Azerbaijan gets good chances for a big breakthrough in Transcaucasia
Since the second half of August, one after another there have been reports about another aggravation of the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, artillery is periodically used, activity is increasing at various international platforms, and there is a series of diplomatic scandals between Yerevan and Moscow.
Numerous sources and media resources are increasingly releasing reviews and comments with openly alarmist content, warning that the aggravation threatens to develop into a military crisis. Azerbaijan is massing troops to Nagorno-Karabakh, and Armenia is moving to its borders.
On the other hand, against all this alarming background, we can read a message from the fairly informed Reuters resource that more than 70% of the text of the peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia has already been agreed upon. But then, what do all other sources testify to, since the text of the agreement is not written by Reuters, but by the diplomatic departments of Yerevan and Baku (although not only there)? Oddly enough, there is no contradiction between these positions.
At first glance, the general outline of the events around Nagorno-Karabakh is clear. However, when they begin to understand the processes in detail, in detail, it turns out that around this small region of Transcaucasia there are so many players and their interests tied in different combinations of nodes that the analysis becomes similar to reading a detective story written in Sumerian cuneiform.
Recently, the American pop diva K. Kardashian (with all her host of fans) added her clay tablet to this cuneiform detective story, asking J. Biden “prevent another genocide" In terms of weight for the domestic American agenda, this sign may mean even more than some diplomatic efforts. But not now - it will be used a little later.
The scandals that have accompanied relations between Moscow and Yerevan over the past week were predictable in principle, although in such processes the exact dates depend on too many circumstances.
They, in fact, finalize the relationship between Moscow and the current government under the leadership of N. Pashinyan. It is appropriate here to quote a paragraph from previous material by the author, which was released at the end of March and is dedicated to the sensational decision of the Constitutional Court of Armenia on the ratification of the so-called. "Rome Statute" of the ICC.
“We cannot simply leave Armenia without agreement with Tehran, but even after the decision of the Constitutional Court of Armenia, the account of our active presence there, if nothing changes, will go “for a while.” We cannot bring the Karabakh clan back to power, time is running out, so it is better to use these few months to seat Tehran and Ankara at the table opposite each other and gradually reduce their direct presence.”
At that time, this was perceived by many as an overly straightforward vision of a position in a confusing stories. Several months have passed, the time that was written about is almost up.
It’s not for nothing that Yerevan has been very actively spreading messages over the last few days that “N. Pashinyan is being removed from power","Moscow secretly transfers Wagner to Armenia", etc. Numbers are quoted from 2,1 thousand to as many as... 12 thousand people.
As part of these narratives, “agents of Moscow’s influence”, the famous pro-Russian blogger Mikael Badalyan and Sputnik Armenia journalist Ashot Gevorkyan, were apparently detained (now released).
On the one hand, with this, supporters of N. Pashinyan’s line, just in case, prevent internal destabilization on the part of pro-Russian forces, on the other hand, even realizing that these are clearly not Moscow’s methods, they add fertilizer to the soil of negotiations with Paris and Brussels, where these messages, naturally , are taken seriously. With this, N. Pashinyan is trying to achieve European and broader Euro-Atlantic security guarantees.
Not least connected with this is the demarche associated with holding exercises with NATO, where what is important is not so much the fact of the exercises (they are not being held for the first time), but how it is presented and against what background.
The Eagle Partner 2023 exercise is being held in Armenia from September 11 to 20 and is aimed at testing
“stabilization of relations between conflicting parties when performing peacekeeping tasks.”
Such is the visit of N. Pashinyan’s wife with humanitarian aid to Kiev for the summit “Mental Health: Resilience and Vulnerability of the Future,” which is held under the patronage of V. Zelensky’s wife, and which periodically brings together the spouses of top officials of a number of states. In this case, the Queen of Sweden, the wives of the leaders of Austria, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Turkey, as well as W. von der Leyen. N. Pashinyan knows what he’s doing—it’s almost impossible to officially undermine such a composition and agenda as purely “anti-Russian.” Or rather, you can dig, but there will be no effect.
