Evgeny Pozhidaev: The ghost of the "Red Colossus" - the causes of the military disaster 1941

9 May 2013 Russia celebrated the 68 anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War - once again recalling its huge price. At the same time, it is obvious that the huge price of Victory is 90% the result of the 1941 disaster, when the personnel Red Army was lost almost completely together with a huge amount of equipment and weapons, and the country lost a third of its industrial potential.

The traditional Soviet version of its causes boiled down to the superiority of the Wehrmacht in the amount of the latest weapons, surprise attacks and miscalculations of Stalin. However, in the post-Soviet period, the parameters of the “red colossus”, which possessed tens of thousands, began to loom more and more tanks, aircraft and artillery barrels - and formally superior to the Wehrmacht in all respects at times. At first glance, the fall of the giant looks almost inexplicable - and this has spawned a long series of speculation.

Mr. Rezun tells about Stalin's sinister plans and claims that the USSR army was not preparing for a defensive war and came under attack while preparing for the attack. Mr. Solonin explores the depths of the people's soul, disillusioned party and government policies: "Mass desertion and mass surrender were both the cause and effect, and the main content of the process of turning the Red Army into an uncontrollable crowd." Mr. Mukhin talks about the world Jewish conspiracy led by Kaganovich and Khrushchev. The phantoms of motorway tanks, although often ridiculed, are still present in the mass consciousness. Meanwhile, the causes of the 1941 disaster are simple and fairly obvious.

Firstly, the fully mobilized army attacked the army, which was in the process of mobilization, with all the ensuing consequences. Further, contrary to the common myth, the attackers had an advantage in manpower. The Wehrmacht, along with the troops of the satellites, concentrated on the border of 4,6 million people; 2,9 million opposed him in the western districts. At the same time, 82% of the Wehrmacht's soldiers had combat experience compared to just a few percent in the Red Army. The infantry armament of the German troops allowed them to conduct noticeably more dense fire - primarily due to the use of the versatile and very rapid-fire machine guns MG34.

Now look at the most impressive Stalinist trump card - giant armored forces. On 1 June 1941, the Red Army Tank Park consisted of 23106 tanks, of which combat-ready - 18691. In five border military districts - 12782 tank, combat - 10540. Of these, HF - 549, T-34 - 1105.

How many cars did the anti-Soviet coalition have? According to Thomas Yents - 3811 units. However, it does not take into account the assault guns, anti-tank self-propelled guns, tanks that were part of the landing groups of armored trains and armored vehicles of the allies of Germany. As a result, the minimum estimate of a tank park concentrated in the East is 5600 units. At the same time, looking at the list of vehicles, you can see that there are more medium tanks and self-propelled guns at their base on the eastern front in the Wehrmacht than in the Red Army.

However, quantity is not everything. According to a common myth, the Red Army had a qualitative superiority. Alas, but ... The test results of the T-34 at the Aberdeen Proving Ground in the United States looked like this. The first breakdown of the T-34 occurred already after 60 km of run - the caterpillar broke, and after 343 km the tank failed and could not be repaired - the engine collapsed to a state that could not be restored, the transmission died. Suspension because of the bad steel on the springs slipped, the tank's clearance decreased, and hence the patency. The motor turning the tower was weak, sparked and quickly failed. The quality of body welding was below any criticism. Meanwhile, the Americans got "the best tank of the best factory", one of the 5 specially assembled copies. In general, the B-2 engine's passport life did not exceed the 100-120 hours on the stand and the 45-70 in a real tank.

At the same time, the T-34 outside of Aberdeen proved to be a miracle of reliability compared to the KV, which specialized in permanent breakdowns (passport life of 80-100 hours). Both tanks were distinguished by poor visibility, poor optics and minimal radio communications. Finally, on the T-34, the function of the gunner was combined with the function of the commander, which radically reduced the combat rate of fire.

However, the extremely low reliability of the new tanks was largely due to children's design diseases, largely overcome later. However, for a long time the used machines did not differ in phenomenal indicators. The motor life of the T-26 engine was 180 hours, BT after 1936 of the year - 250 hours. In theory. Since most of the tanks were no longer new, in fact, the service life was 40-100 hours. At the same time, besides the traditional problems with optics and radio communications, the cars were actually very poorly armed. As the test sites showed before the war, the 45 mm cannon projectile did not pierce the side of the German T-III medium tank with the 400 m - launched in 1936-39. shells were defective.

The poor training of tankers organically resulted from the low motor potential - the motor potential was saved, despite the fact that the management of domestic tanks was difficult.

In other words, the industry created in the shortest possible time did everything badly — steel, optics, transmissions, gunpowder, projectiles — and could not do otherwise. Hastily trained engineers with minimal experience invented non-working air filters for engines and copied the worst possible foreign transmissions.

Such were the costs of technological lag — but the problems of the Red Army were not exhausted by them. Let's look at how the organization of the standard division in June of the 1941 looked.

The Red Army Tank Division had 375 tanks against 200 in the Wehrmacht Panzer Division. However, almost half as many tanks were serviced by one and a half times more cars - 2147 versus 1360. For each German tank, therefore, there were three times more cars than in the Red Army.

The rifle division of the Red Army with the number of people in 10858 had a 203 car, the Wehrmacht with the number of 16859 people 903. In other words, the ratio of the level of motorization again - tripled. In fact, the situation for the “soviets” was even worse, because the average tonnage of German trucks was much larger. And even worse, because even what was supposed to be a very curtailed state of the Red Army, did not go to the troops. For example, in the 43 Tank Division of regular 1360 vehicles there were 630, of which 150 were faulty.

A much higher level of automobilization gave the Wehrmacht compounds, firstly, much greater mobility. Meanwhile, you can have two hundred divisions, the enemy has one hundred, but if he can concentrate three divisions against one of yours in this particular place, he will simply destroy you in parts, each time having an overwhelming local advantage. In this case, your troops, most likely, will simply collapse on endless marches, wasting time on fuel and engine life, unsuccessfully trying to catch in that particular place. About this happened to the Red Army in 1941. Roughly speaking, the Red Army against the Wehrmacht at the initial stage of the war is the Chinese infantry against the cavalry of Genghis Khan.

Secondly, a greater level of automobilization allowed a more balanced structure of the compound, allowing it to carry with it a mass of extremely useful "additions" - and effectively maneuver them on the battlefield. Thus, with half the number of tanks, the Wehrmacht tank division had 1,6 times more personnel, mainly due to attached infantry, 58 field artillery guns against 28, 101 anti-tank guns against 12, 63 anti-aircraft guns against 12.

The Wehrmacht rifle division, with 1,6 times more personnel, had twice as many field artillery guns (74 versus 36) and four times more anti-tank guns (75 guns against 18). The weight of the volley of the German division was three times greater than that of the Soviet - that is, the saturation with fire weapons in the Wehrmacht division was twice as high.

In other words, the tank divisions of the Wehrmacht were fairly well protected from air strikes, unlike the almost defenseless Soviet, went into battle with effective support from field artillery, and when meeting with formally stronger Soviet tank formations they could count on powerful anti-tank defense. Finally, within their framework, effective interaction with the infantry was possible — meanwhile, Soviet tanks, often breaking through the first line of defense, simply left behind “uncleared” trenches and were steadily destroyed in its depth.

Likewise, the German riflemen went into battle with more effective support from field artillery and could count on an “honest” battle with tanks, unlike the almost defenseless Soviet armored vehicles.

What is the reason for this situation? The fact is that the Red Army even theoretically could not reach the German level of automobilization. "In 1941, in Germany, 333 thousand cars were produced, in the occupied countries 268 thousand, satellites of the Third Reich produced another 75 thousand cars." The Soviet car industry has produced a million cars for the entire pre-war period. In addition, Germany got great trophies - only in Dunkirk, the British expeditionary force force had to throw 75 thousand cars.

Equally illusory is the advantage of the Soviet artillery (37 thousand guns against 31 thousand). First, the Soviet guns were much less mobile, with all the consequences described above. Secondly, the artillery must shoot something - and the Germans had more accumulated ammunition. Thirdly, domestic anti-tank guns had their own specifics - as was shown above, the forty-skaters that received defective 1936-39 shells of the year could not effectively deal with medium-sized Wehrmacht tanks.

Now let's look at the Air Force. So, on June 22, 10743 Soviet aircraft opposed 4914 aircraft of Germany and the allies, including about 830 Messerschmidt fighters. What could the Soviet Luftwaffe really oppose aviation? It should be borne in mind that the USSR in aluminum production was several times behind Germany, which left an indelible mark on the face of the Soviet Air Force. Wooden cars, for example, all other things being equal are heavier than aluminum.

