The reason for writing these lines was the appearance on the pages of the "MIC" (No. 49, 2010) the article by Boris Sokolov "Ghost Fight" with the subtitle "Why did it take to invent a feat allegedly committed near Sevastopol." The essence of the publication can be stated with the same phrase taken from it: “... An episode with the five political instructor Filchenkov hardly has a real basis.”
And was he looking there?
By the way, if something is supposedly accomplished, then it is not just “hardly has ... a real basis, but does not have it at all. As for the "Five Filchenkov", I will tell about it later. So far I will only note that today, thanks to a number of "researchers" from the heroes of bygone days, neither the glory of their names nor the memory of examples of fearlessness, courage and perseverance shown by them remained in the public consciousness.
So, Sokolov's colleagues in the search for "the truth of history" precisely "established" that Alexander Matrosov was not a hero, but an imbalance of either schizoid or paranoid type. (It is not clear, however, what type were about another five hundred people who covered the enemy’s embrasures with their breasts, both before and after Matrosov). Now it is “known” that the young guards of Krasnodon dumped alive into the mine holes of the Krasnodon “did not accomplish anything substantial”, as did the “mythical” Nikolai Gastello, as well as the “clumsy” Viktor Talalikhin ...
Young hero pioneers Volodya Dubinin, Valya Kotik, Lenya Golikov “in fact” “were hooligans”. Pilots from the 46 Guards Tamansky regiment of light night bombers received Golden Stars not for combat sorties and strikes at the enemy, but “in bed with the bosses”. And the fact that the defense of Stalingrad was provided by "defensive detachments of executioners from the NKVD", for the current "advanced scientists" has long been an "indisputable fact."
The current Russian "seekers of truth" made it a rule to reject any evidence of Soviet sources
Now the turn has come to political director Nikolai Filchenkov, the Red Navy men Vasily Tsibulko, Daniil Odintsov, Ivan Krasnoselsky, Yuri Parshin.
In Soviet schools and military registration and enlistment offices hung stands with colorful posters describing the exploits (as it turned out, “almost entirely invented by totalitarian propaganda”) of our fellow citizens during the Great Patriotic War, including five brave soldiers from the 18th separate battalion of the Marine Corps. They fought on November 7, 1941 with the German tanks beneath the village of Duvanka (now the Upper Sadovoye of the Sevastopol City Council) and there they laid down their heads, the last remaining heroes lying under armored vehicles, tied with grenades.
For the second Sevastopol defense, as well as for the first, in the Crimean war, contempt for death quickly became the norm of behavior. However, in this feat there was a special sacrifice - go under the tank, this ...
However, is it worth explaining?
But did a similar case take place, do the seekers of "truth" ask? After all, the “slaves of the totalitarian system” could not be personalities by definition. And now Boris Sokolov, after “thorough searches” in the “sources”, throws the “grenade” under the very fact of the feat, having doubted even in the reality of the existence of people who “allegedly committed it”. He refers to the Books of Memory of various regions, etc., finds several Cibulco, Parshin, Krasnoselsky, although he should have referred to the handbook “Heroes of the Soviet Union. A brief biographical dictionary in two volumes ”(M., Voenizdat, 1987). Here are the official information about all five warriors.
Politruk Nikolai Dmitrievich Filchenkov (there is a photo) was born in 1907, in the village of Kurilovo, now Dalnekonstantinovsky district of the Gorky region, Russian, member of the CPSU since 1930. In the Navy in 1929 – 1934 and since June 1941.
Ivan Mikhailovich Krasnoselsky (there is a photo) was born in 1913, in the village of Yevlashevka, now the village of Krasnoselskoye, Borznyansky district of the Chernihiv region, Ukrainian, member of the CPSU, in the Navy since 1941.
Daniil Sidorovich Odintsov (without photo) was born in 1918, Russian, in the Navy with 1941.
Yuri Konstantinovich Parshin (without photo) was born in 1924, Russian, in the Red Army from 1941. (I will note in parentheses that brief biographies of seven Parshins awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union are placed in the reference book. Four of them were assigned posthumously. Guard Lieutenant Nikolai Parshin, awarded with the 13 Gold Star on September 1944, died in April 30 Berlin 1945 Berlin- go.)
