Military Review

Operation "Typhoon". crash

Operation Typhoon was to worthily crown the Panzerwaffe campaign on the Eastern Front with another brilliant victory. However, the path to the Typhoon was far from as simple as it might seem at first glance. The fact is that in mid-August a dispute broke out between Hitler and the command of Army Group Center. Hitler intended to temporarily switch to defense on this sector of the front in order to defeat the grouping of Soviet troops in the Kiev region, while simultaneously transferring additional Army Group North tank connections for the complete encirclement of Leningrad. And I want to note that not one of the directives of Hitler or his memorabilia says a single word about the assault on Leningrad or Moscow. Everywhere diligently emphasizes that these megacities should be surrounded and strangled in the ring of blockade. By the way, I would like to remind you that the Germans didn’t storm Minsk and Kiev, but simply occupied after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Therefore, one of the famous exploits of Marshal Zhukov, who allegedly saved Leningrad, is in fact nothing more than a soap bubble. Easily repel a non-existent threat! If the Barbarossa plan lay on the Stalin table 3 hours before Hitler signed it, then why are our glorious knights of whip and spade ... pah! In the sense of a cloak and a dagger ... Once again confused ... the valiant defenders of the progressive blacks of Zanzibar did not put there any of Hitler's subsequent directives?

Von Bock and Guderian came out against this proposal, and Brauchitsch somewhat unexpectedly supported them. Fupep lost patience and snapped:
"The proposals of the army for further operations in the East, made by 18 of August, do not correspond to my intentions." As a result, he gives his own order, that is, Hitler begins to actively intervene in the leadership of the course of military actions long before he declared himself commander-in-chief of the armed forces. At the same time, he rightly points to one of the main drawbacks of the Panzer generals who were intoxicated by the colossal successes: “Unfortunately, as a result of setting too remote targets for tank formations, the gap between them and the infantry units behind them was so significant that it took many precious weeks, so that the hardly advancing infantry caught up with the tank formations that had escaped too far forward. It was thanks to this circumstance that the Russians managed to save part of the formations, which, having received replenishment, are again facing the front of the Army Group. ” In his memorandum, Hitler explicitly states: "The most important tasks that should be resolved before the onset of winter is not the seizure of Moscow, but the occupation of the Crimea, the industrial and coal Donetsk region and blocking the oil supply from the Caucasus."

Operation "Typhoon". crash
Heinz Wilhelm Guderian, Colonel General of the German Army (1940), military theorist

Moritz Albrecht Franz-Friedrich Feodor von Bock - German commander, Field Marshal. Commander of Army Group "Center" during the invasion of the USSR. Commanded an attack on Moscow in the fall of 1941.

Still, September 16 OKH gives the order to prepare a further attack on Moscow. For this purpose, it is supposed to return the Guderian tank group to the Center Army Group, and also to transfer the Göpner Tank Group, which was still subordinate to the Army Group North. 16 September Von Boca headquarters sends an order for Operation Typhoon. At its first stage, it is planned to encircle and defeat the “armies of Tymoshenko” in the area of ​​Vyazma and Bryansk. Here I really want to throw a couple of stones in the direction of the vaunted intelligence services of both opponents. For some reason, in all German orders and directives only "Tymoshenko's army", "Eremenko army" and so on appear. The Germans failed to determine the exact names of the fronts opposing them? Gru showed no better. Our command spent a lot of effort to prevent the assaults of Moscow and Leningrad, which the Germans did not even think about starting.

All our historians write in unison that the Germans concentrated all available forces to capture Moscow, which is, to put it mildly, an exaggeration. Yes, von Bock did get an 4 tank group at his disposal, but that’s all. Moreover, the Germans took a rather strange step, which is impossible to unambiguously assess. Actually, this step was within the framework of the general strategy of von Bock, who even during border battles quite logically duplicated tank and conventional armies. But now the army corps, consisting of conventional infantry divisions, were introduced into all tank groups, so their mobility has noticeably decreased. In preparation for the attack on Moscow, the Panzer generals received a single additional tank division.

In addition, new disputes broke out in the German command. Von Bok wanted to make a deep detour near Vyazma, while the OKH wanted to restrict himself to the surrounding city. Halder intended to send the motorized units directly to Moscow, and Hitler was totally against street fighting. (Note in parentheses - quite rightly!) In addition, a crazy idea was born to combine the attack on Moscow with a von Leeb strike in the area of ​​Lake Ilmen, as well as with the actions of Army Group South in the area of ​​Kharkov. In general, the Germans tried to bring together so many disparate factors that it is not surprising that the Typhoon failed, but that they even managed to do something.

Their position was complicated by the state of tank divisions. A throw to the south hit the Guderian group painfully; its divisions now had no more than 50 percent of serviceable tanks. In Goth, this percentage reached the “70” mark, and the Goepner divisions were fully staffed, but there was another problem. The composition of the 4 Tank Group from June 22 completely changed, and Göpner did not have a single division with which he started the war. Everything else the Germans experienced a shortage of fuel. Although in Gomel, Roslavl, Smolensk and Toropets there were huge warehouses, only drops came to the front.

The German offensive began with another improvisation. Try to guess who tried? Well, of course, “Swift Heinz”, which launched the September 30 offensive, that is, two days earlier, was covered by the expected deterioration of the weather. The operation began successfully for the Germans. Once again, tank wedges cut through the defenses of the Soviet troops, like a red-hot knife a piece of paper. In the area of ​​Vyazma and Bryansk, several boilers were formed in which ... And here we slow down a little. I have already written and will now repeat that the loss figures that Tippelskirch cites and are readily repeated by all Western authors do not arouse any shadow of trust in me. Too well the sum of those killed and prisoners coincides with the beautiful and round figure of a million. You could write 1,01 million or 998 thousand, so no, no more and no less. I can guess where this figure came from, but I cannot justify my guess. Most likely, this million is an approximate assessment of the outcome of the battle by the Army Center headquarters Center, which at that time was not going to refine it, there were more important matters. But over time, the approximate assessment was transformed into an exact count. I can even assume that the notorious 668 000 is not the number of prisoners, but the total losses of the Red Army, but, as they say, I cannot either confirm or deny this point of view.

In any case, it was 1941's last successful blitzkrieg of the year. October 7 von Bock ordered the continuation of Operation Typhoon. On the left, the 9 Army and the 3 Panzer Group were to attack Rzhev and Kalinin, in the center of the 4 Army and Göpner’s tanks were moving to Kaluga and Mozhaisk, in the south of Guderian, which now commanded the 2 Armored Army (another renaming, which did not add to him a single extra tank), was supposed to move to Tula. But here the Germans were summed up by the same passion for gigantism, which we have already mentioned. Well, Guderian once again repeated the mistake that had already become traditional for him, rushed forward, not caring about the reliable closing of the encirclement ring, which allowed part of the Soviet troops to escape from the trap. However, almost two thirds of von Boc's forces were connected with the liquidation of the boilers, the field marshal broke into the defense of the Red Army for an enormous distance, but failed to take advantage of this, giving the Soviet command a breather.

In early October, the Germans resumed the offensive, and at this point von Bock made a serious mistake. He decided that the Russian army finally defeated, and the operation moved into the stage of persecution. The order of the headquarters of the Army Group Center from 14 of October speaks directly about this, but the Germans once again confronted Soviet forces that were reborn from the ashes like a phoenix. However, for some unknown reason, von Boc did not respond to the changing situation. Entries in his diary indicate that the field marshal continued to remain in a state of incurable euphoria.

“In the afternoon, preliminary orders were issued and sent to the armies. Regarding the main objectives of the offensive, the following is said: The movement of the 2 tank army, bypassing Moscow to the south, must ensure that the city is surrounded from the south and east. At the same time, the 4 Army is responsible for the encirclement of Moscow from the south-west, west and north. It was proposed to turn the 9 army and the 3 tank group to the north and move through Torzhok in the direction of Vyshniy Volochek. The right-flank corps of the 9 army should join the 4 army, otherwise the 4 army would not have enough strength to carry out its mission. 2-th army was charged with the obligation to cover the operation from the right flank. In pursuance of this mission, the 2 Army must reach the Don River through the Yelets and Stalinogorsk lines. ”

The German armies continued to move on a wide front, no longer trying to concentrate forces, although it was possible to deliver a powerful blow in the north, where the 3-I and 4-I tank groups now occupied a noticeably narrowed front. Von Bock broke the key rule of not only tank war, but also of the art of war in general - to concentrate forces for striking, and not to try to slap with the open palm.

Small help. For some reason, OKH renamed tank groups to tank armies at the same time. 2-I was renamed the first, 5 of October, 25 of October was followed by 1-I, and 3-th and 4-th had to wait for the New Year, the corresponding order was issued only on January 1. All this introduces a lot of confusion in the descriptions of military operations.

Optimism turned out to be a very contagious disease that spread from the headquarters of Army Group Center to the OKH. There the idea was suddenly born of turning the tank army 2 to the south after the inevitable and quick capture of Tula. Part of the forces of the 3 Tank Group, the command intended to again turn north towards Leningrad. Von Bock managed to defend his divisions so far, but this helped him little.

