Middle Eastern visits and new concepts of Russia and the Arabian monarchies
The last few days have been quite eventful, the central one being the official nomination of the Russian leader as a candidate for the presidency. For obvious reasons, there was no surprise here; the only question was choosing a specific date.
However, before this date we could observe several very interesting episodes of international politics. In particular, V. Putin’s rather fleeting, but media-bright visits to Abu Dhabi, then to Riyadh, and then, almost every day, a long five-hour meeting with Iranian President E. Raisi.
The picture for the media during visits to the Middle East, I must admit, turned out to be exceptional.
Firstly, V. Putin was accompanied to his destination by an escort of Su-35S fighters. When the fighter aviation with suspended weapons accompanies the first board over its territory or neutral zone, then this is the norm, but escort until landing in another sovereign jurisdiction without relations of a military-political alliance is an amazing thing.
Secondly, in both cases the reception was provided no less than the royal regulations, and, as they say, “with a plus and from the heart.” Flags, horsemen, volleys of cannons, the sky in the colors of the Russian flag. It all looked very impressive.
However, the meetings themselves, although they took place in a very friendly atmosphere, were very short. This contrast was strong, and the composition of the Russian delegation was also interesting: in addition to the press secretary and functionaries of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, these were: the head of Chechnya R. Kadyrov, the head of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation E. Nabiullina, the Ministry of Industry and Trade D. Manturov, Deputy Prime Minister A. Belousov (economics, national projects, transport, export), presidential assistant M. Oreshkin (economics), Deputy Prime Minister A. Novak (energy), K. Dmitriev (Direct Investment Fund)
We know practically nothing about the results of the meetings, except for general theses on strengthening cooperation and issues of Israel and Palestine. However, E. Nabiullina and the Palestinian question still have some difficulty in reconciling, so let’s note the statement in Abu Dhabi about reaching the “highest point” and take a deeper look.
Despite the paucity of information, there are very good reasons to think that we are seeing a reflection of very serious processes that will have to be examined analytically. And what can help us with this is what is called the “context of events.”
A. Lukashenko’s visit to Beijing, also out of context, looks like just another negotiation, but in the context it becomes clear that we are talking about geopolitical vectors. V. Putin’s speech at the “One Belt and One Road” forum also looks “general”, but in detail and in the same context - nothing less than a geopolitical program.
What could the shortness of the visit mean? With the highest degree of probability, it is the completion of some large preliminary work on one or more specific issues. At the same time, the issues are included in the framework of the big agenda, but in such a way that the big agenda is still defined in general terms. But specific questions “are” quite expensive, since such meetings were required, and from this specificity something more should clearly be born.
In this case, it can be analytically assumed that through very complex coordination it was possible to resolve the issue of settlements in the Russia-India-UAE triangle. Moreover, the result of this process is the transfer of funds into investment flows with the expansion of participation of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, including at the expense of their own funds. The fact that the visits are carried out with such a composition and such regulations means that clearing mechanisms have been found, and preparations have generally been completed.
The visuals that accompanied the meetings become clear if we recall a small but interesting episode on the eve of the visits. Addressing the new ambassadors during the presentation of his credentials, he decently reprimanded the European ambassadors about Russophobia, but it was the new British Ambassador N. Casey who said that he expected that the situation in relations would change for the better.
For some reason, our observers focused on the fact that the Russian leader was holding a “cordon sanitaire,” which hurt British pride. But the fact is that the cordon was common to everyone, and there were representatives of countries that clearly did not suffer from Russophobia. Also in April, everything took place according to a similar pattern, with cordons. But the British themselves in the media are still trying to understand what the Russian president meant after all the attacks and events of recent years.
It is clear that no matter how technically complex and even financially voluminous the issue of raw materials may be, it is still a private issue in itself, and meetings of this kind show that it may well develop from a particular issue into a serious economic and foreign policy factor.
That is, if this analytical interpretation is correct, then we actually have a certain basis where two of the three main oil supplying countries (Russia and Saudi Arabia) are potentially ready for such a level of coordination in order to balance the United States and its suppliers, the UAE acts as a settlement for Russia. an investment center and India a trade hub. Soon we will obviously hear about some digital or quasi-digital tools that these processes provide.
In Beijing, the Russian leader expressed the position that instead of East and West, Moscow intends to move to the South. If everything that happens is not elements of this movement, then what is it?
Let us note that the same logic followed the visit of the Crown Prince of Oman to Moscow, who generally spoke out sharply in an anti-Western vein. And it is in this vein that it is quite logical that among all the new European ambassadors, the Russian leader “reprimanded” the representative of Great Britain least of all. It’s just that this puzzle has not yet been put together in the minds of British observers.
The next visit was much longer in time - the conversation with the President of Iran lasted five hours. And this can be understood if we take into account that, despite all the close cooperation and political interaction, we still have not finalized: an agreement on a free trade zone between Iran and the EAEU and an agreement on cooperation with the EAEU.
The fact is that we still have a temporary agreement on a free trade zone from 2018, which was considered as a quick intermediate option before moving to a full-fledged form.
But in Russia (in certain circles) there is such strong opposition to Russian-Iranian cooperation that something constantly prevented the finalization. All the time: “soon”, “almost”, “a little more”. There was no official talk about the agreements following the meeting, but it was not for nothing that a specific date for signing appeared the next day - December 25.12.2023, XNUMX at a meeting of the Supreme Economic Council of the EAEU.
When in one of the previous articles the author compared trade turnover in different macroeconomic clusters, he set a forecast for turnover with Iran for 2023 of ±4 billion dollars, which is actually a very, very modest figure in the current conditions. However, judging by the analytics in Iran itself, even this will not be achieved; it would be better to cross the $3 billion mark.