Everyone understands everything perfectly, but it’s difficult for the Russian Foreign Ministry to rely on this and somehow formalize it. The answers will come through diplomatic channels of the same type - the mission to Kyiv is humanitarian, the exercises are “peacekeeping”. And Azerbaijan also supplies humanitarian aid to Kyiv. These are not simple moves, but well-calibrated ones.
Russian diplomacy, which traditionally works in the “old-fashioned” style, according to rules that are often difficult to perceive within society, interacting with official Yerevan and N. Pashinyan’s cabinet, constantly encounters such tricks. One can only relatively imagine how much this specific format of relations brings the Foreign Ministry’s traditionalists to a state of white heat. But that’s what it’s all about.
The narratives being promoted by the liberal wing of politics in Yerevan are simple at heart: “Russia supplied weapon It did not help Azerbaijan defend Karabakh in 2020” or “Russia cannot unblock the Lachin corridor, its peacekeepers are useless.”
However, they are quite intricate in terms of specific diplomatic execution, such as the example of NATO exercises or a visit to a summit under the patronage of E. Zelenskaya.
In terms of the peacekeeping mission, our forces generally find themselves in an interesting situation. On the one hand, in winter “civil activists” of Baku block the highway for supposedly environmental reasons, and in the summer they find weapons, as well as armed people, in cars that seem to be coming from Armenia.
All sides talk about provocations, but they come from both sides. In such a situation, it is impossible to fully perform any functions, especially since there is also a mission from the EU working at the same time, which either monitors the humanitarian situation or assesses the quantitative and qualitative composition of the forces and assets of Iran and Russia in the region.
Why was Russia's peacekeeping mission doomed to failure in such a situation? After all, other international peacekeeping contingents in such a situation could not do anything more than “record violations.”
This is true, but they have a sanctions baton sticking out from behind their back. It is this, and not a pistol, which peacekeepers cannot simply take out of a holster, that is the basis, the basis for preventing provocations.
There is no possibility for significant sanctions or willingness to apply them, and such a mission will gradually become a formality, and who will take advantage of it and how is another matter. Next, we should answer the question: were we ready to impose sanctions against one or the other side, especially in conditions when policy is often determined by lobbying resources, albeit under different correct theses for all the good and against all the bad? The answer is obvious.
In theory, it would be possible to use UN sites, making the peacekeeping mission functional at least for careful monitoring, but here it was the alternative “Brussels format” that was critically important to N. Pashinyan. It makes no sense to play on the side of one player if he is playing for a third party at all.
Two factors have been and remain for the continuation of our efforts to “gnaw granite” in Nagorno-Karabakh: the factor of Iran, which is categorically against Baku’s aim to go deeper than Karabakh itself - to the Zanegezur corridor, and the fact that the curtailment of the mission will inevitably affect the attitude towards Russian bases in Armenia. In fact, there is a direct correlation in the current conditions between “peacekeepers and bases”.
The Iranian direction is a priority for Russia today, since full-fledged regional trade is finally unfolding there: an agreement on a large-scale abolition of tariffs and duties is being prepared, a new comprehensive agreement is being prepared, and ruble-rial payments have been launched. All this took a long time and the wheels creaked, but in the end the results are on the way.
Some time ago, in the Russian expert segment, there was a very popular thesis that R. Erdogan, faced with the consequences of an earthquake, inflation, the need to prepare for elections that he “would not be able to handle,” would actually leave his active position on Karabakh, Syria, Libya, even Cyprus and Greece. They say that Turkey needs almost 100 or even 500 billion dollars to stop the crisis, etc.
It is difficult to say what motivated this exceptional optimism. The author has previously published several materials where it was described that the earthquake will only slow down the amplitude of Ankara in these directions, inflation in the context of the specific Turkish model and the strengthening of its European vector will not be a critical problem, Taking into account the regional breakdown, the Turkish president will win the elections with a ratio of votes close to the traditional one.
Accordingly, in the summer Turkey continued to support Baku in terms of military decisions, another thing is that it did not advertise its steps much. Ankara never left an active position even during the difficult spring period.