However, the German offensive frankly exhausted. Von Boku still managed to crush the troops of the Reserve Front on the Mozhaisk Line, but it was precisely crushing and dropping, not destroying. Now everything worked decisively against the Germans, starting with the same autumn thaw. After all, it was not from the good life that Guderian’s tank fuel had to be dropped by parachutes — automobile columns could not make their way to the front line, and transport aircraft could not land. All this taken together — losses, command errors, extended communications, bad weather, and much more — predetermined the failure of the Typhoon. None of the factors was decisive in itself, but they overlapped each other, and the effect was devastating.

German units in one of the settlements occupied by Moscow. On the road - ACS StuG III Ausf B, in the background Sd.Kfz.222 armored cars. December 1941 of the year.

It is difficult to imagine the degree of ignorance of the German High Command regarding the state of affairs at the front, for some reason convinced that everything is going fine. From October 24 to November 13 there came an operational pause. The Germans once again shuffled their forces, and on November 13, a representative of the OKH General Halder met with the commanders of Army Group Center in Orsha. Halder handed them Hitler's order to continue the offensive with the available forces, although the Germans had very few of these forces left. For example, by this time Guderian had failed to take Tula, and had already received an order to attack Gorky! By the way, if you carefully read the memoirs of the German generals (von Boca, Goth, Guderian, Kluge, Raus), we will see a curious feature: the terms typical for the description of mobile war have practically ceased to appear in them. It remains only a primitive frontal bulk, which rarely brings success. In the same period, German troops in other sectors of the Eastern Front suffered a series of sensitive failures, which did not sober the top of the Wehrmacht. The attack on Tikhvin failed, the German troops were driven out of Rostov, but the Germans stubbornly rushed forward near Moscow.

In the meantime, the Soviet command transferred new large reinforcements to the front near Moscow. If von Bock had learned that only in November, 22 rifle divisions, 17 rifle brigades, 4 tank brigades, 14 cavalry divisions and other units appeared on the front, he would have been horrified. At the same time, most of them came from the Far East and Central Asia and were full-fledged divisions of the pre-war formation.

The Germans began preparations for the final phase of Operation Typhoon with the transfer of a significant part of the 2nd Air Force to the Mediterranean Sea fleet. The supply situation was rapidly deteriorating. Most tank divisions had no more than one refueling, which would have been enough for the first strike, but not for the whole operation, and yet the Germans went on the offensive on November 15. The 3rd and 4th tank groups moved to Klin and Istra to bypass Moscow from the north. But these battles swallowed the last fuel reserves of the Göpner and Goth tanks, despite the fact that they failed to destroy the opposing Soviet units. The 16th and 30th armies suffered serious losses, but withdrew, maintaining the front. The consequence of this turn of affairs was the transformation of the German offensive into a series of uncoordinated attacks by forces of divisions and even regiments. That is, even at the stage of the offensive, the German military machine (forgive me this erased stamp) began to fall apart, and its twitches more and more resembled the chaotic actions of the Red Army at the beginning of the war.

German soldiers at the tank Pz.Kpfw. IV near Moscow. A captured Soviet Mosin rifle hangs on the barrel of a tank gun.

Therefore, the output of the LVI units of the Reinhardt corps to the Moscow-Volga canal did not mean anything. Intelligence crossed over to the east bank of the canal, admired the gathering Soviet troops, and hastily retreated. 30 November 2-I tank division by inertia has come to Krasnaya Polyana, but more she could not take a step. The northern half of ticks stopped. The combined strike of the two tank groups managed to push the front no more than 80 kilometers, not a very impressive achievement, well showing how exhausted the German troops were. When you look at the map, it becomes very interesting: how did Halder imagine a deeper detour of Moscow? The new generation of historians has become accustomed to accusing Stalin of having fought around the globe, but even with a cursory analysis of the second phase of Operation Typhoon, it is suspected that German generals were engaged in this.

The situation with the southern half of ticks was no better. In addition to the already battered XLVIII corps, Guderian received the task of covering the left flank of Army Group "Center" for the length from Kursk to Yelets. Truly, they found someone. Of course, Guderian didn’t even think about all this, he was winding along the Tula-Orel highway, gathering his troops for the last throw. He somehow managed to collect a small amount of fuel and throw the XXIV Corps on Tula. The 4 Panzer Division even approached the outskirts of the city from the south, but it was no longer possible to enter the city. On November 18, Guderian made a new attempt to seize the city, but now he moved the XXIV Corps around to the east, at the same time ordering General Heinritzi's LIII Corps of the infantry divisions to cover its flank from the east. But this turned out to be too difficult - the front of the corps was prohibitively stretched, and it was only with great difficulty that he beat off counterattacks in the Ivanozer, Uzlovaya and Teply regions. Guderian was forced to send 2 motorized divisions to help Heinrici, weakening his strike force.

Only on November 24, he was able to resume the offensive by the 3, 4 and 17 tank divisions east of Tula, although their breakthrough to Venev did not mean anything. There was no talk of any interaction between tanks and infantry, the principle of “every man for himself” began to operate. In the first days of December, Guderian last tried to surround Tula, and his motorcyclists even went to the railway leading to Serpukhov, but this was the same minute as the north of Reinhardt. If the entire Army Group Center 4 / 5 December turned to defense, then Guderian had December 4 forced to begin a gradual withdrawal of its troops, since its XXIV corps was in a very dangerous position. The offensive failed, and it turned out that the Germans themselves had climbed into the bag, which could close at any moment. By the way, on the same day, in the same way, without an order, I began to withdraw my troops across the Nara and von Kluge.

Tank Pz.Kpfw III ausf. H 7 Tank Regiment at the headquarters of the 10 Tank Division near Moscow.

The reasons for the failure of Operation Typhoon were many, but we will list only purely military errors. First of all, the Germans did not concentrate enough forces to capture Moscow, there was not enough simple turn south of the 4th tank group. Once again, they made a mistake in assessing the forces of the Red Army, and near Moscow this mistake became fatal for them. The “swift Heinz” did not bother to reliably shut the boilers around Bryansk and Trubchevsk, which allowed a significant part of the troops surrounded there to withdraw to Tula. The OKH made a gross mistake by ordering the 9th Army to advance north to Kalinin, and the 2nd Army to Kursk. Von Bock obediently obeyed this order, taking her infantry divisions from the 3rd Panzer Group and sending them to Kalinin. If in the south the tanks and infantry of Guderian were forced to separate under the pressure of Soviet troops, but in the north the German generals themselves did it. Further, von Kluge’s 4th Army completely unexpectedly refrained from participating in the second phase of the operation, although perhaps the state of its divisions was such that they simply could not do anything. Large forces are no longer climbing into any gates aviation to another theater, so a decisive attack is not carried out. We have already mentioned the shortage of fuel, ammunition, food and other types of supplies, but this means that the rear of the army disgusted.

An impressive list, because all of this together would be enough to fail any operation. By the way, as it is easy to notice, the Germans began to violate their own canons of tank warfare, having forcedly or intentionally turned their tank corps into a kind of English - tanks, again tanks and again tanks. If we talk specifically about the tank war, then for the Germans on the Eastern Front it ended in September 30 1941 of the year, and it was necessary to wait for its continuation for a very, very long time, more than six months.

And what happened at this time on the other side of the front line? The temptation is very great, given the successful end of the battle for Moscow, to declare the actions of Soviet commanders the pinnacle of military art, especially considering the military results of the battle. After all, the failure of Operation Typhoon meant that the last hopes of the German command for a quick end to the war were scattered. And in a protracted war, Germany had no chance of winning. That is why we say with full confidence that the battle near Moscow became a radical change in the course of the war, not the beginning of a change, namely, the change itself.

Statement of the combat mission of the German infantry unit near Moscow.

Naturally, the Soviet tank units participated in the battle, but so far they were separate tank brigades, not even united in the corps. In terms of the organization of tank forces, the Red Army actually fell back in the era of the First World War, when tanks were used by small groups attached to infantry divisions and corps. While this was an objective requirement of the situation, the Soviet command simply did not have time to form large units, yet the same tank brigade was not just a mechanical gathering of hundreds of cars on the parade.

The first notable and extremely controversial event was the battles near Mtsensk, where the Katukov brigade collided with Guderian’s tanks. We talked in detail about this episode in the previous book and we can hardly add anything. Just recall that not only the results of the fighting opponents describe extremely contradictory, it is quite understandable. The descriptions of the actions of the parties do not coincide, which is a much more serious problem. As a result, it becomes difficult to give any definite assessment of this episode.

However, it was characteristic for use by the Soviet command of tanks during this period of war. By the beginning of the battle of Moscow from the tank forces there were: the Western Front had 101-i and 107-i motorized rifle divisions, 126, 127, 128, 143 and 147-I tank brigades; in the Reserve Front — 144, 145, 146, and 148 Tank Brigades and three separate tank battalions; in the Bryansk Front - 108-I tank division, 42, 121, 141 and 150-I tank brigades and 113-th separate tank battalion. There were 780 tanks on all three fronts (of which 140 are heavy and medium). Tank brigades were considered as not even fire brigades, but emergency plugs, although the official история ascribes to them the role of mobile reserves, intended for inflicting counter-attacks with the aim of defeating and destroying the wedged enemy. The statement is certainly correct, and even Guderian himself - himself! - ordered to act in this way. But, unfortunately, there was one small detail that makes evaluate this tactic quite differently. It can be used when the front line is securely held and the enemy can achieve only minor tactical successes. Here the picture was completely different. The front collapsed on one or the other station, the enemy tanks broke through in large groups, in fact, the Germans did not act otherwise. And attempts to throw a tank brigade towards the oncoming corps, which also had complete freedom of maneuver, did not end as the Soviet generals wanted.

