This is not the time to trade – Russian arms exports are falling
SIPRI, as always, knows everything
No matter how they dramatize global military instability, the height of the Cold War is still far away. For comparison: from 1973 to 1987, the planet spent 30–40 percent more on weaponthan in the period 2017–2022. However, everything is still ahead, but it is obvious that such a sharp jump in costs is not feasible. The existing production capacity is simply not enough for this. First of all, in the West, which, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, slowly but surely reduced its military-industrial complex.
The SIPRI agency or the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in its latest yearbook published a somewhat depressing picture of Russian exports. It’s worth mentioning right away that all the data the institute has is indirect - Russia does not disclose the true volumes of arms sales abroad. The head of Rostec, Sergei Chemezov, put it best on this matter back in 2021:
“We, like other countries, for example China, do not publish this data - it is closed. Where do they get them from? They’re just pulling it out of the park.”
But when there is no other comparative data, one has to be content with SIPRI information. Moreover, the head of state indicated the volume of Russian arms exports in 2023 at significant “billions of dollars.”
However, SIPRI does not yet have data on sales in Russia for the past year - statisticians calculated only for 2019–2022. And there is little optimism here. Compared to the previous three years, the drop in arms exports was an impressive 53 percent. The number of countries purchasing weapons from Russia has decreased no less rapidly: in 2019 – 31 states, in 2022 – 14, and in 2023 – only 12.
If the Americans take the vacant place, then later it will not be easy to unhook them from our old customers. Serious arms supplies are associated with the inclusion of consumers in the American range of services - GPS services, global data transmission and reconnaissance systems. If in conventional India they get drawn into such stories, then returning will be difficult.
The most surprising result of the SIPRI analysis was not even the drop in Russian exports, but its displacement from second place by France. Did Macron really manage to promote the defense industry so much that it jumped to second place?
Of course not - this is a temporary phenomenon. The decent growth in French exports is primarily due to sales of six submarines and twenty-six Rafales to India. They tried to go to Kazakhstan with their planes, but Astana settled on the Su-30SM for now.
Of course, the main reason for the peak in arms exports from Russia was the needs of special operations, but not only them. The country is intensively arming itself - the Moscow and Leningrad military districts are approaching, which require the most modern weapons. If anything, they will have to fight not with the Ukrainian Armed Forces, but with the NATO bloc itself.
Cautious optimism is permitted
Despite the pessimism of Swedish analysts' numerical calculations, there is no point in tearing your hair out. First, let's remember the history.
How did the weapons of one or another power become competitive in the market?
That's right, after a war or some other mess. The Soviet arms business would never have become one of the largest in the world if not for the Great Patriotic War. In its crucible, an outstanding weapons school was born, the fruits of which we still use today.
But how much military equipment did the USSR export in 1941–1945?
That's right, practically nothing.
The Americans were doubly lucky in the World War. Firstly, they were able to inflate the military-industrial complex to a state where there were enough weapons for both themselves and their allies. Secondly, no one bombed America, and there was no need to restore industry after the global massacre. But it was after the war that American weapons became in demand as never before.
Remember who needed pre-war crafts from the US defense industry?
Something similar, albeit on a much smaller scale, is now happening with the Russian defense industry. No matter how cynical it may sound, the special operation is a kind of advertising campaign for Russian weapons. An extremely expensive campaign, but very effective.
After the victory, Russia's arms exports will inevitably increase for several reasons.
The first is that entire groups of weapons that have been successfully tested at the front will become in demand on world markets.
Secondly, the cost of weapons will decrease due to the organization of mass production, which will add attractiveness to customers. Now enormous resources are being invested in the domestic military-industrial complex, many samples of equipment are being put on the assembly line, and the final cost of products is invariably reduced due to their mass production. If it is possible to maintain at least part of this dynamics in the post-war period, few people in the world will be able to compete with Russian weapons in the world.
Buyers’ priorities are unlikely to change fundamentally, but some samples will receive special attention. Air defense systems, traditionally outstanding in Russia, have confirmed their high level over the past couple of years and will not be left without orders after the SVO.
In the same way, electronic warfare systems will be snapped up like hot cakes, if, of course, Russia intends to sell them. Now the “Rabmans” of the Russian Army are faced with an enemy of unprecedented power in the person of NATO and have accumulated invaluable experience. No one has this, and in the foreseeable future there won’t be.
The Northern Military District fronts have become an excellent testing ground for unmanned systems of various classes and purposes. For example, they showed the uselessness of any Bayraktars against modern air defense and highlighted the obvious invulnerability of FPV-drones. For now, kamikaze drones are considered invulnerable, but once Russian engineers find a cure for FPV, the market effect will be unimaginable.
Perhaps it is precisely the means of combating cheap drones and will become the new Klondike in the world of arms business. And, of course, the famous UMPC (controlled planning and correction modules), which make a significant contribution to the advancement of the Russian Army to the west, will not be left without fans.
Should not be written off and Tanks, but which were given up for only a couple of years. Whatever one may say, there is nothing worse for infantry than a tank working on them. Unlike howitzers and mortars, after a tank “exit” there is no opportunity or time to hide from a shell. And the accuracy of direct fire is disproportionately higher than the area work of the rest of the artillery. This is somewhat different from the traditional path of tanks, but new conditions dictate new requirements. A renaissance awaits domestic tank builders, although it is unlikely to be associated with the Armata family of vehicles.
It is possible that Rosoboronexport will be able to allocate some of the weapons for supplies abroad even before the completion of the SVO. This is possible when industry enters the plateau phase and when the front is 100% saturated. We hope that we will not learn about this from the ubiquitous SIPRI analysts.
Russia is now objectively not in the mood for increasing arms exports. Moreover, if the flows had not decreased over the past two years, this could be called a real blasphemy. “Everything for the front! Everything for Victory! And buyers will wait.
The markets will not evaporate; on the contrary, they will only warm up. It is enough to look at the number of hot spots on the planet to understand the scale of the arms business in the present and future. Equipment made in Russia will take its rightful place here, and no France will remain in second place.
Information