Durand Line: Kabul and Islamabad on the way to a solution or a new escalation
The Durand Line – a Pakistani perspective
Legacy of British Imperialism
In this material we will abstract from the raised in article topic - we will definitely continue it in the next issue - and move to Central Asia (I like this pre-revolutionary phrase more than modern remakes), as the current agenda requires of us.
We are talking about the Durand Line, drawn in 1893 between the British colonial administration and the Afghan Emirate. The line, which is almost 2 kilometers long and difficult to control, is another problem in the relations between the two Muslim states.
And so recently:
By order of the acting Minister of Defense (banned in the Russian Federation) of the Taliban, Maulavi Muhammad Yaqub Mujahid, 100 checkpoints were built along the Durand Line in the provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar and Nuristan. Previously this was impossible.
But let's take it in order and start with stories.
Is Russia to blame for everything?
Ironically, the subject of our conversation indirectly owes its appearance to the Russian Empire: in the second half of the XNUMXth century, its military march in Central Asia became quite confident, and Russian soldiers washed their cow boots in the Amu Darya. The latter greatly worried the gentlemen in London, who feared the Shah from St. Petersburg in “Bigger game"on a chessboard covered with the Turanian lowland, the Pamirs and the Iranian plateau.
Earlier - in the second half of the XNUMXth - first half of the XNUMXth century, when Russia was advancing in the Black Sea region, Transcaucasia and in the direction of the Balkans (the Greek project of Catherine II), indirectly threatening the interests of the British crown, it used it against the Russians as a buffer "Sick man of Europe» – the Ottoman Empire and partly Persia. The latter was assigned the role of preventing the possible return of the French to India, who lost their presence on the subcontinent during the Seven Years' War.
However, Russia’s advance into Turkestan brought it directly to the Indian possessions of England: the Bukhara Emirate, which bordered them, recognized vassal dependence on St. Petersburg in 1868.
Around the same time, Adjutant General K.P. Kaufman reached the snow-capped peaks of Afghanistan, overcoming which Russian troops could threaten the British not only from the north, but also from the northwest (the only question is: were they going to do this).
Afghanistan: a look through the English sight
However, London's interest in Afghanistan appeared already at the beginning of the 1808th century, when the first attempts were made to establish contacts. In XNUMX, the embassy of Baron M. Elphinstone arrived in the country. Goal: establishing a dialogue with Shah Shuja, the ruler of the Durrani Empire (Durrani or Abdali - this was the name of one of the largest Afghan tribes that belonged to the Indo-European language group).
The result was the Treaty of Peshawar, which provided for Afghanistan's participation on the side of England in the fight against France and Persia if they attempted to attack India. That is, the East India Company (before the sepoy uprising, it formally bore the “heavy burden” of the white man on the subcontinent), through the monetary subsidies provided to the Shah, actively pulled him into the orbit of its influence, seeing the Afghans as a kind of mercenaries.
However, such a view of Afghanistan can hardly be called correct from a geopolitical point of view. The fact is that the very beginning of Afghan statehood was laid in 1747, that is, a little more than half a century before Elphinstone’s mission. Kandahar became its center.
And it was during that period that the Mughal Empire and Persia weakened, which allowed the first Afghan ruler, a talented administrator and commander Ahmad Shah (his title sounded orientally refined: “Durr-i-Durran (Pearl of Pearls)" to expand the possessions of the young states.
True, after his death, Afghanistan collapsed under the weight of fragmentation, inevitable for an early feudal state, into a quagmire of civil strife, and Shah Shuja was largely a nominal ruler. But by this time, the Afghans had a taste for military victories outside the country and were not going to submit to anyone, even in the status of mercenaries.
And when in 1838 the British intervened in another intra-Afghan conflict, they were defeated, mainly due to the underestimation of the “natives” and the low military competence of the namesake of the envoy mentioned above, who headed the English garrison in Kabul.
Result: the death of the English detachment that left the city. Of the four and a half thousand soldiers and officers (the majority were Indians) of Major General W. Elphinstone, only one made it to his own. All the rest, including civilians (there were about twelve thousand of them), died.