Composition with German tanks Pz.Kpfw. III at the station near Moscow.

Of course, an attempt was made to form a compound adequate to the situation, and to combat the enemy groups that had broken through on the Western Front, an operational group was created under the command of General I.V. Boldin, which included the 152-i rifle and 101-i motorized rifle divisions, 126-i and 128-I tank brigades. During the first days of October, the group of General Boldin repelled several attacks by the LVI units of the enemy corps, but after that, Soviet historians began to talk about the exploits of the Communists, which, as a rule, means that the mission did not fulfill its tasks. Later, in exactly the same way, to eliminate a breakthrough in the Kashira region, the Belov group was created, that is, the Soviet command was forced to respond convulsively to the actions of the enemy, engaging in momentary improvisations.

Separately, I would like to consider the actions of General Rokossovsky, who deserved so violent disapproval of V. Beshanov. This is the November 16 counterstrike, in which the 58 I tank division took part. This counterstrike ended in complete disaster for the division, which lost 157 tanks from 198. True, some sources say the loss of 139 tanks. For some reason, most historians place all the blame on Rokossovsky, exposing the division commander, Major-General Kotlyarov, to an innocent victim. Similarly, Rokossovsky exposes the 17 th and 44 th cavalry divisions.

Almost all authors refer to the note of Lev Mehlis as unmistakable evidence of the mediocrity and criminality of Rokossovsky’s ideas. So:
“The 58 Panzer Division, which arrived from the Far East, is defeated because of its criminal leadership, its remnants are concentrated in Voronino. On November 20, the commander of the 58 Tank Division, General Kotlyarov, shot himself, leaving a note: “General disorganization and loss of control. Guilty higher staffs. I do not want to be responsible for the general mess. Move to Yamuga for anti-tank obstacles, rid Moscow. ” After the signature, this capitulant added: "Ahead without prospects." The 8 Tank Brigade looks better, but it now has 2 KB, 3 T-34, 2 T-26, 8 T-40. The 107 Motorized Division concludes 114 fighters at the front, and in the rear of the 51 is a crew without tanks. Mehlis.

German soldiers freezing in the snows near Moscow.

Sorry, but what does Rokossovsky have to do with it? The army commander gives the order for the offensive, and this is where his role ends. He is not obliged to paint the tasks of the regiments of the division and determine the time of artillery preparation. This is the task of the division commander, apparently, General Kotlyarov failed to cope with it, and he shot himself very even in time, otherwise he would have to answer unpleasant questions. Let's look at the map, as a rule, this is a very useful activity, and we will try to sort it out. Moreover, if you believe the damned fascists, Rokossovsky unmistakably chose the place of attack - the gap between the 7-th tank and 14-th motorized divisions. The state of the German divisions by this time is well known, look at the books of the same A. Isaev. By the way, General Raus, who during the period of these battles commanded the 6 armored division, highly appreciated the qualities of the Soviet junior commanders and highly commended the commanders of the highest, speaks about the middle commanders (regiment - corps) with frank contempt gray mass.

There is another nuance that complicates the assessment of events. The fact is that in the evening of November 17, the Supreme Command Headquarters with 23.00 transferred, finally, the 30 Army of the Kalinin Front to the Western Front. The 30 armies were subordinated to the 58-I tank, 24-I and 17-th cavalry divisions of the 16-th army that had withdrawn into its zone. The commander of the 30 army, Major General Lelyushenko, was ordered to defend the Klin sector and ensure the junction between the 30 and 16 armies. At the time of such restructuring, it is most convenient to hide any mistakes and failures, placing the blame for them on the old boss. So there are serious grounds to suspect, especially given the division’s total inexperience, that this disastrous attack simply had no place to be. Most likely, General Kotlyarov lost his tanks in the woods and snowdrifts, because such incidents have already occurred during the Soviet-Finnish war. And in the summer of 1941, this happened everywhere, except that there were no snow drifts then.

Similarly, you can ask the question: what, in the order of General Rokossovsky and it is written "17 th and 44 th cavalry divisions to attack machine guns in the equestrian system," or is it all the same division commander?

Although Rokossovsky's actions can also be criticized, but, to be honest, the language does not turn. He received the order of Zhukov to carry out the attack, he executed the order. V. Beshanov can condescendingly brush his teeth: “I think that the commander-16 didn’t mind too much, he didn’t want to go back to prison bars.” But I would love to admire Mr. Beshanov after proper processing: 9 broken teeth, 3 broken ribs, toes crushed with a hammer - and listened to how to object in such a situation.

Soviet light tanks T-26 near Moscow in December 1941. In the column tanks of various modifications, having towers of various types.

Alas, apparently, Marshal Rokossovsky was broken once and for all, otherwise his memories would not have appeared such passages:
“Another touch of those days, very memorable. In Novo-Petrovsky, Emelyan Yaroslavsky visited us with a group of agitators of the Central Committee of the party, and the people knew and loved that person. Our comrades made sure that people from each regiment arrived to listen to him, and there too the soldier's rumor would spread the word of the party into positions. ”
You had to be very scared to write like that in 10 years after the death of Stalin.

In general, all these events in the descriptions of Soviet / Russian and German historians differ, like heaven and earth. I will cite an extensive quotation from the work of A. Isaev concerning the same events:

“Already in the conditions of the beginning of the German offensive on the night of 16 in November, the 16 Army made a regrouping of the troops and launched an offensive with 10.00. At the same time, the same morning, the enemy launched an offensive at the junction of the 316 Infantry Division and Dovator cavalry group. The entire day of November 16, the 16-I army spent in a state of offensive action of its right wing and defensive - left wing and center. In general, both were unsuccessful. The cavalry of the mobile group joined the battle in parts. At the start of the 10.00 offensive, the 17 and 24 Cavalry divisions approached the starting line only to 12.30. The rear is hopelessly behind. The upcoming 58 Tank Division suffered very heavy losses, having lost 139 tanks in a day. The defending 316 division and cavalry group of Dovator were forced to withdraw from their positions. After the fighting for Volokolamsk, the artillery group of the division of I.V. Panfilov significantly decreased, in addition, part of the artillery of the 16 Army was used in the attack on the Skyrman bridgehead (in particular, one of the two guards anti-tank artillery regiments). On 16 in November, the 316 Division had twelve 45-mm cannons, twenty-six 76,2-mm cannons, seventeen 122-mm howitzers, five 122-mm cannons and one 120-mm mortar. From 207 guns in mid-October 1941 were left alone memories. Accordingly, the ability to resist the German offensive was much more modest. A change for the better was the narrowing of the front to 14 km compared to 41 km near Volokolamsk in the month of October. This happened as a result of the arrival of the 78 th rifle division from the Far East and the exit from the environment of the 18 th rifle division. Also division I.V. Panfilova actually became a four-infantry, she had a 690 th infantry regiment of the 126 division, who had left the encirclement near Vyazma. Opposed 316-th Infantry Division and Cavalry group Dovatora XLVI Motorized Corps (General of Panzer Troops von Heinrich von Vietinghoff, 5-11-I and Panzer Divisions) and the V Army Corps (General Ruoff infantry, 2-Panzer, 35-I 106- i infantry divisions). The latter was given the 1 tank battalion from the 11 armored division. In other conditions, the blow of such a mass was irresistible. However, by that time the supply problems had reached their peak, and only part of the German tank formations that received fuel had participated in the battle. By the morning of November 17, the 690 th rifle regiment was half-circled, the 1073 th and 1075 th regiments were knocked down and retired. At the height of the fighting, 17 in November 1941, the 316-Rifle Division received an order to rename the 8-th Guards Rifle Division. The next day, on November 18, during the artillery-mortar shelling of the command center of the division in the village of Gusevo, its commander I.V. Panfilov. At the request of G.K. Zhukov 8-I Guards Division received the name of his deceased commander. "

Soviet troops on the march. Counter-offensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow. Winter camouflage is applied to the tank, all the soldiers in camouflage.

The reasons that pushed the author to write this are for me even more incomprehensible than the motives of K. Rokossovsky. It is firmly written, in the best traditions of Glavpur and Agitprop! 2 of the fascist corps, whole 5 divisions, attacked the unhappy heroic division of Panfilov. To begin with, the corps of Ruoff and Fitinghoff in total had 6 divisions, that is, the feat was supposed to look as much as 20 percent more heroic. Dear author somewhere I lost 252 th Infantry Division XLVI Corps.

But the Germans claim that the LVI corps operated in 20 kilometers to the north, and all tank divisions were concentrated south of the Volokolamsk-Istra-Moscow railway, while the 316 division occupied positions to the north. And it turns out that she was confronted by a single German 35-I infantry division. By the way, how do you imagine the concentration of 6 divisions in the 14 strip of kilometers? In general, probably, it would be more critical to treat sources.

According to others, the battle looked a little different. The 316 Rifle Division occupied a defense on the Dubosekovo-8 front km northeast of Volokolamsk, i.e., on the order of 18 – 20 kilometers along the front, which was very much for a weakened unit in combat. On the right flank, the neighbor was the 126-I infantry division, on the left - the 50-I cavalry division of the cavalry corps Dovator. In addition, somewhere in the rear in ambush there were tanks of the 27-th tank brigade. On November 16, the division was attacked by two German tank divisions - the 2 tank division attacked the 316 division in the center of defense, and the 11 tank division hit in the Dubosekovo area, at the positions of the 1075 rifle regiment, at the junction with 50- th cavalry division A blow to the junctions between the formations was a frequent element of the tactics of the German forces.

