Ulagayevsky landing in the Kuban
Since July, the White Command has been developing a plan for a large landing operation with the landing of troops on the Kuban. The capture of this area allowed to expand the political, military, economic, demographic base of the White movement. Created a new anti-Soviet front. The landing of troops was going to be carried out in three places. Having mobilized the Kuban Cossacks, the whites had to occupy Ekaterinodar, Maikop and then the whole Kuban. Great hope was on the rebel Cossacks. In the Kuban, there were about 30 large rebel groups. The largest of them - the Army of the Revival of Russia, General Fostikova consisted 5,5 thousand fighters with 10 guns and 35 machine guns. At the end of 1919, Mikhail Fostikov was the commander of the 2 of the Kuban Cossack Division. In the spring of 1920 of the year, being cut off from the Kuban army, with a small detachment he left for the mountain villages and by the summer organized an “Amyu” of several thousand Cossacks. His forces occupied a number of villages of the Batalpashinsky Department.
To communicate with Fostikova, the commander-in-chief sent a group of officers. On August 4, an agreement was signed with the “governments” of the Don, Kuban, Turk and Astrakhan, who fled to the Crimea. Cossack troops were granted internal autonomy, their representatives were included in the government of the South of Russia. Wrangel was given full power over the Cossack armed formations.
The operation was prepared for a long time, thoroughly, several times postponed its beginning. It was necessary to replace the Kuban units at the front. There were battles that threatened the very existence of Wrangel’s army, and it was impossible to isolate forces for the landing. There was an acute question with the infantry, so its significant part was made up of the junkers of the schools. The special purpose group was headed by Sergey Georgievich Ulagay, a Kuban Cossack of Circassian origin. Ulagai had an enormous combat experience - a participant in the Russian-Japanese and World War I, by the spring of 1917 had reached the rank of colonel. As a member of the Kornilov revolt was arrested, was able to go to the Kuban. He became one of the participants in the volunteer movement, organized a detachment of Kuban Cossacks. During the First Kuban (ice) campaign of the Volunteer Army in February-May, 1918 commanded the foot Plastun Cossack battalion, was seriously wounded. After being healed of his wounds, he headed the 2 th Kuban division. Later Ulagay commanded the 2 of the Kuban Corps, the equestrian group of the Caucasian Army under Tsaritsyn, the Kuban Army. According to contemporaries, it was an excellent cavalry commander, versed in the situation, courageous and resolute. According to Denikin, Ulagay was a rare commander alien to politics and personally flawless. Slashchev called him "a man who is absolutely honest," a Kuban general, it seems, the only "of fame, not stained by robbery."
Sergey G. Ulagay.
The chief of staff of the group was Lieutenant-General D. P. Dratsenko. The group included: 1-I Kuban Cossack Division under the command of Lieutenant-General Nikolai Babiev (about 1 thousand sabers with 6 guns); 2-I Kuban Cossack Division (foot) - Lieutenant-General Shifner-Markevich (about 1 thousand fighters with 8 guns); Consolidated infantry division of General Kazanovich, it included - 1-th Kuban Rifle Regiment, Alekshyevsky Infantry Regiment, with Alekseevsky Artillery Battalion, Konstantinovsky and Kuban Military Schools (about 2,5 thousand bayonets, with 12 guns, XNXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX-XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX In total, the Ulagai group had about 3 thousand bayonets and sabers.
At the same time, a small landing force was planned to be landed in the Anapa area - a separate detachment of General Cherepov. It consisted of the Kornilov Military School and the Circassian Division, only about 500 people with 2 guns. A landing squad of General Kharlamov were going to land in the area of Taman. It included the 42-th Don Cossack regiment, part of General Bredov (Bredovtsy) and the Cossack Division, a total of about 3 thousand people with 6 guns.