The most numerous of the modern fighters, the Mig-3, was lightly armed, but had record speed and good maneuverability ... at high altitude. However, most of the battles took place at low and medium altitudes. In addition, the plane burned very readily. The nearly all-solid Logg-3 was the product of a desperate attempt to save aluminum. The combination of the overweight design with a weak engine led to dubious flight performance and practically negated the value of the aircraft as a “fighter jet”. The old I-16 fighters, which were the most popular in the Soviet Air Force and made up 41% in the western districts, were inferior to the enemy in speed and altitude, and because of the habit of yawing - accuracy of fire. As a result, the real threat to the Luftwaffe fighters was represented only by the 399 Yak-1, but even they were noticeably inferior to them both in speed and altitude. The situation was aggravated by the lack of radio communications and the extreme shortage of trained crews.

An additional factor was the unsuccessful basing system. The airfields were located directly at the border - but not at all because it was part of the aggressive plans of the Red Army. It was just a new border and former Polish airfields, located at a standard distance from the border of the Commonwealth.

In general, no 22 puzzle of June, 1941 th does not exist. There was only, first, technological backwardness. Secondly, a purely quantitative preponderance of the German block, based on a much greater industrial potential. Thirdly, inadequate views of the military leadership on the scenario of the beginning of the war.

However, even if there were no last, the Red Army would inevitably lose the border battle, although, perhaps, with a less devastating result. One way or another, the bloodiest phase of the Great Patriotic War was inevitable.

Comments

[svp67]

In principle, it’s right, it remains to recall the low maneuverability of our artillery, which universally used conventional agricultural tractors and a small number of modern battlefield planes — attack aircraft and dive bombers.
And yet, I think it is not entirely appropriate in this article to mention the testing of our tanks by the Americans, since the tanks of the pre-war production and the wartime were very different in quality, in particular, the "pairing of armor plates" ...

[Gari]

From this article - At the same time, the T-34 outside Aberdeen proved to be a miracle of reliability compared to the KV, which "specialized" in permanent breakdowns (passport motor life 80-100 hours)

And reality- In early 1943, at a military base in Aberdeen (located somewhere between Baltimore and Philadelphia in Maryland), they tested two Soviet tanks of the T-34 and KV-1 models. They wanted to find out what decisions Soviet designers made to use them when developing their own tanks.

When both tanks delivered a transport ship from Murmansk to the east coast of the USA, the Red Army had already managed to stop two offensives of the tank armies of the Nazi Wehrmacht: in the battle of Moscow and in the Battle of Stalingrad on the Volga.

“Learning from the Soviet Union means learning to win.”
US military engineers accepted this postulate as a guide to action.

[valerei]

I read an interesting document on the Internet, where, among other things, there was a categorical instruction to prohibit cutting autogenous holes on T-34 tanks in the front sheet for front hatches. Why did you do that? Why was annealed armor steel at the cutting site? Two reasons: either the engineers developed this technology, or there was simply nowhere to go. Let with a weakened sheet, but still the tank was released and went to plan.

[Nick]

Quote: svp67

And yet, I think it is not entirely appropriate in this article to mention the testing of our tanks by the Americans, since the tanks of the pre-war production and the wartime were very different in quality, in particular, the "pairing of armor plates" ...

The mention is quite appropriate. The author analyzes the period of military failures of the Red Army in the first months of the war, when tanks built in the pre-war period were used.

[Egoza]

Article +! The situation at the beginning of the war is calmly and honestly described, which in no way detracts from the feat of our soldiers, who were the first to meet the enemy.

[Kaa]

Quote: Egoza

The situation at the beginning of the war is calmly and honestly described.

Quote: krpmlws

the main problems of the Red Army, problems in the field of military science

It is in science and technology that is another factor. Quite recently (20 years before 1941, just like now, after 1991) the Civil War ended, with its millions of uncounted victims and with the massive emigration of a significant number of specialists, in particular, scientists and engineers from Soviet Russia. Scientific schools, technology specialists have been lost, new ones (especially in the 20s) are being trained in the conditions of reduced programs at workers' faculties. Therefore, progressive aircraft models suffer from a low resource and engine power, AT-guns have shells that sluggishly pierce the armor of tanks, tanks on the march are sometimes lost in greater numbers than in battles, due to minor factory defects, a tractor is, of course, often a tracked vehicle, but not a tank, and drafted tractor drivers with 5-7 grade education sit in them as mechanics, radios on airplanes are either absent, or work so poorly that the pilots often take them off to make the plane easier. The same as now - shortcomings in general education. It would not be possible to repeat these mistakes again. But despite this - the main task of 1941 - was completed - the plants of the South-East of Ukraine were evacuated to the sites in the Urals, in Kazakhstan, the sites, access roads to which, by the way, under the leadership of the "bloody Beria", began construction back in 1939. The price of this evacuations - the regular Red Army, which perished, delaying the Wehrmacht at every possible line, going over to desperate counterattacks, fighting hopelessly in “cauldrons.” As a result, many Russian, German and other sources admit that the Wehrmacht's defeat in the war In general, it became apparent near Smolensk, Vyazma and Moscow. Then there was a total war of destruction, already without any special chances for Germany - yes, it won tactical victories and still won - but the strategic goal - the destruction of the military industry - was not achieved, and in 1943 the war rolled back to where it began - "Give me Berlin!"

[Gari]

Quote: Kaa

It is in the field of science and technology is another factor. More recently (20 years before 1941, just like now, after 1991), the Civil War ended, with its millions of countless victims and the mass emigration of a significant number of specialists, in particular scientists, engineers from Soviet Russia.

And more recently, there was a completely agrarian country, with an illiterate population, where people in the village did not even know what a light bulb was.

[Spiegel]

This is not an argument. For one simple reason, Russia would not have stood still without the Bolsheviks until 1941. And in the notorious 1913, the pace of its development was one of the best in the world, not to mention the fact that it was among the top five countries in terms of economy. Yes, they somehow showed the chronicle from an American farm from the very beginning of the 20th century - they plowed on horses, as we do. But after the revolution it was necessary to start everything not just from scratch, but from the minus, as after 1991. Our poor country, damn it ... The people are only stubborn and stubborn, only time is needed to get angry - from the border to Moscow. Well, then Paris, or Berlin :-)

[krpmlws]

I don’t quite agree, the technology is secondary. The Germans took Minsk on the fifth day, but Smolensk only two months later. What’s the reason? The Soviet troops received excellent walkie-talkies, miracle tanks, had combat experience, no.

[folds]

I would only replace "Mr. Rezun tells about Stalin's sinister plans" with "In the books of Mr. Rezun .." - so it is better to know who he is;)

[Vanek]

Well, yes, I agree. We were fewer, we had everything bad (at that time, 22.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX), etc., etc. But not as recently as five days ago, I celebrated the victory and my child carried flowers to the Eternal Flame.

[avt]

Quote: Vanek

Well, yes, I agree. We were fewer, we had everything bad (at that time, 22.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX), etc., etc.

No, not everything is bad - objectively, it could not be better. And they fought in 1941 much better than the democratic, not totalitarian, well-fed and packed, at the very least, Franks and Angles combined.

[Strashila]

You can add a lot ... and the completeness of parts according to the option of peacetime, the lack of combat experience, the lack of experience and structures for repairing equipment in the field ... do not forget the fifth column. When they write the disaster or the defeat of the Soviet army in 1941 ... this is Goebels propaganda caught in the Khrushchev thaw and survived to this day, launched by the military who made these losses to relieve themselves of responsibility for these events, if that was the way they say, then there would be no spring of 1945.

[Gari]

The most numerous of the modern fighters, the Mig-3, was weakly armed, but possessed a record speed and good maneuverability ... at high altitude. However, most of the battles took place at low and medium altitudes. In addition, the plane was very willing to burn

In World War II, the MiG-3 was used in various versions. Its main qualities - a large ceiling (12 thousand meters) and a speed at altitudes of more than 5 thousand meters allowed Soviet pilots to successfully conduct battles with enemy bombers and reconnaissance and found use as a high-altitude night fighter in the air defense system. So it was mainly used until the end of the war, in particular, protecting Moscow.

On MiG-3, an enemy plane shot down on July 22, 1941, in the very first battle over Moscow, the pilot of the 2nd separate fighter air defense squadron of Moscow Mark Gallay, one of the aces of the Red Army Red Army flew and won his first victory over a German plane on the same plane A.I. Pokryshkin shooting down the Me-109E.

[Kaa]

Quote: Gari

Mig-3, was weakly armed, but had a record speed and good maneuverability ... at high altitude. However, most of the battles took place at low and medium altitudes.

And no one really knew ... until the spring of 1941 we will fight with KEM, and at what heights - in 1940 plans for high altitude bombing by the British and French oil fields of the Caucasus became known. Here we went into a series of three raw Bf-109 , MIG-3, LaGG-3 and Yak-1, and the greatest successes in 1941 (in total) were achieved on the I-16, which took off in 1933 ...