In general, one thing is clear - so far these battles have not received reliable coverage. Most likely, even the very same 2 German tank divisions were actually the mentioned tank battalion of the 11 division. But we somehow evaded the description of the actions of the Soviet tank units. This is not surprising, because during this period they played a clearly secondary role. After all, it is impossible even to say that the tank brigades served as a cementing element of the defense, in some places they were present and somehow participated, and the long-suffering infantry still bore the brunt of the battles.

Soviet infantry in defensive positions. The photo was taken during the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow. Interestingly, the individual cells are not yet connected by passages. It is possible that this is a temporary position at the next vacated height.

The transition of the Red Army in the offensive did not change the situation. Tanks were still on the sidelines, providing more psychological support than real. We give one more quote:
“The counterattack of the Soviet troops later turned into a general winter offensive, which was carried out from January to April 1942. Our glorious tank forces also took part in the winter offensive, along with rifle troops, cavalry and aviation. Due to the lack of tanks, the Red Army did not have large units during this period. The basis of the tank forces were brigades and separate battalions, which were used mainly for direct support of infantry, in tactical interaction with infantry, artillery and cavalry. The breakthrough of the enemy defense was carried out by infantry together with tanks and artillery. When pursuing tanks used in the vanguard, most often to intercept enemy escape routes. Sometimes, to bypass the flanks of the defending German fascist troops or capture important objects, mobile groups were created, the strike force of which was composed of tank brigades. However, in mobile groups there were few combat vehicles and there was a shortage of vehicles, which reduced their mobility, impact force and limited the possibility of operations in the operational depth. Still, mobile teams contributed significantly to the development of operations. The experience of using mobile groups in the counteroffensive near Moscow played later, when large units and unions began to form in the Red Army, ”

That is, as it is easy to notice, a certain period of powerlessness balance has begun. Soviet tank forces were still under construction, and by December 1941, the Germans had retired to the plane of virtual existence. Divisions and headquarters are still preserved, but they have no tanks left. It is therefore not surprising that in 1942, both sides began to take vigorous measures to remedy the situation.

Soviet soldiers in a battle in the woods near Moscow. two are armed with Mosin rifles, the third has a bag with discs for a DP machine gun. Tank - a downed German tank Pz.Kpfw. Iii.

Killed German soldiers and abandoned German artillery during the December counteroffensive of the Red Army near Moscow. For an extra effect, a flock of crows has been added to the photo editing.

A Soviet soldier gallops a horse past a German tank Pz.Kpfw abandoned near Moscow. Iii.

Calculation of the machine gun "Maxim" A. Lebedev on the firing position on the approaches to Moscow.

A woman embraces a Soviet soldier after the liberation of her village during the Soviet counteroffensive near Moscow. Author's name of the photo: “In the liberated village”.

Soviet tank English production "Valentine II" in ambush during the battle for Moscow. The photo was published in the newspaper “Krasnaya Zvezda” No. 275 of 22 in November 1941. The article “To the battle in British tanks” was published on the issue. It described the division of Captain Frost. Stepan Samoilovich Moroz, commander of the 137 tank battalion, killed 7 on December 1941. Most likely, this photo was taken exactly at the location of the 137 tank battalion.

Soviet military inspect the German vehicles captured during the Battle of Moscow.

German soldiers killed in the Battle of Moscow.

A group of German soldiers captured during the battle for Moscow.

German soldiers surrender to the Red Army during the battle for Moscow. Winter 1941 - 1942
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  1. Vladimirets
    Vladimirets 8 May 2013 08: 45 New
    On the teeth, with blood, soldiers, officers, cadets, militias, women who dug anti-tank ditches, stood up, stopped a plainly worn Wehrmacht, stopped it and threw it away. Eternal memory to the fallen.
    What a bastard minus article set?
    1. omsbon
      omsbon 8 May 2013 09: 28 New
      Quote: Vladimirets
      What a bastard minus article set?

      Unfortunately, at all times, there were bastards who betrayed or, for a start, put a minus!
      Forever and ever, the banners of the regiments defending Moscow and for the first time truly giving praise to the praised Wehrmacht were glorified!
    2. Papakiko
      Papakiko 8 May 2013 11: 12 New
      Quote: Vladimirets
      Everlasting memory

    3. The comment was deleted.
    4. revnagan
      revnagan 8 May 2013 19: 01 New
      Quote: Vladimirets
      What a bastard minus article set?

      I put it. There is nothing for the author to drive on Zhukov - he really saved Leningrad by coordinating the actions of all branches of the military. His predecessors did not succeed. And why the author decided that the Germans were not going to storm Leningrad if the direction of the Fritz strikes indicates precisely an attempt to capture the city from And according to Rokossovsky, the author walked, condescendingly patting on the shoulder ... Well, well, the author would certainly have acted heroically in a different way ... In general, the article is interesting, but the author has a "minus".
      1. Alex
        Alex 27 August 2013 13: 12 New
        There is nothing for the author to drive to Zhukov — he really saved Leningrad,

        There is no need to repeat these Khrushchev's inventions. If we put together all the stories about Zhukov, we get the impression that without him we would have lost the war in two or three days. I do not want to slip into the position of Rezun, but Zhukov's "commanding talents" are known quite well. As for Leningrad, the order to stop the assault attempts followed, if memory serves, two days after Zhukov took office. And the way the Germans conducted the "genius commander", leaving the radio operators of the tank group and secretly transferring tanks to Moscow, also says something. So all his merits are the result of greatly exaggerated efforts of the agitators of the times of Khrushchev-Brezhnev. Not free, by the way. In each new edition of his "Memoirs and Reflections" new facts appear, surprisingly standing in a favorable light of another prominent and influential functionary of the CPSU Central Committee.
    5. maxvet
      maxvet 8 May 2013 21: 12 New
      1. Gari
        Gari 9 May 2013 00: 41 New
        Quote: maxvet
        I DIDN'T PUT

        Good evening, I didn’t put a minus either
        but expressed his attitude to the Great Marshal,
        if Hitler admired his leadership talent
        All a Happy holiday!
        1. Apollo
          Apollo 9 May 2013 01: 41 New
          Quote: Gari
          if Hitler admired his leadership talent

          I personally sneeze when and by whom Hitler admired something. Since when did you start to refer to Hitler, and Gari ?! Only because you wrote the name of Hitler with a capital letter and for an ill-considered statement is still a minus. His name, executioner and fascist. you need to write only with a small letter and you my advice no longer refer to this freak. bully
          1. Gari
            Gari 9 May 2013 02: 48 New
            Quote: Apollon
            I personally sneeze when and by whom Hitler admired something. Since when did you start to refer to Hitler, and Gari ?! Only because you wrote the name of Hitler with a capital letter and for an ill-considered statement is still a minus. His name, executioner and fascist. you need to write only with a small letter and you my advice no longer refer to this freak.

            But because even the enemy is the most important fascist and monster, Marshal respected
            I always think and then write
            1. Alex
              Alex 27 August 2013 13: 21 New
              Hitler’s assessments cost exactly as much as his commander’s talent - the results of WWII speak for themselves quite eloquently. However, the corporal remains a corporal even in the field marshal uniform.
    6. vot-te-raz
      vot-te-raz 8 May 2013 21: 43 New
      And I put a minus. I didn’t like the article. It turns out that it was not the Russian soldier who stopped the Germans, not the people's militias and not the 28 heroes of Panfilov’s, but the endless miscalculations of the German headquarters, the lack of fuel, and Russian frosts. In general, judging by the article, all by itself I recalled one show in which it was told how Hitler saw a swastika somewhere on Tebet and decided to take it as a symbol of fascism, and the monk there or how he understood that Hitler was evil and slipped him the wrong swastika (rays in the opposite direction ). And all the kabzdets to the Führer did not send him karma, from that moment he was doomed.
      We naive thought that the Germans were stopped by the Russian Soldier, the battle of Moscow, Stalingrad, the Kursk Bulge and 30 million lives, but no, the swastika is not the right one for Feng Shui.
    7. I think so
      I think so 8 May 2013 22: 04 New
      I put MINUS because the one-on-one article rehearses the eternal song of beaten Germans -
      1. Winter frost is to blame, extended communications.
      2. Guilty of Hitler, who turned the tanks the wrong way.
      3. We did not THINK to capture Moscow.
      4. The stupid Soviet command did not seize the opportunity ...

      A typical ugly perversion of truth and history, and the VLADIMIRIAN ALREADY BELIEVED all this mura and indignant ... horror ... horror ... how easy it is to rewrite history ... Would you even read Zhukov’s and Rokossovsky’s memoirs ... and not this FRAUD from journalism ...
  2. igordok
    igordok 8 May 2013 09: 10 New
    Thank you for the article. In detail and with illustrations.

    In addition, the Germans were short of fuel. Although there were huge warehouses in Gomel, Roslavl, Smolensk and Toropets, only drops came to the front.

