Don't play the fool, America. Russia's place in the system of world balances
Be strong or at least clever, our ancestors said (we, as always, have simplified everything: there is strength - we don’t need the mind). And this truth today has to be mastered by modern America. She was too accustomed to rely on force, by the way, not only on the military and, it seems, in the end she overstrained herself. Immediately after the end of the Cold War, the United States completely plunged into building a unipolar world in which it would play the role of hegemon. Well, it would be successful - the winners of the wound heal faster, but this is clearly not the case of current America. Washington considered that the United States is capable of owning a military superpower (more than half of the world's military spending) deciding the fate of global security, not really looking at others, not worrying too much about their attitude to themselves, crushing the weak and intimidating the strong. And only now, due to circumstances (the march on the carpet did not work), the United States very unwillingly turn to more realistic approaches to doing business in the international arena. NEW LINES OF THE WORLD FRAME
There are a whole set of factors, especially identified against the background of accelerated globalization and global crisis, making it obligatory for the USA today and especially tomorrow for changes in the planning and implementation of foreign and military policy, choosing its means, assessing the significance of threats and challenges. It turned out that globalization is a double-edged weaponand today it often turns against the United States. America clearly did not appreciate (or misjudged) the rapid rise of the global inter-civilization, including interfaith confrontation along the North-South line.
First, there are new frontiers, faults, zones of conflict and conflict of interests, new configurations of relations and new partnership priorities. Chaos has become easier to provoke and maintain, but increasingly difficult to manage.
Secondly, that which found justification in the bipolar world by the almost biblical concept of the struggle between good and evil turned out to be of little use in a unipolar and even more so in a multipolar world. This is what essentially limits the possibilities of the US without painful and unpunished intervention, including military, outside the western civilization area.
The exponential growth of the influence of non-systemic, non-governmental, transnational, including global in scale and scope of activities of forces with a military component should be taken into account. And this largely devalued the factor of military power as a means of US policy in the context of network-centric confrontation (the so-called concept of “powerlessness”, “from a cannon to sparrows”). Even if a military victory is achieved, the “flag over the citadel”, it still needs to be “equipped”, it is right to dispose of it - is it worth it to fence another military-force “garden”. Meanwhile, there has been a marked increase in the rejection of the United States as the main world policeman, let's say softer, a moderator: the Yankee Gringos and their satellites were to blame for everything. Hence the dramatic hesitations — from craving for the excessive use of American military superpowers to curling before the enemy. With the corresponding fluctuations in the mood of those responsible for making decisions and, most importantly, in the well-being of the Armed Forces and the special services, who turned out to be scapegoats, with cleansing and demonstrative flaws. Leaks, betrayals, tantrums about the non-return of apostates - from the same series. It has spoiled the US law enforcement agencies and the Afghan drug traffic, which has become the subject of unhealthy competition, and for some of them the main point of the Afghan campaign.
The crisis in the world and American economy (which will be quite long, hard, “many-humped”, albeit sluggish), in turn, makes certain changes in the US military preparations system inevitable. While reducing, more precisely, saving defense funds, including the purchase and development of weapons, military operations. Of course, for the United States, it is hardly possible to cut the military spending too deeply: military power is one of the main factors maintaining the reputation of American power and the US dollar in the eyes of the rest of the world. But still more than 1,7 trillion. dollars for two, as it turned out, the United States is not at all necessary, and not victorious wars at all - even for America there are too many, and there is still no chance to invest and invest there, just like that, after a farewell parade on the parade ground.