The operation could not be kept secret. The operation was prepared for a long time, and a large number of people were involved in it, including completely strangers who were not involved in the hostilities. Natives of the Kuban from other parts received the opportunity to transfer to the compounds that were included in the special forces. Cossacks, preparing to leave "home", took their families, relatives, relatives, all the belongings. Members of the parliament (“governments”), public and political figures and their environment also rode. They spoke openly about the landing. The shock group was burdened with a huge rear. According to fleet, about 16 thousand people were landed on landing transports with a total number of troops of 4,5 thousand soldiers. True, this same poor organization played into the hands of the white command. The Red Command, receiving information about a possible landing, considered this frank hype another misinformation. White landing was expected again in the Don area. In addition, the White Command was able to conduct a fairly good concentration of troops, their landing, passage through the Kerch Strait and following the sea.
The coast of the Azov and Black Seas from Rostov-on-Don to the Georgian border was defended by the 9-I Kuban Army of the Caucasian Front led by Mikhail Lewandowski. The 9 Army of the Red Army included 2 rifle divisions, 2 cavalry divisions, one rifle division, and 3 cavalry brigades. Total about 34 thousand people, 157 guns. However, most of the army was engaged in the fight against rebel formations, which numbered more than 10 thousand people. The 22-Rifle Division was stationed in the Novorossiysk area, a brigade of this division was deployed in Taman, a team of the 9 division was stationed in the villages of Krymskaya and Gostagaevskaya, north of the Taman Peninsula to Yeisk, on the coast - the 1-th Caucasian Cavalry Division.
Operation
The ships were loaded in Kerch and at night they went to the Sea of Azov. On the night of August 14, the squadron united and headed towards the village of Primorsko-Akhtarskaya. Ship artillery suppressed a rather weak resistance and the landing of the landing force began. The very village of Primorsko-Akhtarskaya, there were two mouths of Red Army soldiers, was occupied practically without resistance. Alekseevsky regiment advanced in the forefront. White cavalry under the personal command of Ulagaya immediately rushed to Timashevskaya - to an important railway junction, which led to the approaches to Ekaterinodar.
The Red Command hastily made countermeasures: the population requisitioned horses so that White did not get it; where they had time, tried to evacuate the entire male population that the whites could mobilize (the Cossacks, who were already accustomed to the white and red mobilizations, tried to hide); thrown into the brigade 1-th Caucasian Cavalry Division with 9 guns. The small 1 Cavalry Division was able to hold out for some time, counterattacking the enemy, destroying one of the Alekseevsky battalions. They sent reinforcements to her - an armored train and a cavalry brigade of Balakhonov. But by this time the 1-I Kuban division of Babiyev had already completely landed. Under the villages of Olginskaya and Brinkovskaya, the Reds were surrounded, the Balakhonov brigade escaped, and the 1-I cavalry division and armored train were destroyed. The commander of the 9 Army Lewandowski barely escaped. The head of the division, Meyer, along with all his staff and all the artillery of the division were captured.
Babiev secured the left flank, led the troops to Bryukhovetskaya. In the center behind the vanguard of Ulagai, the Combined Division of General Kazanovich was advancing on Timashevskaya. On the right flank of the 2-I Kuban division Shifner-Markevich attacked Grivensk. In Primorsko-Akhtarskoy, the headquarters is located with a small cover and the whole "rear", mostly civilians. This dashing offensive immediately led to mistakes, the main forces were too far from the rear. Dratsenko, the chief of staff, unsuccessfully tried to warn Ulagay of this, speaking of the inferiority of such tactics, demanded that he pay attention to the weak flanks. In general, Ulagai and his divisional chiefs sought to repeat 1918's success of the year — swift raid, victory, and general uprising. However, the reds were not the same as in the 1918 year, and the Kuban has changed. The population has already “fought”.
The landing took place on the 4 of the day and by the end of it the advance units were already in 50-80 km from the headquarters and rear. The Red Command redeployed reinforcements from the north and decided to cut off the white rear of the shock divisions. White's weak barrier at Brinkovsky was easily shot down. Red troops were advancing to the south, planning to cut the Akhtari-Timashevskaya railroad. Dratsenko ordered Babiyev to immediately restore the front. 1-I Kuban division was forced to return. Babiyev threw away the red ones, put up a barrier and again moved on to Bryukhovetskaya.
