Enemy Toolkit
The first and fairly detailed analysis of the methodological techniques of the enemy TsIPSO was published under the leadership of Daniil Beznosov, deputy information officer of the DPR. The work is called “Methods of information-psychological influence used by Ukrainian units of information-psychological operations against participants of the SVO, their relatives and other citizens.” The author, by profession, has been actively working with nationalist propaganda since 2014 and has managed to accumulate considerable experience. And the manual turned out to be solid - in a different situation, Daniil should have sat down to write his Ph.D. dissertation.
The most important thing to understand is that never before February 2022 has the level and scale of information attacks during combat operations been so high-profile. The king of XNUMXth-century military propaganda, Goebbels, nervously smokes on the sidelines. And this is only true because Joseph’s only mouthpieces were newspapers, radio, a platform, and the weekly video magazine Die Deutsche Wochenschau.
The Kyiv regime has a much wider range. First of all, the key advantage of enemy propaganda is direct dialogue with Russian soldiers and citizens. The special operation did not take on the character of an all-out confrontation, and the means of communication remained the same as they were before February 2022. Whether this is good or bad, time will judge, but in 1941–1945 a Soviet citizen did not have the opportunity to read Völkischer Beobachter in a high-quality translation. And now, please - starting from the most cannibalistic attacks of the Nazis and pumping them with verified Western propaganda.
Adding color are the inner “nuggets” who, under the guise of false patriotism, diligently earn themselves several years in prison. Unfortunately, such individuals have only now begun to be brought to justice for discrediting the army. But the point now is not about them, but about the methods of work of the enemy TsIPSO and its affiliated structures.
How are enemy specialists trying to put pressure on the information war front?
TsIPSO armchair soldiers will sooner or later end up at the front
As Daniil Beznosov rightly noted in his reference book, first of all, the enemy tries to visually shock the reader. Unfortunately, the enemy has enough technical capabilities for this. Videos and photos of corpses, opposition to the highest military-political leadership of Russia, a grandiose exaggeration of the scale and consequences of losses of personnel and equipment.
It is enough to recall the hacker attack on the Military Review website at the end of last year to understand how simple and straightforward the Ukrainians are. More corpses and threats. It is worth mentioning separately about fake news about losses in the Russian high command. From the latter - the fantasies of the Kyiv regime about the death of the commander of the Black Sea fleet Admiral Viktor Sokolov. After a high-profile missile attack on the fleet headquarters in Sevastopol.
By the way, the strike itself has exclusively a propaganda function - in principle, there could not have been even a low-level military leadership in the building from the very beginning of the special operation. But for Ukrainian viewers, the video of the missile strike and subsequent assurances of the death of the fleet commander were sufficient.
True, Viktor Sokolov later dispelled all the rumors by the very fact of his presence at the meeting. For the Ukrainian fake factory this did not turn out to be a total failure - they caught their breath and went again. It feels like propagandists can tell you any kind of utter nonsense - internal and external consumers will forgive everything.
Telephone terrorist attacks on social facilities in Russia - schools, universities, hospitals and other institutions - look completely natural. Anonymous threats of bombing have already become commonplace, but they carried at least some meaning in the initial period of the attacks. Now provocations are responded to appropriately, without causing unnecessary excitement. The main thing is that at the other end of the line they often cannot track the effectiveness of the “bomb threat” call. And this is just one of the adaptations to the new reality.
Intimidation and information sabotage
The key goal of enemy propaganda is to destabilize the internal situation in Russia. At present, only a bloody civil war can prevent our country from achieving victory in Ukraine. They understand this very well in Kyiv and spend considerable resources on trying to undermine society. Hence the numerous evidence of the presence of the “Ukrainian underground”, and the artificial promotion of certain volunteer corps operating on Russian territory, and the public dissemination of public information about prisoners of war.
Dealing with prisoners is generally a hallmark of the conflict. Under the leadership of TsIPSO, there are entire thematic channels aimed at demonstrating Russian soldiers in captivity. Hiding behind the supposedly good purpose of the exchange, the Ukrainians are trying to demoralize the Russian Army soldiers and relatives.
