Results of the APEC summit for the USA and China. Trying to play the game "peace for two"
The APEC summit in San Francisco, California has ended, and now it is quite interesting to observe the reaction on a variety of information platforms, including Russian ones. The summit is being discussed everywhere, and the reason is clear - the two main APEC participants: the USA and China, are meeting at a time of maximum cooling in relations.
This material proposes to focus not on the fact that Biden called Xi Jinping a “dictator”, or some purely psychological nuances of this meeting: who looked and how, where they turned, where E. Blinken’s gaze was, how “constrained” looked like the Chinese leader, etc., but on the basis on which, in fact, APEC was founded - issues of mutual trade.
It is clear that, given the health of J. Biden, E. Blinken, who was sitting next to him, watched his every phrase. E. Blinken had been preparing this meeting for almost a year, but still missed the “dictator” at the press conference, although the real context of the phrase was much less harsh.
However, it was not for nothing that the cameras showed in the foreground more than once or twice not military administrators, but the Ministers of Finance D. Yellen and L. Foan, the Minister of Commerce of the People's Republic of China V. Wentao and the US Secretary of Commerce D. Raimondo.
It is also interesting to see the presence of such figures as Q. Qi, the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee and Xi Jinping’s inner circle, and J. Carrey, J. Biden’s special envoy on climate issues. Both represent what we like to call the “deep state.”
As a small illustration, on the eve of the summit, J. Carrey met with the Iranians, and, obviously, not on the climate agenda, given that at the same time, E. Blinken was already exchanging messages with Tehran through the “courier mail” of Iraqi Prime Minister M. Al-Sudani.
Many observers logically put Taiwan issues first in the negotiations, but both the composition of the participants and the details of the negotiations show that Taiwan, despite the importance of the problem for the United States and China, is part of a more general economic model for future relations, the foundations of which the parties tried to lay during the negotiations.
Each side identified five such foundations or, as the Chinese leader put it, “pillars.”
Chinese stems are arranged in the following order.
The first is the formation of "correct perception of each other“or the correct perception of the characteristics of each of the parties, the characteristics of the management system, goal setting, values, etc. "red lines".
The second is the effective management of disagreements on the principles of deliberation and prudence.
The third is the promotion of mutually beneficial cooperation, since “The common interests of the two countries in the current conditions have not decreased, but increased».
The fourth is the shared responsibility of the leading countries (China and the United States), while such dialogue should include other countries.
Fifth is the promotion of cultural and humanitarian ties.
J. Biden, from the US side, also identified five theses that directly relate us to the last meeting on the island. Bali in Indonesia.
“I reiterate the 5 promises I made at the Bali meeting: the United States does not seek a new Cold War, does not try to change the Chinese system, does not seek to intensify an alliance against China, does not support the independence of Taiwan, and does not intend to enter into conflicts with China.”
“The US and China are interconnected economically. Washington is happy about China’s development and prosperity, does not seek to put pressure on or restrain China’s development, and does not seek to break with it; the United States is committed to the one-China policy.”
Referral to confirmation of agreements on the island. Bali was one of the cornerstones of the entire dialogue. The theses show that this was one of the main conditions of the Chinese side. It turns out that the United States maintains continuity on basic issues, and everything else is “excesses” that can be resolved on dialogue platforms.
It is clear that this is a kind of “Aesopian language” of diplomacy, but it is important that the five foundations and five promises lay the foundation on which the negotiation process can be built.
What is important is how the parties described the zones of international conflicts during the general meeting of delegations. For example, the official communiqué from the Chinese side sounds like this:
“After the talks, Biden hosted a reception for Xi Jinping, during which the leaders exchanged views on international and regional issues of common interest, including the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.”
Let us note that Ukraine, Russia, and Iran, by the way, are not in the text, and much more space is devoted to climate issues. And this is not because the topic of Europe is not of interest to the participants. It’s just that on the root issue of Israel and Palestine, China and the United States have a common point of contact - the two-state principle. On other issues there is no such fundamental consensus, and accordingly, the discussion is taken out of public brackets. This is a very important nuance.
The fact that the United States generally agrees to “divide in two” becomes clear from the introductory addresses. J. Biden:
“San Francisco is the city where the Chinese first arrived in the United States, the place where the United States and China participated in the signing of the UN Charter.”
Chinese leader:
“It is impossible for China and the United States to do without communication; trying to change each other is unrealistic.”
And as a summary:
“The globe is big enough to accommodate both China and the United States. The success of one of the two states gives opportunities to the other.”
But the extent to which this summary was heard in the United States could just be understood from the context of the sensational phrase where the word “dictator” sounded. The word is discussed, but the context is not very good.
“Well, that’s what he is. He is a dictator in the sense that he runs a country with a communist form of government, which is completely different from us."
It is clear that the Chinese Foreign Ministry reacted, and E. Blinken shook his head, but in essence, J. Biden simply confirmed what was said at the meeting, that China is what it is - “communist.” It’s unlikely that all this sounded outwardly successful, but in fact it only confirmed S. Jinping’s thesis that “trying to change each other is unrealistic”, that is, agreement with one of the “five pillars”.