18 August Babiev occupied Bryukhovetskaya, parts of the generals Ulagay and Kazanovich - Timashevskaya, and soldiers of Shifner-Markevich - Grivensky, Novonikolaevskaya and a number of settlements. A significant bridgehead was occupied - 80 km along the front and about 90 km in depth. The Ulagaya group entered into contact with the detachment of Colonel Skakun (several hundred fighters) and about 2 thousand Cossacks from the occupied villages joined the whites. Until Ekaterinodar remained about 40 km, the evacuation of Soviet institutions began, and the white command expected that the Kuban was about to explode with a general uprising against the Reds. The “army” of Fostikov intensified, trying to get through to the Ulagay group. The first stage of the operation, despite some mistakes, was successful. 19 August Wrangel issued an order to rename the Commander-in-Chief of the All-Soviet Union of Civil Defense to the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, and his government to the government of the South of Russia. On the same day, a detachment of General Cherepov was landed north of Novorossiysk.
But the red command has already come to its senses, and the troops were stranded. The command of the Caucasian Front — Commander V. M. Gittis, members of the Revolutionary Military Command G. Ordzhonikidze, A. P. Rozengolts, V. A. Trifonov, began to pull up reserves - 3 rifle divisions, 4 cavalry divisions and one rifle brigade. From the reserve of the high command they sent the Moscow brigade of Kremlin cadets. Two shock groups were formed from them - for a strike from the north to the flank and rear of the Ulagai group, and from the east for a frontal strike. Gathered parts scattered garrisons over a huge area. They moved troops from Azerbaijan, reserve units. Mobilization took place in the cities - “the week of the fight against Wrangel”, the week of the “red volunteer”. 9 and 2 Don divisions were deployed from the north. In order for Wrangel not to send reinforcements from the Crimea, the Tavriya organized the offensive of the 13 and 2 of the Cavalry armies.
The landing of Cherepova failed. He was able to advance only 8-10 km from the coast. Then the 22 Infantry Division was blocked. The messenger from the “greens” promised ambulance, a significant number of former White Guards were hiding in the mountains. However, Cherepov’s detachment could not hold out for long under artillery bombardment. The Greens offered to conduct a detachment bypassing the enemy’s positions by mountain paths, but did not trust them with Skulls, and on August 22 the troops were evacuated.
On August 18-21, the Ulagai units stood still, put themselves in order. The white cover ships, having considered the task completed, left. The red Azov flotilla approached Akhtari and began bombing. Simultaneously, from the north, the Reds attacked again, with the aim of cutting the railway, separating the rear areas from the main forces. The junkers' barricade at Brinkovsky was pushed aside, he could barely keep from Olginsky. The headquarters, which had lost contact with the main forces, and civilians, were threatened with encirclement and destruction. It was decided to make a huge train and make their way to Timashevsk. The train was barely moving, the Olginsky headquarters had to help the junkers, repel the attacks of the Reds. As soon as the railway was cut, the Ulugaya group was cut off from the sea.
The situation has seriously deteriorated. The Azov flotilla on the night of August 24 mined the exits from Primorsko-Akhtarsk to prevent possible evacuation of the enemy, and landed a naval division in the Akhtarsky lighthouse area, which created a threat to the rear of the Ulagai group. The connection between Ulugaya and General Babiyev was interrupted, the commander of the landing party suggested that Wrangel, in view of the overwhelming superiority of the enemy in numbers, send the ships for evacuation. The head of the 1 Kuban Division, General Babiev, assessed the situation differently and offered to continue the operation. For several days there were stubborn battles at Brinkovsky and Olginskaya, the stanitsa changed hands several times. Only after receiving information about the withdrawal of the 2 of the Kuban and Consolidated Divisions, Babiyev 25 of August moved to the area of the farm Stepnoye.
On the night of August 25, the white command landed a third landing - about 3 thousand soldiers under the command of General Kharlamov were landed on Taman. Kharlamov had Temryuk to connect with a group Ulagay. Whites took Tamanskaya and knocked out the Reds from the Taman Peninsula, but they could not move further along the isthmuses. On August 29, the troops began to withdraw under heavy pressure, and in the middle of September, 2 was evacuated.
August 28 against the group Ulagay launched a strong offensive from the front. Timashevskaya was attacked by the 2-th Don Division and a cavalry brigade, and several times passed their hands. As a result, Timashevskaya left for red. The headquarters and rear were transferred to Grivensk; in Achuev, a new seaside base was organized, and a marina was urgently constructed.