    This is not France with gas stations. soldier
    Tell me, do they say that our "bad" gasoline for BT and T-26 did not fit, without modification, for "quality" German tanks?
    1. RoadRunner
      RoadRunner 8 May 2013 14: 39 New
      It may well be. Our engines have always been less "aesthetic" to fuels and lubricants
      1. maxvet
        maxvet 8 May 2013 21: 14 New
        A written-off aviation engine that was also required to fuel was used (except BT7 with a diesel engine)
    2. family tree
      family tree 8 May 2013 20: 39 New
      Quote: igordok
      This is not France with gas stations. soldier
      Tell me, do they say that our "bad" gasoline for BT and T-26 did not fit, without modification, for "quality" German tanks?

      Yes, it’s the other way around. BT and T-26 were riding on the aircraft, the Germans, mostly synthetics, which, by the octane rating, couldn’t reach the gasoline. And due to the lack of fuel, the logistics techniques working in western Europe did not work in the USSR, well, they don’t like strangers on the road, and the roads themselves aren’t sugar, with spare parts, the same problem was.
  3. klimpopov
    klimpopov 8 May 2013 09: 20 New
    Thank! More or less balanced analysis. Photos as elution are also chosen competently. Definitely a plus and repost. Thanks again! All a Happy Holiday!
  4. Pavlov A.E.
    Pavlov A.E. 8 May 2013 09: 21 New
    Everlasting memory.
  5. bunta
    bunta 8 May 2013 09: 37 New
    Therefore, one of the famous exploits of Marshal Zhukov, who allegedly saved Leningrad, is in fact nothing more than a soap bubble.

    No self-respecting researcher will throw such statements. A pair of aphorisms truth is not proved. Let the children play in the bubbles. I, as a techie, are interested in facts. But for me the fact is that Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, the same Soviet man as millions of others, honestly and completely fulfilled his duty. Otherwise there would have been no Victory. No one knows and cannot even suggest what would have happened if Voroshilov had not been replaced by Zhukov. No documents or statements by Hitler regarding the fact that the Germans were not going to storm Leningrad are an occasion to cast a shadow on Zhukov. If Hitler did not write in his notes on the intentions of the storming of Leningrad, is this evidence of what? Maybe he wasn’t going to wipe it off the face of the earth? Hitler bluffer. When it became clear that there was no strength to storm the city, it was easier to declare a siege. And keep 900 days on this siege of a large army. But what about blitz krieg ?!
    Sorry, but I don’t want to write further ...
    1. klimpopov
      klimpopov 8 May 2013 09: 50 New
      Well, yes, the article could not do without passages.
      Although Rokossovsky’s actions can also be criticized, to be honest, the language doesn’t turn around. He received Zhukov’s order to conduct an attack, he executed the order. V. Beshanov can indulgently grit his teeth: "Dumaktz that the 16 commander did not mind too much, he did not want to return to prison bunk." But I would love to admire Mr. Beshanov after proper treatment: 9 of broken teeth, 3 of broken ribs, toes crushed with a hammer - and would listen to how to object in such a situation.

      It adds color. Interestingly, the author personally considered broken teeth? In general, everything is like in Hollywood.
      And again, pushing for the notorious thaw and winter. And about Zhukov. So now it’s fashionable ... unfortunately ... There is such a tendency among researchers.
      But on the whole, I liked the analysis of the actions of the troops and their command. I repeat. He is more or less balanced.
      1. Mikhail3
        Mikhail3 8 May 2013 18: 37 New
        The NKVD counted. The reporting was then strictly conducted, very strictly ... The investigator, who approved all this, most likely received what he deserved due to the accuracy of the same reporting. Seven grams, as it was supposed then ... And I do not agree with "pushing". Quite an adequate assessment. Our weather, like gas stations, is not like in France and not even like in Poland. Why can't our mother's damp earth even cover us? Or did we not shed blood generously for that?
      2. maxvet
        maxvet 8 May 2013 21: 18 New
        And how interesting was Rokossovsky to object? To say - "no, I refuse?" He is a military man, received an order, and began to execute it!
    2. Alex
      Alex 27 August 2013 13: 31 New
      Sorry, but I don’t want to write further ...

      And rightly so - tired of these panegyrics in the adrel of the Great, the Wise, the Genius and so on, so on. The analysis (and not "Memories and Reflections") of the hostilities near Leningrad speaks precisely in favor of the German initiative to stop the attacks of the city and the transition to the blockade, and Zhukov himself had not even had time to do anything by that time. Obviously, Hitler (forgive me the capital letter, but the rules of the Russian language ...) even then, before enuresis and diarrhea, was afraid of Zhukov.
  6. erased
    erased 8 May 2013 09: 43 New
    And why does the author run into Zhukov?
  7. RPG_
    RPG_ 8 May 2013 09: 55 New
    And all the same, we were in the balance. But the Germans themselves fell into their pit.
  8. avt
    avt 8 May 2013 10: 06 New
    Photos just pleased, a good number of lined up! good
  9. hohryakov066
    hohryakov066 8 May 2013 10: 52 New
    The article as an analytical one is good, but some points greatly spoiled the overall impression. The entire German OKH is just a model of democracy and is equipped only with aces and geniuses of war, and Zhukov is a village stump? But what did they lose, not us?
    1. Gari
      Gari 8 May 2013 11: 09 New
      Quote: hohryakov066
      The whole German OKH turns out to be just a model of democracy and is equipped only with aces and geniuses of war, and Zhukov is a village stump

      "In the circle of his entourage, after receiving messages about the next victories of the Red Army - this was already the 44th year - Hitler irritatedly declared: yes, if I had one such commander like Zhukov, I would have solved all the tasks of conquering world domination", - says Doctor of Historical Sciences, Head of the Center for Military History of Russia Georgy Kumanev.

      On behalf of the entire Soviet Union, the defeat of Germany was accepted by Marshal Zhukov, a native of the tiny village of Strelkovka.
      Zhukov - Marshal of Victory
      1. Alex
        Alex 27 August 2013 13: 37 New
        Hitler also in the same 1944 said that if he had done the same thing that Stalin had done 1937, then there would have been no 44. And he regretted a lot after 1944. His other predecessor, so he generally regretted that he began the war with Russia.

        And the face of Marshal of Victory is already well recognizable.
    2. FC SKIF
      FC SKIF 8 May 2013 19: 29 New
      Zhukov is one of our great commanders. Recently, a tub of slops has been poured on it. An article minus for such arrivals is probably the main purpose of the article.
    3. Alex
      Alex 27 August 2013 13: 34 New
      And German generals are not all geniuses; and we are not entirely Zhukovs, but there are also the Rokossovskys, Vasilevskys, Konevs, Vatutins ...
  10. Igarr
    Igarr 8 May 2013 10: 58 New
    The author has done, no doubt, a great job.
    He conscientiously lists the numbers of divisions, regiments, battalions, platoons, companies, branches. Lacking, of course, of inventory numbers on tanks, guns, rifles, base plates of 120 mm mortars.
    As you wish, guys, but I have a completely different opinion from the work of Patients.
    Well, sort of, how to tell at a disco - ... have fun, dudes, sausage makers flooded, and ours - not with an ear, not a snout. Well, our press hut treated everyone well, so under the "plantation" ours fenced them ...
    Zhukov is a poser, Rokossovsky is a ssykun, "Fast" Heinz seems to be only eager to steer the cars. And nobody understands anything. So, it seems like they play airsoft. For fun.
    And then, they screech in the West - Russian soldiers raped all women, including girls of 8 years old.
    Such a presentation - of our tragedy .... and the "brilliant" memoirs of the "brilliant" German statues - are combined with each other?
    In my opinion, no.
    1. Stas57
      Stas57 8 May 2013 11: 48 New
      I completely agree, I put it as a minus, the author deliberately places it in some places, and in some places it unknowingly juggles it, and in general I did not like the presentation moner
      1. dmb
        dmb 8 May 2013 13: 24 New
        I don’t put any pluses or minuses to anyone. But the article inspired. There is such a disease-graphomania, well, when a person writes in order to write something. Otherwise, he must set himself some goal.
        If the author had a goal, then it is quite similar to the goal pursued by a gentleman named Pravdyuk. A couple of years ago, he labored on television, commenting on footage of the military chronicle. All his comments ultimately boiled down to one thing: both ours and the Germans were fools and militarily mediocre. And the most talented were ... Well, of course, the "independent" bandits of Bandera and Shukhevych. The current author of this P ... reminded me very much. Apparently they have one goal.
        1. maxvet
          maxvet 8 May 2013 21: 21 New
          you still Pravdyuk about the events of 1914-1922 listen, that's where the pearls (looked on the channel 365tv)
      2. Cheloveck
        Cheloveck 9 May 2013 00: 10 New
        Quote: Stas57
        I completely agree, I put it as a minus, the author deliberately places it in some places, and in some places it unknowingly juggles it, and in general I did not like the presentation moner

        This is the second article of this author, which I put a minus.
        It seems that everything was worked out and right, but it gives away with some kind of shit, carefully buried ...

        Particularly outraged by the passage in the direction of the "broken" Rokossovsky.
        This is "broken" - that Rokossovsky did not dare to object?
        Or is this conclusion based on the fact that Rokossovsky categorically did not agree with Stalin’s assessment of Khrushchev?

        Hmm ...
    2. Alex
      Alex 27 August 2013 13: 46 New
      "Fast" Heinz seems to be only eager to steer the cars.

