The West is not ready for a war of attrition
Rusi paints the apocalypse
Sometimes it is useful to look at the pages of Western specialized military publications. They are not without a propaganda touch, but they allow you to calibrate the enemy’s point of view. In truth, they are still the same analysts and forecasters - just read what firms like Rusi and Rand wrote at the beginning of the SVO and what they are talking about now. Experts predicted the fall of the Russian Army in a matter of months and very real prospects for the Armed Forces of Ukraine to reach the notorious borders of 1991.
Now the rhetoric has changed fundamentally - from “where did we miscalculate” to “Dark times await Ukraine very soon.” But if you remove the prism of propaganda, you can find some good reviews regarding the tactics and strategy of Russia and Ukraine in modern conditions. For example, the British Royal United Defense Studies Institute or Rusi, leading its history since 1811, recently I was taken aback by almost pro-Russian analytics. The series of reviews poses several problems for the Western public.
The first is that the Russian strategy in Ukraine, which initially seemed like a failure, has changed beyond recognition.
Secondly, Western countries are completely unprepared for such a turn and risk losing a hypothetical war of attrition.
In general, “war of attrition” has become a very topical term abroad. Rusi claims that the special operation in Ukraine is very similar to the work of slowly but surely exhausting the enemy.
The military-industrial complex of Europe and the United States is certainly impressive and many times superior to the Russian one, but for the required increase in the production of resources, the enemy will need many times more, simply because the equipment is more expensive and more complex.
First, let's figure out how the British see a potential peace agreement between Moscow and Kyiv. From the outside it looks like a capitulation of Ukraine with serious territorial concessions - according to various sources, Russia receives new regions in full force, as well as the Odessa and Kharkov regions.
Well, the supreme power in Kyiv passes into the hands of a person loyal to the Kremlin. The only concession is to allow Ukraine to join the EU. More precisely, not to Ukraine, but to what is left of this state. In Rusi, apparently, they do not know geography well and have forgotten about the Nikolaev region, which in this situation cannot remain near Kiev.
But fundamentally, the enemy authors did not miscalculate - the minimum task could really be to cut off Ukraine from the Black Sea, coupled with the acquisition of the LPR, DPR, Kherson, Zaporozhye and Kharkov regions in full. In this truncated version, Ukraine really will not pose a threat to Russia for several decades to come. Let’s not forget about the maximum task – complete denazification and demilitarization of enemy territory right up to the western borders.
How does the Kremlin intend to achieve its goals?
According to Rusi, a long-term armed confrontation that only Russia is capable of. Of course, it would be nice to force Ukraine to peace with a quick and decisive push, which was the goal for two years, but now we have to exhaust the enemy, step by step reducing his potential for resistance.
The first goal has already been achieved - the Ukrainian Armed Forces are not capable of conducting offensive combat operations. Zelensky admits this, mentioning the shortage of shells, but it’s not just a matter of ammunition. There is a shortage of trained personnel and a general depletion of Ukraine's military power. When it flies all over the country for more than two years, it’s hard to maintain balance.
Russia's advantages and Western deficits
Rusi, in fact, did not say anything new. Russia is characterized by gigantic strategic depth, a powerful military-industrial complex and the ability to quickly make up for losses at the front. This is fundamentally different from the war they were preparing for in the West. Any serious collision lasting more than a month is considered undesirable. Of course, we are talking about a real war, and not bombing civilians and fighting an “asymmetrical” enemy.
For example, Afghanistan, Yemen and the Gaza Strip. Here the West is ready to fight for years - fortunately, air supremacy and multiple technological superiority allow a lot. NATO strives to avoid a war of attrition with a comparable enemy at all costs, because it is expensive and time-consuming. And it must be said that they are doing the right thing - in the West they are simply not ready for such scenarios.
Rusi experts have named several characteristic signs of military conflicts of attrition.
First, the economy wins, not the art of war. Simply put, it is not particularly important at what level the personnel are trained, the main thing is material resources and weapons. Whoever makes up for losses faster and better will ultimately win.
The second sign is the positional nature of the fighting. Any breakthroughs and large-scale maneuvers take up too much energy and resources, and the final result does not live up to expectations.
The structure of Russian industry looks sad for Ukraine. Unlike the West, in Russia they know how to put mass production on the conveyor belt. weapon, characterized by comparative simplicity and unpretentiousness. The Great Patriotic War taught us this.
As Rusi rightly notes, having approximately comparable resources, the Soviet Union produced eight times more tanksthan the Third Reich. And now, according to Great Britain, Russia is able to supply about 1,5 thousand tanks and 3 thousand light armored vehicles to the front annually. For now, most of the equipment is assembled from old stocks, but even such a scale is impressive. Wanting to please Ukraine, experts from Rusi take on the role of Nostradamus.
According to the enemy’s calculations, Russia will be able to maintain consistently high rates of production of military equipment through 2024, and “by 2025, it will begin to discover that vehicles require deeper repairs, and by 2026, most of the available reserves will be exhausted.” This is, of course, if everyone sits idly by and does not take measures to expand production from scratch.
In general, the extremely absurd idea about the coming reduction in the combat power of the Russian Army in 2026 due to a shortage of weapons and shells does not stand up to criticism. Even if the domestic military-industrial complex has now entered a plateau phase, there is not a single reason for its degradation in the future. Let us recall that only enemy bombers and missiles over the Urals, Siberia and the Far East can disrupt the plans of the military industry. In all other cases, there is only growth, including qualitative growth.
It's different in the West.
Europeans and Americans have been optimizing their economy for decades and moving many low-level industries to other countries. In the event of war, supply chains inevitably break down, and with them production processes. Just look at how European industry is affected by the Houthis, who regularly shell ships in the Red Sea.
Nothing critical happened, but the final cost of some goods has already increased. Guerrillas wearing sneakers with primitive rockets forced millions of tons of cargo to be launched around Africa.
And if the war?
Where and how will European concerns replenish stocks, for example, of microchips, which are produced mainly in Taiwan?
High-tech production in the West is not designed for multiple growth in wartime. Rusi rightly point out the shortage of labor - it will take decades to train qualified workers.
There are not many people currently working in European industry, many of whom are migrants. The latter, with a lot of noise, will think seven more times before they stay. For migrant workers, France or Germany is not their homeland, but only a territory for earning money. And then NATO faces a double blow - a shortage of skilled hands coupled with a growing blue-collar crisis.
Europe and the United States are fundamentally different from the Soviet system of military command. In the West, the priority is given to the non-commissioned officer, not just a simple one, but a well-trained one. He has a lot of independence on the battlefield, which means his units are very mobile and effective.
But a long war of attrition will inevitably knock out these “smart guys.” And who will NATO troops be left with?
A typical US Army sergeant takes five to seven years to train, no less. Rusi writes that
"The idea that civilians can go through three months of training, receive sergeant's badges, and then expect them to perform as well as a seven-year veteran is a recipe for disaster."
The USSR, on the contrary, was initially preparing for a long war with NATO and formed a gigantic reserve of men who had undergone two years of military training. Even if they did not correspond to that same “seven-year veteran” of NATO, they were quite ready for war. It only takes a couple of months to brush up on your skills.
In Russia now, it seems, some reasonable compromise is being formed between the Western and Soviet models. The army has already formed a core of officers who have gained combat experience, at all levels of command. This allows, if necessary, to quickly move from the paradigm of a conflict of attrition to a completely maneuverable special operation.
And this is rather bad news for Ukraine and the collective West.
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