WHAT THE DPRK HAVE LAUNCHED ON DECEMBER 2012 OF THE YEAR AND THAN THE LAUNCH
What was launched, seemingly understandable, was a spacecraft (SC) for, as stated by the North Korean side, photographing individual parts of the earth’s surface. Nobody disputes that the spacecraft entered the orbit, it is observed by national means of tracking a number of countries and has received official international registration.
Here we should pay attention to the fact that the derived spacecraft, according to reports for the media of astronomers watching it, rotates, therefore, in principle, it cannot be used for the purposes stated by the DPRK. In addition, no information exchange was recorded between the spacecraft and the North Korean ground services.
If the spacecraft were at least in a minimally functional state, we would certainly see a photograph of the earth’s surface, albeit indistinct, but filmed by them, or a patriotic North Korean song heard from space. None of this is and will not be, so the most likely is the assumption that the spacecraft was damaged during the elimination phase. If it was intended at all to transmit any information to Earth. Experts from different countries called the estimated weight characteristics of this spacecraft. The most "generous" figure, named by experts in South Korea, is 220 pounds, that is, almost 100 kg. To this figure we will return.
If to follow from official statements, then they launched with the help of a three-stage launch vehicle (PH) "Enkha-3". Informally, it is about testing the next version of the North Korean combat rocket Tephodon. In the absence of other public data, the conversation about what they, the North Koreans, this time safely “flew off”, can now proceed only on the basis of information published by South Korea, which, it is claimed, has managed to catch part of the fuel tank at sea and elements of the first stage of the PH "Unha-3". What did the experts of South Korea reveal and what was allowed to publish in the media? And that's what.
The propulsion system of the first stage of the PH “Unkha-3” - “Tepkhodon” is a “hitch” of four PH engines “Nodon”, the second stage of the PH “Unha-3” is the “Nodon” itself and the third stage of the PH - “Scud”. The Nodon RV propulsion system, as is known, is a four-chamber bundle of four Scada single-chamber engines. Total we have at the first stage a bunch of “four by four”, that is, sixteen “Scadov” engines, at the second stage - one bunch of four “Scadov” engines, and at the third stage - a single-chamber engine “Scud” (the author also encountered other information on the third steps - that it was kind of like the Soviet "Point", which does not change the essence). In general, as in that old song, "I blinded him from what was." Everywhere the same old, 50-s of development, engines from the good old tactical Soviet missile R-17. And there is nothing new. The aforementioned South Korean information only confirms the conclusion made by the author in a previous publication that North Koreans use old technologies and old engines in their RN developments from among those that are “at hand”, and nothing new has been created by them.
The 16-chamber bundle of old single-chamber engines at the first stage of the PH did not work properly during the previous April launch of the 2012, and sometime after the 100 seconds of the flight, the Unha-2 PH exploded. Most likely due to problems with the flight control system - it is clear that the more engines installed in the first stage of the launch vehicle, the more difficult it is to synchronize their work and control it. And here they are at the first stage - as many as 16. Probably, the North Koreans managed to finish something, and in December, the Eunkha-3 launch vehicle seemed to work fine. But what will happen with the third launch?
The maximum range of the PH "Ynha-3" was again "measured" by South Koreans - 6212 miles, that is, approximately 10 thousand km. God bless her, from this measured to a value with an accuracy of 1,7 km range. Measuring the latter with a payload of the above 100 kg makes no special sense, even with such a load, the Tephodn PH flies even on 15 thousand, it flies, then what? This, after all, is not about the very possibility of the RN to fly to the main territory of the United States, but about the possibility of delivering a strategic nuclear warhead to the North Korean RN. And here, no weight characteristics in 100 kg do not “roll”. If the DPRK can even go from a rudimentary nuclear explosive device to create some kind of nuclear warhead, then it is almost guaranteed to be a warhead (warhead) weighing over 1 tons, and the warhead (MS) of the launch vehicle, this warhead itself carrying the weight, will weigh down the total the weight of the last stage of PH is at least a quarter. For the sake of clarity, I will repeat the purely weight gradation of the weight of nuclear warheads for strategic LVs on open American expert e-sites. The current fifth generation is 250 – 300 kg, the fourth is 500 – 600 kg, the third is 750 – 900 kg, the second is about 1 tons and more, and the first generation is under 1,4 – 1,5 tons. This is quite approximately what, in the opinion of American experts, the USA and the USSR were able to do. And what category does North Korea fall into? Yes, in any!