Vasily Fedoseyevich Tsibulko (there is a photo) was born in 1920, in the village of New Bug, now the city of Nikolaev, in a working-class family, Ukrainian.
However, the article by Boris Sokolov for some reason says about Vasily Grigorievich Tsibulko and reports that the author could not find credentials for him. And this is not surprising. After all, the patronymic name of Vasily Tsibulko, who fought on the approaches to Sevastopol, according to Fedoseyevich's biographical dictionary.
The title of Hero of the Soviet Union Filchenkov, Krasnoselsky, Odintsov, Parshin and Tsibulko was awarded 23 of October 1942 of the year posthumously. At the same time, Boris Sokolov claims that they gained fame thanks to the 19 of May 1942 published in the Sevastopol newspaper Mayak Kommuny, an essay entitled “The Feat of Five Black Sea People”. Its author, military journalist Meer Kogut, went missing in the last days of the defense of Sevastopol in July 1942, and Mr. Sokolov in fact dirty memory of the probably deceased person by suggesting that he simply invented everything that happened at Duvankoy and also doubts the fact the death of political instructor Filchenkov in November 41-th and declares: “However, the feat required to certainly make November 7 - the day of the next anniversary of the October Revolution. The four surnames of the Red Navy men (and maybe not the Red Navy men), who seemed to have fallen in battle, added at random who ... ”
What can I say? It’s a pity there is no time machine to abandon the one who wrote it, with its “hypotheses”, into the battle formations of one of the units of the marines defending Sevastopol. An interesting plot would be ...
However, Boris Sokolov refers to G. E. Zamikhovsky, who after a few decades (!) Does not remember anything about the Filchenkov group (which is convenient for Mr. Sokolov). But just on the day of the 24 anniversary of the October Revolution, the 1200 exploits the cadets from the combined battalion of the Lenin Komsomol coastal defense school (which, however, doesn’t fit well with the “version” of Boris Sokolov).
Boris Sokolov declares that the essay of Kogut was born because “after the Kerch catastrophe it was necessary to strengthen the morale of the people of Sevastopol, who had no hope of a speedy release.” And here the "historian" denigrates the memory of all the defenders of Sevastopol! I repeat, for both Sevastopol defenses, fortitude has become the standard of life, if it can be said about the situation when the daily death was the daily death of comrades.
The current Russian "seekers of truth" made it a rule to reject any evidence of Soviet sources, but to have a peremptory confidence in Western sources, including the memoirs of German generals. So, Mr. Sokolov bases his overthrow on the feat of the Sevastopol Five, destroying ten enemy armored vehicles, based on the assertions of the German 11 commander Erich von Manstein that he did not have any tanks or assault guns in the Crimea during the first assault on Sevastopol .
Well, let's try to deal with the "tank-less" Manstein, whose soldiers almost with their bare hands intended to seize Sevastopol. I will deliberately refer not below to Soviet sources (including memories of the commander of the 7 brigade of marines EI Zhidilov and others), but to the little-known but very informative research of I. Moschansky and A. Savin "Fight for the Crimea . September 1941 - July 1942 of the Year ”, printed as a separate issue of the illustrated periodical War Chronicle (No. 1 for 2002 a year).
So (p. 5): “Manstein in his memoirs wrote that while solving the problem of a breakthrough to the Crimea ... he was afraid to take on this business with insufficient means and forces. Meanwhile 11-I Manstein's Army had the following forces: 30-Army Corps General Zalmuta (22, 72 and 170-Infantry Divisions), 54-Army Corps General Hansen (46, 50 and 73-Infantry Divisions), 49 Army Corps General Kobler (1 and 4-I Mountain Division), motorized SS divisions "Adolf Hitler" and "Viking" ...
The latter two, by definition, could not have had armored vehicles, and they naturally had them. In addition, Manstein was supported by up to 40 artillery regiments, as well as the 4th aviation a corps consisting of the 77th fighter squadron (150 Me-109) and two bomber squadrons (over 100 Yu-87 and up to 100 Heinkel-111). These are only German units, not counting the Romanian corps.
Further (pp. 8 – 9): “According to the statement of the commander of 11 by the German army Manstein (and Boris Sokolov. - S. B.), there were virtually no tanks in the German grouping, except for the 190 of the light battalion of assault guns (18 SAU StuG III Ausf. C / D).
