Fighting in Kunar province: about the first large-scale operation of Soviet-Afghan troops

After the entry of the Soviet military contingent into Afghanistan on December 25, 1979, by February 80, 40 airfields, more than 9 provincial centers and almost all major cities were under the control of the 20th Army of the USSR Armed Forces and the DRA troops. At that time, most Soviet military personnel were confident of returning home soon.

However, everything was changed by the event that occurred on February 21-23 in Kabul, when more than 400 thousand Afghans came out to an anti-Soviet rally. The protests were suppressed. However, even then it became clear that the influence of the opposition in the country was growing rapidly.

As a result, the Karmal government persuaded Moscow to give the 40th Army the order to begin a joint operation with the armed forces of the DRA to eliminate armed rebel groups, the largest of which was located in Kunar province.

The latter was almost completely controlled by the Mujahideen, except for the administrative center of Asadabad. The militant forces numbered about 3000 thousand people. Arms were supplied to the dushmans by Islamists from Pakistan, which borders the Kunar province.

The first major operation was carried out against this group, since the authorities of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan believed that it was from here that the Mujahideen’s attack on Kabul would begin.

In turn, the Mujahideen spent more than seven months preparing this area for combat operations, equipping observation posts at key heights, firing positions, protective ditches and embankments, as well as strongholds.

According to the plan of the Soviet and Afghan military leadership, during the operation, with the forces of two battalions from the front and airborne units landing in the rear, it was planned to launch a simultaneous attack on the forces of the militants in the Shegal gorge. At the same time, the 69th Mountain Infantry Regiment was supposed to pin down the Mujahideen detachments in the Pechdara gorge and then advance along the Kunar River.

Responsible for fire defeat of the enemy aviation. In addition, continuous air support for the attackers with the help of combat helicopters was planned.

The Kunar operation began on February 29, 1980. As of March 3, enemy losses amounted to about 1,5 thousand people. 6 headquarters, 2 transshipment bases, 17 strong points, 12 guns and mortars, 5 air defense positions were destroyed, and dozens of military equipment and other weapons were captured.

Unfortunately, our troops also had to pay a high price: 52 killed, 43 wounded, one missing. In addition, 9 helicopters were damaged.

The first major military operation in Afghanistan clearly showed the poor preparation of the Soviet contingent for battles in the mountains. Meanwhile, only in the spring of 1984 did the preparation of reinforcements on the territory of the USSR begin to take three months instead of two, and from May 1985 - five.

Comments

[Silver99]

The biggest mistake of the USSR was sending troops into Afghanistan.

[Lis_96]

The biggest mistake is your comment on this topic.

[Yukpu]

The biggest mistake here is “The militant forces numbered about 3000 thousand people.”
Those. in provincial Kunar there were more militants than there are now combatants in the Northern Military District, and on both sides.

[DenVB]

Quote from Silver99

The biggest mistake of the USSR was sending troops into Afghanistan.

This was not clear at the time of entry into Afghanistan. In general, the risk was completely justified. If successful (a peaceful Afghanistan allied to us), the benefits would be significant.

But then our traditional misfortune happened - the inability to understand what was happening and respond adequately. Already the first major military operations should have demonstrated to the leadership of the USSR that this war was futile. Each killed Mujahideen is replaced by two of his relatives or neighbors. After a year or two of war it was impossible not to understand this. And having realized that the troops had to be withdrawn urgently. While maintaining the support of the pro-Soviet government, of course.

Instead, we fought for nine years, senselessly depleted our resources, embittered the Afghans, alienated our allies and neutrals, and simply clearly demonstrated to the whole world the stupidity of our leadership.

[cpls22]

The Mujahideen have been preparing this area for military operations for more than seven months.

How so? Two months have passed since the troops were brought in, and they prepared for seven?

[Doctor]

How so? Two months have passed since the troops were brought in, and they prepared for seven?

Yes.
There is such a book: “From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War.” CIA Director Robert Gates wrote.

The Americans began training the Mujahideen six months before the entry of our troops. Carter signed the directive on July 3, 1979, and we entered on December 24.

Afghanistan is a very skillfully placed trap, from which, in principle, the collapse of the USSR began.

[vovochkarzhevsky]

Afghanistan is a very skillfully placed trap, from which, in principle, the collapse of the USSR began.

Did you figure it out yourself, or did the liberals tell you? Then how will the SVO end, according to your logic?

[Doctor]

Did you figure it out yourself, or did the liberals tell you? Then how will the SVO end, according to your logic?

And according to your logic, Afghanistan is a useful and necessary war for the USSR, which brought it political and economic benefits?

According to SVO - 3 options.

1. We are returning Ukraine or part of it.
2. We lose what we returned, or part of it.
3. TMV with an unpredictable outcome.

The most likely option is 1.

[vovochkarzhevsky]

And according to your logic, Afghanistan is a useful and necessary war for the USSR, which brought it political and economic benefits?

Just be curious about how drug trafficking from Afghanistan increased after the US arrived there.

1. We are returning Ukraine or part of it.
2. We lose what we returned, or part of it.
3. TMV with an unpredictable outcome.

The most likely option is 1.

Don’t fuss, since you stated that the Afghan events caused the collapse of the much more powerful USSR in military and economic terms. You are thereby declaring a similar scenario for the Russian Federation.