As a result of stubborn fighting, the Red troops occupied the Steppe, and General Ulagay’s group was cut in two. 1-I Kuban division Babiyev was separated from other forces and headquarters, it was crowded to the marshy estuaries and floods, narrowing room for maneuver. Despite violent counterattacks, White failed to return the Steppe. At the same time, the red command organized a landing on the Kuban and r. The channel was sent three ships and several barges under the command of EI Kovtyukh and Commissioner D. A. Furmanov (about 600 people). An airborne detachment under the cover of fog passed the front line and struck Ulagaya in the village of Grivenskaya. At the same time, the 9 Division launched an attack on Novonikolayevskaya, which was defended by units of Kazanovich and Shifner Markevich. A detachment of Kovtyukh, caused a panic in the white rear, and occupied half of the village. White began to depart from Novikolayevskaya, they drove Kovtyukh out of Grivenskoy. But on the heels were red shelves, fighting again began for Grivenska. The situation has become critical.
The Ulugaya group, under the cover of the rearguards, began to evacuate. At the end of August, Babiev’s forces, rear units, and all those who wished to leave were removed. By September 7 was taken and the main force. The departure was quite calm, they brought in all comers, all property, horses, artillery and armored cars.
Results
- The main goal of the operation could not be realized. Take Ekaterinodar and raise the Kuban against the Reds, to create the Kuban Front, expanding the base of the white movement, did not work. Wrangel's army was again locked in the Crimea and Tavria. It is believed that the main reason for the failure of the operation was the delay of the White forces, which, contrary to the original plan of the rapid offensive, did not look back at the rear, and paused. However, the increase in the combat capability of the Red Army and the operational capabilities of its command also played its role.
- However, the landing Ulagaya was able to replenish the Russian army of Wrangel. Despite the heavy losses of the cadets and infantry (in the companies they knocked out up to 60-70% of the personnel), who held back the onslaught of the Red Army, the troops returned to more than doubled. More than 10 thousand Cossacks joined the evacuated units, but most of them were unarmed or without firearms. weapons. It was possible to strengthen the white cavalry, and 6 brought thousands of horses. They brought more guns than they took with them.
- “Army” Fostikova was defeated. Having lost all the artillery, almost without ammunition, he was pushed into the mountains and went to the Adler-Sochi area. 22-23 September 1920 of the year, his Fostikov detachment (over 2 thousand Cossacks) was taken to Feodosia.
To communicate with Fostikova, the commander-in-chief sent a group of officers. On August 4, an agreement was signed with the “governments” of the Don, Kuban, Turk and Astrakhan, who fled to the Crimea. Cossack troops were granted internal autonomy, their representatives were included in the government of the South of Russia. Wrangel was given full power over the Cossack armed formations.
The operation was prepared for a long time, thoroughly, several times postponed its beginning. It was necessary to replace the Kuban units at the front. There were battles that threatened the very existence of Wrangel’s army, and it was impossible to isolate forces for the landing. There was an acute question with the infantry, so its significant part was made up of the junkers of the schools. The special purpose group was headed by Sergey Georgievich Ulagay, a Kuban Cossack of Circassian origin. Ulagai had an enormous combat experience - a participant in the Russian-Japanese and World War I, by the spring of 1917 had reached the rank of colonel. As a member of the Kornilov revolt was arrested, was able to go to the Kuban. He became one of the participants in the volunteer movement, organized a detachment of Kuban Cossacks. During the First Kuban (ice) campaign of the Volunteer Army in February-May, 1918 commanded the foot Plastun Cossack battalion, was seriously wounded. After being healed of his wounds, he headed the 2 th Kuban division. Later Ulagay commanded the 2 of the Kuban Corps, the equestrian group of the Caucasian Army under Tsaritsyn, the Kuban Army. According to contemporaries, it was an excellent cavalry commander, versed in the situation, courageous and resolute. According to Denikin, Ulagay was a rare commander alien to politics and personally flawless. Slashchev called him "a man who is absolutely honest," a Kuban general, it seems, the only "of fame, not stained by robbery."