However, the British retreat from the country was temporary. London had no intention of giving up control over its territory. Yes, Afghanistan did not attract the British either as a market for goods or as a source of raw materials, and it was not distinguished by the wealth of India. But its advantageous strategic position at the intersection of trade routes to India, Central Asia, Persia and China, as well as the position of a kind of mentioned buffer on Russia’s route to Central Asia, turned it into an object of close attention of the colonialists.
Eventful 1878
Control over Afghanistan became all the more urgent for London after the Russian embassy, led by Major General N. G. Stoletov, visited Kabul in 1878. Then the Russian-Afghan agreement was not concluded only because of the Berlin Congress. Petersburg did not want to make sudden movements, fearing a repetition of 1853. Unreasonably afraid.
For all the conversations associated with the mentioned congress about the alleged isolation of Russia, the prospects for a new war like the Eastern one, existed only in the imagination of Alexander II - a far from outstanding diplomat, like his father.
What isolation when Paris in St. Petersburg saw the only guarantor of French independence after the defeat of the Second Empire in 1870 and almost repeated - but this time the Third Republic - in 1875. Bismarck certainly would not have fought to please the British.
The fleet of the latter in the Sea of Marmara? And, well, yes, who can argue, he still posed a danger to Russia, if only someone else would explain: what kind?
Austrians? Firstly, there is a myth that they were going to fight with us in 1854 (this has been argued пишет military historian S. Makhov:, secondly, from the mentioned year to 1878 they managed to lose wars, both to the French and the Prussians. And for complete happiness, all they had to do was attack Russia at the instigation of the British.
But, alas, the era of Catherine II and Alexander I became the peak of the Russian Empire in the international arena. Then came an increasing decline. And the following monarchs could not be compared with the great empress and her eldest grandson in terms of diplomatic talent. About the impossibility of repeating the Eastern War in 1878 писал at one time military historian S. Makhov.
But let’s return to Durand’s line, especially since in the eventful year of 1878, the question of the border for the gentlemen from Foggy Albion, who were wiping cold sweat from their foreheads after the barely suppressed sepoy uprising and the almost-fall of Istanbul from a slight push from Skobel’s troops, acquired significant relevance .
On November 9, 1878, the Prime Minister of England, Lord Beaconsfield, wrote the orientalist historian N.A. Halfin, said in the House of Commons that the north-western border of India was “accidental and unscientific” (the passage about “unscientific” is excellent, you must agree – Approx. author) that in this regard measures are being taken “to eliminate such shortcomings”, after which it will not inspire any fears.
After Stoletov’s visit to the Afghan capital, the gentlemen fidgeting nervously in their chairs demanded that the emir accept the same English mission in Kabul. The Emir didn’t exactly refuse. Rather, he avoided a positive answer, citing his inability to ensure the safety of the British - as further events would show, he really could not provide it, which led to the death of the Cavagnari mission in 1879.
But the British saw this as a reason for war and brought in an alleged insult to Victoria by the emir - she was not just anyone, but the Empress of India.
In fact, the reasons for the invasion were much less emotional:
It was the Turkmen oases, the Herat Valley, the territory of East Turkestan and northwestern Afghanistan that lay beyond the Caspian, writes historian N. N. Lisitsyna, that were the strip of land that highlighted the intensity of European politics and, in particular, the Anglo-Russian confrontation.
In 1878, a thirty-five-thousand-strong British army invaded Afghanistan, beginning the second war between the two states. It proceeded with varying degrees of success: the technical superiority of the colonialists was offset by their comparative small numbers, inability to fully ensure communications, the mountainous theater of military operations and command errors. The Afghans even won the Battle of Maiwand in 1880.
However, in the context of "Big game“One cannot but recognize the success of the British, who managed to nullify Russia’s influence in Afghanistan for some time.
And twelve years later, after ending in 1881 (in general, the first attempt to conclude peace was made in 1879 - the Treaty of Gandamak; in fact, after it, the Cavagnari mission was sent to Kabul, but after the uprising in the capital and the death of the British, the war resumed) military action and the Durand Line was drawn. It was the result of an agreement between Emir Abdur Rahman and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Administration of British India, Durand.
As for Russia, having signed a joint Convention with the then great Britain in 1907, it also recognized the line. This hardly met its geopolitical interests, but, I repeat, after Alexander I, Russian diplomacy was not at its best, with the exception of A. M. Gorchakov’s note, as a result of which St. Petersburg refused to comply with the shameful articles of the Treaty of Paris.
