Operation "Typhoon". crash
Operation Typhoon was to worthily crown the Panzerwaffe campaign on the Eastern Front with another brilliant victory. However, the path to the Typhoon was far from as simple as it might seem at first glance. The fact is that in mid-August a dispute broke out between Hitler and the command of Army Group Center. Hitler intended to temporarily switch to defense on this sector of the front in order to defeat the grouping of Soviet troops in the Kiev region, while simultaneously transferring additional Army Group North tank connections for the complete encirclement of Leningrad. And I want to note that not one of the directives of Hitler or his memorabilia says a single word about the assault on Leningrad or Moscow. Everywhere diligently emphasizes that these megacities should be surrounded and strangled in the ring of blockade. By the way, I would like to remind you that the Germans didn’t storm Minsk and Kiev, but simply occupied after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Therefore, one of the famous exploits of Marshal Zhukov, who allegedly saved Leningrad, is in fact nothing more than a soap bubble. Easily repel a non-existent threat! If the Barbarossa plan lay on the Stalin table 3 hours before Hitler signed it, then why are our glorious knights of whip and spade ... pah! In the sense of a cloak and a dagger ... Once again confused ... the valiant defenders of the progressive blacks of Zanzibar did not put there any of Hitler's subsequent directives?
Von Bock and Guderian came out against this proposal, and Brauchitsch somewhat unexpectedly supported them. Fupep lost patience and snapped:
Still, September 16 OKH gives the order to prepare a further attack on Moscow. For this purpose, it is supposed to return the Guderian tank group to the Center Army Group, and also to transfer the Göpner Tank Group, which was still subordinate to the Army Group North. 16 September Von Boca headquarters sends an order for Operation Typhoon. At its first stage, it is planned to encircle and defeat the “armies of Tymoshenko” in the area of Vyazma and Bryansk. Here I really want to throw a couple of stones in the direction of the vaunted intelligence services of both opponents. For some reason, in all German orders and directives only "Tymoshenko's army", "Eremenko army" and so on appear. The Germans failed to determine the exact names of the fronts opposing them? Gru showed no better. Our command spent a lot of effort to prevent the assaults of Moscow and Leningrad, which the Germans did not even think about starting.
All our historians write in unison that the Germans concentrated all available forces to capture Moscow, which is, to put it mildly, an exaggeration. Yes, von Bock did get an 4 tank group at his disposal, but that’s all. Moreover, the Germans took a rather strange step, which is impossible to unambiguously assess. Actually, this step was within the framework of the general strategy of von Bock, who even during border battles quite logically duplicated tank and conventional armies. But now the army corps, consisting of conventional infantry divisions, were introduced into all tank groups, so their mobility has noticeably decreased. In preparation for the attack on Moscow, the Panzer generals received a single additional tank division.
In addition, new disputes broke out in the German command. Von Bok wanted to make a deep detour near Vyazma, while the OKH wanted to restrict himself to the surrounding city. Halder intended to send the motorized units directly to Moscow, and Hitler was totally against street fighting. (Note in parentheses - quite rightly!) In addition, a crazy idea was born to combine the attack on Moscow with a von Leeb strike in the area of Lake Ilmen, as well as with the actions of Army Group South in the area of Kharkov. In general, the Germans tried to bring together so many disparate factors that it is not surprising that the Typhoon failed, but that they even managed to do something.
Their position was complicated by the state of tank divisions. A throw to the south hit the Guderian group painfully; its divisions now had no more than 50 percent of serviceable tanks. In Goth, this percentage reached the “70” mark, and the Goepner divisions were fully staffed, but there was another problem. The composition of the 4 Tank Group from June 22 completely changed, and Göpner did not have a single division with which he started the war. Everything else the Germans experienced a shortage of fuel. Although in Gomel, Roslavl, Smolensk and Toropets there were huge warehouses, only drops came to the front.
The German offensive began with another improvisation. Try to guess who tried? Well, of course, “Swift Heinz”, which launched the September 30 offensive, that is, two days earlier, was covered by the expected deterioration of the weather. The operation began successfully for the Germans. Once again, tank wedges cut through the defenses of the Soviet troops, like a red-hot knife a piece of paper. In the area of Vyazma and Bryansk, several boilers were formed in which ... And here we slow down a little. I have already written and will now repeat that the loss figures that Tippelskirch cites and are readily repeated by all Western authors do not arouse any shadow of trust in me. Too well the sum of those killed and prisoners coincides with the beautiful and round figure of a million. You could write 1,01 million or 998 thousand, so no, no more and no less. I can guess where this figure came from, but I cannot justify my guess. Most likely, this million is an approximate assessment of the outcome of the battle by the Army Center headquarters Center, which at that time was not going to refine it, there were more important matters. But over time, the approximate assessment was transformed into an exact count. I can even assume that the notorious 668 000 is not the number of prisoners, but the total losses of the Red Army, but, as they say, I cannot either confirm or deny this point of view.
In any case, it was 1941's last successful blitzkrieg of the year. October 7 von Bock ordered the continuation of Operation Typhoon. On the left, the 9 Army and the 3 Panzer Group were to attack Rzhev and Kalinin, in the center of the 4 Army and Göpner’s tanks were moving to Kaluga and Mozhaisk, in the south of Guderian, which now commanded the 2 Armored Army (another renaming, which did not add to him a single extra tank), was supposed to move to Tula. But here the Germans were summed up by the same passion for gigantism, which we have already mentioned. Well, Guderian once again repeated the mistake that had already become traditional for him, rushed forward, not caring about the reliable closing of the encirclement ring, which allowed part of the Soviet troops to escape from the trap. However, almost two thirds of von Boc's forces were connected with the liquidation of the boilers, the field marshal broke into the defense of the Red Army for an enormous distance, but failed to take advantage of this, giving the Soviet command a breather.
In early October, the Germans resumed the offensive, and at this point von Bock made a serious mistake. He decided that the Russian army finally defeated, and the operation moved into the stage of persecution. The order of the headquarters of the Army Group Center from 14 of October speaks directly about this, but the Germans once again confronted Soviet forces that were reborn from the ashes like a phoenix. However, for some unknown reason, von Boc did not respond to the changing situation. Entries in his diary indicate that the field marshal continued to remain in a state of incurable euphoria.
The German armies continued to move on a wide front, no longer trying to concentrate forces, although it was possible to deliver a powerful blow in the north, where the 3-I and 4-I tank groups now occupied a noticeably narrowed front. Von Bock broke the key rule of not only tank war, but also of the art of war in general - to concentrate forces for striking, and not to try to slap with the open palm.