One important point is important. In the creation of atomic and thermonuclear weapons In principle, there can be no "breakthroughs". Arms are not initially subject to dilettantism, and slogans like "scream and develop!" In nuclear physics in its military application do not work. And if you have a nuclear explosive device the size of a half-home, this does not automatically mean that next time you step through one or two generations and at once create the so-called “light” warhead, which your RN will be able to abandon. It is obvious that the thrown weight in 1 a ton or more for the Tephodon PH of the described construction is unattainable. MS in the form of "Scud", deducing 1-ton warhead on an intercontinental ballistic trajectory? Absurd. But the absurd, carefully silenced by Western lovers to wishful thinking. The author can only repeat the conclusion made in the June publication: the current version of the North Korean long-range RN, called Tephodon, can never deliver a nuclear charge with the specified weight characteristics to the main US territory and the Tephodon program is dead-end in this regard. Incidentally, the North Korean comrades seem to understand this, and there is one thing, albeit not a direct one, but evidence.
HUNTING FOR ENGINES
In early June, 2012 in a number of Ukrainian media “slipped” brief information that a court in the city of Dnepropetrovsk sentenced two DPRK citizens to eight years of imprisonment each for an espionage attempt in late May. The author, with the support of the relevant Ukrainian department, was able to gain more insight into these relatively recent events. This spy история very interesting and deserves a separate detailed description, but the volume of this article, unfortunately, does not allow this. In short, it looks like this.
Two DPRK citizens - employees of the DPRK trade mission in Minsk - managed to reach a specialist at Yuzhnoye Design Bureau in Dnepropetrovsk and offered him for money (attention, reader: as much as three thousand US dollars!) To provide secret information. A security officer showed civil consciousness and appealed to the local administration of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU). The rest, as they say, was the “work of the technician” of the SBU, which, as it turned out, was not occupied by this technology. Under her control for North Korean spies was organized re-shooting of secret materials, during which they were captured in the act. By the way, not secret, but supposedly secret materials - even with a comprehensively prepared seizure, the contents of the volumetric secret volume of materials with the corresponding stamp were replaced with unclassified materials, and the “secret” signature remained only on the cover.
Interest in this story is both the spy story itself and the subject of interest of the North Koreans. On a piece of paper they gave to the aforementioned employee of the KB, there was a list of questions of interest. Among them were such as the design of the first-stage engine of a heavy rocket and fuel for it, heat-resistant materials for the first-stage combustion chamber, the control system, and all this — as much as in relation to the “Voevod” strategic rocket R-36X2 (general The name of the family of these rockets in the West is known as “Satan”), the glory and pride of the Soviet military rocket science. This rocket was developed in Dnepropetrovsk in NPO “Yuzhnoye” and was produced there at the serial plant. Design and other documentation on the rocket, of course, continues to be in the local archives, and the Ukrainian specialists continue to participate in the work on the extension of the resource of these missiles, which are still in considerable numbers on alert in the Russian Federation.
The beginning of this spy story is the autumn of 2010, the end (capture red-handed) is the summer of 2011. The timing is the period after the unsuccessful launch of Tephodon in the 2009 year and before the explosion of the Unha-2 in the 2012 year. The presence in the list of specific questions on the heavy LV indicates that the North Korean spies were not just hunting for any information on the former Soviet missile programs, but for the data, the receipt of which their leadership required them first. “Gag” in such cases can not be, and therefore, the North Koreans tried to get what they themselves do not work, in this case - the documentation on the first stage of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). It is noteworthy that the two North Koreans mentioned made the above-mentioned employee of the KB a proposal for cooperation at the very first meeting. Perhaps from the standpoint of the DPRK trade mission in Minsk, in any case, it was not easy to organize a study of the alleged recruitment object, but the author’s experts know the question with one voice: the so-called head-on recruitment at the first meeting suggests that the North Koreans had instructions in any way and as soon as possible try to obtain the necessary information. Thanks to the efficient work of the SBU, a potential leak of information was prevented, while the North Korean designers continue to place bundles of “scad” engines on the first step of Tephodon.