The time bomb was the division of Pashtun tribes on both sides of the quasi-border. Moreover, the mine was not only this: the emir handed over the province to the British, thereby depriving himself of access to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean (about this, see: Dhar A.P., Ponka T.I., Dhar P. Op. cit. Their work is available not only at the link below, but also posted online).
Pakistan and Afghanistan: different views on the same line
Accordingly, Islamabad is quite happy with the line as a state border, but Kabul is not. It was not for nothing that Afghanistan was the only country that opposed Pakistan’s membership in the UN, because its consent meant recognition of the legitimacy of the border. The ethnic Pashtun Daoud, who headed the government of Afghanistan from 1953 to 1963, did not agree to this either (by the way, he could well have become for his country what Ataturk was for Turkey).
Furthermore:
Daud in his policy - write A.P. Dhar, T.I. Ponka, P. Dhar - sought to unite the Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line, and he was the first to take a course of defending claims to the territory of the North-Eastern Province of Pakistan, i.e. It was during this period that the province experienced a nationalistic rise of the Pashtuns. During his premiership, the policy of uniting Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line became decisive in Afghanistan's policy towards Pakistan. Under Daoud's rule, Pashtuns held most positions in the government.
In defiance of US-oriented Pakistan, Daoud set a course for rapprochement with the USSR and India (although, of course, not so much in defiance as following the interests of his own country). It did not come to an Afghan-Pakistani war: Islamabad had enough of an armed confrontation with India, a military defeat in East Pakistan, and even against the backdrop of serious economic problems.
Although bilateral relations experienced acute crises in 1950, 1955, 1961–1963, and in a number of cases, Afghan border villages could not avoid airstrikes by the Pakistani Air Force.
All subsequent leaders of Afghanistan also headed for the unification of Pashtun tribes under the auspices of Kabul, which ran counter to the 1893 document. Another thing is the lack of practical steps on the part of Afghanistan to solve the problem.
Later, Pakistani intelligence services fabricated a document about the alleged recognition of the Durand line by Najibullah, although he said the opposite at a Tashkent meeting in 1988 with M. S. Gorbachev.
The Pashtun leader of Afghanistan, Karzai (2004–2014), called the quasi-border
line of hatred that built a wall between two brothers,
and declared, amid a desire to improve relations with Pakistan, that he would never recognize Durand’s brainchild.
Pakistan's position on this issue is clear: Afghanistan must recognize the line as a state border.
Islamabad can be understood, because otherwise
60% of its sovereign territory is in question
(quoted from: Dhar A.P., Ponka T.I., Dhar P. Decree cit.).
Pakistan already had enough historical trauma from the loss of the Eastern Province, which became Bangladesh.
A revision of the Durand Line could hypothetically result in the collapse of the country (another question: in whose hands will the nuclear weapon).
However, such a scenario is unlikely. Modern Pakistan is pursuing a fairly balanced policy to adapt the Pashtun population living on its territory to the “Country of Pure” and improve its standard of living. This process is not designed for immediate results.
And how the installation of a checkpoint by the Taliban, where we started our conversation, will affect him, difficult time will tell. Because a new exacerbation of a long-standing conflict under current conditions can lead to unpredictable consequences.
Использованная литература:
Dhar A.P., Ponka T.I., Dhar P. – The problem of the Durand Line in the context of relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan // International Relations. – 2019. – No. 2. D.
Siidov H. S. M. Elfinston and some problems of the history of the Tajiks of Afghanistan // https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/m-elfinston-i-nekotorye-problemy-istorii-tadzhikov-afganistana
Zholudov M.V. Russophobia in the political activities of Lord Palmerston // https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/rusofobiya-v-politicheskoy-deyatelnosti-lorda-palmerstona
ISIS members vowed to erase the Durand line // http://af.gumilev-center.ru/archives/630
Lisitsyna N.N. Afghan Emir Abdurrahman Khan and Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Middle East // https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/afganskiy-emir-abdurrahman-han-i-anglo-russkoe-sopernichestvo-na- mid-eastern
Mahan A. The influence of sea power on history 1660–1783: Terra Fantastica, St. Petersburg - 2002.
Khalfin N.A. The failure of British aggression in Afghanistan (XIX century - early XX century). M.: Publishing house of socio-economic literature, 1959.
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