Sergey G. Ulagay.
The chief of staff of the group was Lieutenant-General D. P. Dratsenko. The group included: 1-I Kuban Cossack Division under the command of Lieutenant-General Nikolai Babiev (about 1 thousand sabers with 6 guns); 2-I Kuban Cossack Division (foot) - Lieutenant-General Shifner-Markevich (about 1 thousand fighters with 8 guns); Consolidated infantry division of General Kazanovich, it included - 1-th Kuban Rifle Regiment, Alekshyevsky Infantry Regiment, with Alekseevsky Artillery Battalion, Konstantinovsky and Kuban Military Schools (about 2,5 thousand bayonets, with 12 guns, XNXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX-XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX In total, the Ulagai group had about 3 thousand bayonets and sabers.
At the same time, a small landing force was planned to be landed in the Anapa area - a separate detachment of General Cherepov. It consisted of the Kornilov Military School and the Circassian Division, only about 500 people with 2 guns. A landing squad of General Kharlamov were going to land in the area of Taman. It included the 42-th Don Cossack regiment, part of General Bredov (Bredovtsy) and the Cossack Division, a total of about 3 thousand people with 6 guns.
The operation could not be kept secret. The operation was prepared for a long time, and a large number of people were involved in it, including completely strangers who were not involved in the hostilities. Natives of the Kuban from other parts received the opportunity to transfer to the compounds that were included in the special forces. Cossacks, preparing to leave "home", took their families, relatives, relatives, all the belongings. Members of the parliament (“governments”), public and political figures and their environment also rode. They spoke openly about the landing. The shock group was burdened with a huge rear. According to fleet, about 16 thousand people were landed on landing transports with a total number of troops of 4,5 thousand soldiers. True, this same poor organization played into the hands of the white command. The Red Command, receiving information about a possible landing, considered this frank hype another misinformation. White landing was expected again in the Don area. In addition, the White Command was able to conduct a fairly good concentration of troops, their landing, passage through the Kerch Strait and following the sea.
The coast of the Azov and Black Seas from Rostov-on-Don to the Georgian border was defended by the 9-I Kuban Army of the Caucasian Front led by Mikhail Lewandowski. The 9 Army of the Red Army included 2 rifle divisions, 2 cavalry divisions, one rifle division, and 3 cavalry brigades. Total about 34 thousand people, 157 guns. However, most of the army was engaged in the fight against rebel formations, which numbered more than 10 thousand people. The 22-Rifle Division was stationed in the Novorossiysk area, a brigade of this division was deployed in Taman, a team of the 9 division was stationed in the villages of Krymskaya and Gostagaevskaya, north of the Taman Peninsula to Yeisk, on the coast - the 1-th Caucasian Cavalry Division.
Operation
The ships were loaded in Kerch and at night they went to the Sea of Azov. On the night of August 14, the squadron united and headed towards the village of Primorsko-Akhtarskaya. Ship artillery suppressed a rather weak resistance and the landing of the landing force began. The very village of Primorsko-Akhtarskaya, there were two mouths of Red Army soldiers, was occupied practically without resistance. Alekseevsky regiment advanced in the forefront. White cavalry under the personal command of Ulagaya immediately rushed to Timashevskaya - to an important railway junction, which led to the approaches to Ekaterinodar.
The Red Command hastily made countermeasures: the population requisitioned horses so that White did not get it; where they had time, tried to evacuate the entire male population that the whites could mobilize (the Cossacks, who were already accustomed to the white and red mobilizations, tried to hide); thrown into the brigade 1-th Caucasian Cavalry Division with 9 guns. The small 1 Cavalry Division was able to hold out for some time, counterattacking the enemy, destroying one of the Alekseevsky battalions. They sent reinforcements to her - an armored train and a cavalry brigade of Balakhonov. But by this time the 1-I Kuban division of Babiyev had already completely landed. Under the villages of Olginskaya and Brinkovskaya, the Reds were surrounded, the Balakhonov brigade escaped, and the 1-I cavalry division and armored train were destroyed. The commander of the 9 Army Lewandowski barely escaped. The head of the division, Meyer, along with all his staff and all the artillery of the division were captured.
