The new government of Pakistan in the context of big projects and schemes
More than a month ago (February 8), Pakistan held very important general elections for the region, which will largely determine the economic and military-political configuration not only in the system of Pakistan itself, but also in a number of other countries.
For Russia, Pakistan is generally a kind of “big country in the south”, between Afghanistan, China, India and Iran, which has a quarter of a billion poor population and at the same time has a nuclear weapon, and of our own production.
This existing description is, to put it mildly, incomplete, but it is largely determined by the practical absence of this country in our information agenda. This is not very good, since both Pakistan and its region are part of the large (at least officially declared) “Southern Project”.
But it’s not just about projects, because using the example of changes in the Pakistani political system, in fact, you can find a lot of useful data for analyzing the situation in other problem areas. Strange as it may seem, even in terms of the conflict in Ukraine, this is not at all an attempt to stitch together some kind of Frankenstein from an assessment of various regional problem areas.
Schedule
The breakdown of the main political forces and parties of the second echelon showed that compromises for the formation of both regional and federal governments in Pakistan, if possible, would not be possible immediately.
The main opponent of the Punjabi elites and a significant part of the army corps, the Pakistan Movement for Justice (PTI) party of the removed (and arrested) Prime Minister I. Khan, received 93 seats.
The party of his irreconcilable opponents, the Sharif family clan (Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), PML-N), representing the hereditary elites of Punjab, big business and a significant part of the army corps - 75 seats.
The party of the elites of Sindh and parts of Balochistan, a real competitor to the first two and associated with the names of Bhutto and Zardari (Pakistan People's Party, PPP) - 54 seats.
Also at the federal level, the party of Muhajir migrants (“United National Movement” (MQM-P) performed relatively strongly at the federal level, taking 17 seats. The remaining movements performed, plus or minus traditionally, with 2–4 seats each.
It was clear that in this situation, even taking into account the so-called. “women’s quotas” and non-Muslims, it will be possible for the Sharifs to get a majority and form a government (and therefore the vector of development for the coming years) only through agreements. 103 seats is not even close to a majority. Even the unification with Bhutto did not provide guarantees. Therefore, bidding and approvals lasted throughout the rest of February and the beginning of March, ending with the taking of the oath of office by the cabinet only on March 11.
When voting for the candidacy of the new prime minister, only 92 votes were cast for the PTI candidate I. Khan (O. Ayub). This was even less than what was initially recruited, taking into account quotas.
As many as 201 votes were cast for the Sharif candidate, Sh. Sharif, i.e., in the end, the Sharifs collected not only common votes with the Bhutto family, plus all their quotas, but also received 28 votes from other political forces. PTI I. Khan was left in splendid isolation.
As administrators and managers here, the Sharif clan can only be applauded. They agreed with everyone, except those with whom it was impossible to do this in principle. The father of the leader of Bhutto's party, Bilawal Bhutto, A. Zardari eventually became the president of Pakistan again. Bilawal himself, who had headed the country's Foreign Ministry several times before, did not join the federal government this time, concentrating on party work, and this was determined by the fact that his political force received benefits in other areas.
For example, the Ministry of Commerce, which was headed by D.K. Khan, comes from the elites of Sindh and Balochistan, close to Bhutto. By the way, according to the criterion of “high birth”, this is perhaps the most interesting character - in general, one can consider the genealogy from the time of Zoroaster. A. Zardari himself is also a Balochistan elite.
By the way, in terms of the long-standing discussion that the presence of aristocratic old elites is a kind of guarantee of success in management. They say that all our troubles are due to the fact that Russia lost these imperial elites in the 20th century and has not yet raised them in the 21st century. Well, in Pakistan, no matter what the surname, with the exception of part of the army elite, it’s impossible to imagine anything older than the elite, but for some reason this did not guarantee the economic and military leadership of the state in the region either in the pre-colonial or post-colonial period. And, in fact, all these ancient clans did not interfere with being a colony for a long time. The hereditary aristocracy gets along quite well with the colonial status of the state. But you can trace how all these names are integrated into Western power chains.
The important Ministry of Internal Affairs also went to the candidate agreed between the military and Bhutto - M. Naqvi, and not to the Sharifs' protege. And this is the fight against drug trafficking. The departments related to privatization and infrastructure also did not come completely under the control of the Sharifs, and there the military caste installed a relatively neutral figure.
MQM-P received a federal second-plan portfolio for its vote and position. Small parties have become significantly stronger in regional governments. And even in Khyber they did not prevent the appointment of the odious supporter of Imran Khan, A. Gandapur, as chief minister.
S. Bugti became the chief minister of Balochistan. Quite a tough supporter of the fight against separatism and “Indian influence”, even though the Baloch himself is from the Baloch tribal elite. He collaborated with both the Sharifs and again with the Bhuttos. The traditional connection between Bhutto and the structures of the Aga Khan Foundation in the climate-friendly and extremely important for agriculture region of Azad Kashmir has also been preserved.
Actually, this means that the current cabinet does not plan to aggravate relations on the border with Afghanistan, where radical movements close to a similar wing of the Taliban are strong (this is a change from previous years), but to clear the approaches from China to sea communications from radicals and work for the Iranian border in the same direction is just gathering.
It is interesting that in Punjab, the daughter of Nawaz Sharif and the niece of the new prime minister, Maryam Sharif, were promoted to chief minister (though not without problems), which, given the role of this central province, as well as the political history Pakistan, allows us to say that they will further try to carry it higher, similar to the role of Benazir Bhutto in the past.