Small help. For some reason, OKH renamed tank groups to tank armies at the same time. 2-I was renamed the first, 5 of October, 25 of October was followed by 1-I, and 3-th and 4-th had to wait for the New Year, the corresponding order was issued only on January 1. All this introduces a lot of confusion in the descriptions of military operations.
Optimism turned out to be a very contagious disease that spread from the headquarters of Army Group Center to the OKH. There the idea was suddenly born of turning the tank army 2 to the south after the inevitable and quick capture of Tula. Part of the forces of the 3 Tank Group, the command intended to again turn north towards Leningrad. Von Bock managed to defend his divisions so far, but this helped him little.
However, the German offensive frankly exhausted. Von Boku still managed to crush the troops of the Reserve Front on the Mozhaisk Line, but it was precisely crushing and dropping, not destroying. Now everything worked decisively against the Germans, starting with the same autumn thaw. After all, it was not from the good life that Guderian’s tank fuel had to be dropped by parachutes — automobile columns could not make their way to the front line, and transport aircraft could not land. All this taken together — losses, command errors, extended communications, bad weather, and much more — predetermined the failure of the Typhoon. None of the factors was decisive in itself, but they overlapped each other, and the effect was devastating.
It is difficult to imagine the degree of ignorance of the German High Command regarding the state of affairs at the front, for some reason convinced that everything is going fine. From October 24 to November 13 there came an operational pause. The Germans once again shuffled their forces, and on November 13, a representative of the OKH General Halder met with the commanders of Army Group Center in Orsha. Halder handed them Hitler's order to continue the offensive with the available forces, although the Germans had very few of these forces left. For example, by this time Guderian had failed to take Tula, and had already received an order to attack Gorky! By the way, if you carefully read the memoirs of the German generals (von Boca, Goth, Guderian, Kluge, Raus), we will see a curious feature: the terms typical for the description of mobile war have practically ceased to appear in them. It remains only a primitive frontal bulk, which rarely brings success. In the same period, German troops in other sectors of the Eastern Front suffered a series of sensitive failures, which did not sober the top of the Wehrmacht. The attack on Tikhvin failed, the German troops were driven out of Rostov, but the Germans stubbornly rushed forward near Moscow.
In the meantime, the Soviet command transferred new large reinforcements to the front near Moscow. If von Bock had learned that only in November, 22 rifle divisions, 17 rifle brigades, 4 tank brigades, 14 cavalry divisions and other units appeared on the front, he would have been horrified. At the same time, most of them came from the Far East and Central Asia and were full-fledged divisions of the pre-war formation.
The Germans began preparations for the final phase of Operation Typhoon with the transfer of a significant part of the 2nd Air Force to the Mediterranean Sea fleet. The supply situation was rapidly deteriorating. Most tank divisions had no more than one refueling, which would have been enough for the first strike, but not for the whole operation, and yet the Germans went on the offensive on November 15. The 3rd and 4th tank groups moved to Klin and Istra to bypass Moscow from the north. But these battles swallowed the last fuel reserves of the Göpner and Goth tanks, despite the fact that they failed to destroy the opposing Soviet units. The 16th and 30th armies suffered serious losses, but withdrew, maintaining the front. The consequence of this turn of affairs was the transformation of the German offensive into a series of uncoordinated attacks by forces of divisions and even regiments. That is, even at the stage of the offensive, the German military machine (forgive me this erased stamp) began to fall apart, and its twitches more and more resembled the chaotic actions of the Red Army at the beginning of the war.
Therefore, the output of the LVI units of the Reinhardt corps to the Moscow-Volga canal did not mean anything. Intelligence crossed over to the east bank of the canal, admired the gathering Soviet troops, and hastily retreated. 30 November 2-I tank division by inertia has come to Krasnaya Polyana, but more she could not take a step. The northern half of ticks stopped. The combined strike of the two tank groups managed to push the front no more than 80 kilometers, not a very impressive achievement, well showing how exhausted the German troops were. When you look at the map, it becomes very interesting: how did Halder imagine a deeper detour of Moscow? The new generation of historians has become accustomed to accusing Stalin of having fought around the globe, but even with a cursory analysis of the second phase of Operation Typhoon, it is suspected that German generals were engaged in this.
The situation with the southern half of ticks was no better. In addition to the already battered XLVIII corps, Guderian received the task of covering the left flank of Army Group "Center" for the length from Kursk to Yelets. Truly, they found someone. Of course, Guderian didn’t even think about all this, he was winding along the Tula-Orel highway, gathering his troops for the last throw. He somehow managed to collect a small amount of fuel and throw the XXIV Corps on Tula. The 4 Panzer Division even approached the outskirts of the city from the south, but it was no longer possible to enter the city. On November 18, Guderian made a new attempt to seize the city, but now he moved the XXIV Corps around to the east, at the same time ordering General Heinritzi's LIII Corps of the infantry divisions to cover its flank from the east. But this turned out to be too difficult - the front of the corps was prohibitively stretched, and it was only with great difficulty that he beat off counterattacks in the Ivanozer, Uzlovaya and Teply regions. Guderian was forced to send 2 motorized divisions to help Heinrici, weakening his strike force.
Only on November 24, he was able to resume the offensive by the 3, 4 and 17 tank divisions east of Tula, although their breakthrough to Venev did not mean anything. There was no talk of any interaction between tanks and infantry, the principle of “every man for himself” began to operate. In the first days of December, Guderian last tried to surround Tula, and his motorcyclists even went to the railway leading to Serpukhov, but this was the same minute as the north of Reinhardt. If the entire Army Group Center 4 / 5 December turned to defense, then Guderian had December 4 forced to begin a gradual withdrawal of its troops, since its XXIV corps was in a very dangerous position. The offensive failed, and it turned out that the Germans themselves had climbed into the bag, which could close at any moment. By the way, on the same day, in the same way, without an order, I began to withdraw my troops across the Nara and von Kluge.
The reasons for the failure of Operation Typhoon were many, but we will list only purely military errors. First of all, the Germans did not concentrate enough forces to capture Moscow, there was not enough simple turn south of the 4th tank group. Once again, they made a mistake in assessing the forces of the Red Army, and near Moscow this mistake became fatal for them. The “swift Heinz” did not bother to reliably shut the boilers around Bryansk and Trubchevsk, which allowed a significant part of the troops surrounded there to withdraw to Tula. The OKH made a gross mistake by ordering the 9th Army to advance north to Kalinin, and the 2nd Army to Kursk. Von Bock obediently obeyed this order, taking her infantry divisions from the 3rd Panzer Group and sending them to Kalinin. If in the south the tanks and infantry of Guderian were forced to separate under the pressure of Soviet troops, but in the north the German generals themselves did it. Further, von Kluge’s 4th Army completely unexpectedly refrained from participating in the second phase of the operation, although perhaps the state of its divisions was such that they simply could not do anything. Large forces are no longer climbing into any gates aviation to another theater, so a decisive attack is not carried out. We have already mentioned the shortage of fuel, ammunition, food and other types of supplies, but this means that the rear of the army disgusted.
