But these are not the only differences that prevent full cooperation between the parties. Another sensitive issue in the relationship between Moscow and Brussels is control over conventional weapons. According to the Russian side, today there is no need to keep unchanged the instruments of arms control and disarmament that were established during the Cold War. Including the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), from which our country withdrew in December 2007. He has completely exhausted himself, and new agreements — such as the Vienna Document 2011 of the Year and the Open Skies Treaty, which allows you to see and know what is happening militarily in a given country — can replace it completely.
There is a problem with regard to new types of weapons. Some of them blur the line between nuclear and non-nuclear munitions. And so non-nuclear weapons cannot be artificially withdrawn from negotiations to reduce stockpiles of nuclear weapons. This applies to carriers of various types, from cruise missiles to multifunction fighters and even strike drones, which can also be used to deliver nuclear warheads to a target. According to the domestic military, restrictions on conventional weapons that were within the scope of the CFE Treaty (Tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery systems, planes and helicopters), as a means of preventing aggression, primarily for large-scale operations, today have lost much of their significance. Now, drones and electronic warfare systems, cyber weapons systems, the ability to launch weapons into space, advanced missile defense systems, and the creation of compact special-purpose units capable of operating at great distances from their own bases are now coming to the fore.
The presence of all this in the arsenal of one or another state can provoke individual regimes to unexpected aggression, an attempt by force to solve old problems with its neighbors, to draw all of us into large-scale military actions with unpredictable consequences. This is especially dangerous during the rampant international terrorism, religious extremism, and attempts to change governments that are unwelcome by someone in this or that country with the help of multi-colored revolutions.
During the tactical and operational-tactical exercises, attempts to play out the Cold War scenarios and to cause fears of aggression from neighbors in the NATO countries for a long time do not serve to strengthen confidence, which, by the way, is directly included in the design of the Stedfast Jazz-20132 maneuvers, which are planned in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in November of this year. The main idea underlying these exercises - the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, guided by the requirement of paragraph 5 of the Washington Treaty, come to the aid of their allies, against whom an unnamed country committed aggression. Who borders on the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Baltic countries, it is not necessary to guess. Here it is obvious who the NATO staff officers mean - the developers of the upcoming exercises. And the justification that Russia and Belarus also conduct their “West-2013” maneuvers at the borders of the same Poland and Lithuania cannot be misled by anyone. In the scenario of the Russian-Belarusian teachings there is not a word about aggression by any state. In them, as is customary in recent times and how it really correlates with the international situation, it refers to the reaction to the actions of terrorist groups and illegal armed groups. What is called, feel the difference.
Moreover, the scenario of these exercises was disclosed in detail in a speech in Brussels by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General Alexander Postnikov, and specific polygons were named where the active maneuvers phase, the number of combat equipment and personnel involved, and the structure of military command and control bodies would take place. Invited observers from the North Atlantic Alliance. And this is not the only example of transparency in conducting exercises that Russia demonstrates in relation to NATO.
How to improve our relationship? What can and should Russia and NATO do together to increase trust in each other and be more predictable in strengthening their security? The proposals of the domestic military are not new, but have not lost their relevance. In the first place is the development of an open and honest dialogue on all issues of interest to the parties. Including reforming the armed forces and conducting various types of exercises near the borders, continuing the practice of inviting observers to the most significant of them. It is necessary to create a common security space from the Atlantic to the Urals and to take additional measures of transparency, as proposed by the delegation of Germany. And of course, to work more closely in the fight against common threats. Not only in words, but in deeds. There is simply no other way to eliminate the defects of trust.