MILITARY FATIGUE
Today, the United States is hardly ready to overcome the systemic crisis through the implementation of military preparations, the conduct of a "power-nation" military-force policy. And it's not the desire of Barack Obama to "work off Nobel." The Americans "swallowed" the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, were tired of them. Yes, the losses incurred are an order of magnitude smaller than the Vietnamese, but the sensitivity to losses is now incomparably higher. And the voices of the patriotic lobby-and in what country is it not? - Today they sound loud in the USA, but still not in the same way as before. Moreover, in the American society with the victory in the Cold War, very important competitive, mobilizing, motivational incentives were lost. There is no worthy irritant whose card could be played out in the public consciousness and against which the former Messianic foreign and military policy, traditional for the USA, could be built. Whether it was worth "destroying the USSR to the ground" in order for China to take its place, although the United States seems to be instinctively aware of the limits to the growth of Chinese influence in the world. And in light of this, is it worth pursuing a tough "policy of humiliation" in relation to modern Russia? Another point: in the demography of the United States, its inter-ethnic proportions, civilizational preferences dramatic changes occur. Where, with what sense of patriotism, will the new Glory carry its Old Glory tomorrow (“Old Glory” is a common name for the flag of the USA), and will it be borne in general? By the way, this problem of the CIA in the early 70-s of the last century prophesied the then Soviet army.
As for the “proxy wars”, for the United States the risk of subsequent involvement in them and its escalation is too great. On the one hand, the United States is actively seeking to participate (not so successfully lately) in sharing the security burden. But on the other hand, there are enough hunters in the world to “milk and feed” the United States, playing on their superpower instincts, and draw them into all sorts of adventures. And in the long term, the United States can run into even greater dislike and hatred, they will be paid through asymmetrical responses by increasing terrorism, including in the territory of America itself. The United States today is more than ever integrated into the global economy.
Remember the "tentacles of Uncle Sam" on Soviet caricatures that have enmeshed the whole world, and now in this world, tightly and heavily entangled? But up to a third of the “expanded (extended) gross product” of the country today is connected with activities outside the United States, including American companies for the US market. So in the context of globalization, the United States is very vulnerable not only in cyber-technological terms. All of this does not mean, as some predict, the new US isolationism, but their ability to effectively implement global, including military, control is declining. This also applies to the ability of the United States to maintain and even more to increase its military and political-military presence in various regions, including the macro-region of Eurasia.
A number of advanced Russian analysts have been scolding Russia in vain for its bad manners and preparation for past wars. However, it is obvious that this is not the least characteristic of America, although very serious changes have occurred in the sphere of threats and challenges to US national security. We assume that the accelerated development of the missile defense system is inevitable, not even because of military and military-political expediency, but as a manifestation of the logic of military-technical progress.
But today, perhaps, no less chance that the "product" will not arrive in America from heaven, but will arrive in a truck across the Canadian-American border or on a pleasure yacht from Antilles. Moreover, the "product" can be worked out somewhere in a garage on the outskirts of West Ellis, in the "rebellious" state of Wisconsin. And even not at all by Islamic terrorists, but by real Americans, who hate “fat cats” from power offices and a corrupted, cosmopolitan megalopolis public. At least the test in Los Alamos proved the possibility of illegal access to the necessary volumes of the desired materials.
Much of what really happened today in the fate of American foreign and military policy was predicted by Vladimir Putin in his famous Munich speech with his characteristic frankness, and this happened six years ago, when everything seemed to be rosy for the US. Even earlier, on the eve of the invasion of Iraq, it was Russia represented by the same Vladimir Putin (together with the FRG and France) sincerely warned the United States about the serious consequences of such a policy both for international security and for the United States itself.
We repeat, we can state, in fact, the failure of US foreign and military policy in its previous format, first of all, its regional component, especially with regard to the Eurasian direction. This means that the search for new approaches to its implementation, new partner preferences, including careful casting of promising partners, is inevitable. Moreover, if you believe Lord Palmerston, there are no eternal friends and constant rivals - only our interests are eternal and constant. Today more than ever in the international arena, the degree of reliability of a partner and an understanding of its true long-term goals are important. For example, with regard to the United States, their attempt to use radical Islam, in particular, to contain China and Russia, is one of the greatest strategic mistakes of Washington. If we talk about Europe, then it is too different today, exhausted by its problems, in particular, the expectation of reconquest from the South, for the implementation of which, however, it is doing everything possible. How can all this affect Russian-American security relations, the potential for our strategic partnership?