[Gari]

Quote: Kaa

three raw, MIG-3, LaGG-3 and Yak-1, and the greatest success in

And they brought it to mind, more precisely, creating an excellent Yak-3, and a powerful La-5., but the MiG-3 was less fortunate, the MiG-3 production was phased out for various reasons, but the fact that the plant that manufactured AM-35A engines served He also produced AM-38 engines for IL-2.
To increase the production of AM-38 for IL-2, the production of engines for the MiG-3 was curtailed

IL-2 certainly needed the front

[Nvalexandr]

“... How many vehicles did the anti-Soviet coalition have? According to Thomas Jenz, 3811 units. fleet - 5600. At the same time, looking at the list of equipment, you can see that there are more medium tanks and self-propelled guns on their base on the eastern front in the Wehrmacht than in the Red Army .... "
The Germans had many times better communication between the crews and the command. Therefore, they acted as a single fist with all the consequences. We also had excellent models of equipment: both in caliber and in armor ... But here is the connection (((

[Gari]

"In 1941, 333 thousand cars were produced in Germany, 268 thousand in the occupied countries, the satellites of the Third Reich produced another 75 thousand cars."

Here we can agree with this - the most developed European auto industry: its German, French, Czech and Italian were under their control

[Setrac]

Quote: Nvalexandr

We also had excellent models of equipment: both in caliber and in armor ... But here is the connection (((

Enough to use other people's brains, it's time to turn on your own.

[krpmlws]

I liked the article, but some figures raise doubts, for example, the number of artillery in the rifle division of the Red Army. The author did not disclose the question of "inadequate ideas about the scenario of the beginning of the war" - the most important question. The fact is that the military leadership of the Red Army, based on the experience of WWI, was preparing for a similar a scenario when hostilities begin with limited forces-cadre divisions and only a few weeks later the main forces begin to enter the battle.This is the reason for the weakness of the first echelon of border cover, which was unable to fulfill its combat mission of covering the border and ensuring the deployment and concentration of troops the second echelon (the troops of the second echelon were to be replenished with people mobilized from the national economy by cars, tractors). Troops of the western districts were heavily echeloned at a depth of 400 km, so the Germans easily smashed the Red Army in parts, while the troops of the second echelon had to be deployed in 40 -60 km from the first. Thus, the problems in the first echelon pr Undetermined the failure of the second echelon, as in dominoes. Zhukov also wrote about the need to build a deeply echeloned defense in 41. However, if the standards of the field regulations of the Red Army were met (in the main direction, the rifle division occupies a front of up to 6 km, instead of 30 km in reality) WWII would begin on another scenario. The Germans would have to slowly gnaw through the defenses of cadre divisions, giving our command time to strengthen the threatened areas, perhaps they would have time to bring up large reserves from the depths of the country. A completely different situation: instead of a rapid blitzkrieg, heavy border battles, with oncoming tank battles and large losses. There were serious problems in the Red Army in organizing the defense, which was built on a linear principle, without the formation of support areas with a circular defense, and instead of using a system of trenches and passages, they used a system of individual cells, in some cases trenches to the compartment, which significantly undermined the combat the spirit of Soviet soldiers, as well as the control and management of sergeants and officers. There were serious problems with the tactics of the combat use of tank units. There were, of course, other shortcomings. As a result, we can conclude that the main problems of the Red Army are problems in the field of military science, in correlation science and army, in low quality training of the commanding staff. Another major problem that the author did not talk about is the timely bringing of the western districts to full combat readiness. And here is also not all clear. It is known that Stalin until the last moment did not believe in the reality of German aggression. Why? It seems to me that he was misinformed about the real military potential of Germany. So the Air Force commander of the Kiev district (shot in July 41) before the Second World War wrote to Stalin about the presence in Germany of many tens of thousands of combat aircraft, thereby substantiating the need to increase the production of Soviet aircraft. Other similar data were received by Stalin. What could he think Stalin, when he was informed that only 3500 tons and 5500 planes (approximately) were located near the western border, and with this Germany would start a war against the USSR, and where are the main forces of Germany?

[Bronis]

Quote: krpmlws

Some figures are in doubt, for example, the number of artillery in the RKKA infantry division.

The author, it seems, was not mistaken. The rifle division of the Red Army had either 16 or 18 anti-tank magpies. The basis of the artillery is a 76-mm cannon of the 1927 model - something in the region of 40-50 pieces. In addition, howitzers 122-152 mm - another 24 pieces. + anti-aircraft artillery and "recoilless", but in a significantly smaller number.

[krpmlws]

G.K. Zhukov writes: “According to the wartime states, the divisions were supposed to have about 14 and a half thousand people, 78 field guns, 54 anti-tank 45-mm guns, 12 anti-aircraft guns, 66 mortars of 82-120 mm caliber, 16 light tanks, 13 armored vehicles, more than three thousand horses. "

[Sol]

Fair! Thank!

[Igarr]

Gets to read .... similar opuses.
"..In other words, the industry created in the shortest possible time did everything poorly - steel, optics, transmissions, gunpowder, shells - and could not otherwise. Hastily trained engineers with minimal experience invented non-working air filters for engines and copied the worst of possible foreign transmissions ... "
".. even if it weren't for the latter, the Red Army would inevitably lose border battle .. "
..
What else will tell us ... the author?
..
Junk, ravings and juggling.
...
1939 year, Khalkhin Gol.
1939, Polish campaign.
1940, Finnish campaign.
1940, Romanian campaign.
...
Colleagues, do you immediately forget what you read a week ago?
But what about ... pedestrian German infantry, all armed with Mauser rifles. Like "Fast" Heinz, dangling far behind Soviet lines?
Like .. the forgetful Leeb, not fumbling in "orange peels".
I'm embarrassed for you.

[Bronis]

Junk, ravings and juggling.
...
1939 year, Khalkhin Gol.
1939, Polish campaign.
1940, Finnish campaign.
1940, Romanian campaign.

The battles you mentioned enriched the experience of the Red Army, but most of them are either army-scale operations (Khalkhin Gol), or although they are a military operation, but, in fact, there is occupation of the territory (Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, Poland). The Finnish campaign should be considered a war, but the nature of this war clearly did not correspond to either a deep offensive operation or a blitzkrieg.
On the other hand, the Germans had two "full-fledged" blitzkriegs under their belt: France and Poland. And they did not lose the officer corps after the revolution - there were no such shocks. This did not mean the automatic success of the Germans, but it contributed to it. There are a lot of factors.
German industry, reinforced by the potential of the occupied countries, was technically developed by the Soviet Union. Could produce a more complex and advanced technique.
But it is worth noting that the USSR was able to gain competitive advantages from many of its shortcomings (sometimes, at the cost of the lives of many people, which was almost inevitable). For the same tanks. German tank production was, in general, more perfect than the Soviet in terms of product quality. But they did not have giant tank factories. Production was "distributed" to smaller enterprises. The complexity of the designs required skilled workers, attentive service and more man-hours per tank. In essence, this was German ideology - qualitative, not quantitative, superiority. In the USSR, everything was just the opposite. After the launch of the evacuated production facilities, the USSR increased the pace of production, simultaneously simplifying the design. The Germans continued to "improve" by complicating things. T-1 from the turn of 34-1942 can be considered the best tank not because its gun or armor was outstanding (by that time it was no longer the case), but because there was a lot of it, it was everywhere, where possible, it had high maintainability, required fewer resources for production ... "Panthers" produced about 1943 units, but the resources were spent comparable to the T-7000. And they were released (of all modifications) - about 34 during the war.

[tomket]

Resonist ??? A-Khalkin-Goal fighting the troops of the Far Eastern District, will arrive at the front about the battle of Moscow. B- Polish campaign: and against whom were they gaining experience there? against the sticks ??? And even in the absence of battles, they managed to screw up with the supply of the advancing divisions with fuel and other things, as Voroshilov wrote in his report. The V-Finnish company, the troops of the Leningrad district are waging war, they certainly gained some experience, otherwise Leningrad would have been surrendered like Kiev, so to speak with a BAND. If you think the Mauser is worse than the three-line, then I feel sorry for you. The number of vehicles in the Wehrmacht division is probably not an argument for you.

[knn54]

-The situation was aggravated by the lack of radio communications and the extreme shortage of trained crews.
Radios were only among the squadrons and above. In addition, ours flew in "troikas" and only then switched to a pair - "leader-slave", as the Germans initially fought.
The Germans trained their tank crews for 5-6 months.
I would add the lack of effective interaction between the ground forces and the air force. This was shown by both Afghan and 08.08.08, when they bombed their own or shot down their own.
-unsuccessful basing system.
Plus, the aircraft drove to several airfields, at the same time at the same time began to concrete strip.
-In general, there is no mystery on June 22, 1941 ...
The surprise factor is also an important thing.
And the author +

[Jurkovs]

Nevertheless, the main reason for the failures of 41 years lies in the psychological sphere. The army was demoralized by large-scale, senseless and inexplicable repressions. Military training was not conducted, command personnel from Pavlov to the last lieutenant just sat and waited, any initiative was punishable. Read the memories of Simonov (and he talked with knowledgeable people). In early summer, lieutenants arriving in the Western District from schools were forced to accept regiments. As a result, heavy equipment was lost immediately (without any TTX comparison), in the surrounded parts there was confusion and confusion. Even in the year 42, there were still arrests of commanders in the Tukhachevsky case. It was a time of missed opportunities and it is possible to recall this only with bitterness.