And on the 4th, Turkish Foreign Minister H. Fidan specially arrived in Tehran to discuss, among other things, the Transcaucasian direction, and Iranian representatives were, according to a number of reports, in Baku during the week, where the vision and plans of the parties on the Karabakh issue were discussed. Considering how tense relations between Iran and Azerbaijan were in the spring and summer, this says too much about the time that has passed.
The fact that N. Pashinyan is, in fact, turning to NATO today suggests that the bet on the “Brussels format” is not justified. Brussels, under pressure from the United States, is preparing the ground for expanding cooperation with Turkey up to a new format of integration, and in this case it would be very strange if right now there was talk of any potential sanctions at all.
Over the summer, the contours of a possible operation by Baku both in Karabakh and beyond became clear, which manifested itself through the parties’ attempts to test the military and diplomatic ground. And, apparently, the set of preliminary actions is considered sufficient there.
Now the most promising operation for Baku looks like an operation in Nagorno-Karabakh to disarm the remaining militia there, with the expectation of a military response (in any form) from the territory of Armenia. Then the answer is "to escalation by Armenia and attacks on the territory of Azerbaijan».
Next, either a limited operation in Armenia with access to a new track of international negotiations, or a sharp strike with the goal of crossing the forty kilometers separating Karabakh from Nakhichevan, again with access to negotiations. And even Baku does not need to “annex” anything - after all, the Zangezur corridor was already part of the package of agreements from 2020, and it is better to work on its implementation from the strongest possible positions.
Russia and the CSTO in this situation will be forced to intervene, and there is no doubt that they will somehow intervene, but Baku’s route is too short not to hope for a quick breakthrough, with access to the diplomatic track after the fact. It was not in vain that Iran held an almost combined-arms army opposite the Armenian border for six months in advance. The so-called is simply too small. Zangezur corridor.
The Azerbaijani troops have (sufficient) experience, and the distances are short, despite the very difficult terrain. Actually, in this negotiating position, Baku, if successful, can finally complete the very 30% of the peace treaty that Reuters mentions. And therefore, there is no contradiction between messages that, on the one hand, speak of an impending crisis, and on the other, emphasize that the peace treaty is already close to finalization.
Iran worked against this scenario for Baku on the one hand, and the reluctance to spoil relations with the EU and the United States on the other. Actually, even now Yerevan will still make attempts to rely on these resources, for which it is already taking demonstrative steps, where the skirmish between M. Zakharova and the Chairman of the National. collections by A. Simonyan is only the tip of the iceberg.
It would be nice for N. Pashinyan to “stay” with the American “peacekeepers”, but the fact of the matter is that for Washington, a much greater result is that even with limited success, Baku, with the maximum possible, is put on edge The issue is not only Armenia’s participation in the CSTO, but also the very presence of Russian military bases there. You can stay as a guest longer, just to observe the development of events.
It is difficult to say how well supporters of N. Pashinyan’s line understand this, because, among other things, Yerevan receives economic benefits primarily from working in the EAEU. By the way, this is constantly mentioned in our Foreign Ministry, and through other official channels, but there is no feeling that the liberal wing in Armenia hears this.
In this situation, it would indeed be logical for Russia, as its “partners” from the United States usually do, to rely on the internal political and social resource in Armenia itself.
But we, on the one hand, do not have sufficient experience for this in cultivating a loyal opposition, although even its presence does not at all guarantee results. On the other hand, while we cling to military bases and past patterns of relations, we really look strange - those narratives that liberals are actively broadcasting in Armenia, it turns out, have some basis.
But this shouldn’t be, it shouldn’t look like this. In theory, taking into account reports of a possible escalation, we should gather the CSTO, prepare for the transfer of additional forces, but we cannot do this without official Yerevan, and when our forces are not there, we will hear from the political wing of N. Pashinyan, as usual , “did not prevent.” Only the moment will be much more acute.
There is an important point in this story - if we at least start a serious discussion about the withdrawal of our forces from Armenia and a preventive review of relations between the EAEU and the CSTO (which in the end we will have to do anyway), this could try, on the contrary, to activate pro-Russian forces in Armenia. Another thing is that this will require the highest class of media training. Although whether there is time left for it is also a question.
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