Operation Danube and NATO. West German suffering and Danish hesitation

De Gaulle and Adenauer – smiles of mutual distrust?

NATO and events in Czechoslovakia: through the eyes of CIA analysts

Let's continue what we started in the article Operation Danube and NATO. Dissenting opinion of France talk. Not only France took a restrained position regarding the events taking place in Czechoslovakia.

The problem of relationships within the alliance should not be viewed only through the prism of the Danube. It is generally deeper:

“In the report presented to the attention of the presidential administration in January 1969,” writes American historian K. Yu. Boguslavskaya, the impact of the Czechoslovak crisis on the state of relations between NATO allies was assessed as “uncertain,” which can be designated with greater accuracy as moderate.

The document noted that the crisis had "generated a new impetus for joint action ... indicated by extended consultations and a delay in the implementation of the decision to reduce the number of troops," but it did not lead to a abandonment of the idea that "the threat of Soviet attack remained low."

CIA analysts foresaw an increase in rivalry between NATO allies, which would further worsen due to changes in the perception of the threat from the USSR, as well as an increase in the general “tendency towards pluralism” within the Alliance and even the real possibility of termination of the alliance by individual states (Denmark, Canada) . From today’s perspective, it is noteworthy that none of the trends mentioned was considered by the authors of the memorandum as capable of calling into question the existence of NATO.”

As we can see, the reaction of analysts to the actions of the USSR looks restrained. They seem to be looking for a reason for non-interference in Moscow’s implementation of Brezhnev's doctrines, more concerned about leveling intra-bloc contradictions.

Moreover, the dictatorship of the United States, mired in Vietnamese aggression, was not as obvious west of the Oder as it was in the new millennium (though now the alliance and politicians do not have the caliber of de Gaulle or Brandt, and then there were no watchdogs, like the current Polish one, or the Baltic countries, the leadership, faithfully looking at Washington with: “What do you want?”).

Therefore, I am inclined to believe that the Americans would rather have taken cautious actions unilaterally and not of a momentary nature, if the Kremlin had not taken prompt and necessary steps to ensure its security in the long term aimed at preserving the integrity of the internal affairs department.

At the same time, Dubcek himself asked the Soviet leadership to take the mentioned measures, as evidenced by his dialogue with Brezhnev that took place on the eve of the Danube (for its content, see below). here).

As for the White House, it had enough of anti-war protests within the metropolis and the aforementioned failures in Vietnam. I think the US leadership would adhere to a step-by-step strategy to integrate Czechoslovakia either into NATO or, I emphasize again, acting in the format of a bilateral dialogue with Prague.

The result would be to attract American investment - following the Chinese model made possible after the meeting between Nixon and Mao in 1972 - into the Czechoslovak economy. In some ways, I see this strategy as similar to the current one being implemented by Beijing in relation to Taiwan - its gradual non-violent integration into the PRC.

Of course, the resignation of de Gaulle in April 1969 played into the hands of the Americans (a separate topic is the role of the United States in the actual overthrow of the obstinate president, but it is too big to talk about casually). And the general’s desire to revive the former greatness of France, similar to the times of Louis XIV, seemed exorbitant to a society that had said goodbye to imperial ambitions - hence, I note, Petain’s popularity in the country. However, the successors of the creator of the Fifth Republic, right up to Sarkozy, who returned it to the military structure of the alliance, adhered to a generally Gaullist course in foreign policy.

Now in more detail about the difficult situation within NATO using the example of two countries.

Denmark: in the alliance, but also a little on the sidelines

Let's start with the above-mentioned Denmark. And if Paris had a special opinion in the alliance since the mid-1960s, then Copenhagen expressed it initially, declaring its non-intention to place military bases and nuclear weapons on its territory in peacetime. weapon.

Moreover, the descendants of King Knut the Great made Brussels nervous (about which in the above report) with talk of a possible withdrawal from the alliance.

“The greatest success,” writes the Scandinavian historian A. S. Kahn, “was (at the next elections - I. Kh.) the radical party - partly thanks to its pacifist promises to hold a referendum in 1969 on NATO membership and to reduce military spending. »

Of course, such promises were of a populist nature, because the strategic importance of the Jutland Peninsula and, above all, the Sound Strait (the duty of the same name was once the source of wealth for the Danish monarchs and the stumbling block of their relations with Sweden) firmly tied the small kingdom to the alliance. But the descendants of the Vikings also could not ignore public opinion - neither then nor now.