[valokordin]

Quote: Jurkovs

Nevertheless, the main reason for the failures of 41 years lies in the psychological sphere. The army was demoralized by large-scale, senseless and inexplicable repressions. Military training was not conducted, command personnel from Pavlov to the last lieutenant just sat and waited, any initiative was punishable. Read the memories of Simonov (and he talked with knowledgeable people). In early summer, lieutenants arriving in the Western District from schools were forced to accept regiments. As a result, heavy equipment was lost immediately (without any TTX comparison), in the surrounded parts there was confusion and confusion. Even in the year 42, there were still arrests of commanders in the Tukhachevsky case. It was a time of missed opportunities and it is possible to recall this only with bitterness.

Do not smack nonsense, with the deployment of the armed forces there were many vacancies, which there was nothing to fill. Yes, there were repressions, but not on the same scale as you imagine, and your Simonov during the war, a correspondent glorifying the Generalisimus and the AUCPB, began to spoil Stalin with all Jewish decisiveness after Khrushch exposed the personality culture. Until the age of 60, he did not express anything critical.

[dmb]

You never seem to have been among the "Stalinists", and your comments were sensible. It would be such a statement of some "sergeant". I would not pay attention. But you somehow were not associated with them, and therefore I would like to know who cheerfully criticized him before Stalin's death (Bronstein and Co. do not count), where you read Simonov's criticism of the CPSU (b) after Stalin's death. Where and when Simonov "poured mud" on Stalin, and how exactly was this expressed. Yes, if you are so concerned about blood issues, then it is worth talking about the Armenians, and not about the Jews. And most importantly, do you seriously believe that everyone but Stalin can be blamed for the 41-year tragedy? Then, of course, the discussion can not continue.

[Black]

Quote: valokordin

Do not smack nonsense

An opinion other than yours is called nonsense?
The repressions that covered the upper strata of society, including the army, were kicked off, claiming that there was nothing, at least stupid.
The army was "shorn" by repressions very strongly, and the lack of elementary education, and the MAIN thing - the lack of any initiative, was the main thing in trouble for 41 years. Millions of columns of prisoners - the reason for the lack of organization and lack of command.
The author of the article focuses on the technical side of the issue. What is coming out corrected for 1-1,5 front years ???? This is nonsense!

[Setrac]

Quote: Jurkovs

Read the memories of Simonov (and he talked with knowledgeable people).

Cool! That is, the information is not from Simonov himself (a correspondent, a loser in one word). Information from some mythical "knowledgeable people". Who were these great enlightened ones?

[dmb]

You would at least not advertise your illiteracy. Or do you confuse Simonov-peer with his malacholny living son. And if not, then the last war, and who was surrounded by Simonov, of course, is a "loser" about the comparison with the snotty Krasnodar intellectual. Apparently, Zhukov, who told him, as well as the participants in his programs, full holders of the Order of Glory, are also "losers". Here Tsapki or there Tkachev with Ustinov is yes.

[Setrac]

Quote: dmb

who was surrounded by Simonov of course "loser" about the comparison with the snotty Krasnodar intellectual.

Well, got excited, not a loser, just an enemy of our state.

[dmb]

Bravo my dear, you are getting smarter before our eyes. If you still exposed the "hostile activity" of Konstantin Mikhailovich, you would not have had a price. Only I beg you, for God's sake do not do this among the participants in the war. Among them, despite their age, there are still quite strong men, and therefore you can deservedly lose a couple of teeth. One thing you definitely do not face - a concussion. I think even you can guess why.

[bairat]

Quote: svp67

a small number of modern battlefield aircraft - attack aircraft

the attack aircraft were, IL-2, their combat use was not worked out, single sorties without fighter cover ended with the loss of aircraft.

[svp67]

Quote: bairat

the attack aircraft were, IL-2, their combat use was not worked out, single sorties without fighter cover ended with the loss of aircraft.

And how many of them were on the 22 of June 1941 of the year in the troops

According to reports on the combat actions of the air forces of the fronts for the first month of the war, by the beginning of the war there were 15 armored Il-2 attack aircraft in their composition: 8 vehicles - in the ZAPOVO (Western Front), 5 - in KOVO (South-Western Front) and 2 "Ila "- in the OdVO (Southern Front).

[bairat]

"Before the start of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Air Force managed to receive 174 Il-2s built in Voronezh. By June 20, 1941, 84 attack aircraft were transferred to the combat units of the Red Army Air Force."

[Monster_Fat]

And the photo that is given in the article shows the landing in the city of Novorossiysk in 1943 in the port, in the area of ​​the cat, now, called. "Standard" (pictured is the building of the "Port Workers' Club"). By the way, this place has survived to this day ...

[Selevc]

The whole article is a plus - but you can doubt about Soviet tanks ... On the same T-34, Koshkin went on his own from Kharkov to Moscow and back ... The same KV, T-28, T-35 tanks took an active part in the Finnish company (in much more difficult conditions than in 1941) - and there seemed to be no serious complaints ...

Soviet tank building developed very rapidly in the prewar years - of course, in a hurry and certainly could not do without mistakes - but this is a payment for speed ... The Germans were always famous for their mechanical engineering and metalworking and the fact that they had quantitatively fewer tanks and didn’t say any other equipment !!!

[krpmlws]

I agree that they do not always correctly assess the quality of Soviet tanks. I read somewhere that all the T-35 tanks of the 8th MK were lost during the marches, but to my surprise I found in Poppel's memoirs that some had reached Dubno. Also, the author bent somewhat on the quality of the armor and welding of our tanks — the armor was normal — the tankers did not complain. Poppel’s T-34 received over twenty direct hits and nothing — the tank retained combat effectiveness.

[Setrac]

Quote: Selevc

On the same T-34, Koshkin went on his own from Kharkov to Moscow and back ...

Putin didn’t make a rally in Kalina, this does not mean the quality of AvtoVAZ products, it’s just a piracy.

[Selevc]

I think that AvtoVAZ products would be much better - if, as in the Stalin era, some responsible persons were threatened by a tribunal for marriage !!! :)))

There is a story among Kharkiv residents - "The Germans bombed Koshkin's grave during one of their first raids on the city" ... Quite plausibly considering Hitler’s love for beautiful gestures ... They probably got from the 34th from the very beginning of the war ...

[Uzoliv]

I strongly disagree with the opinion of the author that the Germans had a quantitative superiority in medium tanks. What they had: T3-660 pcs, T4-440 pcs, assault guns - 250 pcs. Total - 1350. For some reason, it is customary for us to consider only the T34 as the medium tank, of which, according to the author, it was 1105. They completely forget about the T28. The car, of course, is not new, although the last T28s were launched in 1940, and a certain amount was modernized - additional reservation was established. Altogether a fully operational tank for 41 years, well studied in the army. And there were 300 of them in operational condition, and about 150 were under repair. And we calmly get 1500 medium tanks. So the Germans did not have any quantitative superiority in medium tanks.

[krpmlws]

The T-28 is a good tank, just remember the raid of one of them in Minsk, the Germans sent 300 funerals to their Faterland. I agree that all Soviet tanks with anti-ballistic armor should be taken into account.

[Setrac]

Quote: Uzoliv

So the Germans did not have any quantitative superiority in medium tanks.

The Germans had superiority in artillery. And not even by the number of barrels, which is not primary, although it is important, but by the number of ammunition produced and the means of delivery of these ammunition from the factory to the battery.

[tomket]

no matter how well the t-28 was not studied in the army, but without fuel and ammunition it won’t gain much. it’s not a matter of armor or even quantity, remember the failed stronghold, where the best tanks and tanks in decent numbers could not oppose anything to the stratgic initiative and the increased overall combat readiness of the troops

[rainer]

The article is the wildest boyan of a typical "Isaevite" ... Read the liberast ... Backwardness ... quantitative superiority ... incompetence ... yeah, and the Germans have already found the experience of war for two years somewhere ...
And what is the notorious inadequacy of command?

[bairat]

You do not read Isaev and the memoirs of veterans. They write that the commanders were more afraid of their leadership than the Germans, the initiative was tightened to the limit. It’s better to put your fighters with a frontal attack and carry out the order than to try to make things wise with flank detours, God forbid at the same time who gets captured, all the dogs will be hanged for you for this. But what the Germans would attack in the forehead would rarely remember, German officers had the freedom to maneuver.