      That the concepts of "Guderian" and "discipline" are practically incompatible has always been known to everyone. It is only with us, and now such information has become a "moment of truth".
  11. ng1941
    ng1941 8 May 2013 12: 23 New
    war is always a mess, what can I say, take any military action at any time in history, the same mess, it’s just that someone gets better and someone doesn’t.
    1. jjj
      jjj 8 May 2013 19: 47 New
      Absolutely. Living in confusion, fighting in confusion, winning is better at the Russians.
      Once the son said that during the exercises, everything went wrong at once as planned. I ask: "Did you complete the task?" "Yes," he replies. - "We figured out what was happening, got our bearings and did everything right. On time." It's just in our blood: in special cases to act independently, boldly, outside the usual logic.
      1. yurta2013
        yurta2013 9 May 2013 06: 16 New
        The ability to quickly navigate in a difficult situation is an indicator of high qualification, and not a national feature. The Germans, judging by their recollections, also had quite a few such cases.
  12. Aleksys2
    Aleksys2 8 May 2013 12: 40 New
    Now everything was working decisively against the Germans, starting from the same autumn thaw. After all, it was not from a good life that the fuel for Guderian's tanks had to be parachuted - car columns could not break through to the front line, and transport aircraft could not land. All this taken together - losses, command errors, extended communications, bad weather and much more - predetermined the failure of the Typhoon.

    It was all to the west of the front line, it was warm to the east, there was no rain, there was no autumn thaw, in general, it was warm and dry on our side of the front line, pineapples and bananas were ripening.
    1. yurta2013
      yurta2013 8 May 2013 16: 57 New
      The problem of thaw is always more reflected on the advancing side, and not on the one sitting on the defensive. In addition, it reduces the chances of more technically secure troops.
      1. wax
        wax 9 May 2013 01: 05 New
        This also affected our December attack, and in some places they could not catch up with the Germans.
        1. yurta2013
          yurta2013 9 May 2013 06: 12 New
          In December there was no thaw. But there were frosts that disabled a significant part of German cars. Therefore, the Germans were forced to retreat mainly on foot. And the fact that our troops could not catch them is not the best praise.
          1. Lukich
            Lukich 9 May 2013 16: 55 New
            ... well, in the heat of summer - the motors overheat ...
            ... in the autumn it rains - the roads become wet ...
            ... and in winter it turns out to be frost - and everyone died ...
            ... ah..yayay it is necessary, everything is wrong with these Russians - when to fight with them ...
            1. yurta2013
              yurta2013 9 May 2013 17: 13 New
              The heat didn’t particularly interfere with the Germans. It was in the spring-summer season that they achieved our greatest success in 1941 and 1942. And this is understandable. It was at this time of the year that the then superiority of the German troops in technical equipment, maneuverability and tactical skill was especially affected. In the autumn and winter during these years, it, due to the unusually complex climatic conditions for the Germans and their equipment, was reduced to zero.
              1. Alex
                Alex 27 August 2013 20: 53 New
                Firstly (let me instead of the author) it was irony.

                Secondly, in 1943, even the native summer did not go to the Germans not only to gain a strategic advantage, but even to solve an important tactical task.

                Thirdly, it’s only getting into a fight without having carried out a preliminary analysis of ALL conditions of the upcoming theater. And just does not draw conclusions from errors (his first).

                And fourthly, in the spring-summer campaigns of 1944-45. it was the Red Army that achieved crushing successes in offensive operations (up to the capture of Berlin).
          2. Alex
            Alex 27 August 2013 20: 46 New
            Germans were forced to retreat mainly on foot

            And very fast. Yes so
            that our troops could not catch them
      2. Lukich
        Lukich 9 May 2013 18: 30 New
        Quote: yurta2013
        The problem of thaw is always more reflected on the advancing side, and not on the one sitting on the defensive. In addition, it reduces the chances of more technically secure troops.

        ... the Nazis rushed through Moscow in six months to heat, thaw and frost, and our soldiers sat in warm trenches near Moscow and waited, smoked the White Sea - Did I understand you correctly? ...
        ... or, in the same heat, thaw, and frost with fights, biting into the ground, protecting every mound of our land, they departed and tore apart, the advancing fascist armada, every dead Nazi soldier, every tank, every blown up Nazi gun brought us closer to Victory !
        And near Moscow, the heroism of our people, the talent of our Leaders and the Wisdom of our leaders broke (no neck) the backbone of the fascist scum ...
        ... like that, dear little friend ... yurta2013 ... you don’t want to build a plague ...
        1. yurta2013
          yurta2013 10 May 2013 17: 28 New
          Quote: Lukich
          the Nazis rushed through Moscow in six months to heat, thaw and frost, and our soldiers sat in the warm trenches near Moscow and waited, smoked the White Sea - Did I understand you correctly?

          No, you misunderstood me. I meant only what I said.
          Quote: Lukich
          And near Moscow, the heroism of our people, the talent of our Leaders and the Wisdom of our leaders broke (no neck) the back of the fascist scum

          I would have formulated it differently: And near Moscow, the heroism, courage and steadfastness of our army made it possible to stop the fascist war machine, inflict a serious defeat on it and throw it back several tens and hundreds of kilometers.
          1. yurta2013
            yurta2013 11 May 2013 06: 51 New
            I will explain in more detail my previous conclusion. Thaw, then frost, snowstorms and snowfall deprived the Germans near Moscow of their main advantage of the first period of the war - higher maneuverability and mobility due to better technical equipment and tactical skill. In these conditions, the possibilities of the parties were practically equalized, and in some respects the advantage even passed to us, since better provision with winter uniforms and skis made it possible for our infantry to make longer marches outside roads and settlements. As a result, the decisive factors were the heroism, courage and steadfastness of our soldiers, in which we, of course, surpassed the Germans. Under normal environmental conditions, these qualities would not have helped us.
            1. Alex
              Alex 27 August 2013 20: 57 New
              Yes, in general, and so everything is clear that you WANTED to say. Just wording more precisely, colleague.
      3. Alex
        Alex 27 August 2013 20: 44 New
        The problem of thaw is always more reflected on the advancing side, and not on the one sitting on the defensive.

        Something I don’t remember a single case when, until December 1941, someone somewhere “sat on the defensive” for more than one month.
    2. maxvet
      maxvet 8 May 2013 21: 23 New
      But how did you forget the Russian women who gave birth to 20-year-old fighters 6 times a year?
      1. Igarr
        Igarr 9 May 2013 21: 25 New
        Maxim Ivanovich ...
        Happy Victory Day ...
        Here you are fundamentally wrong ... ".. forgot the Russian women who gave birth to 20-year-old fighters 6 times a year .."
        They gave birth six and a half times a year ..- 1940 and 1944 .. were leap.
        Not only that, they were born immediately with a Mosin rifle and two "lemons" in their handles. Some, especially twins - immediately from the PPS-43.
        That's why there were them - about half a million.
        Well ... "the technical illiteracy of the Red Army ...." - very much helped in sitting in the floating pits. Although the Germans were taught, after that - to make sheathing trenches. Personally, by the way, Rokossovsky taught.
        Well well....
        Our generation will leave, 20-30 years old until 1991 ..... that's all. It will end .. Victory.
        How sickening .... to see that. Feel.
        1. Alex
          Alex 27 August 2013 21: 04 New
          But what is there to wait ... Already now I see those who are smartly discussing the strengths and weaknesses of our and German tanks, and their performance characteristics for them (but what about the performance characteristics - they cannot name the caliber of the guns!) Are a mystery with seven seals.

          Here is one case. I attended the scientific conference of the historical section of the MAN (Small Academy of Sciences - this is such a Kiev game of science at school sad ) in one cool lyceum. Among other rubbish (you understand: history in Ukraine in 2005 is something, Zhvanetsky is resting), the report "The Role of Motorization of the Wehrmacht in Blitz Krieg", in which "Tiger" is indicated as a tank of "lightning war", stood out as a special idiocy. Do you need comments if all this nonsense was favorably perceived by the teacher? ..
  13. nnz226
    nnz226 8 May 2013 12: 57 New
    "A donkey can kick a dead lion" is about a passage about Zhukov's role in the defense of Leningrad. It is possible, according to the author, to develop the topic and call Stalin an idiot who sent Zhukov to save Leningrad when there was allegedly no danger there. I wonder how the Germans burst into Leningrad at the Pulkovo Heights and along the Vitebsk railway, taking Pushkin, and at Kolpino (Izhora battalion) ??? !!! After all, according to the afftor, the task of encircling the city was solved on September 8 by taking Shlisselburg and reaching Ladoga ?! And here the "stupid" Germans and 9, and 10, and 11, and 12, and 13 September, not sparing themselves, are breaking into Leningrad. Moreover, the fierceness of the battles was the highest! This is also described by Soviet historians and the description of the military actions of the Army Group "North" ... And here, 72 years later, the "divine revelation" descends on the afftor about the "bubble" of Zhukov's role in the defense of Leningrad. So you can then say about the defense of Moscow - Zhukov did nothing, except for the distribution of orders, they say, and so "Typhoon" would have choked due to mistakes in the leadership of the Germans. And everything else: the heroism of the soldiers, the art of commanding the front and the armies - so - seeds ... The little article smells like rot ...
  14. neri73-r
    neri73-r 8 May 2013 13: 58 New
    You had to be very scared to write like that in 10 years after the death of Stalin.