WHAT IS IN THE HEAD OF POLITICIANS AND IN REALITY
Globalization with its inherent "compression of space" dictates its own behavior patterns. Today, virtually every point on the globe is a zone of cross-sectional, multiple interests and attempts to influence. The interaction between the leading players of world geopolitics will only intensify, another question is whether it will become a partner or confrontational (the latter is associated with very serious, unacceptable risks). We will not exaggerate the factor of “rising Russia from its knees,” everything, unfortunately, is not so straightforward. But it becomes obvious that the Russian Federation, due to external circumstances and changes in its own behavior, has clearly raised its rating in the world table of ranks and its relevance as a partner.
The paradox is that if Russia is weak, supple, complimentary, as it was in 90, then America “does not see”, loses interest in it. A strong, independent - "does not want to see." In the minds of American politicians, there is some kind of invented Russia that it will never become and cannot become. A number of our advanced politicians and political scientists, advising to be friends with America on the proposed conditions, do not understand this either. We emphasize that to win a place in world geopolitics, voluntarily essentially given away in 90-s, when it seems to have been buried with honors as a first-line force, it is very difficult for Russia today - and this process cannot proceed without conflict and without problems.
Unfortunately, the United States, with its habit of unconditional leadership, had the wrong idea of partnership, including strategic. This is a pronounced master-slave practice, with proof of readiness to drag chestnuts out of the fire for the sake of the common goal for the USA. The inability to apply such a scheme in relation to the modern Russian Federation causes obvious irritation in the USA. Including due to elementary misunderstanding: Russia's role as a strategic partner is completely different. Moreover, in a specific geopolitical context, no one other than the Russian Federation can play this strategically important for international security and the United States itself.
Unfortunately, Washington’s approach to the issue of partnership with the Russian Federation is too primitive market. They tend to see Russia as a junior partner in world geopolitics, a kind of entrusted. For example, as a demonstration of friendship and partnership, to deliver the political head of Bashar al-Assad to Washington on a platter. Or in some way "persuade" Iran to abandon the possession of nuclear technology. Well, at the worst, to take part, together with the USA, in the policy of “soft enclosing” of China in the field of energy carriers.
Meanwhile, as evil tongues say, the serious problems of a well-known Russian oligarch began after his exposure to some close foreign friends, with whom he had very confidential conversations, including about the political future of Russia, and who today pour on him crocodile tears and accuse in all sins of the Kremlin. All these misfortunes, we note, happened right after the decision of the aforementioned oligarch about a sharp expansion of energy supplies to China.
Nevertheless, the events of August 2008 of the year brought a definite turning point in the American perception of the Russian Federation, when Russia was obviously trying to try hard. By the way, looking back, we are less inclined to see only the costs of that “five-day war”. Otherwise, it would not be “five days” with all the ensuing (very serious, destructive) geopolitical consequences, including for the United States. And the prerequisites for this were. Russia in this important, significant episode of global geopolitics just beat the United States. At least, we would not be understanding and condescending to treat the stars on the chest and the epaulets of some of the leaders and participants of the August campaign. Perhaps even the know-it-all insiders simply do not know everything about the preparation and conduct of that military campaign: a lot was really done, what is called “tiptoeing”. Well, the PRC in general should be forever grateful to Russia. Since it is obvious that Saakashvili’s hands on the Tskhinvali bulge did not strike Russia, but in order to discredit China and the Beijing Olympics — and this is worth a lot. In general, not everything that was done (and not done) in the “Serdyukov era” should in the future receive an assessment that fully coincides with the present one.