[krpmlws]

I agree that we are sometimes abused, speculate on German military experience, and thus the real reasons for failures remain out of focus: problems with military science and military education. What the Germans had: two weeks in France, three in Poland, Norway, etc .; and the Red Army: Khalkhin-Gol, Finnish, China (ours participated) and Spain in a common asset. Someone will say, you don’t need to compare different things, but I don’t agree, because we got experience in using tank units, the principles of artillery attack worked back in Finnish (this was useful later in the Second World War), the interaction of various branches of the armed forces. For example, the German 20d did not practically include (except for a few officers) people who would have combat experience, but thanks to good training, they unfortunately completed all the missions assigned to them, including the counteraction against the Soviet 5th TD (which had t-34 and t-28 tanks). Of course, combat experience is very important, but equally good training of officers and privates, and if with the first Red Army was comparable to the Wehrmacht the fact that the second was significantly inferior. It can be concluded that the Red Army was doomed to defeat, since it was significantly inferior in combat experience, thereby diminishing the importance of military science and the training of military personnel.

[Setrac]

Quote: Rainger

And what is the notorious inadequacy of command?

This means not everyone was shot, the traitors remained, the good-looking Stalin was too much, he wanted to stay clean.

[Semyon Albertovich]

With the beginning of the war, the mobilization plan was fulfilled by 30% (in reality, maybe less), and this suggests that control of the troops was lost. The political mistake is huge: when huge troops are concentrated near the borders, then in spite of the treaties and chatter about peace, there will be an attack - it cannot be otherwise. All this led to colossal casualties at the beginning of the war and greatly complicated the road to victory over the Germans. If the States are now deploying military bases and missile defense systems near the borders of Russia, then under their cover in modern conditions they will be able to transfer troops to the Russian borders in a short time / WikiLeaks published a plan for the transfer of 9 NATO divisions to the Baltic States /. Huge responsibility on the President of the Russian Federation, if he, like Stalin, "sleeps" - then you know what will happen.

[Setrac]

Quote: Semyon Albertovich

The mobilization plan with the outbreak of war was 30% complete

Nothing can be done about it. Due to the large distances, mobilization in the USSR is slower. Moreover, the loss is huge, three times. Whenever the USSR begins to mobilize, the Third Reich will in any case be able to preempt, which actually happened.

Quote: Semyon Albertovich

then under their cover in modern conditions they will be able to transfer troops to the Russian borders in a short time

This is all bullshit, the transfer takes a lot of time, the United States and its allies simply do not have enough boats, despite their entire mighty fleet.

[AK44]

Good article. Competent and high-quality analysis of the situation of the Red Army before the war. And the meaning is clear - "Better less is more."

[Roll]

The problem is that our army itself was going to attack Germany, and was manned out of these considerations. Reduced motor resources during the onset and retreat are two big differences. If our army was preparing for the defense, the Germans did not get any blitzkrieg despite all the arguments of the author. let the author say how many of our tanks died under the lion and why they were there. If our tanks were dug in the ground and in ambushes along the roads, if the Bridges were undermined, if there was normal troop control, all German advantages would be reduced to zero. The main reason we did not prepare for defense. And then what military experience the Ghanaians have. Drive a motorcycle in France.

[djon3volta]

Quote: Rolm

If our army was preparing for defense, the Germans did not get any blitzkrieg despite all the arguments of the author.

it follows that if we hold parallels these days - now our army getting ready for defense, therefore, a blitzkrieg from NATO or the United States + NATO will not work! and if they try to make an invasion, they will wash with a yushka

[Baboon]

Roll
Was our army about to attack? In fact, they gathered and attacked us, enough to do fantasy already, I can also fantasize, but if we had t-72 and instant-21 at that time, would they be blitzkrieg would quickly break off? How knowledgeable are you, just no one could stand the blitzkrieg, Everywhere in Germany it took less than a month. They had tactics to bypass, and the capture of transport nodes, just buried tanks in the ground, constantly appeared behind enemy lines without supplies. If they continued to dig in, then in general our troops would constantly be surrounded. The fact that in 44 Normandy landed, Germany was no longer able to show them the blitzkrieg, and so they would have sent all the Anglo-Saxons back to the sea.

[Baboon]

I would also like to note that the fleet has always been an indicator of the aggressiveness of the state’s foreign policy, tired of reading musing about the number of tanks in the Red Army, why doesn’t anyone discuss the fleet of the British Empire? Why did they need so many ships? So we were going to fight, and England with its fleet is a peaceful country?

[Standard Oil]

If anyone has forgotten, the blitzkrieg strategy provides only for the concentration of troops in key areas to break through the enemy defenses and develop the offensive at a rapid pace further to destroy key units of the enemy army, destroy communications, capture airfields, headquarters, etc., while introducing as much as possible into the breakthrough the number of motorized and tank forces that literally attack until the fuel runs out, and if a defensive line is encountered in which the enemy stubbornly sat down in defense, then he simply bypasses, which happened on June 22, the enemy wedged deep into the territory of the USSR and the troops of the first echelon were left to themselves. communications no supply, no one knows where the enemy is, how much is it, what orders to carry out, retreat or advance? This is how the entire first strategic echelon melted and what is the use of the T-34 or KV if they are stuck in a field without fuel and ammunition? There is even a tank "Mammoth" "will not help, because without supplies he is just a piece of metal. That is the whole answer to the" terrible secret. "

[Gari]

They didn’t know how and could not in 1941,

learned and were able to and the result is Great Victory Day May 9 Berlin!

[Vtel]

Overall, not bad. With all the bad luck of the beginning of the war, Stalin was able to raise the patriotic spirit by his appeals to our people, which is not very observed now. And a united people will win, even with a "pitchfork", is not so easy.

[valokordin]

You read and wonder how many speculations and legends about the reasons for the defeat, sometimes justified, but forget what Soviet society was at that time. People just rose from their knees, the general level of training in the technical and intellectual respect of the population was lower in mass than in Germany. But on the other hand, the fighting spirit and dedication of the Soviet soldiers, multiplied by the military equipment that we learned to do in a short time, allowed us to win the Victory under the leadership of the AUCPB and Generalimus I.V. Stalin. Article ++++. Some would have to wonder why, with the numerical gigantic superiority of Arabs over Jews, they constantly lose wars.

[antidote]

The following should be recalled:
1. betrayal of General Pavlov, who actually opened the Western Front for the invaders (This is by the way about the repressions among the command staff. Obviously not all potential traitors were repressed)
2. The low interaction of the combat arms at the beginning of the war, by the way, and the lack of radio communications not only in aviation, but also in other formations. The Supreme even had to issue a series of orders on this issue.
3. In fact, the lack of modern air defense. Designer Shipunov not in vain talked about it. In his memoirs
3. I agree with many of the above

But the most important thing is for all those who are shouting indiscriminately at the Red Army.
Germans defeated Poland in 2 weeks, France in 40 days. The rest of the countries have nothing to say about
The Germans came to Moscow only after 4 months, where for the first time they got the real teeth. We had a lot of mistakes at the beginning, but by 1943 the Red Army became a high-altitude military machine

[Thunderbolt]

Mr. Pavlov is not a traitor. He was shot for (literally): "for cowardice, inaction, lack of discipline, the collapse of command and control, the surrender of weapons to the enemy without a fight and unauthorized abandonment of positions," he was shot for (literally): "for the dishonoring command of the most responsible Zap. Special VO. Not enough experience. Before that he commanded a tank brigade for a short time, then Spain. The District Air Force Commander also had experience in commanding a squadron, Spain and immediately to the District.

[igordok]

They criticize the Red Army for the mass surrender in the surroundings of 1941goda. But formally 22 June 1940g. ALL army (one of the strongest armies in the world) surrendered, ALL fleet, ALL aviation, ALL FRANCE. The fact that Vichy France remained independent is not true.

[skullcap]

1 / The article as a whole is informative and the author, in a limited format of the article, quite well examined a number of technical reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War.
But it would have to be sure that the main reason for this initial failure was political. Western, and after them, our internal, democratic authorities unshakably silenced the fact that the attitude of the Western world to the USSR was worse than to Hitler, who was actually nourished by Western democracies specifically for the war of extermination with the Soviet Union.
For example, England at the same time formed the attack armed forces to attack the USSR in the region of Baku with its oil reserves. Therefore, we had to prepare for war with this enemy.
In general, the position of Western democracies in relation to the war of Hitler with the Soviet Union in 1941 year outlined the future US President Truman. I don’t remember literally, but the essence is this: “If Germany wins, we must help the Russians, if Russia wins, we must help Germany. And may they kill each other as much as possible. ”
Hence: if the initial period were left for the Red Army, then the Soviet Union would have to fight with the combined forces of the whole West ..
Thus, the tactical loss of the initial period of the war turned into a strategic gain for the USSR, a split in the single imperialist camp and the involvement of one part of it to fight the other and, ultimately, our Victory. Although it was America that gained from the war, of course.
An important reason for the surprise attack was the appointment of a number of dates (June 22 - not the only date of the German attack, transmitted by intelligence), in which the attack did not take place. And our troops were mobilized and were ready to repel the enemy. But you can not endlessly be in a state of full combat readiness. And the enemy is free to choose a convenient time to attack.
That is, the situation was the same as before the start of the second American war against Iraq. Remember how the Americans defiantly gathered an army to invade Iraq, and the Iraqi army occupied a defensive line and waited several weeks for the Americans to launch an offensive. And they deliberately pulled out time, until the Iraqis exhausted themselves from continuous tension, and then tactically unexpectedly struck their blow.
Therefore, if the troops were once again mobilized by 22 June, the Germans would simply postpone their attack again.
Knowing that the German army was not provided with winter clothing, the Soviet government came to the conclusion that a hundred from the second half of the summer, the Germans would not start a war, since they would not have time to complete it before winter. But they did not take into account Hitler's adventurism or his obedience to creditors.