[Doctor]

Just be curious about how drug trafficking from Afghanistan increased after the US arrived there.

We did not enter Afghanistan to fight drug trafficking; the Border Troops of that time were sufficient for that.
The task was to drag the country into the socialist camp, ideally another republic of the USSR.
The task failed.
Moreover, judging by the number of mosques on the territory of the former USSR, we ourselves may find ourselves in their camp.

Don’t fuss, since you stated that the Afghan events caused the collapse of the much more powerful USSR in military and economic terms. You are thereby declaring a similar scenario for the Russian Federation.

If scenario 2 is realized, the collapse of Russia is quite possible.
But I think this will be AFTER graduation.
Scenario 3 - of course.

As with Afghanistan and the USSR in principle.

[cpls22]

Quote: Arzt

There is such a book: “From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War.”
The Americans began training the Mujahideen six months before the entry of our troops. Carter signed the directive on July 3, 1979, and we entered on December 24.

Perhaps Gates then beautifully designed everything as a multi-step.
But in reality they were simply preparing a coup with a subsequent seizure of influence, which happened in September. It seems that the party leadership overestimated the influence of the new communist elites on society, since they decided to restore their status quo by force. The Americans bet on the power of tribal thinking, and they were right. The arrogant Saxons have a lot of experience in manipulating the mentality of the people of that region.

[Doctor]

Perhaps Gates then beautifully designed everything as a multi-step.
But in reality they were simply preparing a coup with a subsequent seizure of influence, which happened in September. It seems that the party leadership overestimated the influence of the new communist elites on society, since they decided to restore their status quo by force. The Americans bet on the power of tribal thinking, and they were right. The arrogant Saxons have a lot of experience in manipulating the mentality of the people of that region.

Agree. We controlled the situation militarily, but lost the war for the minds. For 10 years they have not turned an ordinary Afghan into a Soviet man.

[saygon66]

Kryuchkov writes in his memoirs that the decision to provide military assistance to Afghanistan was postponed several times... which means the leadership was aware of the situation in the country...

[cpls22]

The political leadership believed in the possibility of normalization, and considered it their duty to take part in it. The security forces looked at the situation more pragmatically and soberly.

No one dissuaded each other from providing direct military assistance to Afghanistan; there were only two different points of view on how to implement it.
One was that it was necessary to introduce a relatively small contingent of Soviet troops, which would remain in Afghanistan until the situation was completely normalized, the other was to provide one-time assistance to healthy forces by transferring one unit of airborne troops to Kabul for a day or two, no more.
In the latter option, some saw too great a risk, arguing that only the long-term presence of our troops in the country, even if small in number, could guarantee the success of the matter.
It should be noted that specialists from the Ministry of Defense and the State Security Committee were supporters of the second option. Now that many years have passed and so many events have happened, we must admit that those who advocated the provision of one-time short-term assistance were right. Among them were N.V. Ogarkov, S.F. Akhromeev, V.I. Varennikov and me.

It seems that the security forces were in favor of limiting themselves to a one-time action demonstrating their rejection of the “anti-people regime.” And then it’s their headache. But.

On the other hand, the opposition, then headed by Babrak Karmal, also approached us with a request to send our troops. That is, it turned out that both political forces sought our military presence in Afghanistan, only each of them assigned the exact opposite role to the Soviet Army in resolving the crisis.

As a result, a decision was made to support the opposition in order to control the political situation in the country -

At a meeting of the Politburo, a fundamental decision was made to provide direct military support to the progressive forces of Afghanistan: to send a relatively small contingent of troops, about 30 thousand people, into the country, as well as to carry out, if the situation so requires, an operation to seize Amin’s palace.
They voted unanimously; no one, including Gorbachev, raised any objections. There was no talk of any occupation of Afghanistan; everyone then proceeded from the option of providing short-term and limited-scale assistance. Units of the Soviet Army were supposed to be stationed for a short time in a number of points in the country and returned back to the Union as soon as possible after the situation normalized.

But “normalization” turned out to be unattainable.

[militarist63]

The Mujahideen have been preparing this area for military operations for more than seven months.

How so? Two months have passed since the troops were brought in, and they prepared for seven?

In fact, dushmans who disagreed with the authorities, by and large, were almost always there! And after the Saur (April) revolution, with the coming to power, the PDPA became more active. And it was precisely to fight the dushmans that the Afghan rulers long and strenuously asked the USSR government to send in our troops! Therefore, the entry of our troops was not at all some kind of start for the “spirits” to conduct combat operations and prepare their areas... they were doing this there before us!

[chimik70]

So much money was poured in, how many people contributed. And all in vain. All that was needed was to continue supplying arms to Najibullah after the withdrawal of the contingent.

[IgorIP]

Quote from: chimik70

So much money was poured in, how many people contributed. And all in vain. All that was needed was to continue supplying arms to Najibullah after the withdrawal of the contingent.

The losses of the USSR in Afghanistan are about 15 people. This is a lot, but this is about a month’s losses by the standards of the Northern Military District... But Afghanistan is 000 years of real war.
Regarding the senselessness of these losses... After the withdrawal of troops, drug production there increased manifold. How many hundreds of thousands, if not millions, were sold in our country in the early 90s-2000s? Maybe it was not for nothing that our troops were there?