WHAT BREAKED UP
The answer to the question: which plutonium or uranium charge was tested in February, now no one knows. Air samples taken by experts from the United States, South Korea, China and Russia (it is difficult to assume that the Special Control Service did nothing in this regard) seemed to have yielded nothing. In addition, there was information in the media that the US government in any case would refrain from publishing any information on this subject. Official commentary is not traditionally expected from the relevant Russian departments, and the statements of both Koreas for various reasons must be treated very carefully. It may well happen that the world community will never receive an answer to the question “what was blown up this time” or will, but not soon. The same can be said about the energy release of the third explosion - figures from 6-7 to 40 kilotons flashed in the media. One Russian news An electronic channel, citing a source in the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, reported that the explosion power was exactly over 10 ct.
Here I would like to emphasize the following. First, talk about the possibility of undermining a large number of conventional explosives (explosives) as imitations of a nuclear test is not serious. And the point is not that the DPRK has been under the “international microscope” for a long time and it will be difficult for it to conceal the movement of hundreds of trucks carrying explosives to the test site. The fact is that in order to avoid a simple detonation of a huge amount of TNT, testers would have to make efforts to ensure the synchronization of exploding several thousand tons of this explosives (and this is not such a simple task as it may seem). But the use of hundreds or even thousands of electronic fuses to synchronize the explosion does not solve the main problem of imitation - the burning rate of TNT and nuclear fuel differ significantly. The picture of the occurrence and spread of the seismic phenomenon, which is fixed by national and supranational seismic monitoring means, differs accordingly, and any experienced seismologist who is familiar with the topic can easily distinguish one from the other.
Second, let's nevertheless deal with the topic of the so-called amplification, hydrogen amplification and other similar statements in the media on the eve of the third North Korean nuclear test. For what it was written in foreign media, mainly Japanese and South Korean, - unknowingly or for forcing the atmosphere - the author is unknown. But getting such information "frills" in the Russian media, unfortunately, is connected with the former "illness" of the latter - as a rule, with a simple "tracing" of what is published abroad, without even making the slightest attempt to understand it that you are releasing in print or on informational tape.
What was discussed in foreign publications? Probably meant the word “booting” unfamiliar to individual Russian leaders of the pen, which they unknowingly were afraid to use. Such a word - boosting - really exists, it is a professional term, and means a multiple increase in power, that is, energy release, with an explosion of a nuclear charge, often up to megaton values. For this purpose, vials with T-D gas are put inside the charge bodies. First, the so-called “switch”, a compact nuclear explosive device, is undermined, the task of which is to create the necessary pressure and temperature values at which it is possible to ignite heavy hydrogen isotopes — tritium and deuterium. All this together is called "two-stage thermonuclear warhead."
With all due respect to North Korean scientists, designers and engineers, in whose genius the US associates continue to try to convince us for more than the first decade before the creation of thermonuclear weapons to North Korea ... no, not like the Moon, but much further. There are no “breakthroughs” here, they have nowhere to come from, and all the talk about mastering the North Korean specialists the secrets of nuclear fusion is purely antiscientific, but in reality purely propagandistic “spreading cranberries” aimed only at one thing - inflating the scale of the North Korean threat at any cost.
In fact, the DPRK has neither scientific, nor design, nor production, nor a test base for the creation of thermonuclear weapons. As the hero of the Central Asian epic Khoja Nasreddin, how many times you say the word “halva”, will not become sweet in your mouth. Fans can write off foreign publications about “hydrogen enhancement”, the author advises next time to at least look into the electronic “Wikipedia” and read there, for example, that if deuterium can be accumulated during multistage electrolysis of water, then an industrial nuclear reactor is needed for tritium production . Which is simply not in the DPRK. As well as there is no testing range for LV on the ultimate range, a nuclear warhead of tested design and much more. It is not a good idea to “treat with extraordinary ease” publications on topics that are directly related to the national security of the state in which you live and work. And the declared future deployment of an additional “portion” of American antimissiles in Alaska under the pretext of increasing the North Korean threat is the question of Russia's national security.