[skullcap]

2 / Considering the beginning of the war, you can trace the chain of events:
- tactical surprise, achieved by the fascists 22 of June, allowed them to destroy the main part of the Soviet aircraft by the first strikes on the airfields;
- it allowed them to seize dominance in the air;
- reigning in the air, the fascists from the first days staged a massive hunt for fuel and lubricants: warehouses and tankers, destroying them almost completely;
- left without fuel equipment, including tanks, destroyed by the Red Army themselves, so as not to get the enemy. In this way, and not in battles, almost all tanks were lost in the first months;
- left without equipment and heavy weapons, the Red Army was forced to retreat, leading heavy defensive battles with a technically much better armed enemy, which also created a significant numerical superiority in their chosen areas.
And in conclusion, I cannot fail to say that the initial defeat of the Red Army was also being prepared by aspiring fifth column. My father is from the Voronezh region, my mother is from the Bryansk region. Both of them told more than once how before the war commissions from Jews came to the collective farms to inspect the horses and, like a good horse, they announced that they had glanders and shot them.
It is known that the coming of Hitler to power was financed by the Zionists. Apparently, the Soviet Jews from the fifth column interacted with them and prepared for the defeat of the Red Army, while the Nazis didn’t clear their brains from the first days of the war by mass executions of Russian Jews.
We were also completely lucky that Stalin basically managed to clear the fifth army from the fifth column (with the exception of Pavlov and some others), but we would not even see Victory. It is the cohesion of the Soviet people that is the main factor that ensured the Victory. Therefore, today, in the midst of the information war, the main forces must be directed to the elimination of evil wicked evil spirits from public life.

[Black]

Quote: kosopuz

And in conclusion, I cannot fail to say that the initial defeat of the Red Army was also being prepared by aspiring fifth column. My father is from the Voronezh region, my mother is from the Bryansk region. Both of them told more than once how before the war commissions from Jews came to the collective farms to inspect the horses and, like a good horse, they announced that they had glanders and shot them.

From it what !!!! Jews here stuck their nose, and were secret agents of the Abwehr, honorary workers of the Gestapo !!! Here he is the main factor! And do not even think about anything else.
The fifth column consisted of completely different nationalities. these are the peoples of the Caucasus, the lower Cossacks, Kalmyks, (I think if the war had reached Ural, the Bashkirs would have been there), i.e. those who suffered very badly in the Civil War. whether they played any significant role at the beginning of the war or in its course, no !!! And the fifth of the unfinished Trotskyists is nonsense.

[krpmlws]

Less for the Cossacks.

[antidote]

Yeah, but this nationality is only white and fluffy. To see Yezhov in 1937-1938 he shot the whole Chekist post-revolutionary evil spirits (and among the Chekists of the Civil War 80% were representatives of this nationality). And therefore, only the patriots of the Soviet state and its true defenders remained

[AK44]

Quote: antidot

Looks like Yezhov in the years 1937-1938 shot the whole Chekist post-revolutionary evil spirits (and among the Chekists of the Civil War 80% were representatives of this nationality).

I don’t know about the Jews, but I definitely didn’t get the Caucasian (the last one was put on the wall in December 53).

[skullcap]

Quote: Chen

From it that !!!! The Jews and then stuck his nose ... Here it is, the main factor! And do not even think about something else

And what are you so keenly aware of the mention of the Jews?
Their, that, not existed in these times? And if they were, then we have every right to consider and their roles.
What did you struggle for in the years (not at night, be remembered) of perestroika? So that there are no zones outside of criticism. And to move away from considering the role of the Zionists in unleashing the 2 World War II is to hide your head in the sand.
Or will you insist that all the financial, media and other power of the national Jewish clans like the Rothschilds or the Rockefellers does not interfere in the course of world events? Or do not know about the connection of many Soviet party leaders with the international Zionist movement?
In Soviet times, materials were published about the close ties of the Zionists with the Nazis in the years of the 2 MB. It is a pity that I did not know then that once there would be an opportunity to put them on the Internet, otherwise I would have saved it.
In one way or another: to avoid considering the affairs of people and communities of any nationality is to hide your head in the sand.
"And the fifth of the unbeaten Trotskyists is NOT nonsense," but a harsh reality that lurked in anticipation of the right moment and organized the 1991 revolution. And destroyed the USSR, by the way.

[krpmlws]

Tactical surprise is the most important factor? The first echelon of the Baltic region was brought into full combat readiness in advance and the Germans passed it “almost without noticing.” Calculations in the scenario of the beginning of the war are the most important factor (I wrote about this above).

[Setrac]

Quote: kosopuz

- tactical surprise, achieved by the fascists 22 of June, allowed them to destroy the main part of the Soviet aircraft by the first strikes on the airfields;

There was just no tactical surprise; there was strategic surprise. The Third Reich concentrated its army, but the USSR did not.

[Alexey M]

A sober look at the beginning of the war. And it doesn’t matter if Stalin wanted to attack Hitler or not (maybe he didn’t want to deliver a preemptive strike). But the main thing that the Germans didn’t take into account was the stamina of the Russian soldier. Yes, we practically lost our army at 41 but this army was dying but it didn’t give up like the Europeans. And the fact that we have bad weapons or commanders is nonsense. It simply could not withstand the blow of such a force in three directions. Even if the Red Army was the same strength as the Germans, then it was distributed practically throughout the country, and the Germans focused on three areas here is the advantage for you in all respects.

[crasever]

Russian weapons thought defeated the German gloomy military genius conceptually - simplicity, reliability, power ...

[user]

And why no one remembers the MARSHAL OF VICTORY he was at that time the chief of the general staff and participated in all pre-war events

By the way, the old people said that he was called the Butcher in the army for the methods and style of military leadership

[Alekseev]

Because the mind and historical horizons are enough for serious people.
What kind of "old men said that the troops called him a butcher"?
Maybe "moved by the mind", and maybe from the former policemen ... Now everyone has freedom. Especially in some countries of the former USSR.
And here, the opinion of G.K.Zhukov (in general, coincides with the opinion of the author of the article)
“It will be necessary to finally face the truth and, without hesitation, to say how it really was. We must appreciate the German army, which we had to face from the first days of the war. We didn’t retreat a thousand kilometers before the fools, but before the strongest army in the world. It must be clearly said that the German army at the beginning of the war was better than our army, better prepared, trained, armed, psychologically more prepared for the war, drawn into it. She had the experience of war, and, moreover, a victorious war. This plays a huge role. We must also admit that the German General Staff and the German General Staffs then worked better than our General Staff and our General Staffs, the German commanders at that time thought better and deeper than our commanders. We studied during the war, and learned, and began to beat the Germans, but it was a long process. And this process began with the fact that the Germans had an advantage in every way. "..." We must not forget that we entered the war, still continuing to be industrially backward country versus Germany "

[Thunderbolt]

Quote: Alekseev

We studied during the war

I think it’s appropriate to recall here that after the first defeats a special commission was formed. It began to redo the statutes of the Red Army in accordance with the new requirements. And one more thing: Units of the 49th Army have been conducting frontal attacks on the settlements of Kostino, Ostrozhnoe, Bogdanovo for many days, Potapovo and, suffering huge losses, have no success.
It should be clear to every elementary military literate person that the above villages represent a very advantageous and warm defensive position. The area in front of the villages is under full shelling, and, despite this, criminally conducted attacks continue at the same place, and as a result of the stupidity and lack of discipline of the unfortunate organizers, people are paid in thousands of lives, without bringing any benefit to the Homeland.
If you want to be left in your posts, I demand:
Stop criminal attacks on the forehead of the village;
Stop forehead attacks at heights with good fire;
To step only along ravines, forests, and low-fire terrain;
Break through immediately between the settlements and, not stopping at their final mastery, tomorrow capture Sloboda, Dawn and wedge themselves to Levshin.
Execution to bring me to 24.00 27.1 Zhukov.