    I’m embarrassed to ask, and what does Stalin personally have to say if he knocked out his teeth, he probably didn’t know about Rokosovsky at that time! And the case in 1940 was terminated without a composition!
  15. pinecone
    pinecone 8 May 2013 15: 50 New
    Quote: dmb
    There is such a disease-graphomania, well, when a person writes in order to write something. Otherwise, he must set himself some goal.
    If the author had a goal, then it is quite similar to the goal pursued by a gentleman named Pravdyuk. A couple of years ago, he labored on television, commenting on footage of the military chronicle. All his comments ultimately boiled down to one thing: both ours and the Germans were fools and militarily mediocre. And the most talented were ... Well, of course, the "independent" bandits of Bandera and Shukhevych. The current author of this P ... reminded me very much. Apparently they have one goal.

    I agree completely. Graphomania. And for the author of the article, clarification. December 17, 1941 Hitler declared himself the commander of the ground forces, and not the commander in chief of the armed forces.
  16. Kostya pedestrian
    Kostya pedestrian 8 May 2013 15: 57 New
    Nevertheless, our counterintelligence worked skillfully when, with the sky completely dominating, the Luftwaffe, and this also means air reconnaissance, managed to keep the transfer of 22 (!) Divisions in complete secrecy.
    Honor and Glory to the valiant wars of the Sword and Shield!

    And yet ... the author of the article, although he did not pursue this goal, indirectly shows what the Nazi democracy and totalitarianism of I.V. Stalin - they start a war with us, their "luck" immediately vanishes - all the decisions they make are to hell, and our scribblers still dare yapping at our greatest "warriors" like they filled up the Nazis with corpses, and so uncouth bloodthirsty village bears. I would say that all the mentioned Soviet commanders are commanders from God!

    Thank you so much for the Great Victory - for us it is like a beacon in the swamp of democracy.

    Below is an example of PR "honest and fair" democracy - G.K. Zhukov - Marshal of the USSR, Commander of the Parade at the command post in honor of the Victory, holder of many orders and the highest awards, and, yes, somewhere there is already in the background .jpg

    And this is a photo fact and reality:
    1. maxvet
      maxvet 8 May 2013 21: 27 New
      I just want to write, "mongrels near the lion", but remembering tolerance and "common contribution" to the victory, I will not write like that.
  17. Sirs
    Sirs 8 May 2013 16: 26 New
    All with a great holiday))))). Zhukov and other historical figures are ambiguous; there are pros and cons. After all, war is a dirty whore.
    1. aleshka
      aleshka 8 May 2013 16: 59 New
      to judge a war you have to fight a little yourself !!! to judge Zhukov from those who live, not counting the Great Patriotic War veterans, no one has the right !!! Such people as Zhukov and Rokossovsky are now in great shortage, simply not !!!
      1. Cheloveck
        Cheloveck 9 May 2013 00: 14 New
        Quote: Alesha
        Such people as Zhukov and Rokossovsky are now in great shortage, simply not !!!

        There are such people, but they will rise only in the midst of daring trials.
        In the meantime, the Serdyukovs and the Makarovs are afloat ... well, the Commanders-in-Chief, hmm, the Supreme ....
  18. yurta2013
    yurta2013 8 May 2013 16: 38 New
    The article is very interesting and quite competent. It's a shame that the author did not dare to directly analyze the numerical balance of forces at the time of the counterattack of the Red Army. Apparently afraid of criticism of most historians, still relying on the figures of the Stalin era.
  19. aleshka
    aleshka 8 May 2013 17: 02 New
    the article is not bad in terms of analysis, but again, the author assumes the functions of a Strategist with a capital letter, and here he begins to smack of th ** om !!!
  20. ant_ey
    ant_ey 8 May 2013 18: 18 New
    The article makes a double impression, the author tries to rely on the data, whether I don’t know the exact or not, while commenting on the actions of everyone, including God the father, God the son, etc.
  21. ant_ey
    ant_ey 8 May 2013 18: 23 New
    In his comments, German generals are stupid people, Soviet generals are pathological stupid people, and Operation Typhoon failed on its own. The Germans were preparing to come to Stalingrad and surrender to a 300-strong group Somewhere like that, sorry for the author there was not negative
  22. Bigriver
    Bigriver 8 May 2013 18: 47 New
    "There were many reasons for the failure of Operation Typhoon, but we will only list purely military errors.
    1. First of all, the Germans did not concentrate enough forces to capture Moscow, there was not enough simple turn south of the 4th tank group. Once again, they made a mistake in assessing the forces of the Red Army ...
    2. The Swift Heinz did not bother to shut the boilers around Bryansk and Trubchevsk reliably, which allowed a significant part of the troops encircled there to withdraw to Tula.
    3. The OKH made a gross mistake by ordering the 9th Army to advance north to Kalinin, and the 2nd Army to Kursk.
    4. Further, the 4th Army of von Kluge completely unexpectedly refrained from participating in the second phase of the operation, although perhaps the state of its divisions was such that they simply could not do anything.
    5. The dispatch of large aviation forces to another theater does not climb into any gates, so they do not carry out a decisive attack.
    6. We have already mentioned the shortage of fuel, ammunition, food and other types of supplies, but this means that the army rear has worked disgustingly. "

    Comrade Sick, it is simply impossible to read without questions and contradictions.
    He took only one paragraph.

    What are the ERRORS?
    1. The Germans could not to concentrate more forces for the Typhoon. There were no reserves, and in parallel with the Typhoon there was an important operation to advance to the Caucasus. Near Rostov-on-Don, Comrade Tymoshenko kicked his ears in November of the 41st comrade Kleist. By the way, this is the very first significant victory of the Red Army in the 41st.
    2. Yes, yes ... Swift Heinz "put" on service and military duty. The Red Army did not bother him in any way and he had enough strength both to shut down the cauldrons, and to digest them, and to move on. Just the same TG "terminators".
    3. And then what is the grossest mistake of the OKH? Where did the 9th and 2nd armies advance?
    4. To abstain from attacking the 4th Army, Kluge made the Red Army, regularly creating a threat on the right flank of the army. In addition, the army did not have enough fuel and BP.
    5. Kesselring's 2nd Fleet, nevertheless, took part in the very beginning of the Typhoon. But, Hitler did not find more other options to fight the British in Italy, and sent him there. This is mistake? Hmm, rather a lack of funds.
    6. The collapse of supply did not come as a result of the disgusting work of the ARMY rear, but because of the collapse of railway transport on all the few lines: from Germany, through Poland to Russia.
    1. maxvet
      maxvet 8 May 2013 21: 36 New
      1. Stas57
        Stas57 9 May 2013 11: 23 New
        can still click cars loсk and not yell?
    2. Stas57
      Stas57 9 May 2013 11: 27 New
      The "swift Heinz" did not bother to reliably shut the boilers around Bryansk and Trubchevsk, which allowed a significant part of the troops surrounded there to withdraw to Tula.
      IMHO, reliable closure of boilers of such sizes so that the mouse does not slip through is a myth, Heinz did everything he needed, the front broke through and collapsed without loss, Bryansk and Orel took, occupied major roads and settlements, and without them, our only had to leak out in small groups, dropping tanks, guns, cars. which, in principle, was necessary.
      1. Igarr
        Igarr 9 May 2013 22: 08 New
        Stas ... hi countryman ... what's wrong with you ...
        I'm more accustomed to - "Fast" Heinz ... well, this figure ... - fulfilled his task one hundred percent.
        And the drive justified completely.
        Roads in Russia - fig ... yes half that many. Drive along the roads, "Ehay, Ehay ..-" - as they say, shoot down the outposts, and hang up flags ...
        He did everything that he wanted to prove himself. He proved all this.
        Only here to Tula - the evidence is over.
        But how ..- not - fast-moving - .. he was not ready. That's why a nervous breakdown in the fall of 41 years.
        And the evidence is over - because of the courage of our fighters. Militias.
        But not from headlessness ... whether our generals. Is it German?
        It turns out an interesting movie - stupid German power ... defeated even more stupid Russian weakness.
        And the result is May 9th.
        Who is to blame?
        Do not guess?
        So I'll tell you ...
        Americans and British ... with Lend-Lease, with their brilliant operations ...
        So it goes.
        Here, reading all these works ... in parallel .. brains counted-plus-minus ... and it seemed that failing there were no losses - neither on our side nor on the German side.
        There was the usual combat work.
        They surrounded ... 130 thousand ... The 11th army ... then it turns out - the 11th in full readiness is against the Germans ... leaked through the WALLS OF BOILERS - 100 thousand.
        And the remaining 30 .. went to the partisans?
        How did the Germans manage to collect 3,5 million prisoners, ours, by October?
        Did they give up?
        Many on the forum for some reason believe that it seems like the defense of the Doctoral dissertation is going on - each number confirmed should be published in the British Review.
        Such materials are usually published in the section - Opinion.
        So - my Opinion - just that.
  23. jjj
    jjj 8 May 2013 20: 07 New
    Before the war, calculations were made that Germany could not win and would be defeated. Comrade Stalin at first could not even believe that Hitler could be capable of such a suicidal step.
  24. Drosselmeyer
    Drosselmeyer 8 May 2013 20: 24 New
    Well, by May 9, Zhukov - then you can not go. It is a shame and disgusting to read on this site about the imaginary threat of the storming of Leningrad. They blocked him because there was no force to storm, and not because they did not want to storm.
  25. I think so
    I think so 8 May 2013 20: 51 New
    A shitty little article, oh shitty ... especially for the holiday ... There’s a bastard to cheat on even such feats ... A definite MINUS is to freak out journalism ...
  26. datur
    datur 8 May 2013 21: 07 New
    HA- HA- !! Funny !!! Guderian under TULA !!!, SO they gave me a piz..y what he decided is better to get around our CITY than to take it !!!! yes By the way, it is a fact- our militias were better armed than the Red Army combat units !!!!!
    1. maxvet
      maxvet 8 May 2013 21: 43 New
      which, in principle, is not very surprising, because in Tula there are weapons factories, and most of the Tula militia was armed with SVT, and the militia was after all mostly factory workers, i.e. people familiar with technology
    2. Aleksys2
      Aleksys2 8 May 2013 21: 54 New
      Quote: datur
      By the way, it is a fact- our militias were better armed than the Red Army combat units !!!!!