An impressive list, because all of this together would be enough to fail any operation. By the way, as it is easy to notice, the Germans began to violate their own canons of tank warfare, having forcedly or intentionally turned their tank corps into a kind of English - tanks, again tanks and again tanks. If we talk specifically about the tank war, then for the Germans on the Eastern Front it ended in September 30 1941 of the year, and it was necessary to wait for its continuation for a very, very long time, more than six months.
And what happened at this time on the other side of the front line? The temptation is very great, given the successful end of the battle for Moscow, to declare the actions of Soviet commanders the pinnacle of military art, especially considering the military results of the battle. After all, the failure of Operation Typhoon meant that the last hopes of the German command for a quick end to the war were scattered. And in a protracted war, Germany had no chance of winning. That is why we say with full confidence that the battle near Moscow became a radical change in the course of the war, not the beginning of a change, namely, the change itself.
Naturally, the Soviet tank units participated in the battle, but so far they were separate tank brigades, not even united in the corps. In terms of the organization of tank forces, the Red Army actually fell back in the era of the First World War, when tanks were used by small groups attached to infantry divisions and corps. While this was an objective requirement of the situation, the Soviet command simply did not have time to form large units, yet the same tank brigade was not just a mechanical gathering of hundreds of cars on the parade.
The first notable and extremely controversial event was the battles near Mtsensk, where the Katukov brigade collided with Guderian’s tanks. We talked in detail about this episode in the previous book and we can hardly add anything. Just recall that not only the results of the fighting opponents describe extremely contradictory, it is quite understandable. The descriptions of the actions of the parties do not coincide, which is a much more serious problem. As a result, it becomes difficult to give any definite assessment of this episode.
However, it was characteristic for use by the Soviet command of tanks during this period of war. By the beginning of the battle of Moscow from the tank forces there were: the Western Front had 101-i and 107-i motorized rifle divisions, 126, 127, 128, 143 and 147-I tank brigades; in the Reserve Front — 144, 145, 146, and 148 Tank Brigades and three separate tank battalions; in the Bryansk Front - 108-I tank division, 42, 121, 141 and 150-I tank brigades and 113-th separate tank battalion. There were 780 tanks on all three fronts (of which 140 are heavy and medium). Tank brigades were considered as not even fire brigades, but emergency plugs, although the official story ascribes to them the role of mobile reserves, intended for inflicting counter-attacks with the aim of defeating and destroying the wedged enemy. The statement is certainly correct, and even Guderian himself - himself! - ordered to act in this way. But, unfortunately, there was one small detail that makes evaluate this tactic quite differently. It can be used when the front line is securely held and the enemy can achieve only minor tactical successes. Here the picture was completely different. The front collapsed on one or the other station, the enemy tanks broke through in large groups, in fact, the Germans did not act otherwise. And attempts to throw a tank brigade towards the oncoming corps, which also had complete freedom of maneuver, did not end as the Soviet generals wanted.
Of course, an attempt was made to form a compound adequate to the situation, and to combat the enemy groups that had broken through on the Western Front, an operational group was created under the command of General I.V. Boldin, which included the 152-i rifle and 101-i motorized rifle divisions, 126-i and 128-I tank brigades. During the first days of October, the group of General Boldin repelled several attacks by the LVI units of the enemy corps, but after that, Soviet historians began to talk about the exploits of the Communists, which, as a rule, means that the mission did not fulfill its tasks. Later, in exactly the same way, to eliminate a breakthrough in the Kashira region, the Belov group was created, that is, the Soviet command was forced to respond convulsively to the actions of the enemy, engaging in momentary improvisations.
Separately, I would like to consider the actions of General Rokossovsky, who deserved so violent disapproval of V. Beshanov. This is the November 16 counterstrike, in which the 58 I tank division took part. This counterstrike ended in complete disaster for the division, which lost 157 tanks from 198. True, some sources say the loss of 139 tanks. For some reason, most historians place all the blame on Rokossovsky, exposing the division commander, Major-General Kotlyarov, to an innocent victim. Similarly, Rokossovsky exposes the 17 th and 44 th cavalry divisions.
Almost all authors refer to the note of Lev Mehlis as unmistakable evidence of the mediocrity and criminality of Rokossovsky’s ideas. So:
Sorry, but what does Rokossovsky have to do with it? The army commander gives the order for the offensive, and this is where his role ends. He is not obliged to paint the tasks of the regiments of the division and determine the time of artillery preparation. This is the task of the division commander, apparently, General Kotlyarov failed to cope with it, and he shot himself very even in time, otherwise he would have to answer unpleasant questions. Let's look at the map, as a rule, this is a very useful activity, and we will try to sort it out. Moreover, if you believe the damned fascists, Rokossovsky unmistakably chose the place of attack - the gap between the 7-th tank and 14-th motorized divisions. The state of the German divisions by this time is well known, look at the books of the same A. Isaev. By the way, General Raus, who during the period of these battles commanded the 6 armored division, highly appreciated the qualities of the Soviet junior commanders and highly commended the commanders of the highest, speaks about the middle commanders (regiment - corps) with frank contempt gray mass.
There is another nuance that complicates the assessment of events. The fact is that in the evening of November 17, the Supreme Command Headquarters with 23.00 transferred, finally, the 30 Army of the Kalinin Front to the Western Front. The 30 armies were subordinated to the 58-I tank, 24-I and 17-th cavalry divisions of the 16-th army that had withdrawn into its zone. The commander of the 30 army, Major General Lelyushenko, was ordered to defend the Klin sector and ensure the junction between the 30 and 16 armies. At the time of such restructuring, it is most convenient to hide any mistakes and failures, placing the blame for them on the old boss. So there are serious grounds to suspect, especially given the division’s total inexperience, that this disastrous attack simply had no place to be. Most likely, General Kotlyarov lost his tanks in the woods and snowdrifts, because such incidents have already occurred during the Soviet-Finnish war. And in the summer of 1941, this happened everywhere, except that there were no snow drifts then.
Similarly, you can ask the question: what, in the order of General Rokossovsky and it is written "17 th and 44 th cavalry divisions to attack machine guns in the equestrian system," or is it all the same division commander?
Although Rokossovsky's actions can also be criticized, but, to be honest, the language does not turn. He received the order of Zhukov to carry out the attack, he executed the order. V. Beshanov can condescendingly brush his teeth: “I think that the commander-16 didn’t mind too much, he didn’t want to go back to prison bars.” But I would love to admire Mr. Beshanov after proper processing: 9 broken teeth, 3 broken ribs, toes crushed with a hammer - and listened to how to object in such a situation.