INTERESTS OUR AND TO US
What is really the strategic interest for the USA to modern Russia, if it is not only the Ulyanovsk base, the supply of the usual weapons and military equipment for the Afghan army and some other small services. The United States is characterized by arrogance and self-conceit, “black ingratitude”, the egoism of the superpower, but at the same time Washington will sooner or later Moscow to thank for its position on Syria. If it were not for the rigidity of Russia, then the United States would have already plunged into the Syrian conflict to the waist. And who is so clever in the world geopolitical backstage, who so unpretentiously involves the United States under the most plausible excuse in expanding and deepening the Middle Eastern confrontation? One gets the impression that part of the American elite has already booked tickets to the global “train of happiness”. And the United States, as in its time in Russia, is destined for the kindling of brushwood for kindling some kind of new world revolution.
In general, some predict a renaissance in Russian-American security relations, others predict new deep holes. Moreover, the indicator of the instability of our relations, and perhaps their lack of predictability and effectiveness, is fits of euphoria and despair at every, even not too significant, informational cause. Today we are witnessing just such a swing - when expressing sincere sympathy to America over the Boston terrorist attack and accusing Russia of “harboring” a free-thinking intelligence officer.
There is, for example, a reason in the statements of those who emphasize the obvious limitations and insufficiency of the sites for Russian-American interaction. However, this is a false conclusion - something must be done to prevent this relationship from sagging at all. Well, today Russia does not need to go for further pair reductions of nuclear-missile and strategic weapons (RNSM) for well-known, very reasoned reasons. Russia has already explained its position more than once - why it is not going to participate in the disarmament race at the moment. This is the completion of the American nuclear missile triad to the pentad - with the involvement of missile defense and components of strategic non-nuclear weapons.
To devalue the Russian RSASV, strategic and tactical, in these conditions does not follow. Here are the tasks of the so-called asymmetric deterrence, which is especially important when the general-purpose forces are weak and difficult to recover. And the impossibility in the short term to make a change in this process, even with abundant funding. Finally, it is also the fact that the United States is not the only geopolitical opponent for Russia after the breakup of the bipolar world.
An example of bilateral Russian-American disarmament will not inspire anyone in the world for a similar deed, as well as for refusing to develop new weapons of the Doomsday, including nuclear missiles. This, in particular, is a consequence of US offensive policies around the world. Therefore, for example, the calls of Barack Obama for a deep reduction of nuclear missiles addressed to Russia are nothing more than a PR campaign, a desire to hedge against the case of new failures of US foreign and military policy with the goal of blaming everything on incompetent opponents.
And in general, in order to display realism in a promising partnership, one should not wait until our mutual potentials will tend to zero, including nuclear. Just then, the threshold of deterrence in the interests of security can be surmountable, and partnership at that moment will have to be forgotten altogether.
However, we will especially note this, if something unreal-transcendent does not happen, then direct military confrontation between the Russian Federation and the United States, taking into account mutual supra-armed, should not be by definition. Too high the risk of escalation, which is not limited to standing on Point Charlie. But indirect opposition on the periphery, including in regional conflicts, due to a different understanding of geopolitical expediency, through the support of the warring parties, is quite possible. This cannot be completely avoided, but prevented, mitigated, and not exacerbated, is real, especially after the so-called pragmatists come to control the foreign and military policy in the United States.
Syria can become an experience (I would like it to be positive) of similar Russian-American interaction, not burdened by confrontational complexes. Although we note that the main issues are not solved at international conferences. Relations in the sphere of security, military policy in the modern world are inseparable from the whole complex of relations - economic, humanitarian. But the latter should not dramatically affect the security industry. For example, the Russian Federation and the United States have different ideas about human rights, and there are inevitable discrepancies of interests, as well as attempts to use this factor as a means of additional pressure.
Along the way, let us point out the clearly overestimated expectations that have taken place on the effectiveness of the relations between the United States and the Russian Federation in the field of high and advanced technologies, including missile defense, and this does not depend on the overall current state of our relations and personalities in power.