Babiev secured the left flank, led the troops to Bryukhovetskaya. In the center behind the vanguard of Ulagai, the Combined Division of General Kazanovich was advancing on Timashevskaya. On the right flank of the 2-I Kuban division Shifner-Markevich attacked Grivensk. In Primorsko-Akhtarskoy, the headquarters is located with a small cover and the whole "rear", mostly civilians. This dashing offensive immediately led to mistakes, the main forces were too far from the rear. Dratsenko, the chief of staff, unsuccessfully tried to warn Ulagay of this, speaking of the inferiority of such tactics, demanded that he pay attention to the weak flanks. In general, Ulagai and his divisional chiefs sought to repeat 1918's success of the year — swift raid, victory, and general uprising. However, the reds were not the same as in the 1918 year, and the Kuban has changed. The population has already “fought”.
The landing took place on the 4 of the day and by the end of it the advance units were already in 50-80 km from the headquarters and rear. The Red Command redeployed reinforcements from the north and decided to cut off the white rear of the shock divisions. White's weak barrier at Brinkovsky was easily shot down. Red troops were advancing to the south, planning to cut the Akhtari-Timashevskaya railroad. Dratsenko ordered Babiyev to immediately restore the front. 1-I Kuban division was forced to return. Babiyev threw away the red ones, put up a barrier and again moved on to Bryukhovetskaya.
18 August Babiev occupied Bryukhovetskaya, parts of the generals Ulagay and Kazanovich - Timashevskaya, and soldiers of Shifner-Markevich - Grivensky, Novonikolaevskaya and a number of settlements. A significant bridgehead was occupied - 80 km along the front and about 90 km in depth. The Ulagaya group entered into contact with the detachment of Colonel Skakun (several hundred fighters) and about 2 thousand Cossacks from the occupied villages joined the whites. Until Ekaterinodar remained about 40 km, the evacuation of Soviet institutions began, and the white command expected that the Kuban was about to explode with a general uprising against the Reds. The “army” of Fostikov intensified, trying to get through to the Ulagay group. The first stage of the operation, despite some mistakes, was successful. 19 August Wrangel issued an order to rename the Commander-in-Chief of the All-Soviet Union of Civil Defense to the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, and his government to the government of the South of Russia. On the same day, a detachment of General Cherepov was landed north of Novorossiysk.
But the red command has already come to its senses, and the troops were stranded. The command of the Caucasian Front — Commander V. M. Gittis, members of the Revolutionary Military Command G. Ordzhonikidze, A. P. Rozengolts, V. A. Trifonov, began to pull up reserves - 3 rifle divisions, 4 cavalry divisions and one rifle brigade. From the reserve of the high command they sent the Moscow brigade of Kremlin cadets. Two shock groups were formed from them - for a strike from the north to the flank and rear of the Ulagai group, and from the east for a frontal strike. Gathered parts scattered garrisons over a huge area. They moved troops from Azerbaijan, reserve units. Mobilization took place in the cities - “the week of the fight against Wrangel”, the week of the “red volunteer”. 9 and 2 Don divisions were deployed from the north. In order for Wrangel not to send reinforcements from the Crimea, the Tavriya organized the offensive of the 13 and 2 of the Cavalry armies.
The landing of Cherepova failed. He was able to advance only 8-10 km from the coast. Then the 22 Infantry Division was blocked. The messenger from the “greens” promised ambulance, a significant number of former White Guards were hiding in the mountains. However, Cherepov’s detachment could not hold out for long under artillery bombardment. The Greens offered to conduct a detachment bypassing the enemy’s positions by mountain paths, but did not trust them with Skulls, and on August 22 the troops were evacuated.
On August 18-21, the Ulagai units stood still, put themselves in order. The white cover ships, having considered the task completed, left. The red Azov flotilla approached Akhtari and began bombing. Simultaneously, from the north, the Reds attacked again, with the aim of cutting the railway, separating the rear areas from the main forces. The junkers' barricade at Brinkovsky was pushed aside, he could barely keep from Olginsky. The headquarters, which had lost contact with the main forces, and civilians, were threatened with encirclement and destruction. It was decided to make a huge train and make their way to Timashevsk. The train was barely moving, the Olginsky headquarters had to help the junkers, repel the attacks of the Reds. As soon as the railway was cut, the Ulugaya group was cut off from the sea.