Alas, apparently, Marshal Rokossovsky was broken once and for all, otherwise his memories would not have appeared such passages:
In general, all these events in the descriptions of Soviet / Russian and German historians differ, like heaven and earth. I will cite an extensive quotation from the work of A. Isaev concerning the same events:
The reasons that pushed the author to write this are for me even more incomprehensible than the motives of K. Rokossovsky. It is firmly written, in the best traditions of Glavpur and Agitprop! 2 of the fascist corps, whole 5 divisions, attacked the unhappy heroic division of Panfilov. To begin with, the corps of Ruoff and Fitinghoff in total had 6 divisions, that is, the feat was supposed to look as much as 20 percent more heroic. Dear author somewhere I lost 252 th Infantry Division XLVI Corps.
But the Germans claim that the LVI corps operated in 20 kilometers to the north, and all tank divisions were concentrated south of the Volokolamsk-Istra-Moscow railway, while the 316 division occupied positions to the north. And it turns out that she was confronted by a single German 35-I infantry division. By the way, how do you imagine the concentration of 6 divisions in the 14 strip of kilometers? In general, probably, it would be more critical to treat sources.
According to others, the battle looked a little different. The 316 Rifle Division occupied a defense on the Dubosekovo-8 front km northeast of Volokolamsk, i.e., on the order of 18 – 20 kilometers along the front, which was very much for a weakened unit in combat. On the right flank, the neighbor was the 126-I infantry division, on the left - the 50-I cavalry division of the cavalry corps Dovator. In addition, somewhere in the rear in ambush there were tanks of the 27-th tank brigade. On November 16, the division was attacked by two German tank divisions - the 2 tank division attacked the 316 division in the center of defense, and the 11 tank division hit in the Dubosekovo area, at the positions of the 1075 rifle regiment, at the junction with 50- th cavalry division A blow to the junctions between the formations was a frequent element of the tactics of the German forces.
In general, one thing is clear - so far these battles have not received reliable coverage. Most likely, even the very same 2 German tank divisions were actually the mentioned tank battalion of the 11 division. But we somehow evaded the description of the actions of the Soviet tank units. This is not surprising, because during this period they played a clearly secondary role. After all, it is impossible even to say that the tank brigades served as a cementing element of the defense, in some places they were present and somehow participated, and the long-suffering infantry still bore the brunt of the battles.
The transition of the Red Army in the offensive did not change the situation. Tanks were still on the sidelines, providing more psychological support than real. We give one more quote:
That is, as it is easy to notice, a certain period of powerlessness balance has begun. Soviet tank forces were still under construction, and by December 1941, the Germans had retired to the plane of virtual existence. Divisions and headquarters are still preserved, but they have no tanks left. It is therefore not surprising that in 1942, both sides began to take vigorous measures to remedy the situation.
Von Bock and Guderian came out against this proposal, and Brauchitsch somewhat unexpectedly supported them. Fupep lost patience and snapped:
"The proposals of the army for further operations in the East, made by 18 of August, do not correspond to my intentions." As a result, he gives his own order, that is, Hitler begins to actively intervene in the leadership of the course of military actions long before he declared himself commander-in-chief of the armed forces. At the same time, he rightly points to one of the main drawbacks of the Panzer generals who were intoxicated by the colossal successes: “Unfortunately, as a result of setting too remote targets for tank formations, the gap between them and the infantry units behind them was so significant that it took many precious weeks, so that the hardly advancing infantry caught up with the tank formations that had escaped too far forward. It was thanks to this circumstance that the Russians managed to save part of the formations, which, having received replenishment, are again facing the front of the Army Group. ” In his memorandum, Hitler explicitly states: "The most important tasks that should be resolved before the onset of winter is not the seizure of Moscow, but the occupation of the Crimea, the industrial and coal Donetsk region and blocking the oil supply from the Caucasus."
Heinz Wilhelm Guderian, Colonel General of the German Army (1940), military theorist
Moritz Albrecht Franz-Friedrich Feodor von Bock - German commander, Field Marshal. Commander of Army Group "Center" during the invasion of the USSR. Commanded an attack on Moscow in the fall of 1941.
Still, September 16 OKH gives the order to prepare a further attack on Moscow. For this purpose, it is supposed to return the Guderian tank group to the Center Army Group, and also to transfer the Göpner Tank Group, which was still subordinate to the Army Group North. 16 September Von Boca headquarters sends an order for Operation Typhoon. At its first stage, it is planned to encircle and defeat the “armies of Tymoshenko” in the area of Vyazma and Bryansk. Here I really want to throw a couple of stones in the direction of the vaunted intelligence services of both opponents. For some reason, in all German orders and directives only "Tymoshenko's army", "Eremenko army" and so on appear. The Germans failed to determine the exact names of the fronts opposing them? Gru showed no better. Our command spent a lot of effort to prevent the assaults of Moscow and Leningrad, which the Germans did not even think about starting.
All our historians write in unison that the Germans concentrated all available forces to capture Moscow, which is, to put it mildly, an exaggeration. Yes, von Bock did get an 4 tank group at his disposal, but that’s all. Moreover, the Germans took a rather strange step, which is impossible to unambiguously assess. Actually, this step was within the framework of the general strategy of von Bock, who even during border battles quite logically duplicated tank and conventional armies. But now the army corps, consisting of conventional infantry divisions, were introduced into all tank groups, so their mobility has noticeably decreased. In preparation for the attack on Moscow, the Panzer generals received a single additional tank division.
In addition, new disputes broke out in the German command. Von Bok wanted to make a deep detour near Vyazma, while the OKH wanted to restrict himself to the surrounding city. Halder intended to send the motorized units directly to Moscow, and Hitler was totally against street fighting. (Note in parentheses - quite rightly!) In addition, a crazy idea was born to combine the attack on Moscow with a von Leeb strike in the area of Lake Ilmen, as well as with the actions of Army Group South in the area of Kharkov. In general, the Germans tried to bring together so many disparate factors that it is not surprising that the Typhoon failed, but that they even managed to do something.
Their position was complicated by the state of tank divisions. A throw to the south hit the Guderian group painfully; its divisions now had no more than 50 percent of serviceable tanks. In Goth, this percentage reached the “70” mark, and the Goepner divisions were fully staffed, but there was another problem. The composition of the 4 Tank Group from June 22 completely changed, and Göpner did not have a single division with which he started the war. Everything else the Germans experienced a shortage of fuel. Although in Gomel, Roslavl, Smolensk and Toropets there were huge warehouses, only drops came to the front.