In the previous publication (“NVO” No. 18 from 08.06.2012), the author mentioned the reaction of some Western experts to the six new “serial” mobile ballistic missiles, designated KN-2012 and presented to the world by Western media as ICBMs, at the April 08 military parade. . Two German specialists - experts from the German firm Schmucker Technologie, Markus Schiller and Robert Schmucker, based only on a detailed study of photographs of the external appearance of these PH (and there are no other possibilities), concluded that for a number of reasons these PH: mock-ups, and, secondly, these mock-ups are crudely executed and, despite the stated seriality of products, even outwardly differ from each other. This gave German experts a reason to joke about the fact that the DPRK became the first country in the world that managed to demonstrate six different ICBMs in one parade.
Relatively recently, the media passed information that these same KN-08 either are about to be taken on alert, or it has already happened. Answering a question from a foreign journalist why the DPRK declares KN-08 as a PH ready for combat duty, the aforementioned Marcus Schiller said the following (the author’s literal translation): “Either they do some miracles, and such which no one in the world could do before them, they acquire the possibility of combat use of an extremely complex type of weapon even without a single flight test. Or whatever they do is just a show. Here, only the first or second is possible, and no average variants. I - for the second option. "
The author has nothing to add to this characteristic of the new North Korean "threat".
INFORMATION COMBAT ACTION
In his previous publication on North Korean issues (“NVO” No. 18 from 08.06.2012), the author tried to draw attention to the need for a weighted approach to evaluating open foreign information, since inflating the North Korean threat objectively works on the United States with its plans to create a global missile defense system. The author does not at all call for anti-American demonstrations in this regard. But, dear sirs, let us at least not further the spread of mythology on this subject. Unfortunately, too wide informational spaces are still too easy to get (as a rule, in the form of direct “tracing paper”), intentionally prepared information bulletins originated in the USA, South Korea, and Japan.
Let us take, for example, the statement of the North Korean side made on the eve of the third test that this time it will test "a more powerful and compact warhead." It passes the test, yes, it is about times more powerful than the previous one in terms of energy release in 2,3 – 3 (the author calls the most frequently repeated assessment here). And that is all. However, in the story on this topic, the federal TV channel comments that, on the eve of the tests, the experts assumed that a more powerful and compact warhead would be tested, and "the statement of the DPRK confirms this." What does it actually "confirm"? Never mind.
One could write a multi-volume book about how purposefully American journalists, “experts” and officials are lying about North Korean issues. I will give one example. 19 December 2012, a week after the North Korean launch of the spacecraft, the Washington Times published an article by Peter Vincent Praia, a former CIA employee and current official, entitled "Attack by North Korea using electromagnetic pulse (EMR) can destroy the United States now." Such is the optimistic and life-affirming title. Thesis content of this "masterpiece" is as follows:
- The DPRK now has an ICBM capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to the United States;
- North Korea has a compact nuclear charge;
- The DPRK has a weapon that can destroy the United States with one blow. It turns out that, in the summer of 2004, a group of Russian generals warned the US Congress on EMR that the secrets of super-EMR weapons had flowed to North Korea;
- it turns out that the first two nuclear tests of the DPRK were very similar to the tests of a super-EMP warhead, for the detrimental effect of which a large amount of energy released during an explosion is not needed;
- it turns out that there are Russian nuclear scientists in the DPRK who help the North Koreans to create a super-EMP warhead;
- in short, North Korea already now has a guaranteed opportunity to destroy the United States.
So, reader! But Mr. Pry is not a random person, he worked for some time in the mentioned commission of the Congress. And the newspaper, which published these fantasies, as it were, to say the least, is also not a publication of a provincial American town, where life has stopped since the United States gained independence. Nonsense, but after all it is published, and it does its work. Simple coincidence or not, after a couple of months, February 20 2013, the former head of the Livermore National Laboratory, John Foster, makes a call to create an EMI-weapon in the US, which she allegedly does not have. Poor America! And poor Mr. Pry, who lives in a country so unprotected from the North Korean foe!
