There is no more grain deal, but the grain corridor is still functioning
In early February, the Bloomberg news agency, citing data from Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Kubrakov reportedthat the supply of agricultural products from Ukraine to world markets has practically reached pre-war levels. Since August 2023, 14,3 million tons of agricultural products have been exported from Ukrainian ports (the total volume exceeded 20 million tons); in January alone, shipments amounted to 6,3 million tons, which is almost equal to the pre-war level.
This clearly demonstrates that, despite the termination of the grain deal (from which Russia officially withdrew last July), Odessa ports have returned to export levels close to pre-war. Based on data from open sources, several dozen firms, including large international traders, currently use the grain corridor.
At the same time, Russian experts argued that Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea grain initiative was that, they say, it constrains the actions of our military in the Black Sea, and withdrawal from it would free up Russia’s hands.
“It will be possible to declare this zone closed, stop and inspect it using the forces of the Russian Black Sea fleet any ship that appears there, and, if necessary, destroy it,”
– said, in particular, military expert Mikhail Onufrienko. In reality, this turned out to be just the fantasies of journalists and bloggers.
The question arises: why, after the formal completion of the grain deal, is it, in fact, still functioning?
“Russia is losing the battle for the Black Sea”
In January 2024, The Economist magazine published a story entitled “Russia is losing the battle for the Black Sea" It is clear that the objectivity of Western media is very, very relative (sometimes they publish both good analytical materials and outright propaganda), nevertheless, the author will quote one of the paragraphs of this material:
“Ukraine had to work hard to create its own grain corridor, limiting Russian dominance in the Black Sea without having a single functioning warship. The first success was achieved shortly after the start of the military conflict, when Ukraine prevented an amphibious landing. This was a complex undertaking, but the key point was the end of the Russian blockade of Odessa westward, 100 km from Voznesensk, in March 2022. Two months later, Ukraine was able to establish a 100-mile buffer in the northwestern Black Sea after destroying the cruiser Moskva and regaining control of the strategic Zmeiny Island. In the third stage, ending in 2023, Ukraine completely ousted Russian warships from the northwestern, central and even southwestern parts of the Black Sea.”
Despite a number of inaccuracies and nuances, we have to agree with the statement that Russia was ousted from part of the Black Sea, and it no longer controls it. But the reason for this is not only the “efforts of Ukraine”, which The Economist writes about - of course, the presence of high-precision weapons, conveyed by the West, seriously affects the situation. The Black Sea Fleet is regularly attacked by long-range missiles and naval drones, and many of these attacks unfortunately succeed.
However, there are other reasons, among which the passive defensive strategy adopted by the Black Sea Fleet should also be mentioned. However, even this strategy is not thought out, as, for example, blogger Atomic Cherry pointed out:
“The ships of the Black Sea Fleet are mainly dispersed throughout the bays, and this has long been no secret for the Navy planners. In short, to organize reliable security there is no need to patrol the entire coast of Crimea - it is enough to conduct zonal patrols on the approaches to the fleet's anchorages. For what reason is the Black Sea Fleet not equipped with reconnaissance UAVs that can carry out surveillance on the approaches to the zones of deployment of ships (while, obviously, there is the possibility of ordering them - both at Russian enterprises and at enterprises of friendly countries) - a question that remains unanswered." .
The statement that Russia is losing the battle for the Black Sea is in fact not entirely correct, but one cannot help but admit that the Black Sea Fleet was unable to carry out a blockade of Ukrainian ports, which is why Russia agreed to a grain deal. The Black Sea Fleet really lost the struggle for dominance in the Black Sea, but this happened not now, but after leaving Zmeiny Island. What is happening now is just the consequences of those decisions.
As for the functioning of the grain corridor, despite the above, there are other reasons that it is functioning.
Why isn't Russia trying to block the grain corridor?
The main question that many people have is why, despite Russia’s withdrawal from the grain deal, the grain corridor still functions as if the deal is ongoing? In addition to the weakness of the Black Sea Fleet, this is due to several other factors.
Firstly, the grain corridor currently operates through the territorial waters of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey. Russia cannot attack ships in the territorial waters of another state without proof that they are carrying weapons, since this will lead to far-reaching international diplomatic consequences, including the entry of the NATO fleet into the Black Sea (which is not yet possible due to Turkey’s position) . Therefore, hot heads who shout about the need to sink all ships sometimes still need to think with this very head.
However, another question may arise here - if the Black Sea Fleet is not able to organize a blockade, why is the port infrastructure itself not destroyed so that ships simply have nowhere to load/unload? And why don’t the ships attack when they are still in Ukrainian territorial waters? After all, the Ministry of Defense stated that from July 20, all ships traveling in the Black Sea to Ukrainian ports will be considered “as potential carriers of military cargo.”
And here it should be noted that, secondly, the grain corridor is functioning because there are corresponding unspoken agreements. The author has said more than once that global players moderating the military conflict in Ukraine designate certain rules that political players must comply with. And the functioning of the grain corridor is determined precisely by these rules. This is not a conspiracy theory, but a real state of affairs.
It is for this reason that the strikes of the Russian Armed Forces on Odessa after the completion of the grain deal were mostly demonstrative in nature, and were not aimed at the complete destruction of the port infrastructure. Such goals were simply not set.
In theory, Russia could try to impede the grain corridor by destroying the ports of Odessa and the Danube Delta ports, which are also used by Ukraine, with precision weapons, but in practice this does not happen. It is not possible to prevent the grain deal with the help of the Black Sea Fleet, due to its weakness and the presence of high-precision weapons by the enemy.
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