[IRBIS]

Quote: Thunderbolt

Execution to bring me to 24.00 27.1 Zhukov.

He wrote good orders, correct ones. Yes, and they all wrote. That's just under Rzhev G.K. laid down the division every day, being a front commander, when it sent orders to take Sychevka by any means. And the paratroopers (10000 people) were killed in the Dnieper operation on his orders.

[Thunderbolt]

Almost all commanders call Zhukov - tough, tough, etc. That means he was, because who else to believe ... For this he was valued by the Supreme Commander, that he could complete the task at any cost. And as for Sychevka, the "Nevsky Pyatachok" - why not Sychevka? (and how many such "patches" are on the conscience of each commander, the army of the commander of a lower rank). And if Zhukov wrote such an order (above), then the tactical execution went against his operational plans (for each unit of Alexander the Great not put it) I'm not whitewashing the marshal, I'm just trying to understand, after all, it was not because of natural cruelty that orders were given to Sychevka.

[Thunderbolt]

The experience of the Soviet-Finnish war showed, according to S.K. Timoshenko, “the whole malignity of our combat training system is to conduct classes according to conventions,” the inability of commanders and staffs to truly command, as well as the distorted idea of ​​military personnel about the nature of modern warfare.
The new People’s Commissar S.K.Timoshenko in one of his first orders demanded "to teach the troops only what is needed in the war, and only as it is done in the war." --- On the practical training of the tank driver on the eve of the war in the Red Army Allocated only 5 hours, and many had only 1,5-2 hours of driving practice, while in the Wehrmacht - at least 50 hours. We tirelessly increased the production of tanks, and the Germans increased the level of training of crews. Former commanders complain in their memoirs that their subordinates did not have time to master the new technology, but how could it be mastered in 2 hours? The same situation was in the preparation of Soviet pilots before the war .--- Despite the militarization of the whole life of the country unprecedented in history, the Red Army's armed forces were not ready for the demands of a modern war. The tactical illiteracy of the commanders, the low level of combat training of the Red Army led to the fact that the Red Army, having material superiority, suffered one defeat after another.

[Metlik]

Ready to subscribe to every word.
The problem of the army and society as a whole is in the confrontation between the careerist and the professional. The careerist directs all his efforts to climb the career ladder, and he can rise only by means of sucking, licking and assenting to his superiors. A professional calls things by their proper names; he clearly sees mistakes and fools who made them. Therefore, the entire system of careerists strive to get rid of such people.
Stalin became great precisely because he learned to appreciate professionals, knew how to listen to them, was not afraid to argue and admit that he was wrong.

He would also add that the German general was almost always on the front line, he himself saw the situation, could promptly call for the support of artillery and aircraft. Our general, at least in the first period of the war, was at headquarters and had little idea of ​​what was happening with his troops at the moment.

[IRBIS]

The numbers are completely untrue. Take a list of opposing joints and parts, add and compare. This is a very painstaking and tedious job. Since 94, this is my hobby. Memoirs, maps, chronicles, archives and more. Take documentaries of that time and pay attention to tanks, cars, weapons and equipment in general. The Germans have a higher level of mechanization - where is this from? they have horse-drawn guns and soldiers either on a wagon or on foot. Are tanks better? Sorry ... More than 50% - light tanks and trophy trash. And so in everything.
But the level of training, organization of management and interaction - yes, the Germans had an order of magnitude higher! But this is the task of commanders and chiefs. And who is to blame that the Chief of the General Staff Zhukov knew about the "unsuccessful" basing of aviation, and about other weak points, but did nothing to correct the situation. The command simply wrote off its own mediocrity and inability to lead the troops on the alleged technical and numerical superiority of the enemy. And only at the cost of the lives of Russian soldiers, their courage and heroism, did they manage to compensate for all this stupidity. And what really happened, we most likely will never know, the archives are closed and the time of their opening is not even named, although the period of 50 years has long passed.

[krpmlws]

Quote: IRBIS

And who is to blame that the Chief of the General Staff Zhukov knew about the "unsuccessful" basing of aviation, and about other weak points, but did nothing to correct the situation. The command simply wrote off its own mediocrity and inability to lead the troops on the alleged technical and numerical superiority of the enemy. And only at the cost of the lives of Russian soldiers, their courage and heroism, did they manage to compensate for all this stupidity. And what really happened, we most likely will never know, the archives are closed and the time of their opening is not even named, although the period of 50 years has long passed.

In your opinion, Tymoshenko’s lack of talent, stupid and incompetent commanders ... you know. Read my post above, the reason is not the lack of talent of our military leaders (it was they who ultimately beat all the especially gifted Manshteins, Guderians, etc.), but in the absence of a normal military education systems, modern military science. Where do they get sensible commanders if they were poorly trained? Of course, there was negligence before the Second World War (this is a matter of education, commander culture), so the communication wires were not buried, but simply laid along telegraph poles! !! ??? and Zhukov, assuming the post of chief of staff in February 41, raised this issue, but they could not eliminate the flagrant fact before the start of the Second World War.

[IRBIS]

Quote: krpmlws

Zhukov, Tymoshenko-mediocrity, stupid and incompetent commanders

Definitely !!! Tymoshenko in 42 convinced the headquarters of the Supreme Command that he could defeat Army Group South. Received all the necessary reserves and equipment. And he was in such a hurry to "distinguish himself" that he did not analyze the situation that had developed in reality, he "blinked" the enemy's strike groups on the flanks, which were already ready to strike. For the Germans, Tymoshenko's blow became a gift, an attraction of unheard of generosity. As a result - the encirclement of our troops (with their subsequent complete defeat) near Kharkov and the rush of the Germans to Stalingrad and the Caucasus. And who is Tymoshenko after that, a genius?
And that’s how I am, offhand, without special details and tedious figures.

Quote: krpmlws

Zhukov, assuming the post of chief of staff in February 41, raised this issue, but they could not eliminate the glaring fact before the start of the Second World War.

Then to him, as an NGS, the price is worthless! Then they will shoot Pavlov and a hedgehog with him another five people, who will be appointed extreme. And who, excuse me, commanded Pavlov? Who gave him orders for constant (stupid) counterattacks in which tanks were lost? Genius?

[krpmlws]

There was a big mess in the Red Army: the army was growing rapidly, the commanders made a dizzying career, the level of training in higher military institutions was low, the border was moved to the west, it was necessary to create the entire infrastructure from scratch (I can not justify, this can not justify the slovenliness of many commanders, I only state that there are objective reasons for everything); in the end, we got what we got. Not only Pavlova and his headquarters were shot, I know that they shot the Air Force commander of the South-Western Front in July 41. It’s more correct to ask a question and why Pavlov was shot, and not Kirpanos (com.Kievsky okrug.) or Kuznetsov (com.Pribaltiysky okrug), because Pavlov made as many mistakes as Kirpanos and Kuznetsov did not. Zhukov did what he could, it was he and Tymoshenko who gave the order on June 15-19, bypassing Stalin, by the way, to bring the first echelons of border cover to full combat readiness. Can you imagine what responsibility they assumed? It was Tymoshenko who organized the counterattack thanks to which Rostov was released and the German commander was removed by Hitler. The counterattacks were not stupid, in principle, the pre-war plans for covering the border were stupid. So blaming Tymoshenko and Zhukov for mediocrity is a big mistake. They had mistakes by themselves, but who makes no mistakes?

[Quzmi4]

I wish you all good health!

About the technological backwardness of the Soviet Union.
Already at the evacuated factories, AUTOMATIC submerged arc welding of T-34 armored vehicles was introduced.
The vaunted Germans cooked until the end of the war manually ...
Rocket projectiles for the Katyusha were technologically advanced and cheap, therefore they were produced in colossal quantities.
Similar German NURSs had orders of magnitude higher accuracy, but required high-precision production, and the propellant for the rocket engine was damn expensive. They could not create cheap ones.
The most effective anti-tank weapons of the attack aircraft were small-caliber cumulative bombs, which the IL-2 took on board HUNDREDS. Could be made at least in bed workshops. In response - wunderwaffles.
There are numerous cases when the German infantry gladly used captured Soviet small arms instead of their regular one. And by no means out of poverty or out of need. PPSh exceeded MP-40 in effective range. SVT was self-loading, unlike Mauser 98k. And reliability ...
Specialists will expand this list.

About our everlasting gouging.
More recently, the menacing orders of the People’s Commissars of Defense have been cited for the urgent need to mask border airfields and disperse aircraft based on them.
The meaning of almost the first order of Tymoshenko in the role of People's Commissar - "Until when will the orders on camouflage and dispersal not be fulfilled? !!" (Obviously, it was expected that Stalin would personally carry the "Ishachk" tails).
The result is known to all.
The Red Army was what it was. Is there more order in the modern Russian Army? I bow to the feat, but we can no longer afford to step on the same rake over and over again.

[Metlik]

Quote: Quzmi4

Specialists will expand this list.

