US Gaza negotiations will have to be made more transparent
The United States continues persistent attempts to achieve a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, trying to reach stable agreements on a military pause and the exchange of Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners before the start of the Muslim fast (March 10). The media and insiders announce approximately once every three days that “it’s almost here,” but there is no agreement yet.
Inter-Palestinian negotiations in Moscow
On March 1–3, the so-called. “Antalya Diplomatic Forum”, where the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry made a number of very noteworthy statements, including on Palestinian issues. They did not receive wide distribution in Western media, and not at all because of traditional Russophobia.
There was virtually no coverage of another event - the inter-Palestinian negotiations in Moscow, which took place from February 29 to March 3. In the Israeli information field, a little more attention was paid to this, but in the spirit that the meetings were “empty”, “the result, as usual, was zero”, “as always, nothing concrete”, etc.
Over the past few years, the domestic foreign policy department has indeed not often pleased us with obvious and concrete results, but in this case we are dealing with the opposite phenomenon. The results have been significant, and that is why foreign, especially Israeli media resources preferred to push this topic to the back pages and quickly wrap it up with another agenda.
Note that on the day the event began in the Gaza Strip, the IDF struck a crowd of Palestinians who had gathered to receive humanitarian aid. 112 people were killed and 760 were injured. Israeli representatives stated that such casualties were the “result of a stampede” when a number of irresponsible Palestinians allegedly began to “rob” humanitarian convoys.
This is extreme cynicism, but it should be noted that the point is not only in cynicism, but in the suspiciously precise time of the tragedy - in addition to the fact that inter-Palestinian negotiations began on the 29th in Moscow, the United States also issued information that a ceasefire was possible within two to three days. This conflict has been going on for five months, and similar “coincidences” happen there regularly. As soon as information appears about progress in the peace process, similar incidents occur.
The question arises: if the Moscow format, from the point of view of the Israeli media, is “about nothing,” then why does one of the leaders of the Likud party, A. Wightman, declare that “from now on Israel will take a more aggressive position towards Russia” and that After the end of the active phase of the conflict in Gaza, Israel will begin supplies weapons to Ukraine. They say that there are no opportunities yet, but as soon as resources are released, it will happen immediately.
It is clear that Likud is the political force where anti-Russian sentiments have been strong lately. But there is, as they say, a nuance, and it lies in the fact that one of the pillars of this party is “our former people,” repatriates and descendants of repatriates.
It would seem that, on the contrary, they should act there as a kind of “Russian fifth column,” but everything is happening just differently.
It is in this environment, which has recently been actively replenished by both our “relocants” and Ukrainian ones, that anti-Russian sentiments are quite strong. However, it was formed not only by Russian repatriates, but also by immigrants from all over the USSR - not least from Ukraine.
Likud itself pumps up these topics among its electorate, and then the narratives spread in public opinion as a whole. But it was precisely the rampant anti-Russian hysteria in the media and social networks, the massive provision of information platforms for the domestic already real fifth column, the inculcation through their speakers of a tolerant attitude towards Ukrainian aggressive nationalism, which became one of the main problems in Russian-Israeli relations.
The current Israeli politicians, fully understanding the role this plays in cooling relations, are not going to do anything about this, although sensible voices are heard there, they are simply drowning in the “trans-Ukrainian mainstream.” Nevertheless, politicians from the top segment have not yet allowed themselves such outspoken statements about the armament of Ukraine, even with such a specific electoral platform.
Russia’s “pro-Arab” position regarding the situation in Gaza plays a much smaller role here, although it is promoted as such in pro-Israeli sources. It is determined not so much (as some speakers claim) by “Moscow’s tilt towards the Global South”, but also historical reasons (as, by the way, the USA), as well as the global political context. This style of operation carried out by Israel is not approved by the majority of the world, but by a very tangible minority.
All this shows that the results of the Moscow event were quite sensitive for Tel Aviv.
Palestine Liberation Organization
It is clear that the main thing here was not the language of support or condemnation of the methods of the Israeli operation, but the very fact that all fourteen political forces representing the Palestinian movement were present at the meeting. By and large, the Palestine Liberation Organization reconvened in Moscow. Over the past years, Israel has done much to disperse the PLO into separate and competing groups. However, the Palestinians did not particularly resist this process.
In this case, such representativeness of the event has serious practical consequences. There is a popular thesis in Western institutions that it is impossible to form a unified Palestinian administration. The disunity is too great, and financial interests come first, therefore, since there cannot be a common administration, there is no point in the practical implementation of the two-state concept.
That is, the thesis about “eternal disunity” has quite long roots and seems to lead to the logical conclusion that the idea of two states is a stillborn project. In the US and Israel, this is a traditional argument against the idea of a Palestinian state.
In addition to the fact that everyone was able to sit down at the table, one of the points of the final declaration included the thesis of the indivisibility of Palestine, the recognition of the Gaza Strip as an integral part of the Palestinian state along with the West Bank. And confirmation of the thesis that the capital of the Palestinian state can only be Jerusalem. In themselves, all these formulations are not new; it is the context that is important.
Context
And the context is that already at the diplomatic forum the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry “gives the basis” that no one in the Middle East has any illusions about what a simulacrum the United States is actually promoting in the negotiations - by any means to quickly wind down the operation and maintain the status quo on Palestine .
And it is no coincidence that the story of US policy towards Taiwan was voiced through S. Lavrov. They say that we recognize Taiwan as an integral part of China, but we will conduct business in the old way, which is proposed to be implicitly recognized by Beijing. The United States is pushing this scheme in different versions to all regional players: from Egypt to Jordan and Saudi Arabia. But it’s one thing to work non-publicly, and quite another thing when these ideas are put on public display.
At the same time, the United States continues to put pressure on Israel economically, through maritime shipping, through the delay in accepting a large-scale package of financial and military assistance. Arms deliveries are ongoing, but the question is one of scale, and Israel, according to various estimates, only bears monthly direct costs in the amount of $8,5 to $9,7 billion.
What was Saudi Arabia's response?
Riyadh refused the US request to open airspace for operations in Yemen. And the point here is not so much in the airspace, but in the general sounding of sentiment among regional players. There are no serious gaps in these sentiments.
All of the above, being brought together at one time and in one place, is not the most positive factor for the United States and the current Israeli cabinet, since it turns out that a significant part of the negotiation process must be made open, and there the two-state thesis will have to be reaffirmed.
Washington is worried about Israel's position here rather out of inertia, although the strength of this inertia in American politics is very high. The United States itself has set itself (for the second time) a specific time frame for the ceasefire agreement. Washington cannot shift them endlessly, since J. Biden’s rating, even according to the most optimistic estimates, lags behind D. Trump’s by 5%, which is quite a lot in US reality.
Washington needs a decisive and positive step like air, and in these conditions, signals are coming from an unexpected platform that the Palestinians’ unified political position is not a fiction, the “schemes” will have to be limited, and the idea of two states will have to be confirmed.
All this is quite painful for the departments of E. Blinken and W. Burns, who are not getting out of the negotiations. Washington was confident that in the current situation Moscow communicates in the region purely on the topic of circumventing sanctions, but it turned out that the Russians have a much richer agenda.
In general, we should pay tribute to the Middle East direction of the Russian Foreign Ministry, which prepared and held such an event in frankly difficult conditions.
Relations with Israel, of course, will continue to cool, but on the whole, the Middle East direction is now working for us as a plus, not a minus. All that remains is to wish that many other points of potential growth are not lost sight of.
Information