The situation has seriously deteriorated. The Azov flotilla on the night of August 24 mined the exits from Primorsko-Akhtarsk to prevent possible evacuation of the enemy, and landed a naval division in the Akhtarsky lighthouse area, which created a threat to the rear of the Ulagai group. The connection between Ulugaya and General Babiyev was interrupted, the commander of the landing party suggested that Wrangel, in view of the overwhelming superiority of the enemy in numbers, send the ships for evacuation. The head of the 1 Kuban Division, General Babiev, assessed the situation differently and offered to continue the operation. For several days there were stubborn battles at Brinkovsky and Olginskaya, the stanitsa changed hands several times. Only after receiving information about the withdrawal of the 2 of the Kuban and Consolidated Divisions, Babiyev 25 of August moved to the area of the farm Stepnoye.
On the night of August 25, the white command landed a third landing - about 3 thousand soldiers under the command of General Kharlamov were landed on Taman. Kharlamov had Temryuk to connect with a group Ulagay. Whites took Tamanskaya and knocked out the Reds from the Taman Peninsula, but they could not move further along the isthmuses. On August 29, the troops began to withdraw under heavy pressure, and in the middle of September, 2 was evacuated.
August 28 against the group Ulagay launched a strong offensive from the front. Timashevskaya was attacked by the 2-th Don Division and a cavalry brigade, and several times passed their hands. As a result, Timashevskaya left for red. The headquarters and rear were transferred to Grivensk; in Achuev, a new seaside base was organized, and a marina was urgently constructed.
As a result of stubborn fighting, the Red troops occupied the Steppe, and General Ulagay’s group was cut in two. 1-I Kuban division Babiyev was separated from other forces and headquarters, it was crowded to the marshy estuaries and floods, narrowing room for maneuver. Despite violent counterattacks, White failed to return the Steppe. At the same time, the red command organized a landing on the Kuban and r. The channel was sent three ships and several barges under the command of EI Kovtyukh and Commissioner D. A. Furmanov (about 600 people). An airborne detachment under the cover of fog passed the front line and struck Ulagaya in the village of Grivenskaya. At the same time, the 9 Division launched an attack on Novonikolayevskaya, which was defended by units of Kazanovich and Shifner Markevich. A detachment of Kovtyukh, caused a panic in the white rear, and occupied half of the village. White began to depart from Novikolayevskaya, they drove Kovtyukh out of Grivenskoy. But on the heels were red shelves, fighting again began for Grivenska. The situation has become critical.
The Ulugaya group, under the cover of the rearguards, began to evacuate. At the end of August, Babiev’s forces, rear units, and all those who wished to leave were removed. By September 7 was taken and the main force. The departure was quite calm, they brought in all comers, all property, horses, artillery and armored cars.
Results
- The main goal of the operation could not be realized. Take Ekaterinodar and raise the Kuban against the Reds, to create the Kuban Front, expanding the base of the white movement, did not work. Wrangel's army was again locked in the Crimea and Tavria. It is believed that the main reason for the failure of the operation was the delay of the White forces, which, contrary to the original plan of the rapid offensive, did not look back at the rear, and paused. However, the increase in the combat capability of the Red Army and the operational capabilities of its command also played its role.
- However, the landing Ulagaya was able to replenish the Russian army of Wrangel. Despite the heavy losses of the cadets and infantry (in the companies they knocked out up to 60-70% of the personnel), who held back the onslaught of the Red Army, the troops returned to more than doubled. More than 10 thousand Cossacks joined the evacuated units, but most of them were unarmed or without firearms. weapons. It was possible to strengthen the white cavalry, and 6 brought thousands of horses. They brought more guns than they took with them.
- “Army” Fostikova was defeated. Having lost all the artillery, almost without ammunition, he was pushed into the mountains and went to the Adler-Sochi area. 22-23 September 1920 of the year, his Fostikov detachment (over 2 thousand Cossacks) was taken to Feodosia.
Information