But for agricultural products alone we have a potential of $5 billion and above. Iran works very closely with neighboring regions, and Russia and Iran can not only compete for Iraq, but also win this market. And such dynamics, and even for 2022-2023. looks frankly strange against the backdrop of the now “turn to the South”. Working with the south, if we mean India and the Middle East, without Iran is simply technically impossible.
Accordingly, it is understandable that the visit of the Iranian President took the time, since these fences, barriers and brake pads must finally be removed, mutual trade expanded, but the Iranian President also needed to understand the model of the North-South axis on which Russia, Apparently, he hopes to hang the bowls of East and West.
And this is not such a simple question, given the fact that for a long time a kind of “Russia-Iran-China” axis was formed. China comes with the concept of a “Community of a Common Destiny for Humanity”; we have declared our own “Greater Eurasia” and that same “north-south” axis. But these are major changes in future politics.
It is not for nothing that A. Lukashenko, immediately after his visit to Beijing, where he confirmed his commitment to the Chinese concept, went to Abu Dhabi, and this visit took much longer than the Russian delegation. And this is also understandable - everything that happens needs to be realized and assessed.
“Much of what is happening is unexpected for us,”
— Xi Jinping said at a meeting with his Belarusian counterpart.
In general, if you put all this in the form of flowcharts on paper, then the idea of a “north-south axis” itself looks interesting and sensible. After the negotiations between the United States and China, many observers became fixated on the word “dictator,” saying that since Biden’s Xi is a dictator, then the negotiations did not lead to anything. But this is a huge simplification - in fact, the parties in San Francisco quite exchanged opinions on the “five principles” and “five pillars” of what in the future could develop into a game of “peace for two”.
Well, it’s quite logical that India doesn’t want to play this game, the Arabians want to somehow go their own way, and Moscow is somehow not a priori close to the “two-way” ideas. It is also always wise to choose the third between two paths, since it is the third that wins in a fight between two, if the United States and China do not go further than discussing the principles “for two” and end up facing a barrier.
In the form of color block diagrams, all this looks both logical and understandable. But all good and not so intangible essences, as is usually the case, are hidden in nuances and details. In this case, in those vectors whose value formation is available in very specific countries.
The countries of Central Asia have only 1/5 of their foreign trade with Russia, the rest is half with Europe and China. Of Iran's $100 billion foreign trade, Russia's share is about 3% and its trade vector is China. Pakistan, if we take it within the framework of the “axis” - the vector China and Europe. India - domestic market and Europe.
Even Belarus, although it is well integrated into joint trade with us, takes investment and technological resources from China, and Minsk does not hide its eastern (Chinese) vector. The economic model of India, as discussed in one of the previous articles, is such that even if it lends itself to integration, it is with enormous difficulty.
The unity of the economic field is ensured by centripetal connections, not centrifugal ones. And politics is not always a derivative of economics. Practice shows that such a sequence is not an objective pattern today.
There are plenty of examples here, and you don’t have to go far: you can look at the speed with which we ourselves are moving into the Chinese cost zone. What is our political line with Iran and what are our trade turnover? Or take Vietnam and Japan, what policies and where they form the cost. Japan is building ships, is already purchasing Tomahawks against the Chinese threat, and trade is 50% between China and Southeast Asia.
Of course, it is interesting to observe how the United States has been building the idea of an “Indo-Arabian third pole” for years, and how, as a result of the crisis in Palestine (and it is very difficult to resolve under the current political model of Washington), the Arabians and Russians are taking this pole to themselves. Even at the conceptual level. However, it should be noted that although the Americans wanted to rely on Arabian sovereign funds when creating it, the basis here was still high technology and access to American and European markets.
It’s hard to say where to get these technologies if neither India nor Russia, frankly speaking, even have a sufficient industrial base of the past structure to replace the import of at least manufactured goods. The Arabians themselves set a goal over the next decade to make high technology one of the pillars of the economy in addition to black gold.
A plus here, undoubtedly, is the bottomless investment potential of the Arabian funds, which is close to some cosmic mark of $2,3 trillion. That is, the excess of “paper” is huge, and any sensible manager will want to quickly and more reliably convert this into real assets.
But in the current system, someone must act as such a “converter” and open paths for the flow of technologies. Is it really true that we are talking about part of the elite of the British City? In the end, the principle cannot be ruled out: if the United States cannot make this very third pole-balancer, we will dock Russia there and make it ourselves.
This can also be supported by the fact that the total oil potential of this pool of players confidently balances the resources available to the United States. True, with the condition that they de facto control Venezuela’s reserves, but what if they don’t or have poor control? In the future, this may also help in implementing the ideas about “fair capitalization of energy” that are being talked about in Moscow and Riyadh. For the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, this is generally one of the basic software settings.
Let us repeat once again that from the point of view of general ideas, all this looks interesting and will puzzle those who consider a “game for two” as a basic scenario. But this will also puzzle all of Central Asia, Iran, Pakistan, etc.
Here we could rely on the already odious “import substitution” or those programs and declarations that we have made for years regarding integration in the post-Soviet space. But it is what it is.
In general, the end of the year is far from boring. But for now, these ideas are somewhat reminiscent of an ark with resources, which is trying to move between two economic whirlpools, while constantly giving some of the resources to one or the other. The sides of the ark are cracking from centrifugal forces both to the right and to the left, but the ark cannot help but give up resources to the whirlpools; movement and recoil ensure its relative integrity.
We will see how realistic this design is quite soon. Now all processes are moving quickly; in fact, in our politics and economics it takes three years, or maybe more. As a last resort, it is already quite good that mechanisms for converting oil into investments are being developed and Arabian funds are being attracted.
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