Nationalists are no strangers to conspiracy theories. A favorite technique was the demonstration of an allegedly impending coup d'etat in Russia. They say that it was the secret service officers who organized the murder of Dugina and Tatarsky and the attempt on Prilepin’s life. Well, the cherry on the cake is Budanov’s statement about the fate of Prigozhin, who, it turns out, may be alive. The Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Security Service of Ukraine extremely rarely claim responsibility for terrorist attacks in Russia. Naive tactics still had at least minimal effect last year.
Dehumanization of the enemy is another key feature of Ukrainian propaganda. This is not the know-how of the Kyiv regime. The Japanese executioners also tried to come to an agreement with the remnants of their own humanity, calling the victims of experiments “logs.” In Ukraine it’s about the same. It is only to dehumanize Russian soldiers that large-scale fake productions have to be constructed. Few people take their word for it—visible evidence is needed.
It’s best that you can even touch it or bring dear guests from the West. Those same “torture” rooms in Bucha, Irpen, Kherson, “corpses” scattered along the roads, and fake mass graves. Here “hate speech” comes into play - now for the enemy we are all “vatniks”, “Colorados”, “Colorado larvae”, “Colorado females”, “Russians”, “orcs”, “goblins”, “monkeys”, “ subhumans" and others. Moreover, it does not matter whether the person fought in Ukraine or has nothing to do with the special operation at all. For nationalists, Russians are now stigmatized for a long time precisely due to the efforts of Ukrainian propaganda.
Western help is evident in all information operations of the Kyiv regime. The rich portfolio of the White Helmets, accumulated in Syria, came in handy in Ukraine. For ordinary people with problematic critical thinking, theatrical performances can really have a shocking effect. With the exhaustion of the resource of fakes, nationalists will inevitably slide to the very bottom, tried in Syria - for example, the staged killing of children with a mythical chemical weapons. However, Zelensky’s state machine may resort to deliberate killing for greater media effect.
In an attempt to sow panic in the ranks of the Russian Army, enemy propaganda demonstrates staged appeals to the people and authorities. There is only one scenario - we are forgotten, we die, or the entire unit goes over to the enemy’s side. It’s easy and simple for fakes to be posted on videos where our fighters perform in balaclavas. They congratulated their relatives incognito on March 8, and Bandera’s followers re-uploaded the video with extremist text. You can't read fake lips. But even open faces do not guarantee 100% protection - deepfake technologies allow you to create any recognizable image on the screen with the wildest comments. While this technology is somewhat overrated in special operations, progress does not stand still.
Statements about the next “victory” are stamped in Ukraine every day
The most alarming thing is when internal players resonate with the enemy and broadcast very similar things. For example, in Kyiv they are rushing around with the idea that the Russian Army cannot do without detachments. They say that this is why the Ukrainian Armed Forces cannot break through the “Surovikin line” - there are evil machine gunners behind the defenders. This can still be mercifully forgiven to the enemy, but the attack by State Duma deputy, Chairman of the Committee on Nationalities Affairs Gennady Semigin cannot be forgiven.
Since September 29, an unusual text from a deputy has been posted on the website of the All-Russian public movement “Patriots of Russia”. In particular, he wrote:
“If every Russian soldier defended his ideals as uncompromisingly as the son of Ramzan Akhmatovich, then perhaps the Akhmat battalion would not have to kick the soldiers of the Russian Armed Forces onto the battlefield.”
As soon as this savagery became available to the general public, Semigin released a statement:
“The website of the All-Russian public movement “Patriots of Russia” was hacked. The attackers did not just bring down the resource, but posted a fake message on behalf of the movement’s press service with provocative assessments of the participation of a Russian soldier in a special military operation.”
The naive will believe it, and the naive will appreciate it, but we are faced with a typical attempt to shake up our society. All that remains is to find out who so masterfully learned to use the TsIPSO manuals.
Despite all the drama of the above, Russian society over the course of more than a year and a half of the special operation has developed a certain immunity to enemy propaganda.
Not long before the hour when TsIPSO soldiers will be sent to the front as unnecessary. To fight the very heroes whose morale they were trying to undermine. And propagandists, as you know, are not taken prisoner.