In general, the system looks quite balanced and coalition-based, regarding the voting results - not in terms of the number of portfolios, but in terms of their quality and regional representation.
But then things get more interesting.
Relevance for Russia
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan was headed by I. Dar, a financier close to the Sharifs, but he was almost constantly engaged in financial activities. The Ministry of Finance was headed by a very remarkable character, M. Aurangzeb. This is actually a direct corridor to international institutions and the JPMorgan Chase group. I. Dar was supposed to take his place, but in the end he went to manage the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
It is clear that the new cabinet will have to deal with the political basis of the “Movement for Justice” of I. Khan, and this is mainly a relatively young generation, in a rather substantive manner. It is growing and, naturally, major reforms have been announced.
But everyone always announces reforms, constantly after elections they plan to build something, lay pipes, reduce tariffs, develop education and jobs, etc. The question is: how relevant is all this from Russia’s point of view? The fact is that although everyone is planning reforms, the first place is still given to the development model of a particular country and its vector, taking into account the objective processes taking place in the world.
The objective process today is the cost crisis, which leads to the fragmentation of the world economy into large cost clusters. Subjective processes - the interaction of transnational and national elite groups, who works with whom and how, helps or opposes. This forms the model.
Let's take our neighbor - Turkey. And they have problems with inflation, and no matter how you listen in the media about the Turkish economy, everything is bad for Ankara, and, they say, R. Erdogan invited purely representatives of “global financiers” to the financial bloc.
But let's take a closer look.
Last summer, Turkey signed a number of agreements with the European Union, then deepened them at the level of regulations. Let us note how many political obligations Ankara has fulfilled.
In the fall, despite all the problems, representatives of not only traditional partners, such as Qatar, which always helps its ally financially, came to Turkey, but also representatives of Arabian countries, which is interesting and typical - the UAE. And a landing party from the largest investment funds from the top 30 landed, and all this was supervised by the appointees of not just abstract globalists, but specifically the Goldman Sachs group.
It would seem that in Pakistan there is an appointee from JPMorgan Chase, and here it is Goldman Sachs, both those globalists and those are all tarred with the same world. No, not alone.
Goldman work when and where and when the time comes to integrate part of the national business into those very top 30 investment monsters. These are not necessarily large national companies, it just means that Turkey is considered as part of the overall investment model, where funds will be launched into innovative industries - microelectronics, information technology, etc.
The European Union is being cut off in these positions, pushing China away from the traditional bonuses of working with Europe, but Turkey, on the contrary, is being strengthened. This looks strange against the backdrop of Turkey’s “catastrophic problems” that we are constantly told about, but it is strange only outside the framework of the grand scheme. They say one thing, but the reality is different.
Who came to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Finance of Pakistan?
The JP Morgan Chase group, associated not with innovative investing, but with country lending - the IMF and the World Bank. And instead of a trusted financier, the Sharifs put a banker on finance - the former CEO of the Morgan group (JP Morgan Global Corporate Bank - Singapore), and I. Dara put on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who will still deal with finance, only international ones. But not through a pool of investment funds, but through the World Bank and the IMF.
This means that Islamabad will receive additional (really necessary) funds for “macrofinancial stabilization” and to ensure the nominal growth included in the IMF programs of ±2,5–3,0%, but no investment hub, flows from investors from top 30 funds will not be there.
In India it will be, in the UAE and Saudi Arabia it will be, in Turkey it will be, but in Pakistan it will not be. But Pakistan will be able to start importing more technological products, however, it will strengthen its agricultural sector. And these are also opportunities for those who are interested, especially since Islamabad will have certain funds for energy development, but these are opportunities within the framework of a specific model and relationship. China can now begin to calculate how many cars Pakistan will buy from it and whether it is worth installing an additional assembly plant.
On the one hand, somewhere in Pakistan the finances will be handled by a protege of one of the globalist groups, and conclusions can be drawn not only for Pakistan, but also in other areas.
Here we have two practically formed value clusters: Chinese and American-European. And there are four global groups, like in a black square of corners. There seems to be one system, the globalists also seem to be all there, but in relation to the division based on common value in terms of interests, the “angles” can work somewhere together, and somewhere separately, up to the point of conflict.
Pakistan is joining the Chinese cluster and is going to cooperate with structures affiliated with the IMF. If you work with Pakistan on trade and do not interfere with this direction, then there will be no contradictions for Russia.
As an example, if you develop a certain project where pipes with blue fuel will work primarily to create a hypothetical link that will help separate the EU economically from the United States, then Pakistan will face a fight with another global group that aims to establish borders in Ukraine as far as possible (preferably by 1991, taking the assets for yourself).
Like the one whose interests are represented by the (still) rushing E. Macron, borders and assets can be lost, and E. Macron will now have to answer for them in detail after the death of the elder Rothschild.
The benefits here for Islamabad, despite the neutral position of the Sharifs, are not at all obvious, but the problems are quite. Will Pakistan cooperate in such a way as to help Moscow re-make the EU+Russia=total value construct? This is dangerous for Pakistan. And if we formulate it in such a way that the project will strengthen the Chinese cluster as a whole? Yes, this is more interesting and safer for Islamabad, and easier for us if we want it.
The same project, such as the joint supply of Russian-Iranian gas, in the case of one concept can proceed without problems even under sanctions, but in the case of another, it can be delayed for years. In one option, you can get a sales market, in the other, in the best case scenario, political neutrality.
But it would seem that the question was: who took what place from which transnational group after the elections in distant Pakistan.
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