3 November 1941 of the year the 197 division of assault guns as part of 22 SAU StuG III Ausf became part of the German grouping in the Crimea. C / D ... It is not excluded the use of any combined group of 13, 14 or 16-th tank divisions, as well as up to 8 of the R-1 tankettes of the Romanian ... parts, but German sources do not confirm such information (still! S. B. .) ".
It should be noted that the StuG III self-propelled artillery mounts resembled tanks (in fact, they were created on the basis of the T-III tank) and as such could figure in our combat reports, since Russian albums on the military equipment of the Wehrmacht with colorful illustrations were not issued at that time. This assault gun itself had a decent mass (up to 22 tons), powerful armament (75-mm or 88-mm gun) and good armor (50 – 30 mm).
However, besides the assault guns, Manstein had tanks in the Crimea. For example, in the description of the battles for Armyansk 28 of September 1941 of the year in the work of I. Moshchansky and A. Savina it is noted (p. 10 – 11) that “against each of our parts, except aircraft, operated from 20 to 30 enemy tanks that supported their offensive infantry. The Soviet 5 Tank Regiment, which then made up all the armored forces of the Crimea (10 T-34s and 56 T-NNXX / T37 tanks), conducted a battle with enemy 38 tanks, preventing the passage of enemy reserves through Perekopi shaft ... enemy tanks. " This is “at the entrance” to the Crimea at the end of September 30.
But later battles in the Chatarlyk River area: “In the evening of October 19, the 170 Infantry Division of the Germans, with which more than 30 assault installations StuG III operated, broke free to the mouth of the Chatarlyk” (p. 12). In the battles of 20 and 21 of October: “... enemy tanks could not get through the marshy riverbed, but the infantry, with the support of artillery and aviation, sometimes broke into our trenches” (p. 15).
Finally, the description of the first assault on Sevastopol states: “The actions ... enemy groupings supported the 13 artillery battalions and a significant number of assault guns, armored vehicles and airplanes” (p. 20), on November 8 the cruiser “Chervona Ukraine” and “Red Crimea” were at extreme distances the fire on "clusters of troops and tanks advancing along the Bakhchisarai road" (p. 20 – 21), the main attack on Sevastopol "was to be inflicted by the 72-I infantry division with the support of tanks on the left flank", and the auxiliary - 50-I infantry division I and the 118 Motorized Detachment "supported by assault guns" (p. 22).
On the morning of November 13 1941, the Germans "launched an offensive with two battalions with tanks on 440,8 height and one battalion with tanks on Kadykovka", and "on the morning of November 15, the enemy brought the second echelon of the 72 th infantry division and several tanks into battle" (p. 22).
As we see, Manstein had tanks. But what is the most piquant, Boris Sokolov himself confirms this. Referring to G. E. Zamikhovsky, he quotes his words: “... I was under Duvanka on November 7, and our company stood right behind the 18 battalion of marines commanded by Chernousov. There were no German tanks there! The tanks were (highlighted by me. - S. B.) in the position of the consolidated battalion of the coastal defense school. Lenin Komsomol ... "
That is, on November 7, 1941, Manstein’s tanks were still advancing on Sevastopol. And not only in the field of view of the veteran Zamikhovsky. In addition, the five were in combat guard, in front of the positions of the mouths of the Marines, so even in the 18th battalion this battle was seen from afar. What can we say about those who stood "behind"! The 18th separate battalion of the marine corps, in which the five political officers Filchenkov served, belonged precisely to parts of the Black Sea coastal defense fleet.
Here is another evidence - indirect, but weighty.
Oleg Dmitrievich Kazachkovsky, who from 1973 to 1987 was the head of the Physics and Energy Institute in Obninsk, fought during the Great Patriotic War in an artillery regiment of the Reserve of the High Command and later published memories of the military campaign. This is a look at the era of a developed, intelligent and honest participant in the events, retreating from Moldova to Stalingrad and then advancing from Stalingrad to Germany.
He came to the Crimea only in the spring of 1944, and many years later told how the Sevastopol boys told him that “Malakhov Kurgan was a place of our exploits in this war. The sailors, bounding with grenades, rushed there under German tanks. ” Oleg Dmitrievich continues: “The guys spoke sincerely. And I, usually somewhat skeptical about this kind of stories, believed ... "
Major Kazachkovsky did not know about the five Red Navy men, and the boys didn’t mean, of course, not them, because Malakhov Kurgan is already the summer of 1942, this is the third assault on Sevastopol. In those hot days, unknown heroes repeated the feat, which they knew not only from the newspapers, but also from the living stories of those who defended Sevastopol since the fall of 1941.