It looked really awkward, but this is J. Biden and this is the American media. In the end, if the “questioner” with such questions had not been allowed into the hall, we would not have known the White House’s opinion on the recognition of Chinese identity, which is already a very significant value achievement for the US administration.
The specifics on issues of mutual trade, which, in fact, occupied the second part of the negotiations after the “value base”, were first voiced by the Chinese side in the person of the official representative of the State Committee for Development and Reform of the People's Republic of China L. Chao.
China is targeting
“It is reasonable to reduce the negative list for foreign investment and remove all restrictions on foreign investors coming into the manufacturing industry.”
Revise or Cancel
“Regulations and policy documents that do not comply with the Law of the People's Republic of China on Foreign Investment and regulations for optimizing the business environment.”
Beijing is also going to
“ensure fair competition for foreign investors in areas such as government procurement, full or partial exemption from taxes and fees, licensing qualification requirements and project declaration.”
The next step is to
“in a unified manner and in a coordinated manner, resolve issues relating, in particular, to land use and energy consumption.”
According to L. Chao,
“a series of events on international industrial and investment cooperation will continue.”
Investors will be provided with
“favorable business environment and amenities for production and business activities.”
It is clear that if this program was announced after a meeting between the leaders of the United States and China, then we are talking about the fact that China intends, first of all, to allow American investors not just back into the market, but into such a sensitive part of the market as government procurement. But the point is not so much in sensitivity, but in the volume of such a market segment.
In essence, China and the United States are agreeing that the United States will remove technological barriers in exchange for the opportunity to receive a share for their investment companies from China's predominant position in regional trade, as well as from volume orders in the state. sector.
The logic of the current US managerial elite, which is mainly represented by the banking sector and investment financiers, is clearly felt here. And it is quite logical that China came out first with these theses.
This is a kind of “slap in the face” to Trumpist ideas about the “industrial revival of conservative America.” But in its value cluster, the United States is no longer an industrial base, but an investment center that sells services, finance and technology.
However, China today is not only and not so much a “factory”, but also an investment center and an assembly shop, which has taken on the role of a trading intermediary, albeit on a global scale. After all, what is today labeled “made in China” is largely assembled from components that were produced in neighboring regions, packaged and sold through Chinese sites.
In these theses we see the core of the negotiations and the prototype of the model for dividing the world economy into two sectors. Such a model, if taken to its logical conclusion, in theory can help avoid a crisis in relations between the two countries: China receives opportunities for extensive growth, and the United States receives growth in stock markets and the banking sector.
The scheme is potentially too promising for the parties to treat it as a political fiction or a cover to prepare for a phase of aggravation of relations.
“The Asia-Pacific region will have the greatest impact on global economic growth over the next 30 years,”
- said J. Biden.
So China is being asked to share profits as the main economic moderator of the region - in exchange for the fact that the United States will not interfere with further Chinese trade expansion.
All this does not mean that, in military-political terms, the United States will leave Southeast Asia somewhere, stop building military facilities in the Philippines, or stop sailing around Taiwan. Quite the contrary, they will partly increase military activity by constantly monitoring the state of the Chinese Navy.
Every time someone on Wall Street feels that the investment base in China is not yet “open enough to investors,” local flare-ups will occur. If China is not vigilant enough, then the United States, without changing the general agreements, will, if possible, grab some regional military-political “piece.”
But all this is no longer the alarmist prototype of the “Great War”, which the military and politicians in both the USA and China had previously begun to openly talk about.
The United States, of course, would not be itself if it had not considered the most sensitive issue for China—Taiwan—with its own specific casuistry. On the one hand, the United States said it would continue supplies weapons to Taiwan, and J. Biden notified the Chinese leader about this.
On the other hand, the United States has existing arms contracts with Taiwan. The last one is from 2022 to 2028. The contract is “penny” by the standards of the arms market ($45 million).
The PR effect of the statement looks serious, but in practical terms it is the supply of spare parts for certain types of equipment. But such a statement can be sold to critics from the Trumpists and some Republicans.
Considering that the parties are renewing and even strengthening channels of exchange between the military, all this can again be considered as a kind of basis on which a future model of relations can be built even before the elections in Taiwan. China and the United States will still need to decide on the “Taiwan formula,” but so far the base clearly does not look confrontational.
In general, we can once again be convinced that it was not in vain that the IMF updated its reports and studies on “geoeconomic fragmentation” and the division of the world economy into blocks immediately before the APEC summit. China and the United States still really intend to form a model of such relations, without breaking the global financial system or exacerbating confrontation.
This does not mean that it was agreed upon at the summit, it means that they are trying to put those very “supports” under it. In this regard, today guessing who “won” or “lost” at the summit is largely pointless, since both sides came out of it with results, although the PR effect in the United States is traditionally slightly higher. The main test of these results will be the elections in Taiwan in mid-January 2024.
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