Therefore, Denmark would hardly support the active movements of the bloc if they began to be carried out towards Czechoslovakia in the event of our hitch with the Danube. In the end, the worsening of relations between NATO and the Warsaw Department was identical to complications in the Baltic Sea, which was least suitable for a small, prosperous kingdom that had long since lost the warlike fervor of its ancestors. In a word, Copenhagen in its policy within the alliance was largely guided by Hatoskrayin psychology.

Adenauer: the goal is to get out from under Europe

Germany. By 1968, the main West German liberal and at the same time a sympathizer of the fascist evil spirits Adenauer (the state secretary of his office was the Nazi criminal Globke, who escaped the gallows, and the creation of the Bundeswehr was carried out by another executioner personally invited by the chancellor - Manstein) for five years he was in retirement, resting and writing memoirs.

Why did I remember him? Firstly, it was he who literally pushed his country into NATO and at every step talked about the “threat” from the East, fueling the revanchist sentiments of his fellow citizens who actively supported Hitler less than half a century ago, while engaged, albeit in a miniature format, in resuscitating the Wehrmacht (it’s not hard to imagine that Manstein spoke in moments of leisure to his colleagues who had escaped retribution - criminals just like him - who had not been killed by the Soviet Army and who had once again donned their uniforms).

At the same time - and here secondly - Adenauer did not want the fate destined for the Federal Republic of Germany by Ismay - under Europe, advocating in support of the European defensive community, the idea of ​​which was proposed by Churchill back in 1942. In the end, both due to the geographical factor and due to the economic and demographic potential, the Federal Republic in the future had a chance to regain its leading position in Western Europe, if only Washington was somewhat moved away from the too active guardianship of its NATO satellites.

Practical steps, and not only by the Germans, to implement this idea were taken in May 1952, when the Federal Republic of Germany, the once great Britain, the USA and France signed an agreement on the creation of the EOC, and a couple of years later the occupation regime was lifted from West Germany. It was then that the Chancellor gradually set a course for its militarization, and the doors of NATO obligingly opened for Bonn, but they were in no hurry to let the Germans go further than the hallway.

For obvious reasons, the course to revive the German military potential did not meet with support from France. In addition, the Germans were quickly pointed out their role in the alliance and hinted that Ismay’s view of Germany’s place was not at all history. That is, in the event of an armed confrontation with the USSR and its allies, the Bundeswehr is intended to serve as cannon fodder, but no one was going to give Bonn equal status with the others. Of course, this attitude was expressed not at the level of declarations, but of practical steps.

One of them: within the framework of the so-called State Treaty, German assets in Austria were confiscated without compensation to their previous owners. At the same time, President Eisenhower spoke in favor of the idea of ​​a neutral zone in Europe, which reduced the already low geopolitical weight of Germany on the continent.

Adenauer’s reaction to this, in his eyes almost an act of betrayal, was expressed in the summons of West German ambassadors from Washington, London and Paris and the task he set (hardly entirely feasible): to convey to his partners the idea that Germany is their ally, not a satellite.

Adenauer responded to the Americans, British and French with a note in which he stated that

“in its foreign policy,” historian A. N. Filitov says of the chancellor, “he will make decisions in a completely new way.”

After this, the chancellor, unexpectedly, given his anti-communist rhetoric, went to Moscow and established diplomatic relations with the USSR without the consent of his NATO partners (although, perhaps, behind-the-scenes consultations on this matter were held).

According to West German journalists, notes A. N. Filitov, in their conversations with Soviet colleagues, on the eve of his visit to the USSR, Adenauer considered

"the reunification of Germany as his only and last mission in life."

However, such an initiative was not feasible at that time (in fact, it was never implemented, because in 1990 the GDR was absorbed by the Federal Republic of Germany - among other things, its result was the humiliation of the officers of our strongest and most devoted ally: the NPA - what I mean wrote at the time).

Those negotiations cannot be considered as a dialogue of equal parties: Adenauer literally negotiated the release of fascist prisoners of war in exchange for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR.