And perhaps the most important thing. The presence of Russia, strong, integral, loyal, as a bearing pillar of the geopolitical structure, is the most important condition for maintaining and maintaining a geostrategic balance in the sensitive zone of Central Eurasia. Its violation, taking into account the growth of the global, including intercivilizational, competition, permanent systemic crisis, can have the most negative consequences.
BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
This role of Russia is also extremely important for the USA, which is occupied in the foreseeable future by so many things, from licking wounds received during the unsuccessful global blitzkrieg of the previous twenty years, to regrouping forces and building new security frontiers. Why do we need these efforts and against anyone - another question: it seems that Washington is looking for what to invest in a huge military budget, legitimate and justified in the eyes of the Americans. With all this, it is important to understand that the set of keys to Eurasia, which is today really the heartland of world geopolitics, will be clearly incomplete without keys belonging to Russia without any reservations. Drogny it, step aside, including under the pressure of “Western partners wishing for good” - and the geopolitical tsunami flows from the South, from the East, colliding in the post-Soviet space and at its borders, can cause dramatic changes in the Transatlantic and Pacific zones.
The Russian pole of a multipolar world, the “island of Russia,” needs to be strengthened, stabilized, helped to rebuild, overgrow with areas of hardship and security, primarily in the post-Soviet space. And not in the thoughtless hunting instinct of the winners in the Cold War to try to weaken and tame Russia, which, unfortunately, the United States is doing today.
At the same time, a number of questions arise that require answers before they become a stumbling block in Russian-American cooperation. First of all, these are relations in the Russia – China – USA triangle and the role of the Russian Federation in this construction. Of course, Washington is extremely jealous of the partnership between Moscow and Beijing, although he himself does a lot to strengthen it. For example, through the creation of new and reanimation of old security frontiers in the APR, obviously directed against the PRC. The United States would be quite satisfied with the role of the Russian Federation as a geopolitical balancer in the region, but for this to happen, the American policy towards Russia must be qualitatively different. For the same reason, objectively, the United States should be interested in a partnership between the Russian Federation and India, not trying to force Russia out of this axis.
We are categorically against the so-called successive approach with respect to Afghanistan, when Russia takes over the watch from the United States - this is for the Russian Federation both hopeless and dangerous. Another thing is to build defensive frontiers on the path of instability from the South. In solving this problem, Russia may have the most unexpected partners. It is not at all groundless that the fears of those who consider a new surge in US political and military pruritus in the post-Soviet space after leaving Iraq and Afghanistan to be possible. Is it possible to see any clear purpose and prospect of a similar American policy, will it start to be implemented? Unless, of course, Washington fixes another fixed idea, for example, on enclosing Iran.
We emphasize that our country in the role of a stronghold, a fortress on the way from east to west in this geopolitical situation, including for the foreseeable future, is in the hands of the United States itself. And the obstinacy, excessive frankness, consistency of Russia in its imperial delusions must be perceived without undue exaltation. We live in a complex, unstable, not like the previous world, a transition to a new world order that still needs to be designed and created, to understand how it functions and how to live in it. And in it a special role is played and reliable, predictable, even taking into account differences, differences in interests, but civilizationally understandable, without the pathology of cunning, compatible partners with which dialogue can be conducted have a special value.
That is, by and large, is modern Russia, real, and not invented by American politicians and political consultants. Which is guided in its foreign and military policy by its own national interests, and not by the flawed anti-Americanism that is common to many. And Russia, contrary to popular claims, ours and the West, is open to cooperation with the United States. She has already traveled a long way towards America in order to count on a real oncoming movement. But to ensure equality, profitability for the Russian Federation of such cooperation, it has to do a lot in its rear areas. First of all, it is effective (but economically, reasonably, not provocative) to improve the aggregate power, including military power, without reveling in undoubted geopolitical exclusiveness. “What is the strength, brother?” The hero of the cult film asked. And he himself answered: "I think that in truth."
Information