This mister is also a pity because there is not a word of truth in his little article. Well, not one, except for the correct names of several states, as well as the term "EMP". This very electromagnetic pulse is one of the damaging factors of a nuclear weapon, its effect on electrical devices, wiring, cable lines and the like, which it literally burns out, was noted from the first atomic tests (the effect of the so-called Compton electrons). In the World Wide Web, God knows how many years the script “hangs”, according to which “enemy force” (read - Russia) blows up the geographical center of the United States at an altitude of 1 thousand km of a megaton class thermonuclear charge and EMR burns all electrical and electronics in the US Nobody and nothing is moving or working, and in a few days the USA turns into a primitive-communal society. Nobody denies the existence of an EMP weapon (by the way, not only nuclear, there are mobile non-nuclear installations). Nuclear gunsmiths have long learned to strengthen one or another damaging factor of nuclear weapons. But everything else in the article is a deliberate lie.
However, there are examples and "more fun" on one of the foreign Internet resources. The administrator of this site is John Pike, a brutal-looking mustache, a veteran of the American special services, and a certain Charles Vick is perhaps the only author of the “analytics” on the missile and nuclear programs of the DPRK and Iran. This is where you can read anything. And everything is served in a la scientific-analytical style, as a rule, with a mass of footnotes and references. At the same time there are dosed blotches of monstrous disinformation. For example, we are talking about the missile tests of the DPRK in 2006 year. At that time, the DPRK did not have (however, as it does not exist now) the tested overall weight model of a future nuclear warhead launched and dropped into the calculated place. Without his testing and testing, it’s frivolous to talk about the existence of a CU for a PH.
And the DPRK also does not have a range for firing at extreme distances. What, therefore, do the authors of this site do? They claim that six of the seven missiles launched at that time almost in a row went along a ballistic trajectory, and one precisely to work on the return of the prototype warhead to the ground was launched almost vertically upwards. And it is stated already after at least three countries (USA, South Korea and Japan) tracked and published in the media the trajectories of all seven missiles. It does not matter, the slogan "the more monstrous the lie, the sooner they will believe it" was invented before the authors of this site. And the fact that a ballistic missile cannot fly vertically upwards is also not a problem - well, who will pay attention to such “trifles”?
In another case, the reader could read on the Internet that several years ago the DPRK produced the 20 PH Tephodon, which are stored somewhere and are “waiting in the wings.” In the third case, the fact that in order to cause enormous damage to the United States for the North Korea, an ICBM is actually not needed, it is enough to send a North Korean fishing trawler to the US coast, from the hold of which near the US territorial waters will be launched damage to the territory of the United States by electromagnetic pulse.
The statement of the content of this kind of "analytics", I repeat, can take an infinitely long time. Nor does she deserve that. It is a pity that its individual samples are still easily in our country in print and electronic media, as well as on television screens. To the Russian "lovers" to publish all indiscriminately, the author has a question. Suppose next time the DPRK will announce that it has built, say, a super-laser, with which the laser thermonuclear feasible becomes feasible (gentlemen, do not bother to look for what it is, it’s important that in reality this facility is now only in the US , built in France, and should be built in the Russian Federation). And this is a complete "high-end" in this area, besides worth billions and billions of euro-dollars. Or, for example, the DPRK will declare that it has learned how to produce metallic hydrogen - one of the dreams of nuclear weapons gunsmiths. And you still let it all without any checking on your information tapes?
In last year’s publication, the author called on the relevant Russian departments to formally speak on this topic or at least publish their expert assessments that would help many understand the essence of the problems, remove monstrous errors and misrepresentations from their databases and generally feel more confident about being journalistic or research. table. No result yet. But this is by no means too late and still necessary, since the topics of the nuclear programs of the countries of the so-called Third World in connection with the creation of the US global missile defense system will not go away in the foreseeable future.