The ZIS-2 gun was created before the war. As it turned out, its capabilities are excessive for defeating T3 and T4 Germans. Production was curtailed and resumed only when tigers and panthers appeared on the front. At the end of the war, the ZIS-2 sample was presented to England at her request, since the British, no matter how hard they tried, could not create anything like this. The Germans used our f22 guns, they had nothing to hit with t34 and kv.

[tomket]

The article plus upsets the blindness of some of the rezunists on the forum. It seems to have been smashed to smithereens, but some people like to listen to fables about how strong we were in 41. Firstly, for some reason no one wants to take into account the fact that the Wehrmacht was indeed a model army of quality with a good quantity. I especially recommend that you remember how Mac Arthur surrendered his troops in the Philippines. Tell me, how many generals did Roosevelt shoot before the war? It was not otherwise that sergeants took the regiments at all before the war. Well, or the rout of the Air Force and Navy in Pearl Harbor. It was not otherwise that they destroyed the fleet that was being prepared for the attack, and for one the VVS. Well, the 42 was a training year, when there was no surprise ... they remembered how much they knocked out the Americans? This is all called a strategic initiative, not a mystery of history.

[IRBIS]

Quote: tomket

upsets the blindness of some residentists on the forum

Suvorov-Rezun is an unconditional bastard. There is only one "but".
He adjusted all the information and figures to the conclusion that was dictated to him by his "masters". And here it is BUT ...
But the numbers are real, from the original sources. You can read most of them yourself, calculate and make sure that he was not mistaken in numbers.

[Quartermaster]

Everything is correctly and correctly stated!

[lexe]

I will add the following to an interesting article:
1.the Wehrmacht’s superiority in optical surveillance at the forefront, which, combined with powerful radio communications, provided accurate artillery fire (the areas remained in the 1st World War) - Brusilov’s lessons for the Germans went for the future. And we created artillery divisions ... instead of optics and communications . I read the opinion of the German general where he mentioned our huge losses for the heights on the terrain, what do you think why? And all because of this technological lag. From this coordinated fire we lost the most people.
2.fighting tanks and MG calculations ...-- And the anti-tank missiles? Which were handed out en masse only near Moscow. And the light-medium mortars? - which are easier to hide from observers. - Five-year plans are not needed for their production.
3.1941g. prepared by Germany, FRANCE, ENGLAND, USA, POLAND .. and others. on the little things
POLAND - the elite simply surrendered the country. There are no complaints against the Polish people ..- they fought as they could. But the Poles also had anti-tank guns ... in the grease in warehouses and the ability to strain the Wehrmacht in urban battles.
FRANCE-A strike at the joint of armies on the march and in defense from places with a large% of the French-speaking population? This is a betrayal of their General Staff — well, the French did not want to fight and sacrifice as in the 1st World War.
England \ US-money (technology) oil hidden diplomatic cover
4.1941, he himself prepared STALIN. Moreover, consciously. WHEN WE SHOULD SAY THIS DIRECTLY! He solved one main task - changing the national composition of the country. You cannot solve the problem with the gates; voluntarily went to the chopping block. but at the same time supplying the people with powerful pseudo weapons (to remove suspicions from the authorities) with defective shells, with low motor resources, etc. YES and without command personnel ...- I would be more comfortable in 1941 in subordinating commanders- executioners 1917 having combat experience than their peers boys. And in such a war, any executioner recalls his nationality .. I'm talking about Stalin’s shot officers of the spacecraft who went through a civil-bloody war!
5.How did Stalin plan to win the war? Having lost it in 1941. A model evacuation of industry at a time when there was complete chaos is the answer to the question. The winter rehearsal of counterattack near Moscow is the war with Finland and the full debriefing after it. Stalin looked like in conditions chaos in winter (but military science didn’t know it in detail - remember about winter apartments, huh? ..) you can defeat.
6.And yet, STALIN was a genius who deceived Hitler by pretending to be a sheep. It was only the sheep in the full sense of the word that we were ... in 1941.-Russian people. And the Germans were wolves who simply died from overeating.
7.Before the war itself, there were headquarters games with a simulation of defense against Germany. And in this game Germany won up. Conclusion: on the General Staff table there was a complete list of Wehrmacht units on the border. And could this plan go to the left? -The Germans started very bravely in 1941
And the last: I saw the veterans' memories of the early days ..-- this is a shock and awe in their eyes .. it is possible to justify those days with any failures / shortcomings .. But I think this defeat will justify only one-betrayal
For spelling please excuse graphomaniacs

[Selevc]

Superiority of the Wehrmacht in optical surveillance at the leading edge, which in combination with powerful radio communications gave accurate artillery fire

Lex, do you want to say that the Soviet army lacked binoculars? There were enough binoculars - there were even more serious optical means (there are pre-war photos) ...

And the light-medium mortars? - which are easier to hide from observers - do not need five-year plans for their production.

That was all, too - there are statistics and photo reports from the pre-war exercises of the Red Army ...

POLAND - the elite simply surrendered the country. There are no complaints against the Polish people ..- they fought as they could. But the Poles also had anti-tank guns ... in the grease in warehouses and the ability to strain the Wehrmacht in urban battles.

Poland it was a buffer state in 1939 - obviously unworthy adversary of GermanyThere is a clear imbalance of forces ... If they strained the Wehrmacht in urban battles this would extend their resistance for another week - no more !!!

Before the war itself, there were headquarters games with a simulation of defense against Germany. And in this game Germany won up. Conclusion: on the General Staff table there was a complete list of Wehrmacht units on the border. And could this plan go to the left? Germans started very bravely in 1941.

Headquarters exercises in the USSR were conducted annually - naturally against countries that were likely opponents ... And of course, every year the Reds defeated these exercises ... The USSR had such a strategy - beat the aggressor at the border and then go on the offensive - but life has shown another war !!!

[lexe]

1. were ... But the story is repeating. Now we also have something from droneless devices. There are photos and videos). It’s a little far \ clear to see, you also need to quickly use the information and this is a chain where the gap does not give a result.
2. POLAND .. it was the first exam in Germany as a whole. The Wehrmacht 1 and 1939 is like a puppy and an adult dog of a German shepherd. The puppy was fed (production of ammunition) in 1941. bad. By the end of the Polish company there was a shortage of ammunition / aerial bombs- well, the industry had not yet gained pace. The German soldier was still not so confident in himself, the absence of conscription after Versailles affected. A week or two .. and German generals perhaps because of fear of powerful opponents, silently looking from the outside, they would simply throw Hitler into the trash of history, because all his successes were a series of adventures, well, they would get Danzig and go to the world. Why did we enter Poland in 1939? The last Polish soldier fired his last bullet at a likely enemy, that's the moment to send troops. Hitler would have ceded to us those lands in exchange for parity. The Polish people already had victorious experience against a strong opponent. They could win not by points, but simply by time — the Poles could withstand it then.

[Spiegel]

This, apparently, is in our blood. During the entire service (served in Soviet times) there was not a single alarm without the fact that they were not notified in advance. By and large, they were engaged not in combat readiness, but in the satisfaction of the superiors and "no matter what happens." I understand those who actually fought - in Afghanistan and Chechnya. They had to pay in blood for all these military "habits" of ours. As a result, they became different. But then they strongly interfered in a peaceful military life - who needs real combat readiness, the calmness of the authorities is more important. I think that the picture was about the same in June 1941: cheerful reports, concealment of problems and shortcomings. Well, does the authorities want to hear the truth? Who needs it!

This whole our traditional mess was multiplied by the traditional neglect of control systems, which are always based on communication. And this neglect continued throughout the Soviet years, and continues now. What is the use of comparing the number of tanks, if there are many, and they are not controllable? Should I explain to my military colleagues that the well-coordinated actions of small forces are much more effective than the actions of an almost uncontrollable large mass of troops. And if there is no effective control system, then what effective counteraction to a well-organized adversary can we talk about? If there is no such system, then where will the commanders who know how to manage troops with quality be taken from? From Brest to Moscow, this mess was burned with hot iron.

[plasmagod]

In brief about Aberdeen, we can say that the Americans did not comply with the operating requirements when testing our tanks. As a result of the correspondence, they sent another T-34, with which they did better.

Here is a very interesting article with archival documents on this subject: http://yuripasholok.livejournal.com/1742246.html

[Kazanok]

even an alcoholic in a drunken dream will not see such a MONSTERY delirium .... whatever the phrase is a lie ... already shook from the rage and lies of the pseudo-script .... such must be shot in the first place ...

[lexe]

But what politicians are adequate?) After all, they create and write history for adequate, normal people, using the language of translation (well, they wanted and called this language of translation history))). But only translators (historians) are joking) - a dictionary of translated words and meanings of the customer- power is narrow. Well, it is impossible to make scientific and technological progress with an educated population and with spots from the past. What is the main thing for a person? WHY? AS? and other questions move him forward, otherwise cattle ...