a list of objects for which the participants in autonomous cells themselves choose attacks or recommendations on organizing telephone calls to any campaign or public service). Often the organization lacks resources (money, technical equipment, weapons), brings it closer to another category of persons - the so-called lone wolves.
According to the American experts on terrorism from the Stratfor geopolitical research center Fred Barton and Scott Stewart, because of their uniqueness, "lone wolves" present very serious challenges for law enforcement and state security professionals (see “The“ Lone Wolf ” Disconnect ”by Fred Burton and Scott Stuart, www.stratfor.com).
A lone wolf is a person who acts on his own discretion, without orders or even communication with the organization. Theoretically, such a distance would prevent premature disclosure of attack plans through whistleblowers or technical means and therefore provide superior operational security.
A lone wolf is different from a “sleeping operative” because A sleeper is one who penetrates a target group or organization and does not take any action (sometimes for a long enough time) until a certain signal arrives or a number of events occur. The lone wolf is an autonomous activist who by his nature is already in the target group and is capable of self-activation at any time. In addition, we must remember that the "sleeping" or other hidden operative, trained and sent by the organization. The existence of this connection with the organization means that by definition the operative cannot be a lone wolf.
According to American analysts, the main problem of lone wolves may be the acquisition of skills for the successful conduct of terrorist activities. Although, on the other hand, combat training is not 100% necessary. For example, Joseph Paul Franklin committed a series of murders (perhaps about twenty in several states) and robberies, chose high-profile targets such as Vernon Jordan and Larry Flynt, although he only seriously injured both of them. Lack of proper experience can also be an obstacle for single wolves. The famous Unabomber Theodore Kaczynski managed to kill only three during his summer campaign 18. Part of the explosive devices that he created did not work. On the other hand, attempts to acquire weapons and ammunition on the side can be taken out by law enforcement agents.
There is also such a term as “radicalization of a loner”. A person is either already a loner and then radicalized, or he is motivated by external factors. As a rule, mentally unstable people are less worried about their security and are more prone to self-radicalization in the information vacuum than politically motivated people. Attempts to get feedback and support from one’s own kind lead to the creation of dynamic ideological intersections. Similar phenomena were seen among the teams of skinheads racists, radical Jews and Islamic fundamentalists.
Rebel anarchism is very close to these concepts of network wars. It is a revolutionary theory and practice within the anarchist movement itself. Historically, rebel anarchism may be adjacent to anarchosyndicalism, that is, formal anarchism, but within the framework of warfare. Insurgent anarchism can be called the fighting of Makhno on the territory of Ukraine. Nestor Makhno even before Mao understood the banal truth - "a rifle gives rise to power." Although Batko was partially engaged in workers and village committees, developing self-government, he then concentrated exclusively on armed struggle, denying any cooperation with both the Red Army and the puppet national-bourgeois Ukrainian regimes, be it the UPR (“UPR is our class enemy ", - said Makhno) or Directory.
In the modern world, insurrectionary anarchism rejects political programs and holding congresses, concentrating on actions of direct action, either peaceful or violent. Attack instead of pacifism, compromise, refusal, mediation, or compromise is the essence of insurgent anarchism. The work of the Italians, Luigi Galleani (organized a series of explosions in the United States, from where he was deported to 1919), and Alfredo Bonanno influenced the development of modern ideas of insurgent anarchism. The main theses of ideology are: 1) The state just will not disappear. Attack; 2) Self-organization, not a controlled rebellion, from rebellion to revolution; 3) Uncontrollability. The system fears not so much the acts of sabotage as their social distribution; 4) Permanent conflict instead of mediation with institutional forces; 5) Illegality, although rebellion does not mean bank robbery; 5) Informal organization; 6) Take the best from the teachings of individualism and communism.
From street network wars to coups d'état
In an era of asymmetric responses, when non-governmental actors influence the economy, politics, and sometimes change of state regimes, the questions of transforming urban groups into network clans and organizations remain topical.
John Sullivan, Los Angeles County Police Analyst, notes (for details, see his article "Urban Gangs Evoling as Criminal Netwar Actors", Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol 11, No.1, Spring 2000; "Gangs, hooligans, and anarchists - the vanguard of netwar in the streets ") that small criminal groups could potentially turn into highly networked cartels, triads and terrorist groups. And given the rapid development of information technology, the very nature of the conflict and crimes is changing. Military historian Martin van Creveld exacerbates this prediction: "Future wars will be fought not by armies, but by small groups, which we call terrorists, gangsters and gangsters, and who will undoubtedly choose a more appropriate official name." Considering the evolutionary stages, the apogee of which is a network war, Sullivan identifies three generations of urban gangsters. In the past, criminal and armed groups could not claim the status of terrorists and did not fall under the classical definition of terrorism. The lowest level was typically a small group operating in the vicinity of one quarter. Further groupings start their criminal business. And then “mercenary intentions” are mixed with politics. At first, politicization takes place (for example, as in the case of the Sicilian Mafia). It can take place from the establishment of control over a quarter or district to co-opting into the ranks of the police structure and representatives of the authorities. Ultimately, a group with an active political agenda can destabilize the government. The second level is internationalization. By nature, most gangs remain at the local level, despite the large number (for example, the number of members of the Los Angeles multi-ethnic group "18 Street" reaches twenty thousand people). Others create clicks and confederations. Some spread their activities throughout the country. And others are becoming transnational and even international, with their branches in foreign countries. The third level is the experience and sophistication that determine the tactics and strategy of the organization, the use of technical means and weapons, the very structure of the organization.