Least of all, I would like the above stated to be regarded as a kind of discussion with an emphasis on questions of military history. I do not intend to call “respected opponents”, etc., those who question both the fact of the mass heroism of the Soviet people during the Great Patriotic War and their concrete actions. The poet was right: "Our dead will not leave us in trouble." But only if we do not surrender the memory of the defenders of the Motherland.
Yes, not all those who have committed equal feats are equally known. Yes, often widespread fame is a consequence of the fact that the feat was described in print. But this does not detract from the deed itself. The first two names for Stalingrad are Commander-62 General Chuikov and commander of the 13 Guards Rifle Division General Rodimtsev. General Zholudev, the commander of the 37 Guards Rifle Division, reorganized from the 1 Airborne Corps, which received the rank of Guards and Guards Standard before the first battle, is known to few. No luck, as they say, with the "PR" of the compound that lost 99 percent of personnel for a month of fighting in Stalingrad. But his contribution to the defeat of the enemy in the battle on the banks of the Volga does not make it any less bright, nor less significant, nor less real.
The substitution of concepts today is happening everywhere. However, no measures to fill the artificially created vacuum in the military chronicle of the Motherland due to the "revival of the traditions of the Russian army and navy", hanging heraldic eagles, Andreevsky and other crosses, are unable to educate in citizens of Russia, especially young guys, a sense of pride in their homeland, if truly the great Soviet past will continue to be presented as a kind of continuous GULAG, and the exploits accomplished in this past will be assessed as the result of “totalitarian myth-making”.
During the Great Patriotic War, everything happened, but if we talk about the decisive factor that led us to Victory, it is better to refer not to domestic sources, but to German sources, which for many of us are more authoritative than ours. In particular, the former chief of staff of the 5 Tank Army, Major General Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin, fought in Poland, France, the Balkans, Africa, the Eastern Front, and in 1956 published the book Tank Battles 1939 – 1945 in London in 1957. . ”(In our country it was printed in XNUMX). Below I will simply provide excerpts from Chapter XIX of the “Red Army”.
So: “... The party and its organs have enormous influence in the Red Army. Almost all commissioners are residents of cities and people from the working class. Their courage borders on recklessness; these people are very smart and determined. They succeeded in creating in the Russian army what it lacked in World War I — iron discipline ... Discipline is the main asset of communism, the driving force of the army. She was also a decisive factor in achieving the great political and military successes of Stalin ...
The industrialization of the Soviet Union, carried out aggressively and mercilessly, gave the Red Army new equipment and a large number of highly qualified specialists ...
The skillful and persistent work of the Communists has led to the fact that since 1917, Russia has changed in the most amazing way. There can be no doubt that the Russian is increasingly developing the skill of independent actions, and his level of education is constantly growing ...
Military leaders will certainly contribute in every way to such an evolution. The Russian high command knows its business better than the command of any other army ...
My comments were about ... the actions of the Russian infantry, which ... fully preserved the great traditions of Suvorov and Skobelev ... Russian artillery, like infantry, is also used massively ... Russian artillery is a very formidable type of military force and fully deserves the appreciation that it Stalin gave ... The extraordinary development of the Russian armored forces deserves the closest attention of those who study the experience of war ... The Red Army tank crews have been tempered in the crucible of war, their skill has increased immeasurably. Such a transformation should have required exceptionally high organization and unusually skillful planning and leadership ... "
As you can see, the Red Army was strong due to well-defined reasons. It is time to recognize all the "seekers" of the truth. At the same time, he stopped talking about an ostensibly de-ideologized society, which is a simple trick to an ideological war or a simple-minded illusion. The ideological component is present in the life of the modern world community more weighty and ruthlessly than anywhere else in the most "totalitarian" times. Those, for example, the United States in terms of totalitarian thinking from top to bottom are in no way inferior to Nazi Germany, if they are not superior.
And everyone is trying to convince us that the victory of the Soviet people is supposedly nothing more than a “propaganda myth.”