The German offensive began with another improvisation. Try to guess who tried? Well, of course, “Swift Heinz”, which launched the September 30 offensive, that is, two days earlier, was covered by the expected deterioration of the weather. The operation began successfully for the Germans. Once again, tank wedges cut through the defenses of the Soviet troops, like a red-hot knife a piece of paper. In the area of Vyazma and Bryansk, several boilers were formed in which ... And here we slow down a little. I have already written and will now repeat that the loss figures that Tippelskirch cites and are readily repeated by all Western authors do not arouse any shadow of trust in me. Too well the sum of those killed and prisoners coincides with the beautiful and round figure of a million. You could write 1,01 million or 998 thousand, so no, no more and no less. I can guess where this figure came from, but I cannot justify my guess. Most likely, this million is an approximate assessment of the outcome of the battle by the Army Center headquarters Center, which at that time was not going to refine it, there were more important matters. But over time, the approximate assessment was transformed into an exact count. I can even assume that the notorious 668 000 is not the number of prisoners, but the total losses of the Red Army, but, as they say, I cannot either confirm or deny this point of view.
In any case, it was 1941's last successful blitzkrieg of the year. October 7 von Bock ordered the continuation of Operation Typhoon. On the left, the 9 Army and the 3 Panzer Group were to attack Rzhev and Kalinin, in the center of the 4 Army and Göpner’s tanks were moving to Kaluga and Mozhaisk, in the south of Guderian, which now commanded the 2 Armored Army (another renaming, which did not add to him a single extra tank), was supposed to move to Tula. But here the Germans were summed up by the same passion for gigantism, which we have already mentioned. Well, Guderian once again repeated the mistake that had already become traditional for him, rushed forward, not caring about the reliable closing of the encirclement ring, which allowed part of the Soviet troops to escape from the trap. However, almost two thirds of von Boc's forces were connected with the liquidation of the boilers, the field marshal broke into the defense of the Red Army for an enormous distance, but failed to take advantage of this, giving the Soviet command a breather.
In early October, the Germans resumed the offensive, and at this point von Bock made a serious mistake. He decided that the Russian army finally defeated, and the operation moved into the stage of persecution. The order of the headquarters of the Army Group Center from 14 of October speaks directly about this, but the Germans once again confronted Soviet forces that were reborn from the ashes like a phoenix. However, for some unknown reason, von Boc did not respond to the changing situation. Entries in his diary indicate that the field marshal continued to remain in a state of incurable euphoria.
“In the afternoon, preliminary orders were issued and sent to the armies. Regarding the main objectives of the offensive, the following is said: The movement of the 2 tank army, bypassing Moscow to the south, must ensure that the city is surrounded from the south and east. At the same time, the 4 Army is responsible for the encirclement of Moscow from the south-west, west and north. It was proposed to turn the 9 army and the 3 tank group to the north and move through Torzhok in the direction of Vyshniy Volochek. The right-flank corps of the 9 army should join the 4 army, otherwise the 4 army would not have enough strength to carry out its mission. 2-th army was charged with the obligation to cover the operation from the right flank. In pursuance of this mission, the 2 Army must reach the Don River through the Yelets and Stalinogorsk lines. ”
The German armies continued to move on a wide front, no longer trying to concentrate forces, although it was possible to deliver a powerful blow in the north, where the 3-I and 4-I tank groups now occupied a noticeably narrowed front. Von Bock broke the key rule of not only tank war, but also of the art of war in general - to concentrate forces for striking, and not to try to slap with the open palm.
Small help. For some reason, OKH renamed tank groups to tank armies at the same time. 2-I was renamed the first, 5 of October, 25 of October was followed by 1-I, and 3-th and 4-th had to wait for the New Year, the corresponding order was issued only on January 1. All this introduces a lot of confusion in the descriptions of military operations.
Optimism turned out to be a very contagious disease that spread from the headquarters of Army Group Center to the OKH. There the idea was suddenly born of turning the tank army 2 to the south after the inevitable and quick capture of Tula. Part of the forces of the 3 Tank Group, the command intended to again turn north towards Leningrad. Von Bock managed to defend his divisions so far, but this helped him little.
However, the German offensive frankly exhausted. Von Boku still managed to crush the troops of the Reserve Front on the Mozhaisk Line, but it was precisely crushing and dropping, not destroying. Now everything worked decisively against the Germans, starting with the same autumn thaw. After all, it was not from the good life that Guderian’s tank fuel had to be dropped by parachutes — automobile columns could not make their way to the front line, and transport aircraft could not land. All this taken together — losses, command errors, extended communications, bad weather, and much more — predetermined the failure of the Typhoon. None of the factors was decisive in itself, but they overlapped each other, and the effect was devastating.
German units in one of the settlements occupied by Moscow. On the road - ACS StuG III Ausf B, in the background Sd.Kfz.222 armored cars. December 1941 of the year.
It is difficult to imagine the degree of ignorance of the German High Command regarding the state of affairs at the front, for some reason convinced that everything is going fine. From October 24 to November 13 there came an operational pause. The Germans once again shuffled their forces, and on November 13, a representative of the OKH General Halder met with the commanders of Army Group Center in Orsha. Halder handed them Hitler's order to continue the offensive with the available forces, although the Germans had very few of these forces left. For example, by this time Guderian had failed to take Tula, and had already received an order to attack Gorky! By the way, if you carefully read the memoirs of the German generals (von Boca, Goth, Guderian, Kluge, Raus), we will see a curious feature: the terms typical for the description of mobile war have practically ceased to appear in them. It remains only a primitive frontal bulk, which rarely brings success. In the same period, German troops in other sectors of the Eastern Front suffered a series of sensitive failures, which did not sober the top of the Wehrmacht. The attack on Tikhvin failed, the German troops were driven out of Rostov, but the Germans stubbornly rushed forward near Moscow.
In the meantime, the Soviet command transferred new large reinforcements to the front near Moscow. If von Bock had learned that only in November, 22 rifle divisions, 17 rifle brigades, 4 tank brigades, 14 cavalry divisions and other units appeared on the front, he would have been horrified. At the same time, most of them came from the Far East and Central Asia and were full-fledged divisions of the pre-war formation.
The Germans began preparations for the final phase of Operation Typhoon with the transfer of a significant part of the 2nd Air Force to the Mediterranean Sea fleet. The supply situation was rapidly deteriorating. Most tank divisions had no more than one refueling, which would have been enough for the first strike, but not for the whole operation, and yet the Germans went on the offensive on November 15. The 3rd and 4th tank groups moved to Klin and Istra to bypass Moscow from the north. But these battles swallowed the last fuel reserves of the Göpner and Goth tanks, despite the fact that they failed to destroy the opposing Soviet units. The 16th and 30th armies suffered serious losses, but withdrew, maintaining the front. The consequence of this turn of affairs was the transformation of the German offensive into a series of uncoordinated attacks by forces of divisions and even regiments. That is, even at the stage of the offensive, the German military machine (forgive me this erased stamp) began to fall apart, and its twitches more and more resembled the chaotic actions of the Red Army at the beginning of the war.