      This, but what about "one rifle for five and three rounds for 4 barrels"?
      Before going to the front, volunteers took a short-term course, but under the conditions of military operations, this practically did not help people — according to the recollections of veteran volunteers — very many died in the very first battles. Uniforms for people in volunteer divisions also left much to be desired. As again, direct participants in defense actions near Moscow recall that they were given one rifle per five people and several incendiary bottles. At the same time, tank forces of General Guderian and 2 of a million soldiers of the German Center group were launched against the militias. And there was no one to blame for poor military support - the whole country was working for defense, and the main weapon was, of course, the regular units of the Soviet army.

      Taken here:
      y.html # comment-id-948426
      1. Aleksys2
        Aleksys2 9 May 2013 07: 07 New
        Quote: Aleksys2
        This, but what about "one rifle for five and three rounds for 4 barrels"?

        That was the irony lol

        soldier fellow drinks
        1. Igarr
          Igarr 9 May 2013 21: 42 New
          Here, Alexei, a risky comrade ....
          I would not know before .....
          The explanations, in short, help a lot ... but the sediment remains. ... noticed ..- zero response?
          This bike ... about one rifle ... already on five it turns out ... - well, what kind of garbage ... in general?
          Why, damn it, they don’t say in that case - about ... Arisaki, with whom our Siberian divisions were armed?
          Or about Kukri knives ... Chris ... by which, were the Central Asian divisions armed?
          Three working samples of submachine guns ... two working samples of self-loading rifles .. three types of PTRs .. - and ours lacked Mosin rifles ???
          The apparent imbalance in the brain .....
  27. The comment was deleted.
  28. Uhe
    Uhe 9 May 2013 00: 44 New
    I do not understand why Mr. Bolnyh does not believe in Rokossovsky's sincerity in relation to Soviet power and personally to Stalin? The bloody gebnya is also to blame here - it "broke" this brilliant commander so much that she taught her Motherland to love for the rest of her life;) Earlier, apparently, he was an ardent anti-communist and Russophobe, yeah. It is a pity that now there is no such gebney for most of our political and military leadership. That would be worth teaching the Motherland to love. And on Mr. Sick himself, too. Here Rokossovsky, apparently, loved both before prison and after, despite the injustice that scoundrels committed to him in prison.

    However, often people judge others by themselves.

    The article is about nothing, because it is too duplicitous, which is repeatedly noticed here. The Germans were defeated because the Russian soldier would not be defeated when they were led by people like Rokossovsky and Stalin.
  29. wax
    wax 9 May 2013 01: 08 New
    Graphomania - to put it mildly.
  30. bublic82009
    bublic82009 9 May 2013 01: 55 New
    everyone imagines himself a strategist seeing the battle from the side.
  31. Fitter65
    Fitter65 9 May 2013 06: 06 New
    It’s vile as it’s written. And it seems like the facts were taking place, the Germans write about it in their memoirs. One victory, but only arrives in response, immediately the rain rains on the road, then not good Russians gave gas, then frosts were not expected ... Afftar had to write honestly that these are new comments from German memories in his perception.
    And all the descendants of HEROES who defended the right to life for us, I congratulate you on this GREAT HOLIDAY-VICTORY DAY.
  32. Lukich
    Lukich 9 May 2013 16: 05 New
    Alexander Sick
    ... Our command spent a lot of efforts to prevent the assaults of Moscow and Leningrad, which the Germans did not even think to start.
    ... but near Moscow the Germans stubbornly rushed forward ...

    two quotes from Mr. A. Patients are far ahead, if you didn’t think to storm Moscow, and Zhukov and the rest heroically defended it. From whom?
    ... further, the German generals loosened their girdles, abandoned tactics and strategy, tank units hardly reached Moscow, all the tanks crashed on the way (Russia - two troubles "fools and roads") ... Operation Typhoon choked up - by itself - Rezun have read a lot, (Rezun - Suvorov - hack-hacker and p ...)
    ... and the rude G. Zhukov and the frightened K. Rokosovsky have nothing to do with it at all - so perhaps ...
    ... theorists, these are your calculations and analysis of the situation .... say nothing stupid Mr. AB - the enemy makes mistakes in the war ... (in Europe they were not mistaken - there was no one to force - a week and a country on the wheels of tanks).
    And we made them make mistakes and twitch, and we defended Moscow and came to Berlin, but they could not enter Moscow and defend Berlin (We are the whole Soviet people - our mothers, fathers and grandfathers)
    And I Congratulate all of us on Victory Day! ... but I don’t want to forgive you ...
  33. Ivanovich47
    Ivanovich47 9 May 2013 17: 06 New
    The Germans, at the beginning of the war (recalling our emperor Peter 1 in relation to the Swedes) were our teachers. So, the genius of our commanders lies in the fact that they very quickly learned German lessons, and brilliantly passed the exams, on the possession of the battlefield strategically, in Berlin itself!
  34. Lukich
    Lukich 9 May 2013 19: 23 New
    I put a minus article.
    I do not like his approach, I do not want to quote the whole article, I do not agree with such a statement of the question, defective and vile.
    Our people, our economy and technology, the mobilization readiness of the Soviet Union (not only the soldiers, but the mobilization readiness of the whole industry) won, our Generals led by the Supreme Commander won.
    1. Ivanovich47
      Ivanovich47 9 May 2013 19: 28 New
      Pan, these are lines from the History of the CPSU. This is all the more surprising because these lines come from Bandera Ukraine! (laughter and laughter in the audience, applause)
      1. Alex
        Alex 27 August 2013 21: 28 New
        Well, let's say, not everything that was written in "Istria KPSS" is nonsense and lies. And one more thing: in Ukraine, for your information, not only Bandera people live, but honest people too. For example, I consider myself one of those. And people like me are in the majority in the country. It is thanks to them that Ukraine is still not in NATO. And I can assure you, it will never be there. And the constant indiscriminate reproaches of all indiscriminately Bandera, Melnik, Shukhevych and OUN-UPA do not contribute to our fight against this rabble. Follow the vocabulary, dear.
  35. diversant2013
    diversant2013 9 May 2013 20: 02 New
    Thank you for the article! I’ve been reading for a long time but registered only now ... I shoveled everything connected with the war, but did not observe the photo in the article! Happy holiday to all!
    PS I'll go smoke, as an ashtray, the captured German mug HRE42! I will remember Yura (scratched on a mug)!
  36. Kazanok
    Kazanok 9 June 2013 17: 07 New
    forgot to add that the whiskered Satan, in a fit of hopelessness, drove over Moscow discs with the icon of the Mother of God .... this is how he was crap .... then Judas nearly merged the country with a gang of his red-bellied sloths ....
  37. Alex
    Alex 27 August 2013 21: 30 New
    The article is of interest (for me personally) only as a source of some facts. As for the analysis - who studied what.
  38. DimerVladimer
    DimerVladimer 19 October 2016 12: 56 New
    Excuse me, but what does Rokossovsky have to do with it? The army commander gives the order for the offensive, and this is where his role ends. He is not obliged to paint tasks for the regiments of the division and determine the time of artillery preparation.

    A fundamentally wrong judgment.
    An offensive order is a general directive. Before the appearance of the directive, an offensive plan must be developed - scheduled for the army units in minutes!

    The army headquarters is 110-150 people of which the most important is the beginning of the army headquarters! He is directly involved in PLANNING operations and the interaction of parts of the Army with their material and technical support.

    The army headquarters plans forces and means for the offensive, calculates the time for the transfer, the deployment of deployment areas, the deployment of troops, the time necessary to capture the line and the time for pursuit. Distributes reserves and makes adjustments during the offensive. The offensive plan is not a dogma - it is constantly being adjusted depending on the OPERATIONAL situation.

    If the division commander receives a general directive, then the army headquarters is not doing its job. It does not happen that the divisional commanders decide the time and place of the offensive on their own, but within the framework of the directive they can make decisions on massing the offensive in one or another tactical direction, coordinating with the army headquarters so as not to lose interaction with the flank units.

    In a particular case with
    counterattack on November 16, in which the 58th Panzer Division took part. This counterattack ended in complete disaster for the division, which lost 157 tanks out of 198

    This is an incompetent choice of a place for a counter strike by the army headquarters and an inexperienced command of the division.
    As Rokosovsky himself bashfully writes in his memoirs "Soldier's Duty" - ... not everything worked out for us then, we were still learning to fight ...
    - This is not written by the battalion / company / platoon commander, drafted into the personnel army from the student bench - this is a military personnel (which says a lot about military education)!
    The commander, who "learned" to fight and at the cost of his mistakes, were tens of thousands of soldiers' lives ...