According to American analyst Robert Bander, network informal organizations struggle much harder than conventional terrorists, and the development of such structures will lead to the emergence of so-called non-state "soldiers", and terrorism will have not political, as it was before, but system (For details, see C Robert J. Bunker, "The Terrorist: soldier of the future?" Special Warfare, vol. 10, No 1, Winter 1998).
Under the black flag of "direct democracy"
The revolutionary avant-garde of anarchists, nicknamed by journalists as the "Black Bloc", successfully use online tactics to stimulate political action. In a study conducted by the American Rand Corporation, among the network of potentially dangerous communities, where football hooligans, gangs and radical organizations fell, the anarchists took the highest rating in all indicators. High levels of politicization and internationalization, plus considerable experience at the level of evaluation between medium and high. Concern over the actions of anarchists is primarily sacred with a good lesson that social activists and anarchists presented to the US government in November-December 1999 during the WTO summit in Seattle. The losses incurred as a result of the unrest amounted to $ 3 million and were, together with the arrests of more than six hundred people, the results of the mistakes of the special services and the police. Street actions were held in parallel with international and virtual - the WTO website was attacked, spam was sent by e-mail, and the WTO headquarters in Geneva was rendered electricity-free as a result of the operational and defiant Green Renet Brigade campaign (Battle in Seattle: Strategy and Tactics Behind the WTO Protests, Washington, DC: The Maldon Institute, Dec. 16, 1999).
Where does power go?
“Power is shifting to small non-governmental actors who can organize themselves into recognizable networks more quickly than traditional government structures,” write John Arquila and David Ronfeldt in their book Preparing for Conflicts in the Information Age (In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age), published by Rand. Is this what Foucault wrote about, characterizing the finding of power as “everywhere and nowhere”, or is it transformed into something new?
Despite the fact that the network theory of the year has been developed for a relatively long time, the model of managing the world without a specific center of power is quite suitable for the mondialist club. President of the Council on Foreign Relations (СFR) Richard Haas in his programmatic article on the Future of the World titled “The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Happen After the US Dominance”, published in the June issue of the Journal of International Relations (http://www.foreignaffairs.org/ 2008 / 3.html) writes that the main feature of international relations in the 21st century will be a world dominated not by one, two or several states, but rather by a multitude of actors who will represent different types of power. “At first glance,” writes the apologist of modern mondialism, “the modern world looks multipolar. The main forces - China, the EU, India, Japan, Russia and the United States are countries where more than half of the world's population lives, produces 75% of world GDP and spends 80% of world weapons costs ... However, the fundamental difference from the classical scheme of a multipolar world is nation states lose their monopoly on power. It moves to regional and global organizations, including non-governmental and corporations. ” Further, the author lists new regional players, which include not only countries, such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Nigeria, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, Australia, etc., and not only global organizations like the IMF, UN, World Bank, but also a number of regional from the Arab League to the SCO. Separately allocated states and cities, for example. Uttar Pradesh in India and California in the United States, as well as cities such as New York or San Paolo. The list of candidates for power includes energy companies and media giants (al Jazeera, BBC, CNN), militia groups (Hamas, Hezbollah, Mahdi Army, Taliban), political parties, religious organizations and terrorist groups, as well as drug cartels and non-governmental organizations, the number of which includes specific funds such as "Doctors Without Borders" and "Greenpeace".
The author predicts the appearance of not a unipolar or bipolar world, but a multipolar system, where several leading authorities will determine the rules of the game and punish those who violate them. “The absence of poles complicates diplomacy,” Haas writes. The classic state associations and unions that exist at the moment are accustomed to certain threats and are preparing for them in advance. Therefore, in the near future they will face an inevitable crisis, and the building of relations between political actors will be more situationalist. Since the absence of poles will cause difficulties and dangers, Richard Haas, expressing concern about the deterioration of the system of international relations, proposes to exacerbate global integration, which will help establish stability. In fact, the president of CFR voiced the thoughts of his predecessors, who proposed the theory of convergence during the collapse of the USSR. Definitely, mondialists fear loosening of their power, therefore they are interested in integration as one of the key players in future world politics. On the other hand, the US actions on the world stage (military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, recognition of Kosovo’s independence, diplomatic intrigues with unrecognized republics and puppet states) show that they are not going to lose power from their hands and a soft transformation in favor of the interests of Washington.
Therefore, whatever the actors of network wars, whether a small radical group or a large concern, should be aware of global interests and the eternal geopolitical rules of struggle. We have to win this war.