German soldiers at the tank Pz.Kpfw. IV near Moscow. A captured Soviet Mosin rifle hangs on the barrel of a tank gun.
Therefore, the output of the LVI units of the Reinhardt corps to the Moscow-Volga canal did not mean anything. Intelligence crossed over to the east bank of the canal, admired the gathering Soviet troops, and hastily retreated. 30 November 2-I tank division by inertia has come to Krasnaya Polyana, but more she could not take a step. The northern half of ticks stopped. The combined strike of the two tank groups managed to push the front no more than 80 kilometers, not a very impressive achievement, well showing how exhausted the German troops were. When you look at the map, it becomes very interesting: how did Halder imagine a deeper detour of Moscow? The new generation of historians has become accustomed to accusing Stalin of having fought around the globe, but even with a cursory analysis of the second phase of Operation Typhoon, it is suspected that German generals were engaged in this.
The situation with the southern half of ticks was no better. In addition to the already battered XLVIII corps, Guderian received the task of covering the left flank of Army Group "Center" for the length from Kursk to Yelets. Truly, they found someone. Of course, Guderian didn’t even think about all this, he was winding along the Tula-Orel highway, gathering his troops for the last throw. He somehow managed to collect a small amount of fuel and throw the XXIV Corps on Tula. The 4 Panzer Division even approached the outskirts of the city from the south, but it was no longer possible to enter the city. On November 18, Guderian made a new attempt to seize the city, but now he moved the XXIV Corps around to the east, at the same time ordering General Heinritzi's LIII Corps of the infantry divisions to cover its flank from the east. But this turned out to be too difficult - the front of the corps was prohibitively stretched, and it was only with great difficulty that he beat off counterattacks in the Ivanozer, Uzlovaya and Teply regions. Guderian was forced to send 2 motorized divisions to help Heinrici, weakening his strike force.
Only on November 24, he was able to resume the offensive by the 3, 4 and 17 tank divisions east of Tula, although their breakthrough to Venev did not mean anything. There was no talk of any interaction between tanks and infantry, the principle of “every man for himself” began to operate. In the first days of December, Guderian last tried to surround Tula, and his motorcyclists even went to the railway leading to Serpukhov, but this was the same minute as the north of Reinhardt. If the entire Army Group Center 4 / 5 December turned to defense, then Guderian had December 4 forced to begin a gradual withdrawal of its troops, since its XXIV corps was in a very dangerous position. The offensive failed, and it turned out that the Germans themselves had climbed into the bag, which could close at any moment. By the way, on the same day, in the same way, without an order, I began to withdraw my troops across the Nara and von Kluge.
Tank Pz.Kpfw III ausf. H 7 Tank Regiment at the headquarters of the 10 Tank Division near Moscow.
The reasons for the failure of Operation Typhoon were many, but we will list only purely military errors. First of all, the Germans did not concentrate enough forces to capture Moscow, there was not enough simple turn south of the 4th tank group. Once again, they made a mistake in assessing the forces of the Red Army, and near Moscow this mistake became fatal for them. The “swift Heinz” did not bother to reliably shut the boilers around Bryansk and Trubchevsk, which allowed a significant part of the troops surrounded there to withdraw to Tula. The OKH made a gross mistake by ordering the 9th Army to advance north to Kalinin, and the 2nd Army to Kursk. Von Bock obediently obeyed this order, taking her infantry divisions from the 3rd Panzer Group and sending them to Kalinin. If in the south the tanks and infantry of Guderian were forced to separate under the pressure of Soviet troops, but in the north the German generals themselves did it. Further, von Kluge’s 4th Army completely unexpectedly refrained from participating in the second phase of the operation, although perhaps the state of its divisions was such that they simply could not do anything. Large forces are no longer climbing into any gates aviation to another theater, so a decisive attack is not carried out. We have already mentioned the shortage of fuel, ammunition, food and other types of supplies, but this means that the rear of the army disgusted.
An impressive list, because all of this together would be enough to fail any operation. By the way, as it is easy to notice, the Germans began to violate their own canons of tank warfare, having forcedly or intentionally turned their tank corps into a kind of English - tanks, again tanks and again tanks. If we talk specifically about the tank war, then for the Germans on the Eastern Front it ended in September 30 1941 of the year, and it was necessary to wait for its continuation for a very, very long time, more than six months.
And what happened at this time on the other side of the front line? The temptation is very great, given the successful end of the battle for Moscow, to declare the actions of Soviet commanders the pinnacle of military art, especially considering the military results of the battle. After all, the failure of Operation Typhoon meant that the last hopes of the German command for a quick end to the war were scattered. And in a protracted war, Germany had no chance of winning. That is why we say with full confidence that the battle near Moscow became a radical change in the course of the war, not the beginning of a change, namely, the change itself.
Statement of the combat mission of the German infantry unit near Moscow.
Naturally, the Soviet tank units participated in the battle, but so far they were separate tank brigades, not even united in the corps. In terms of the organization of tank forces, the Red Army actually fell back in the era of the First World War, when tanks were used by small groups attached to infantry divisions and corps. While this was an objective requirement of the situation, the Soviet command simply did not have time to form large units, yet the same tank brigade was not just a mechanical gathering of hundreds of cars on the parade.
The first notable and extremely controversial event was the battles near Mtsensk, where the Katukov brigade collided with Guderian’s tanks. We talked in detail about this episode in the previous book and we can hardly add anything. Just recall that not only the results of the fighting opponents describe extremely contradictory, it is quite understandable. The descriptions of the actions of the parties do not coincide, which is a much more serious problem. As a result, it becomes difficult to give any definite assessment of this episode.
However, it was characteristic for use by the Soviet command of tanks during this period of war. By the beginning of the battle of Moscow from the tank forces there were: the Western Front had 101-i and 107-i motorized rifle divisions, 126, 127, 128, 143 and 147-I tank brigades; in the Reserve Front — 144, 145, 146, and 148 Tank Brigades and three separate tank battalions; in the Bryansk Front - 108-I tank division, 42, 121, 141 and 150-I tank brigades and 113-th separate tank battalion. There were 780 tanks on all three fronts (of which 140 are heavy and medium). Tank brigades were considered as not even fire brigades, but emergency plugs, although the official story ascribes to them the role of mobile reserves, intended for inflicting counter-attacks with the aim of defeating and destroying the wedged enemy. The statement is certainly correct, and even Guderian himself - himself! - ordered to act in this way. But, unfortunately, there was one small detail that makes evaluate this tactic quite differently. It can be used when the front line is securely held and the enemy can achieve only minor tactical successes. Here the picture was completely different. The front collapsed on one or the other station, the enemy tanks broke through in large groups, in fact, the Germans did not act otherwise. And attempts to throw a tank brigade towards the oncoming corps, which also had complete freedom of maneuver, did not end as the Soviet generals wanted.