However, the Chancellor’s well-known opposition to the Western victorious countries in World War II and France, which joined them; steps aimed at reviving the military machine (their logical and monstrous result: German planes in the Yugoslav skies in 1999), attempts, to a certain extent, to play on the contradictions between the USA and the USSR (and the former, as well as the British and French, feared the imprisonment of the Chancellor in Moscow and behind their broad backs something similar to Rapallo) - all this fit into the context of the return, albeit indirect, of Germany to big politics and defending its own interests in Europe.

And it is only within the framework of the above context that Germany’s reaction to the Danube should be considered.

The forgotten chancellor and ex-Nazi rolled into one

In 1966, the Nazi (he had been a member of the NSDAP since 1933) Kiesinger became the West German chancellor. In modern Germany it is generally little known; it is even called forgotten chancellor, who found himself in the shadow of Adenauer and Brandt.

The German historian Knopp gave him an exhaustive description:

“Kiesinger, a tall, slender man of elegant appearance with silver hair, in short, “the most handsome chancellor who ever ruled Germany,” bore the burden of power with the dignity of “Prince George I” and was “an endangered species” in a turbulent era of change. This was the time of the birth of the “generation of 1968”, the time of sit-ins, stand-ups and lie-down strikes, the time of breakthrough, when the ideals of parents were ridiculed and it became fashionable to worship idols like Che Guevara and Ho Chi Minh. The spirit of the times demanded that “tomorrow” should already come, and Kiesinger symbolized “yesterday.” A former member of the NSDAP and an employee of Ribbentrop's Foreign Office, Kiesinger was for most young people a typical Nazi."

It is difficult to disagree with the view of German youth, and its then representative, Beate Klarsfeld, at one public event slapped the chancellor and called him a Nazi (she was given a year in prison for this, and it is curious that it was not Kiesinger who canceled the term, but his successor, Brandt ).

In the international arena, Kiesinger emphasized the connecting role of Germany between the West and the East (which, of course, ran counter to Ismay’s aforementioned view of Germany’s European status), and, having become chancellor, hurried to Paris. The Americans hardly liked this (less than a year earlier they had to pack their bags and move to Brussels - to the new headquarters of the alliance), who preferred Kiesinger's predecessor Erkharad, whom de Gaulle called "property of America».

Regarding Franco-West German relations, Kiesinger once said (I quote from the memoirs of Brandt, who held the post of head of the Foreign Ministry during the chancellorship of the ex-NSDPA):

“German-French cooperation in as many areas as possible is also of great importance for improving relations with our Eastern European neighbors.”

In general, Bonn’s policy aimed at, let’s say, historical reconciliation with France while simultaneously allying with the United States forced it to balance between two states in the 1960s. Accordingly, if someone in the White House had decided to initiate the “Prague Spring” in 1968 and even send troops into Czechoslovakia, it is unlikely that he would have found sympathy from the Federal Republic of Germany, and the idea of ​​German unity in the future would have to be shelved completely for a long time.

In a word, the United States, in the event of its attempt to intervene in the August events that disturbed the Czechoslovak leadership (mostly it, and not society, and especially the working class) cannot count on the effective support of West Germany - rhetoric for the press does not count. had to. West Germany had not yet slipped into a Scholz region that was obsequious to the United States and contrary to the interests of the burghers, and did not seek to irritate Paris with its drift towards the White House.

In the next article we will talk about the reaction to the “Danube” of a number of countries of the socialist camp, but we will do this after traveling to Transcaucasia, because what is currently happening in Nagorno-Karabakh requires us to analyze it within the historical context.

Использованная литература:
Brandt V. Memoirs
Visit of Chancellor Adenauer to Moscow September 8 – 14, 1955
Cooperation between Denmark and NATO
Kamenskaya E.V. Germany in information coverage of the Czechoslovak conflict of 1968 (based on materials from Soviet newspapers)
Kan A.S. History of the Scandinavian countries
Knopp G. History of triumphs and mistakes of the first persons of Germany
Lyubin V.P. Heinz B. Adenauer and the USSR: unknown pages of history
Polonsky I. The first steps of the Bundeswehr, how the German army was created
Rybas S. Dubcek asked Brezhnev to send troops
Sorokin A.I. State Treaty of 1955 and the formation of economic relations between the USSR and Austria
Starodubov V.P. Superpowers of the 2001th century. M.: “OLMA-PRESS” Strategic confrontation. XNUMX.
Filitov A.N. Adenauer's Moscow visit 1955