Composition with German tanks Pz.Kpfw. III at the station near Moscow.
Of course, an attempt was made to form a compound adequate to the situation, and to combat the enemy groups that had broken through on the Western Front, an operational group was created under the command of General I.V. Boldin, which included the 152-i rifle and 101-i motorized rifle divisions, 126-i and 128-I tank brigades. During the first days of October, the group of General Boldin repelled several attacks by the LVI units of the enemy corps, but after that, Soviet historians began to talk about the exploits of the Communists, which, as a rule, means that the mission did not fulfill its tasks. Later, in exactly the same way, to eliminate a breakthrough in the Kashira region, the Belov group was created, that is, the Soviet command was forced to respond convulsively to the actions of the enemy, engaging in momentary improvisations.
Separately, I would like to consider the actions of General Rokossovsky, who deserved so violent disapproval of V. Beshanov. This is the November 16 counterstrike, in which the 58 I tank division took part. This counterstrike ended in complete disaster for the division, which lost 157 tanks from 198. True, some sources say the loss of 139 tanks. For some reason, most historians place all the blame on Rokossovsky, exposing the division commander, Major-General Kotlyarov, to an innocent victim. Similarly, Rokossovsky exposes the 17 th and 44 th cavalry divisions.
Almost all authors refer to the note of Lev Mehlis as unmistakable evidence of the mediocrity and criminality of Rokossovsky’s ideas. So:
“The 58 Panzer Division, which arrived from the Far East, is defeated because of its criminal leadership, its remnants are concentrated in Voronino. On November 20, the commander of the 58 Tank Division, General Kotlyarov, shot himself, leaving a note: “General disorganization and loss of control. Guilty higher staffs. I do not want to be responsible for the general mess. Move to Yamuga for anti-tank obstacles, rid Moscow. ” After the signature, this capitulant added: "Ahead without prospects." The 8 Tank Brigade looks better, but it now has 2 KB, 3 T-34, 2 T-26, 8 T-40. The 107 Motorized Division concludes 114 fighters at the front, and in the rear of the 51 is a crew without tanks. Mehlis.
German soldiers freezing in the snows near Moscow.
Sorry, but what does Rokossovsky have to do with it? The army commander gives the order for the offensive, and this is where his role ends. He is not obliged to paint the tasks of the regiments of the division and determine the time of artillery preparation. This is the task of the division commander, apparently, General Kotlyarov failed to cope with it, and he shot himself very even in time, otherwise he would have to answer unpleasant questions. Let's look at the map, as a rule, this is a very useful activity, and we will try to sort it out. Moreover, if you believe the damned fascists, Rokossovsky unmistakably chose the place of attack - the gap between the 7-th tank and 14-th motorized divisions. The state of the German divisions by this time is well known, look at the books of the same A. Isaev. By the way, General Raus, who during the period of these battles commanded the 6 armored division, highly appreciated the qualities of the Soviet junior commanders and highly commended the commanders of the highest, speaks about the middle commanders (regiment - corps) with frank contempt gray mass.
There is another nuance that complicates the assessment of events. The fact is that in the evening of November 17, the Supreme Command Headquarters with 23.00 transferred, finally, the 30 Army of the Kalinin Front to the Western Front. The 30 armies were subordinated to the 58-I tank, 24-I and 17-th cavalry divisions of the 16-th army that had withdrawn into its zone. The commander of the 30 army, Major General Lelyushenko, was ordered to defend the Klin sector and ensure the junction between the 30 and 16 armies. At the time of such restructuring, it is most convenient to hide any mistakes and failures, placing the blame for them on the old boss. So there are serious grounds to suspect, especially given the division’s total inexperience, that this disastrous attack simply had no place to be. Most likely, General Kotlyarov lost his tanks in the woods and snowdrifts, because such incidents have already occurred during the Soviet-Finnish war. And in the summer of 1941, this happened everywhere, except that there were no snow drifts then.
Similarly, you can ask the question: what, in the order of General Rokossovsky and it is written "17 th and 44 th cavalry divisions to attack machine guns in the equestrian system," or is it all the same division commander?
Although Rokossovsky's actions can also be criticized, but, to be honest, the language does not turn. He received the order of Zhukov to carry out the attack, he executed the order. V. Beshanov can condescendingly brush his teeth: “I think that the commander-16 didn’t mind too much, he didn’t want to go back to prison bars.” But I would love to admire Mr. Beshanov after proper processing: 9 broken teeth, 3 broken ribs, toes crushed with a hammer - and listened to how to object in such a situation.
Soviet light tanks T-26 near Moscow in December 1941. In the column tanks of various modifications, having towers of various types.
Alas, apparently, Marshal Rokossovsky was broken once and for all, otherwise his memories would not have appeared such passages:
“Another touch of those days, very memorable. In Novo-Petrovsky, Emelyan Yaroslavsky visited us with a group of agitators of the Central Committee of the party, and the people knew and loved that person. Our comrades made sure that people from each regiment arrived to listen to him, and there too the soldier's rumor would spread the word of the party into positions. ”
You had to be very scared to write like that in 10 years after the death of Stalin.In general, all these events in the descriptions of Soviet / Russian and German historians differ, like heaven and earth. I will cite an extensive quotation from the work of A. Isaev concerning the same events:
“Already in the conditions of the beginning of the German offensive on the night of 16 in November, the 16 Army made a regrouping of the troops and launched an offensive with 10.00. At the same time, the same morning, the enemy launched an offensive at the junction of the 316 Infantry Division and Dovator cavalry group. The entire day of November 16, the 16-I army spent in a state of offensive action of its right wing and defensive - left wing and center. In general, both were unsuccessful. The cavalry of the mobile group joined the battle in parts. At the start of the 10.00 offensive, the 17 and 24 Cavalry divisions approached the starting line only to 12.30. The rear is hopelessly behind. The upcoming 58 Tank Division suffered very heavy losses, having lost 139 tanks in a day. The defending 316 division and cavalry group of Dovator were forced to withdraw from their positions. After the fighting for Volokolamsk, the artillery group of the division of I.V. Panfilov significantly decreased, in addition, part of the artillery of the 16 Army was used in the attack on the Skyrman bridgehead (in particular, one of the two guards anti-tank artillery regiments). On 16 in November, the 316 Division had twelve 45-mm cannons, twenty-six 76,2-mm cannons, seventeen 122-mm howitzers, five 122-mm cannons and one 120-mm mortar. From 207 guns in mid-October 1941 were left alone memories. Accordingly, the ability to resist the German offensive was much more modest. A change for the better was the narrowing of the front to 14 km compared to 41 km near Volokolamsk in the month of October. This happened as a result of the arrival of the 78 th rifle division from the Far East and the exit from the environment of the 18 th rifle division. Also division I.V. Panfilova actually became a four-infantry, she had a 690 th infantry regiment of the 126 division, who had left the encirclement near Vyazma. Opposed 316-th Infantry Division and Cavalry group Dovatora XLVI Motorized Corps (General of Panzer Troops von Heinrich von Vietinghoff, 5-11-I and Panzer Divisions) and the V Army Corps (General Ruoff infantry, 2-Panzer, 35-I 106- i infantry divisions). The latter was given the 1 tank battalion from the 11 armored division. In other conditions, the blow of such a mass was irresistible. However, by that time the supply problems had reached their peak, and only part of the German tank formations that received fuel had participated in the battle. By the morning of November 17, the 690 th rifle regiment was half-circled, the 1073 th and 1075 th regiments were knocked down and retired. At the height of the fighting, 17 in November 1941, the 316-Rifle Division received an order to rename the 8-th Guards Rifle Division. The next day, on November 18, during the artillery-mortar shelling of the command center of the division in the village of Gusevo, its commander I.V. Panfilov. At the request of G.K. Zhukov 8-I Guards Division received the name of his deceased commander. "
Soviet troops on the march. Counter-offensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow. Winter camouflage is applied to the tank, all the soldiers in camouflage.
The reasons that pushed the author to write this are for me even more incomprehensible than the motives of K. Rokossovsky. It is firmly written, in the best traditions of Glavpur and Agitprop! 2 of the fascist corps, whole 5 divisions, attacked the unhappy heroic division of Panfilov. To begin with, the corps of Ruoff and Fitinghoff in total had 6 divisions, that is, the feat was supposed to look as much as 20 percent more heroic. Dear author somewhere I lost 252 th Infantry Division XLVI Corps.
But the Germans claim that the LVI corps operated in 20 kilometers to the north, and all tank divisions were concentrated south of the Volokolamsk-Istra-Moscow railway, while the 316 division occupied positions to the north. And it turns out that she was confronted by a single German 35-I infantry division. By the way, how do you imagine the concentration of 6 divisions in the 14 strip of kilometers? In general, probably, it would be more critical to treat sources.
According to others, the battle looked a little different. The 316 Rifle Division occupied a defense on the Dubosekovo-8 front km northeast of Volokolamsk, i.e., on the order of 18 – 20 kilometers along the front, which was very much for a weakened unit in combat. On the right flank, the neighbor was the 126-I infantry division, on the left - the 50-I cavalry division of the cavalry corps Dovator. In addition, somewhere in the rear in ambush there were tanks of the 27-th tank brigade. On November 16, the division was attacked by two German tank divisions - the 2 tank division attacked the 316 division in the center of defense, and the 11 tank division hit in the Dubosekovo area, at the positions of the 1075 rifle regiment, at the junction with 50- th cavalry division A blow to the junctions between the formations was a frequent element of the tactics of the German forces.
In general, one thing is clear - so far these battles have not received reliable coverage. Most likely, even the very same 2 German tank divisions were actually the mentioned tank battalion of the 11 division. But we somehow evaded the description of the actions of the Soviet tank units. This is not surprising, because during this period they played a clearly secondary role. After all, it is impossible even to say that the tank brigades served as a cementing element of the defense, in some places they were present and somehow participated, and the long-suffering infantry still bore the brunt of the battles.
Soviet infantry in defensive positions. The photo was taken during the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow. Interestingly, the individual cells are not yet connected by passages. It is possible that this is a temporary position at the next vacated height.
The transition of the Red Army in the offensive did not change the situation. Tanks were still on the sidelines, providing more psychological support than real. We give one more quote:
“The counterattack of the Soviet troops later turned into a general winter offensive, which was carried out from January to April 1942. Our glorious tank forces also took part in the winter offensive, along with rifle troops, cavalry and aviation. Due to the lack of tanks, the Red Army did not have large units during this period. The basis of the tank forces were brigades and separate battalions, which were used mainly for direct support of infantry, in tactical interaction with infantry, artillery and cavalry. The breakthrough of the enemy defense was carried out by infantry together with tanks and artillery. When pursuing tanks used in the vanguard, most often to intercept enemy escape routes. Sometimes, to bypass the flanks of the defending German fascist troops or capture important objects, mobile groups were created, the strike force of which was composed of tank brigades. However, in mobile groups there were few combat vehicles and there was a shortage of vehicles, which reduced their mobility, impact force and limited the possibility of operations in the operational depth. Still, mobile teams contributed significantly to the development of operations. The experience of using mobile groups in the counteroffensive near Moscow played later, when large units and unions began to form in the Red Army, ”
That is, as it is easy to notice, a certain period of powerlessness balance has begun. Soviet tank forces were still under construction, and by December 1941, the Germans had retired to the plane of virtual existence. Divisions and headquarters are still preserved, but they have no tanks left. It is therefore not surprising that in 1942, both sides began to take vigorous measures to remedy the situation.
Soviet soldiers in a battle in the woods near Moscow. two are armed with Mosin rifles, the third has a bag with discs for a DP machine gun. Tank - a downed German tank Pz.Kpfw. Iii.
Killed German soldiers and abandoned German artillery during the December counteroffensive of the Red Army near Moscow. For an extra effect, a flock of crows has been added to the photo editing.
A Soviet soldier gallops a horse past a German tank Pz.Kpfw abandoned near Moscow. Iii.
Calculation of the machine gun "Maxim" A. Lebedev on the firing position on the approaches to Moscow.
A woman embraces a Soviet soldier after the liberation of her village during the Soviet counteroffensive near Moscow. Author's name of the photo: “In the liberated village”.
Soviet tank English production "Valentine II" in ambush during the battle for Moscow. The photo was published in the newspaper “Krasnaya Zvezda” No. 275 of 22 in November 1941. The article “To the battle in British tanks” was published on the issue. It described the division of Captain Frost. Stepan Samoilovich Moroz, commander of the 137 tank battalion, killed 7 on December 1941. Most likely, this photo was taken exactly at the location of the 137 tank battalion.
Soviet military inspect the German vehicles captured during the Battle of Moscow.
German soldiers killed in the Battle of Moscow.
A group of German soldiers captured during the battle for Moscow.
German soldiers surrender to the Red Army during the battle for Moscow. Winter 1941 - 1942
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